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PREFACE
Wherever possible in this monograph I have referred to English 
translations of works originally appearing in other languages. Where 
this has not been possible, for example with Russian material, I have 
followed the Library of Congress system of transliteration, but omitted 
the diacritics. I have also retained the conventional use of 'y' for 
the ending of certain Russian proper names (e.g., Trotsky not Trotskii).
In accordance with the policy of using existing English translations, I 
have referred to the Martin Nicolaus translation of Marx's Grundrisse, 
which is relatively faithful to the text. (The Grundrisse, although the 
Dead Sea Scroll of Marxism, bears all tire characteristics of a rough 
draft, characteristics which are preserved in the Nicolaus translation.)
In preparing this work I have received bibliographical assistance 
from Professor Israel Getzler, now of the Hebrew University, and critical 
assistance from Mr Bruce McFarlane of the University of Adelaide and 
especially from my supervisor, Dr Eugene Kamenka of the Australian 
National University. Professor Jean Chesneaux of the Sorbonne has 
provided me with some further insight into the issues during the final 
stages of preparation. My husband Michael has supplied invaluable assist­
ance with the proof-reading and bibliography, and my thanks also go to 
my typist Mrs Cheryl Newman of the Political Science Department, RSSS, 
Australian National University. Unfortunately Gianni Sofri's II modo d.i 
produzione asiatico. Storia di una controversia marxista was not available 
to me at the time of writing.
VABBREVIATIONS
MEGA Marx and Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
ed. D. Rjazanov/V. Adoratskij, Frankfurt/Berlin, 
Marx-Engels-Archiv Verlagsgesellschaft/Ilarx-Engels, 
Verlag, 1927-1932.
Werke Marx and Engels, Werke, 39 vols., 2 supplementary vols., 
Berlin, Dietz, 1956-68.
MESC Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, 2nd ed., 
Moscow, Progress, 1965.
MESW Marx and Engels, Selected Works, 2 vols., Moscow, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951-55.
Capital Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols.,
N.Y., International Publishers, 1967.
Grundrisse Marx, Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of 
Political Economy (Rough Draft), tr. Martin Nicolaus, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973.
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Shlomo 
Avineri, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1969.
The Russian Menace to Europe
Marx and Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, ed. Paul 
W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1953.
N.Y.D.T. New York Daily Tribune.
Ex Libris Ex Libris Marx und Engels; Schicksal und Verzeichnis 
einer Bibliothek, ed. B. Kaiser, Berlin, Dietz, 1967.
Rubel M. Rubel, Bibliographie des Oeuvres de Karl Marx, Paris, 
Marcel Riviere, 1956; Supplement, 1960.
Collected
Works
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1960- (Vol. 40 appeared in 1968) .
Selected
Works
V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, 2 vols., Moscow, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1950-52.
Sochineniia G.V. Plekhanov, Sochineniia, 2nd ed., 24 vols., ed. D. 
Riazanov, Moscow, 1923-27.
History G.V. Plekhanov, Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, 
Parts One and Two, Sochineniia, Vol. XX.
1INTRODUCTION
The p a s t  decad e  h a s  s e e n  a d r a m a t i c  r e v i v a l  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  
A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w i t h i n  M arxism . T h is  h a s  b e e n  one  a s p e c t  o f  
t h e  em erg en ce  o f  p o l y c e n t r i s m ,  and o f  t h e  accom pany ing  a t t e m p t  t o  b r e a k  
down t h e  ' t h e o r e t i c a l  s c l e r o s i s '  in d u c e d  by S t a l i n i s m .  I t  h a s  h a d  f a r -  
r e a c h i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  M a r x i s t  t h e o r y  and p r a c t i c e  -  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  
g iv e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h i s  m onograph c o n te m p o ra ry  r e l e v a n c e  as  w e l l  a s  
h i s t o r i c a l  i n t e r e s t .
The p r e s e n t  work a t t e m p t s  t o  e x p l o r e  i n  some d e t a i l  t h e  o r i g i n ,  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  and c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  M a r x i s t  h i s t o r i o g r a p h y ,  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  as  fou n d  i n  t h e  work o f  Marx and  E n g e ls  
and  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  M a r x i s t  w r i t i n g s .  I n  d o in g  so  i t  h a s  t o  t a k e  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  d im e n s io n s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  w hich  have  l e d  t o  th e  
c o n t r o v e r s i e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  i t  b o t h  i n  t h e  p a s t  and i n  t h e  p r e s e n t .
The i d e a  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c  n a t u r e  o f  A s i a t i c  s o c i e t y ,  a l r e a d y  
p r e s e n t  i n  A r i s t o t l e ,  was d e v e lo p e d  i n  p o l i t i c a l  te rm s  by M o n te s q u ie u ,  
an d  i n  p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c  te rm s  by th e  P h y s i o c r a t s  and  th e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  
e c o n o m i s t s ;  and t h e  i d e a  was t a k e n  o v e r  by Marx i n  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  an 
A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The p r e s e n t  work b e g in s  by t r a c i n g  t h a t  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  and th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  an a s s o c i a t e d  i d e a ,  nam ely  t h e  i d e a  
o f  E u ro p e a n  s u p e r i o r i t y  and  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  E u ro p e an  c i v i l ­
i s a t i o n .  I  a t t e m p t  t o  show t h a t  Marx a l s o  to o k  o v e r  t h e  l a t t e r  i d e a ,  i n  
t h e  fo rm  o f  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  W es te rn  c a p i t a l i s m  was d e s t i n e d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i s e  
i t s e l f  b o t h  c o n c e p t u a l l y  and  c o n c r e t e l y ,  and t o  'o v e rc o m e ' n o n -W e s te m  
fo rm s o f  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .
B e c a u se  t h e  p l a c e  and f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  i d e a s  i n  t h e  t h o u g h t  o f  Marx 
and  E n g e l s  have  b e e n ,  and  a r e ,  a  m a t t e r  o f  d e b a t e ,  t h e  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  
o r i g i n s  o f  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  th e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  f o l l o w e d  by an 
a n a l y s i s  o f  p r e c i s e l y  how Marx and E n g e ls  u s e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  and w h a t  r o l e
2it played in their work. The analysis includes an account of the manner 
in which the concept came to be dropped, for political reasons internal 
and external to the socialist movement, and in the interests of simplifying 
Marxism into a single universal account of human social development.
From there we move on to a study of one of the issues which the 
'Asiatic1 concept raises for historical materialism, namely the issue of 
the role of geographical factors in historical development. This problem 
is inherent in Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, which 
is the only mode of production he explicitly states as being geographically 
circumscribed. The discussion leads on to the conception of alternative 
forms of historical development, determined by specific geographical, 
historical and ethnographic circumstances. Such an approach to Marxist 
historiography, associated with the concept of the Asiatic mode of 
production, is exemplified in a comparatively unknown work by the 'father 
of Russian Marxism', G.V. Plekhanov, The History of Russian Social Thought. 
Hence I analyse in some detail this work, which raises many of the problems 
involved in reconciling Marxism with the idea of the coexistence of 
different lines of historical development. One of those problems concerns 
the role of non-economic factors in the appropriation of surplus value 
in pre-capitalist production, and in providing the general dynamic of 
society. Plekhanov, like Marx, however, saw the coexistence of different 
forms of historical development as being brought to an end by the 
universalising impact of Western capitalism. Trotsky, on the other hand, 
at least in his earlier writings, was to foreshadow more recent Marxist 
theorising allowing for, and even welcoming, non-Western and non-capitalist 
forms of industrialisation. He also foreshadowed recent theories that 
such forms of industrialisation tend to lead to non-Western forms of 
socialism, based on non-Western historical experience combined with modem
industrial technology.
3Thus we come to the crux of the argument presented here: the fact
that human history, on Marx's own account of it, cannot be presented as 
a single sequence of successive stages, each the necessary outcome of its 
predecessor, in accordance with the immanent logic of the development of 
productive forces. As I show, Marx believed that at least three altern­
ative forms of historical development from the primitive community were 
possible, and only one of these, at first sight, contains within it a 
necessary set of subsequent stages. This eliminates, or at least conflicts 
with, the quasi-teleological view of world history often attributed to Marx, 
that world history consisted in a unitary process of development leading 
inevitably to socialism - and to socialism in a form which was the 
culmination of Western European civilisation (reconciling individualism 
with ideals of community, etc), and also universal in both scope and 
content.
The new approach to Marxist historiography, which has been stimulated 
by the revival of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, suggests 
the historical existence of various alternative forms of social production. 
These include forms identified by Marx, such as the classical, feudal and 
Asiatic, but also some not identified by Marx but which appear to incor­
porate sufficient distinctive features to warrant being described as 
separate modes of production - e.g., the tentative models of African and 
Central Asian modes of production.
Furthermore, the new approach to Marxist historiography implies the 
belief that the historical differences which it identifies will not be 
submerged in either universal capitalism or universal socialism, but rather, 
are likely to be preserved both as different roads to socialism and in 
different forms of socialism. This belief is linked with a second 
element in the new Marxist historiography, the abandoning of the rather 
dubious asset of 'historical necessity' and the stress on the role of
4social choice (or revolutionary consciousness) and social struggle in 
bringing socialism into being. The role of revolutionary consciousness is 
not part of the theme of the present monograph, but it is mentioned here 
because, together with the concept of alternative lines of historical 
development, it adds up to the post-Stalinist emphasis in Marxism on the 
openness of history. And it is the compatibility of Marxism with the 
idea of the openness of history which this monograph seeks to establish.
51
THE PREHISTORY OF THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF THE 
ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION
When the Greeks began to categorise political systems more than three 
thousand years ago, they introduced the idea, since recurrent in European 
political thought, of a political system specific to Asia"*" - that of 
Oriental despotism. Despotism has been traditionally considered a 
principle of political organisation foreign to Europe, although European 
rulers have frequently been attacked for attempting to transplant it there 
artifically. The dominance of this type of political organisation in Asia, 
on the other hand, has been explained by European theorists in terms of 
various ethnographic, geographic and historical factors held to be 
specific to the East.
The idea of a typically Eastern politico-economic system fundamentally 
distinct from European forms of social and political development has been 
seriously undermined by twentieth century intellectual developments, by 
the vast increase in the rsinge and complexity of specialised knowledge of 
the countries concerned, and by the search for new categories of social 
organisation which cut across the distinction between East and West.
Nevertheless, one influential form of this idea, that contained in 
the Marxist concept of the Asiatic mode of production has, if anything, 
gone through a remarkable revival in recent years. This situation may at 
first sight seem anomalous, in that Marxism has often been taken to establish 
a universal pattern of development common to all societies, and, indeed, 
in many respects lends itself to such an interpretation. It is necessary 
to look at the reasons that led Marx to incorporate the idea of Asiatic 
particularism into his theory of history, at the way he did so, and at the
 ^ With the usual exception of Japan, once Europe had become acquainted 
with that country.
6impact of such an incorporation on Marxist historiography in general.
The following account is intended to bring out the sources of Marx's 
analysis of non-Westem society, rather than to be an exhaustive descrip­
tion of the cumulative body of belief about Asia on which Marx was 
drawing. In general the account is restricted to those writers who also 
contributed to the development of a systematic model of Oriental society, 
although it includes some description of the political functions the 
concept has served in the past - without which it is impossible to 
understand the emotional overtones which still surround the concept.
The Legacy of Aristotle
The concept of Oriental despotism as Marx encountered it in the
mid-nineteenth century had its original source in Aristotle. It was
Aristotle who systematised the distinction between Western and non-
Western forms of political organisation as observed and polemicised by
the Greeks during the preceding centuries of conflict With the Persians.
In the Politics the distinction is presented as follows:
There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon among the 
barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But this 
is both legal and hereditary. For barbarians being more 
servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than 
Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic government.
Such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the 
people are by nature slaves; but there is no danger of 
their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal.
Wherefore also their guards are such as a king and not such 
as a tyrant would employ, that is to say, they are 
composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are 
mercenaries. ^
Aristotle, Politica, tr. Benjamin Jowett in Vol. X of The Works of 
Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921, reprinted 1946, Book III, Ch. 14, 
§ 1285a.
7According to Aristotle, the form of political organisation found 
among the barbarians (i.e. non-Greek speakers) or Asiatics was notable 
for the fact that the citizens had no rights vis a vis their sovereign, 
but rather were a 'community of slaves'.^ Such a form of government 
differed from the tyrannies known among the Greeks, in that it was the 
rule rather than the exception: it was endowed with legitimacy, enjoyed
the acquiescence of its subjects, and therefore had a stability unknown 
to the tyrannies of the Greeks.
Aristotle's concept of Asiatic government was reintroduced into
European political thought with the translation of the Politics into Latin
in the thirteenth century. New translations and commentaries were to
appear at an increasing rate throughout the subsequent four centuries,
during which time the Politics remained a focal point for study of the
principles and forms of government.
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the concept of despotic
2government was rendered by various forms of the Greek word 'despotes'.
With the rise of humanism, however, in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, such terms were temporarily banished from use as they were
3deemed incompatible with scholarly Latin. Attempts were made to represent 
the concept by a more familiar terminology based on the Latin 'dominus' 
or the French 'seigneur'. These attempts were relatively short-lived, the 
terms 'seigneur' and 'dominus' having the disadvantage of being closely 
associated with Western political forms and indeed with contemporary
Ibid., Book I, Ch. 2, § 1252b. Cf. Hegel's 'general slavery'.
2 Richard Koebner's article, 'Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a
Political Term', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. XIV 
(1951), pp. 275-302, contains an excellent account of the fortunes of the 
term.
3 By the seventeenth century they had made a come-back. See, for example, 
the use by Hobbes of derivatives such as 'despotical'.
8European feudal institutions. If there was one thing that all writers 
on despotism were agreed upon, it was that despotism was not a political 
system native to Europe.
In the fourteenth century the concept of Oriental despotism was
already playing a role in the political controversies current in Europe.
Marsilius of Padua and William of Occam, for example, took pains to
explicate the concept in the course of their attacks on the power of 
2papacy. Thus the Defensor Pads follows Aristotle in attributing the
despotic system of government to Asia and then uses the term, and its
associations, to criticise the attempts of the Popes to exercise unlimited 
3power.
It is in this period that the concept of (Asiatic) despotism becomes
more precisely linked with the absence of private-property rights. This
idea had been implicit in Western thinking about the Asiatic system of
government since classical Greece, for example, in the Greeks' description
of the claims of the Persian kings to absolute lordship over land and water.
However the conceptualisation of the despot presented in the words 'despotes
4potest uti sibi subiectis & bonis eorum ad propriam utilitatem' does not 
seem to appear before the fourteenth century.
From this time onward the absence of private-property rights, or the 
weakly developed nature of these, becomes a standard component of the 
concept of Oriental despotism drawn from Aristotle; the despot is able 
to treat 'des biens des subiects comme des siens' (Bodin). The idea of 
the absence of private-property rights in Asiatic or non-Western society
Whereas 'dominus' was one of the titles of the Roman emperors, 'despotes' 
was one of the titles of the Byzantine emperors, whose political system 
was already seen as more 'Eastern' in tone.
2 William of Occam, Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate (facsimile 
of the 1495-1496 edition of Occam's works), London, Gregg Press, 1962, Pars 
III, Tract. I, Lib. II, Cap. 6; Marsilius of Padua, Defensor P a d s , Discourse 
I, Ch. IX, §4, 5; Ch. XII, §6; Ch. XIV §3, Ch. XVI, §16.
3 Marsilius of Padua, Defensor P a d s , ed. C.W. Previte-Orton, Cambridge U.P., 
1928, Discourse I, Ch. XVI, §16.
4 William of Occam, Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate, op.cit.,
Pars III, Tract. I, Lib. II, Cap. 6, p. CXCIII.
9was soon to be further reinforced by the Western perception of Islamic 
law. According to Western observers, in Islamic countries the title to 
all land was vested in the ruler, or conqueror, and there existed no 
real private property in land.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century the figure of the Turkish 
sultan was beginning to appear as the epitome of the 'Asiatic' despot as 
known from Aristotle.’*' Niccolo Machiavelli, for example, did not make 
any direct comments on Aristotle's concept of Asiatic despotism, but he 
did draw up an interesting distinction between principalities in which 
there existed a hereditary nobility and principalities in which there 
existed only a service nobility. The latter category he felt was 
illustrated by the Persian kingdom of Darius, and in Machiavelli's own 
times by the Turkish empire. Machiavelli described the two types of 
kingship as follows:
...all principalities known to history are governed in one of 
two ways, either by a prince to whom everyone is subservient 
and whose ministers, with his favour and permission, help 
govern, or by a prince and by nobles whose rank is established 
not by favour of the prince but by their ancient lineage.
Such nobles have states and subjects of their own, and these 
acknowledge them as their lords and bear a natural affection 
towards them. In states governed by a prince and his servants, 
the prince has greater authority. For throughout the whole 
country he alone is recognized as being entitled to allegiance; 
anyone else is obeyed as a minister and an official for whom 
no special love is felt.2
Machiavelli's distinction between a function-based elite and a hered­
itary elite was to become an accepted component of the concept of Asiatic 
despotism as received from Aristotle. The feudal opponents of encroaching 
absolutism were to depict the existence of a hereditary nobility as the
The figure of the Persian king had lingered anachronistically up to the 
sixteenth century as the paradigm of the despot, thanks to Aristotle.
2 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. George Bull, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1971, Ch. IV, pp. 44-45.
10
major bulwark against the introduction of an Asiatic type of political 
system, a system that was identified with the barbarian and infidel 
menace to Europe - the Turk.
Other sixteenth-century writers who helped to popularise the identi­
fication of the Sultan of Turkey with Aristotle's Asiatic despot were Loys 
le Roy and Jean Bodin. In the Six Books of the Republic Bodin used not 
only the Turkish empire, but also Muscovy, Tartary, and Ethiopia, as 
contemporary illustrations of Aristotle's concept.'*’
Bodin divides kingship into three main types, largely derived from 
Aristotle, namely royal, tyrannical and 'seigneurial' (despotic). The
royal monarch or king is one who respects the laws of nature and hence
2respects the liberty and property of his subjects. The seigneurial monarch, 
on the other hand, is master of both the persons and the property of his 
subjects.
In his discussion of seigneurial monarchy Bodin describes it as the
first form of government known to man, and comments on the longevity of
this form of political rule. He moves definitely beyond Aristotle in
providing a reason for the development of this form of government which
is more than the flat assertion of the servile character of Asiatics
(although Bodin also indulges in the latter). He wrote that in this type
of monarchy, 'the prince is lord and master of both the possessions and
3persons of his subjects by right of conquest in a just war'. It was its ■ 
origin in just war that differentiated seigneurial monarchy from tyranny, 
and gave it a legitimacy that pure tyranny could not enjoy. Bodin's deriv­
ation of despotism from the right of conquest was to become a standard
Jean Bodin, Les six Livres de la Republique (facsimile of Paris, 1583 
edition), Aalen, Scientia, 1961, Book II, Ch. II, 'De la Monarchie 
Seigneuriale', pp. 270-279. Bodin believed the despotic system to exist 
commonly in Asia and Africa, but in Europe only in Muscovy and the Turkish 
empire. See ibid., p. 274.
2
Ibid., Book II, Ch. Ill, 'De la Monarchie Royale', p. 279.
3 M.J. Tooley's translation, in his abridged edition entitled Six Books 
of the Commonwealth, Oxford, Blackwell, n.d., Book II, Ch. II, pp. 56-57 
(Les six Livres de la Republique, op.cit., p. 273).
11
explanation of the origin of Eastern forms of government in later 
centuries (cf. Richard Jones, infra p. 47) .
Another interesting aspect of Bodin's work is his ambivalence towards 
the concept of Oriental despotism, an ambivalence reflecting his role as 
the first major theorist of the movement towards absolutism in Europe.
In some later protagonists of absolutism this ambivalence was replaced by 
direct admiration for the system of Asiatic despotism. ■*"
Thus Bodin praises the Turkish system of providing non-heritable
2service-lands and privileges for the class of military servitors. ‘ He 
uses the Turkish system as a counter-example to the contemporary system 
of feudal privilege in Europe, though he presents his argument in the form 
of the necessity to return fiefs and feudal lands to their original 
purpose, rather than in the form of the necessity to copy a foreign paradigm. 
Although Bodin approved of the Turkish timariot system, as a French 
provincial lawyer and a good 'bourgeois' possessive individualist he could 
not countenance the further invasion of private property rights which for 
him the Eastern system represented.
Travellers' Tales
While Aristotle's ideas on Asiatic government were still being 
discussed and annotated, the European 'discovery' of the Far East had been 
taking place. By the end of the sixteenth century, the so-called 'Century
Bodin's contemporary, the Muscovite, S. Peresvetov, already far exceeded 
Bodin in his admiration for all aspects of the despotic system as exempli­
fied in the Turkish empire. This might perhaps have been expected if one 
accepted Bodin's account which included Muscovy itself among the despotic 
monarchies. For more discussion on this subject see Ch. IV.
2 Jean Bodin, Les six Livres de la Republiquef op.cit., Book V, Ch. V, 
p. 780.
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of Discovery', a considerable amount of evidence had been accumulated by 
merchants and missionaries concerning these previously semi-fabulous regions. 
The burden of the reports reaching home was that Asia was dominated by 
absolute monarchies. Of these, the kingdoms of Burma, Siam and Cambodia 
were deemed the most absolute, 'the land being entirely the royal domain 
and the tillers of the soil being royal chattels'.'*' In Siam, for example, 
no grants of land were given in perpetuity, so there was no basis for a 
landed aristocracy of the Western sort.
China was seen as the most powerful and influential state in the 
region, though not as the most absolute. The Chinese emperor was regarded 
as sharing his power with a meritocracy, a meritocracy which was recruited 
through a system of state-supported schools which supplied candidates for 
the national system of civil-service examinations. Western observers saw 
the Chinese bureaucracy, thus recruited, as the organising force in the 
country, and they noted that there existed an elaborate system of public 
welfare services.
In general, the literature of the period observes that it is an 
Eastern practice for the state to control key economic activities by means 
of state monopolies, as well as retaining a controlling interest in all 
landed property. A quite different aspect of Eastern society which also 
struck Western observers at this time, in the sixteenth century, was the 
prevalence of religious toleration. While the Asiatic state appeared to 
be more deeply involved in the economic life of its subjects than its 
Western equivalent, it appeared less concerned to regulate minutely their 
religious beliefs.
In the seventeenth century there was a still greater boom in Eastern 
trave1-literature. Produced in popular form, it provided further corrobor­
ative evidence for the concept of Oriental despotism nurtured in the West.
From the composite picture drawn up by Donald Lach in Asia in the Making 
of Europe, Vol. 1 (The Century of Discovery), Book Two, University of 
Chicago Press, 1965, p. 828. The next two paragraphs follow Lach.
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The two travellers of most significance in promoting the further develop­
ment of the concept were Jean-Baptiste Tavernier and Frangois Bernier.
They were to elaborate and provide concrete illustrations of already 
existing notions concerning the absence of private property in land in 
Asia, and of the related notion of the existence of a service-based elite 
as contrasted with a landed hereditary nobility. In the nineteenth 
century, when the absence of private property in land came to be viewed 
as the key to understanding the Oriental system, Tavernier and Bernier 
were cited copiously.
Bernier was a French physician who lived and practised for some years 
at the court of the Great Mogul. His writings included an eloquent 
letter to the French finance minister, Colbert, in which he attributed the 
decline of Asian states to the absence in the East of private property and 
its incentives.  ^ He urged Colbert to preserve France from a similar decline 
a reference to the contemporary rumours that Louis XIV and his minister 
were planning to proclaim all land in France royal property.
Bernier was convinced of the special (i.e. non-Western) character of
the Oriental land-tenure system with its absence of 'strong' property
rights, and he distinguished it carefully from Western feudalism. The
Oriental system was illustrated by the case of Hindostan, where the
sovereign made conditional grants of land to governors and tax farmers,
and of service-land (jaghir) to military men, without surrendering his 
2title to it.
One aspect of Bernier's work, which was to be developed more 'scient­
ifically' two centuries later by the British political economists, in 
particular by Richard Jones, was his account of the barriers the Oriental 
system posed to the development of manufacture. He provided a vivid picture
 ^ Frangois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, A.D. 1656-1668, London, 
Constable, 1891, pp. 200-238.
2
Ibid., pp. 224-225. The jaghir was the equivalent of the Turkish timar, 
discussed by Bodin.
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of the 'moving cities of Hindostan' made up of artisans who perforce had
to follow the prince, on whose arbitrary will they were dependent for a
living.^ Artisangsuffered from this complete dependence on the
revenue centrally distributed by the sovereign and his servants. The
security which would have been provided by a middle-class market was
2completely lacking in the East, Bernier reported. Richard Jones, as we
will see was to build on Bernier's observations in order to draw a more
general theoretical comparison between the categories of wages paid from
revenue and the category of wages paid from capital. Jones was also to
employ Bernier's description of the Oriental city to illustrate the
differences in development between the Eastern and Western city, and the
consequences of this difference for the growth of industry.
Tavernier's travel books likewise enjoyed great popularity, both in
the seventeenth century and later. With Bernier's work, they helped to
reinforce the belief that absence of private property in land was an
integral feature of 'Oriental despotism'. Tavernier wrote:
In the territories of this Prince [the Great Mogul], the nobles 
are but Royal Receivers, who render account of the revenues 
to the Governors of Provinces, and they to the Treasurers 
General and Ministers of Finance, so that this grand King of 
India, whose territories are so rich, fertile and populous 
has no power near him equal to his own.* 23
This passage also brings out the structural characteristic noted by Machia-
velli and which had since become a generally accepted feature of the
popular Western model of Oriental society - the absence of loci of
power independent of the king himself.
Another popular work of the seventeenth century was Pierre Bergeron's
'Relation des Voyages en Tartarie ...' which applied the concept of Oriental
Ibid., p. 200.
2 Ibid., p. 256.
3 Jean Baptiste Tavernier (Baron d'Aubonne), Travels in India (a trans­
lation from his Les six voyages, 1676), 2 vols., London, Macmillan, 1889, 
Vol. I, p. 324.
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despotism to Tartary. Bergeron echoes vividly Bodin's definition of the 
'seigneurial monarch' (despot) in recording that in Tartary: 'Everything
belongs to the Emperor to such an extent that there is nobody who can, 
or dares to, say that this or that is his, but everything is the Emperor's'.^
Oriental Despotism and French Politics3 The First Phase: A negative
Model for Europe
It was in France in particular that the concept of Oriental despotism 
flourished at this time as a political slogan, nurtured on the one hand 
by the contemporary Türkenfurcht, and on the other hand by the continued 
strengthening of the central power. In this first phase it was employed 
by the feudal party to discredit the supporters of absolutism by identi­
fying them with the infidel Turks and otherwise inferior Asiatics.
As the development of French absolutism reached its peak under Mazarin 
and Louis XIV a vigorous pamphlet literature appeared in which the French 
monarchy was likened to the despotic kingdoms of the East or to the 
Turkish sultanate - as the prime example of a monarchy not tempered by 
aristocracy. The allusions made by his critics were strengthened by Louis 
the Fourteenth's own claims that as representative of the state he was
master of both his subjects and all their goods, and that the state was
2sole proprietor of the land. He could hardly have fitted himself more
'Tout appartient tellement h cet Empereur, qu'il n'y a personne qui puisse 
ou ose dire cecy ou cela estre a soy, mais tout est a 1'Empereur'. Pierre 
Bergeron, Relation des Voyages en Tartarie, plus un traicte des Tartares ...', 
Paris, 1634, p. 356, quoted in Geoffroy Atkinson, The Extraordinary Voyage 
in French Literature, 2 vols., N.Y., Burt Franklin, 1965, Vol. 1 "Before 
1700", p. 121.
2 See Sven Stelling-Michaud, 'Le mythe du despotisme oriental', Schweizer 
Beiträge zur allgemeinen Geschichte, 1960-1961, pp. 332-336. For Louis the 
Fourteenth's claim to dispose freely and fully over the property of his 
subjects see Louis XIV, Memoires ... pour l1instruction du Dauphin, ed. C. 
Dreyss, Paris, 1860, Vol. II, pp. 120-121. This claim was more than simply 
the dominium over property and land traditionally exercised by Western kings.
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neatly into the classical definition of the Asiatic despot.
In order to describe adequately the policies of Mazarin and Louis XIV, 
various forms of the Greek term 'despotes' came to be revived in France, 
after their temporary eclipse by forms of the term 'seigneur', which had 
been used to denote the same concept. A neologism which made its first 
appearance at the very end of the seventeenth century was the word 'despot­
ism' itself. Etymologically 'despotism' was the first of the great political 
'isms' that have besieged modem language. (Religious 'isms', on the other 
hand, had long been accommodated into both Latin and vernacular.)
The first important political work in which the actual word 'despotism' 
(i.e. the French 'despotisme') appears is Pierre Bayle's Reponse aux 
Questions d'un Provincial of 1703.  ^ In his two chapters entitled 'Du 
Despotisme' Bayle was replying to a French disciple of Hobbes, named
2Sorbihre, who had written in favour of absolute or despotic monarchy.
Sorbifere had put forward as examples of good government the absolute empires 
of Asia, in particular the Ottoman Empire. He had contrasted the peace 
and prosperity of these empires with the turbulence and insecurity arising 
in the West from the existence of political liberty, or counterpoises to 
sovereign power. Bayle, in his reply, defended the 'Western' system, which 
for him meant the existence of traditional liberties and institutionalised 
checks on the crown.
The greatest of those political writers who employed the concept of 
Oriental despotism as a weapon against absolutism in France was undoubtedly 
Montesquieu. All subsequent writers on the subject of Oriental despotism 
were to relate themselves to Montesquieu, whether to affirm or deny his 
general propositions. Inspired by his dislike of the development towards
 ^ See Pierre Bayle, Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial, Chapters LXIV 
and LXV, in Oeuvres Diverses, Vol. 3, Hildesheim, Georg 01ms, 1966, pp. 620- 
628.
2 Hobbes himself did not contribute to the development of the concept of 
Oriental despotism, though the idea of the 'Dominion Despotical' is central 
to his work. What Hobbes did was to universalise the idea, and also give it 
a contract basis, so that it had no particular reference to an Asian system 
of government.
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absolutism in his time, Montesquieu drew up a vast critique of despotism, 
as the illustration of what must occur when a system of checks and balances 
to central power is lacking. The form of government which Montesquieu 
personally favoured was the monarchy, but a monarchy in which sovereignty 
was tempered by the existence of intermediary bodies. He wished to see 
in France the retention of the feudal monarchy, in which the central power 
was held in check by the independent power of the nobility. Should the 
power of the feudal nobility continue to be whittled away, Montesquieu 
believed that one would arrive at despotism - a system which thrived 
where the political scenery consisted only in the king on the one hand, and 
an atomised mass of social nothings on the other.
In De 1'esprit des lcis, Montesquieu's model of despotism became, 
as in the writing of previous European political theorists,the form of 
government empirically existing in Asia, 'that part of the world where 
absolute power is to some measure naturalized ...'^ Montesquieu's picture 
of Asiatic government was put together somewhat imaginatively from the 
contemporary travel and missionary literature available to him. His model 
of Oriental despotism was intended as a negative example for home consump­
tion, rather than as a systematic explanation of the principles of Asiatic 
government. Nonetheless the broad sweep of his comparative political 
theory was powerful enough to guarantee his lasting influence in this area. 
[See, for example, Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism, which was to depend heavily 
on the polarity between the multicentred 'free' societies of the West, 
and the unicentred, potentially totalitarian societies of the East.]
The method of Montesquieu's analysis, in particular his use of geo­
graphical environment as a major explanatory variable,was also to exercise 
lasting influence. The geographical factor which Montesquieu regarded as
Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of Laws, tr. Thomas Nugent, 2 vols., London, Colonial Press, 1900, 
Vol. 1, Book V, Ch. 14, p. 61.
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having the most impact on the character of political systems was extens­
iveness of the natural unit of territory. Despotism was the political 
correlate of large land empires. These, in turn, were native to Asia
because of the lack of natural barriers in the shape of mountains and 
1seas.
On the correlation between despotism and extensiveness of territory 
Montesquieu wrote as follows:
A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person 
who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the 
prince's resolutions should supply the distance of the 
places they are sent to; that fear should prevent the 
remissness of the distant governor or magistrate; that the 
law should be derived from a single person, and should 
shift continually, according to the accidents which incess­
antly multiply in a state in proportion to its extent.2
This argument appealed to Catherine the Great so much that she
reproduced it exactly in her own Instructions to the Commissioners for
Composing a New Code of Laws. Having described the magnitude of Russian
territorial possessions, she wrote that:
The Extent of the Dominion requires an absolute Power 
to be vested in that Person who rules over it. It is 
expedient so to be, that the quick Dispatch of Affairs, 
sent from distant Parts, might make ample Amends for 
the Delay occasioned by the great Distance of the Places.
To emphasise her point she added:
Every other Form of Government whatsoever would not 
only have been prejudicial to Russia, but would even 
have proved its entire Ruin.4
Ibid., Book XVII, Ch. 6, p. 269.
2
Ibid., Book VIII, Ch. 19, p. 122. This argument had appeared in the 
popular work by Sir Paul Rycaut, entitled The Present State of the Ottoman 
Empire, which is used extensively by Montesquieu. This work had survived 
the Great Fire of London (in which according to Pepys most of the first 
edition was lost) to go into many editions, including French, German and 
Italian.
3 Catherine the Great, The Instructions to the Commissioners for Composing 
a New Code of Laws (1767), in Documents of Catherine the Great, ed. W.F. 
Reddaway, Cambridge U.P., 1931, Ch. 11, §10, p. 216.
4 Ibid., Ch. 11, §11, p. 216.
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A second geographical factor which Montesquieu considered as having 
an important impact on political systems was that of climate. Asia was 
divided into extremes of heat and cold, and lacked a temperate zone such 
as found in Europe. The cold regions gave rise to strong nations which 
easily conquered the enervated nations of the South and reduced them to 
political slavery.'*'
As we have mentioned, Montesquieu's ideas concerning the relation­
ship between Asiatic geography and Asiatic despotism were to exercise 
great influence in succeeding centuries, particularly in Germany. The 
correlation of physical geography and social institutions was however to 
receive its most direct statement in the widely-read work of Marx's 
contemporary, the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle. According to 
Buckle, the political destiny of Asia was determined by the fact that
the lavishness of nature with regard to soil, climate and food led invari-
2ably to overpopulation, a depressed labour market, slavery and despotism.
Non-geographical factors which Montesquieu regarded as also having
an important impact on political systems were those of religion and laws.
The Islamic religion, for example, greatly encouraged the veneration of 
3the prince. In India, the laws 'which give the lands to the prince, and
destroy the spirit of property among the subjects, increase the bad effects
4of climate, that is, their natural indolence'.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, op.cit., Vol. I, Book XVII, Ch. 3, p. 
266. In Europe, on the contrary, nations of nearly equal strength 
contended with each other.
2 Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilisation in England, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
London, Parker, 1858, Ch. Two, pp. 36-137.
3 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, op.cit., Vol. I, Book V, Ch. 14, p. 59.
4
Ibid., Book XIV, Ch. 6, p. 226. Montesquieu did not regard the absence 
of private property in land as one of the defining characteristics of 
despotism, but rather, as an optional extra. He wrote: 'Of all despotic
governments there is none that labors more under its own weight than that 
wherein the prince declares himself proprietor of all the lands, and heir 
to all his subjects'. {Ibid., Book V, Ch. 14, p. 59.) Montesquieu defined 
despotism in terms of its power structure, the existence of a single centre, 
operating with equal force on all parts of the organism.
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Religion could, on the other hand, counteract the influence of 
geographical factors which would otherwise given rise to a despotic 
system:
It is the Christian religion that, in spite of the extent 
of the empire and the influence of the climate, has 
hindered despotic power from being established in 
Ethiopia, and has carried into the heart of Africa the 
manners and laws of Europe.1
In defending the continuance of feudal restraints on central power,
Montesquieu was careful to deny the analogy drawn by some previous writers
(such as Bodin) between the early period of French feudalism and the
Eastern system of distributing property as service land. He wrote:
If at a time when the fiefs were precarious, all the 
lands of the kingdom had been fiefs, or dependencies 
of fiefs; and all the men in the kingdom vassals or 
bondmen subordinate to vassals; as the person that 
has property is ever possessed of power, the king, who 
would have continually disposed of the fiefs, that is, 
of the only property then existing, would have had a 
power as arbitrary as that of the Sultan is in Turkey; 
which is contradictory to all history.^
That is to say, the later system of feudal diffusion of power was in
no way a distortion of the original system of central control of the fiefs.
Throughout the eighteenth century one important stream of writers was
to follow Montesquieu in employing Oriental despotism as a negative model
for Europe, the epitome of all that was to be avoided at home. One of the
earliest of these was Helvetius, who agreed with Montesquieu's use of the
concept as a means to attack native French absolutism, but disagreed with
the alternatives to absolutism put forward by Montesquieu. VJhere Montesquieu
wished to preserve aristocratic privilege as a counterbalance to the
monarchy, Helvetius wished to initiate a limited and secular monarchy,
Ibid., Vol. II, Book XXIV, Ch. 3, p. 29. Perhaps to some extent written 
with tongue in cheek, considering the satirical portrait of the form of 
Christianity assumed in Ethiopia which Montesquieu put into his Spicilege.
2
Ibid., Vol. II, Book XXX, Ch. 5, p. 174.
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uncluttered by such a multiplication of petty despotisms. It is in
Helvetius' De 1'esprit (1758) that the phrase 'Oriental despotism' appears,
2probably for the first time. Helvetius rejected Montesquieu's geograph­
ical determinism and argued instead that it was the progress of civil­
isation itself that led inevitably to a degeneration into despotism; as 
the nations of Asia were organised into society earlier than those of
3Europe they had also reached the despotic stage of development earlier.
Although Helvetius employed the term 'Oriental despotism', it
probably only came into general use with the publication in 1761 of a work
by Nicolas Boulanger entitled Recherches sur 1'origine du despotisme 
4oriental. This book was published after Boulanger's death by Holbach,
who was himself influenced by its contents. John Wilkes published his
own English translation in London, in 1764.
Boulanger also used the concept of Oriental despotism as a negative
example for home consumption. His book is an interesting account of the
'irrational' sources of political power, and of the ways in which charisma
comes to be institutionalised in political systems. He argued that the
despotic systems of the East were a hangover from the period of human
5history when the rule of theocracy was general. Theocracy had originally 
arisen out of the disappointed millenialism of the Hebrews. Men compensated
See the letter written by Helvetius to Montesquieu in 1747, after reading 
the manuscript of De 1'esprit des lois, quoted in Sven Stelling-Michaud,
'Le mythe du despotisme oriental', loc.cit., p. 343.
2 See, for example, Helvetius, De 1'esprit, Discours Troisieme, Oeuvres,
Paris, Briand, 1794, Vol. II, Ch. XVII, p. 89; Ch. XXII, p. 121; Ch. XXIX, 
pp. 172, 174. Helvetius also used the term 'Asiatic despotism'. See, for 
example, his A treatise on man, tr. W. Hooper, N.Y.,Burt Franklin, 1969,
Vol. I, p. viii.
3 vHelvetius, De 1'esprit, Discours Troisieme, Oeuvres, op.cit., Vol. II,
Ch. XXIX, p. 174.
4 There does not appear to be any basis for Joseph Needham's remark that 
the phrase 'despotism', as applied to China, originates with Quesnay, 
whose work appeared much later. (See Needham's review of K.A. Wittfogel's 
Oriental Despotism, Science and Society, Vol. 23 (1959), p. 61.)
5 Cf. Turgot, Condorcet, and Voltaire in his The Philosophy of History,
(first published London, 1766), London, Vision Press, 1965. Voltaire, however, 
believed that the Chinese were the first to transcend this rule of theocracy, 
because although their histories extended further back in time than that of
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for the non-arrival of the millennium by attributing to their worldly rulers 
supernatural powers. The fact that political power became surrounded by 
superstition led to all sorts of excesses, and to the general exploitation 
of the irrational by the rulers.
In the West men eventually began to assert their own (rational) 
nature, i.e., the autonomy of reason^ and to a large extent abandoned this 
mystical political form. Boulanger was unclear as to just why this same 
development did not take place in the East. He acknowledged the relevance 
of Montesquieu's climatic argument but regarded it as insufficient 
explanation.
The purpose of Boulanger's account of Oriental despotism was to plead
the cause of completely rational monarchy in Europe, based on the human
and natural laws uncovered by the progress of reason. Republicanism was
no longer suitable for modern states with their great size (an echo of
Montesquieu), so the desirable antithesis to the Oriental despot was the
1philosophically instructed monarch.
The type of argument put forward by Boulanger became much more popular
in the nineteenth century, when India rather them China had become the
2prime reference point for the model of Oriental despotism. The passivity 
and submissiveness towards the 'supernatural' (including temporal power) 
supposedly inculcated by eastern religions then became a popular explanation 
for Asiatic despotism. For example, Lieut.-Col. Wilks, one of Marx's
any other people, they 'do not refer to those savage times when it was 
necessary for men to be cheated in order to be guided.' (Ibid., p. 83.)
 ^ Nicolas Antoine Boulanger, Recherches sur 1'origine du despotisme oriental, 
in Oeuvres de Boullanger (sic), 8 vols., Paris, Jean Servieres and Jean- 
Frangois Bastien, 1792-1793, Vol. IV, 1792, pp. 236-237. A similar attempt 
to use the Oriental example as a warning to the contemporary French monarchy 
to reform itself is to be found in the Essai sur le despotisme of Mirabeau 
(2nd ed., London, 1776). Mirabeau urged the monarch not to indulge in 
despotism, because this would bring on France the weakness it had brought 
on Turkey, Persia and Mogul India.
2 Boulanger himself had been swimming against the tide of eighteenth century 
thought in applying his concept of the politics of irrationalism to China.
He conceded to the Jesuits that natural law might set the tone at the begin­
ning of each dynasty in China. Thereafter, however, the hidden vices of the 
system were bound to re-emerge. (Recherches sur V  origine du despotisme 
oriental, loc.cit., p. 222.)
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sources on India, was also to raise Montesquieu's climatic explanation 
only to dismiss it,^ ' and to write that: 'The shackles imposed on the
human mind by the union of the divine and human code [including political, 
civil and criminal codes] have been stated as the efficient causes of 
despotism . ..'* 2
Meanwhile, the concept of Oriental despotism had been undergoing 
a metamorphosis, and in eighteenth-century France it emerged for the first 
time as a positive model, held up for the instruction of the West in 
rational government.
Oriental Despotism and French Politics 3 The Second Phase: A Positive
Model for Europe
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Jesuit missionaries 
in China had done much to create a more flattering image of the Orient 
than that which had prevailed in Europe prior to the seventeenth century.
It was largely owing to the information provided by the Jesuits and other 
missionaries that the concept of Oriental despotism came to be used by one 
faction of French political life in the eighteenth century as a positive, 
rather than a negative model for Europe. This faction,as we shall see, 
sought the strengthening and rationalisation of central government at the 
expense of feudal powers, and in the process of their propaganda campaign, 
fused models of enlightened despotism and of Oriental despotism.
One of the most influential examples of the Jesuit literature produced 
in this period, and one which in fact was utilised by both the proponents 
and opponents of despotism, was the Description geographique, historique, 
chronologique, politique et physique de 1'Empire de la Chine et de la
Lieut.-Col. Mark Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South of India, 3 
vols., London, Longman, 1810-1817, Vol. 1, p. 22.
2 Ibid., p. 29. Marx quotes from this work in Capital, Vol. I, pp. 357-358.
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T a r t a r i e  c h i n o i s e , by  P e r e  J e a n - B a p t i s t e  du H a ld e .  T h is  work e n jo y e d  th e
h o n o u r  o f  b e i n g  t r a n s l a t e d  from  t h e  o r i g i n a l  F re n c h  i n t o  E n g l i s h ,  German,
2
and R u s s ia n ;  o f  b e i n g  m is q u o te d  by M o n te sq u ie u ;  and  f i n a l l y ,  o f
b e in g  a c c la im e d  i n  t h e  D i c t i o n n a i r e  de B i o g r a p h i e  F r a n ^ a i s e  a s  h a v in g
e x e r c i s e d  on th e  h i s t o r y  o f  i d e a s  i n  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n tu r y  1 2*456une i n f l u e n c e
3
d o n t  on n ' a  p a s  f i n i  de m e s u r e r  l e  r e t e n t i s s e m e n t ' .
The work i t s e l f  c o n s i s t e d  i n  a c o l l a t i o n  o f  a  mass o f  m a t e r i a l  s e n t  
t o  P a r i s  from  members o f  t h e  O rd e r  who w ere  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  I t  i n c l u d e d  
c h a p t e r s  on e d u c a t i o n ,  t h e  e x a m in a t io n  s y s te m ,  and th e  s y s te m  o f  g o v e rn m e n t .  
C o n c e rn in g  th e  l a t t e r ,  du H alde  w r o te :  'T h e r e  i s  no m onarchy  more a b s o l u t e
4
th a n  t h a t  o f  C h i n a ' . The outcom e o f  t h i s  was a  happy  o n e ,  ho w e v e r ,  as 
'n o  P e o p le  i n  t h e  w o r ld  have  b e t t e r  [Laws o f  G o v e r n m e n t ] ' . ^  These  law s 
w ere  i n t e r p r e t e d  and  a d m i n i s t e r e d  by men o f  t h e  h i g h e s t  m e r i t ;  p o s i t i o n  
i n  C h in e s e  s o c i e t y  and g o v e rn m en t  b e in g  d e p e n d e n t  n o t  on b i r t h  b u t  on
g
a b i l i t y .  The Em peror e x e r c i s e d  u l t i m a t e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  p r o p e r t y ,  th ro u g h  
t a x a t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r o s p e r i t y  as t h e  t a x  re v e n u e  
was u s e d  t o  p r o v id e  w e l f a r e  s e r v i c e s ,  p u b l i c  b u i l d i n g s ,  s a l a r i e s  f o r  t h e
m a n d a r in s ,  e t c . 7
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Above a l l ,  du H a lde  saw i n  t h e  C h in e s e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m  t h a t  g r e a t
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  v i r t u e  o f  s t a b i l i t y . He w r o te :
C h ina  h a s  t h i s  A dvan tage  o v e r  a l l  o t h e r  N a t i o n s ,  t h a t  f o r  
4 ,0 0 0  Y e a r s ,  and u p w ard s ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  g o v e rn e d  a lm o s t  w i t h o u t  
I n t e r r u p t i o n ,  by i t s  own n a t i v e  P r i n c e s ,  and  w i t h  l i t t l e  D ev i­
a t i o n ,  e i t h e r  i n  A t t i r e ,  M o ra ls ,  Laws, C ustom s, o r  M anners , 
from  t h e  w is e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  i t s  f i r s t  L e g i s l a t o r s . ^
F i r s t  p u b l i s h e d  i n  P a r i s ,  1735, i n  f o u r  v o l s .
2
M o n te s q u ie u  q u o te s  du  H alde  as  s a y in g  * I t  i s  t h e  c u d g e l  (b a to n )  t h a t  
g o v e rn s  C h i n a ' .  {The S p i r i t  o f  L a w s . ,  o p . c i t . ,  Book V I I I ,  Ch. 21 , p .  123; 
s e e  a l s o  Book XVII, Ch. 5, p .  2 6 8 . )  No su c h  s t a t e m e n t  i n  f a c t  a p p e a r s  i n  
du H a l d e ' s  b ook .
E n t r y  u n d e r  J e a n - B a p t i s t e  du H alde  i n  t h e  
Franq^a i se .
4
J . - B .  du H a ld e ,  H i s t o r y  o f  Ch ina ,  London,
5
I b i d . ,  V o l . I l l ,  p .  60 .
6 I b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p p .  9 9 -1 0 8 .
7 I b i d . ,  p .  22 .
D i c t i o n n a i r e  de B i o g r a p h i e  
W a t t s ,  1841 , V o l .  I I ,  p .  12 .
I b i d . ,  p .  1 .8
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Works such as that of du Halde became the fuel for the eighteenth- 
century vogue of sinophilia, which in France became a veritable sinomania.^ 
This vogue was more than just a demonstration of enlightenment cosmopolitan­
ism. It was part of the intellectual campaign against feudal prejudice 
at home, in favour of a ’modern' state, administered by a rational bureau­
cracy.
The mandarinate and examination system, for example, were of parti­
cular interest to enlightenment figures in arms against the old forms of 
government based on ascriptive principles. This interest was finally 
transformed into practical policy in the nineteenth century, when the 
'Chinese' system of recruitment to the civil service through examination 
was generally adopted in Europe. The system of state schools admired by 
Western observers of China in the eighteenth century was also eventually 
transplanted to Europe.
China was credited by missionary observers with having a political 
system that was both rational and based on natural law in spite of the 
absence of the Christian religion. Society was sustained through a practical 
morality that was inculcated through the legal system, without the benefit 
of revealed religion - a claim that in other hands became useful ammunition 
in the struggle for religious toleration.
French sinomania reached its height with figures such as Voltaire and 
the Philosophes (with the notable exceptions of Diderot and Rousseau). It 
was revived towards the last quarter of the century by the Physiocrats.
The significance of the Physiocrats was that they saw in China a positive 
model for France, not only in its political aspects, but also in its 
economic aspect.
The Physiocrats were advocates of what they termed 'legal despotism'
in France. What they meant by the term legal despotism was aptly defined
1 For the most comprehensive account of this aspect of French thought in the 
eighteenth century see Basil Guy, 'The French image of China before and after 
Voltaire', Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 21 (1963), 
pp. 1-468. Henri Cordier's Bibliotheca Sinica (2nd ed., Paris, Guilmoto, 5 
vols., 1904-1924) is still indispensable for the bibliographical details of 
this period of Western writing on China.
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by one of their number, Le Mercier de la Riviere. He decribed Euclid as
the epitome of the legal despot; his laws rightly had absolute authority
because they were backed by the irresistable force of the evidence, or,
in other words, because of their obvious congruence with natural laws."*"
In the same way, governments should wield absolute power in order to up-
2hold the laws of nature relating to society (i.e. economic lav/s) .
The major tenet of the Physiocrats was that the source of all value 
lay in agricultural production, or land made fertile by labour. Hence 
they believed that taxation should be limited to a direct tax on agricul­
tural production, payable by the proprietor to whom the surplus accrued 
3in rent. The revenue thus obtained should be used by the government to
provide the general conditions for agriculture.
Where the government was co-proprietor of the 'net product' through
its share of the agricultural surplus it would have a natural interest in
encouraging productivity. Per contra, any other form of taxation, tolls,
or internal barriers to trade served only to upset the natural laws of
the economy, and was detrimental to the prosperity of the nation.
4As was noted by Marx himself, the intellectual position of the 
Physiocrats was complex: objectively they sought the removal of obstacles
from the path of capitalist production, but they did this in the name of 
beliefs about land as the only source of value. 'The bourgeois glorify
La Mercier de la Riviere, L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des societes 
politiques, London & Paris, 1767, facsimile ed., Paris, P. Geuthner, 1910, 
Ch. 24. For further explanations of the concept see Dupont de Nemours in 
Ephemerides du citoyen, Vol. XII (1767), pp. 188-204, and in de l'Origine 
et des progres d'une science nouvelle, London, 1768.
2 Francois Quesnay, Despotism in China, comprising Vol., 2 (bound together 
with Vol. 1) of Lewis A. Maverick, China: A model for Europe, San Antonio,
Texas, P. Anderson, 1946, p. 225.
3 The Physiocrats anticipated the'iron law' of wages, whereby competition 
forces wages down to the minimum level necessary to maintain the existence 
of the labourer. For this reason, the Physiocrats argued, tax could not 
be deducted from the wages of farm-labourers without making them a burden 
on their employers.
4 Marx, [Private Property and Labour], Early Writings, ed. T.B. Bottomore, 
London, Watts, 1963, pp. 149-150.
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f e u d a l i s m  i n  t h e o r y  . . .  o n ly  i n  o r d e r  t o  r u i n  i t  i n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e . *
2
They w ere  t h e  ' f a t h e r s  o f  modern e c o n o m i c s ' ,  i n  t h a t  t h e y  made v a lu e  a 
f u n c t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  r a t h e r  t h a n  an i n t r i n s i c  p r o p e r t y ,  b u t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  v a lu e  c o u ld  be  c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e .  The k i n d  
o f  t a x a t i o n  s y s te m  a d v o c a t e d  by  t h e  P h y s i o c r a t s  w ou ld  h a v e  a i d e d ,  and 
i n d e e d  p a r t l y  a ssum ed , t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  
ad v o c ac y  was c o u p le d  w i t h  an  a d m i r a t i o n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p a t r i a r c h a l i s m .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  t h e  P h y s i o c r a t s  u s e d  as  a  medium f o r  t h e i r  eco n o m ico ­
p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  a  m odel drawn from  a  c o u n t r y  w h ich  c o u ld  n o t  b e  d e s c r i b e d
as e i t h e r  c a p i t a l i s t  o r  f e u d a l  i n  any W e s te rn  s e n s e .  C h in a  was t h e  i l l u -
3
s t r a t i o n  and  p r o o f  o f  P h y s i o c r a t i c  t h e o r i e s .  Thus Q u esn ay , t h e  c r e a t o r
4
o f  t h e  P h y s i o c r a t i c  s c h o o l ,  i n  h i s  D e s p o t i s m  i n  China  ( p u b l i s h e d  i n  1 7 6 7 ) r 
a rg u e d  t h a t  C h ina  was a u n i q u e l y  we1 1 - r e g u l a t e d  and  w e a l th y  s t a t e ,  and 
t h a t  t h i s  was b e c a u s e  t h e  C h in e s e  economy was s o u n d ly  b a s e d  on t h e  s i n g l e ­
t a x  s y s te m .  The r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  C h in e s e  h a d  b e e n  a b l e  t o  a c h ie v e  su c h  
an  e x e m p la ry  econom ic  s y s te m  was t h a t  i n  C h in a  t h e  s tu d y  o f  n a t u r a l  lav;
was t h e  ' p r i n c i p a l  aim  o f  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  and  o f  t h e  s c h o l a r s  e n t r u s t e d  by
5
him w i t h  t h e  d e t a i l e d  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t . ' G overnm en t,  and 
t h e  g e n e r a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  economy, was i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h o s e  d e d i c a t e d  
t o  t h e  em ployment o f  r e a s o n  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  a p u r e l y  h e r e d i t a r y  n o b i l i t y )  
and  h e n c e  C hina  was b l e s s e d  w i t h  a  s t a b i l i t y  and p r o s p e r i t y  unknown i n  
F r a n c e .
In  one P h y s i o c r a t i c  w ork , 'C h i n a '  was s p e c i f i c a l l y  p u t  f o rw a r d  a s  a
G r u n d r i s s e , p .  329.
I b i d . ,  p .  328.
3
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  p r e c i s e  r o l e  w h ich  W e s te rn  a c c o u n t s  o f  
C h ina  p l a y e d  i n  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  P h y s i o c r a t i c  econom ic  t h e o r y .  P i e r r e  l e  
P o i v r e  h a d  g iv e n  a r e c e n t  a d d r e s s  b e f o r e  t h e  Academy a t  P a r i s  on  t h e  f l o u r -
i s h i n g  s t a t e  o f  a g r i c u J t u j e J ^  „ C ^ a  ,r e s u l t , i g g „  a t t e n t i y ^ e s s  _
t h e  g o v e rn m e n ts  A l r e a d y  i n  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  F e rn a n d e z  N a v a r r e t e  and  
P e r e  L o u is  l e  Comte h a d  p r a i s e d  t h e  C h in e s e  s y s te m  o f  t a x a t i o n ,  and 
N a v a r r e t e  h a d  u r g e d  E u ro p e a n  g o v e rn m e n ts  t o  i m i t a t e  t h e  C h in e s e  i n  t h e i r  
c a r e  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r e .
4
P u b l i s h e d  s e r i a l l y  i n  Ephemeri d e s  du c i t o y e n ,  M arch , A p r i l ,  May and 
J u n e  1767. ,u* ^
F r a n g o i s  Q uesnay , D e s p o t i s m  i n  China,  l o c . c i t . ,  p .  212 . i •V C* /)<t»
X G e f %'
( o r .«. C».
*JL. »/***■»
I .  ■ I i n / . . .
f-v rr? h. I
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model for Russia - the reverse of twentieth-century developments. This
work was intended as instruction in the essential principles of government
including the participation of the sovereign in the economy, for the
benefit of the Russian Grand Duke who later became Tsar Paul I.
The Physiocrats viewed the economic system long associated with
Oriental despotism as exemplary, at least with regard to the intervention
of the state in agriculture. This attitude towards the Oriental system
of land-tax was to be shared with other opponents of the outmoded forms of
2aristocratic land-tenure at home, in contrast with aristocratic sympath­
isers, such as Montesquieu, who found this aspect of the Oriental system 
quite abhorrent.
One eighteenth-century writer whose attitude towards the economic
aspect of Oriental despotism was even more radical than that of the
Physiocrats was Simon Nicolas Linguet. Marx was later to prize Linguet's
critique of Montesquieu, which was summed up in the epigram, 1 2341'esprit
3des lois, c'est la propriety*.
Linguet praised the control exercised by Oriental governments over
privilege and property, a control he saw as acting to the advantage of
4the poorer classes. He discounted the so-called freedom which existed
Nicolas-Gabriel Le Clerc, Yu le Grand et Confucius, four vols., Soissons, 
1769.
2 See, for example, James Mill in the nineteenth century.
3 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 615, fn. 2; p. 738, fn. 1. The epigram appears 
in Linguet, Theorie des lois civilesr ou Principes fondamentaux de la 
societe, Vol. 1, London, 1767, p. 236.
4 Marx made excerpts (via Villegardelle) from Theorie des lois civiles in 
Brussels, 1846, and later took notes directly from Linguet which are to be 
found in a notebook dating from about March-April 1859. See also the 
section on Linguet in Marx's Theories of Surplus Value, Part I, London, 
Lawrences Wishart,1969, pp. 345-350. Marx did not share Linguet's enthus­
iasm for the Asiatic model, although he appreciated his critique of 
bourgeois liberalism. According to Marx, Linguet 'defends Asiatic despot­
ism against the civilized European forms of despotism, thus he defends 
slavery against wage-labour.' (I b i d p. 345.)
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in Europe - the freedom to die of hunger - and made the claim that even 
the serf or slave was better off than the contemporary working man. The 
slave, for example, was at least a valuable property for his owner, and 
was looked after accordingly.^
Bentham's editor, Dumont, was so incensed by Linguet's analysis of
Western law as simply a device for maintaining an inequitable distribution
of property that he described it as:
...the product of a disordered imagination in the service of 
an evil heart. Oriental despotism is the model to which 
he seeks to make all European governments conform, in order 
to cure them of the notions of liberty and humanity which 
seem to torment him like lugubrious spectres .* 2 3
In spite of his radicalism, Linguet was against revolution, fearing 
that it would entail the collapse of civilisation. His fears were vindi­
cated, in so far as he was finally guillotined during the Terror for 
'inciting the despots of London and Vienna.
A quite different kind of critique of Montesquieu was provided by 
the Orientalist and pioneer of Persian studies, Anquetil-Duperron.
Anqueti 1-Duperron was one of the few eighteenth-century writers on Oriental 
despotism who was more interested in the functions of the concept than in 
employing it for his own purposes.
In his work Legislation orientale, Anquetil-Duperron claimed that 
the idea of Oriental despotism elaborated by Montesquieu and others was 
simply a rationalisation for European intervention in the East. He was 
less interested in analysing the role the concept had served within Europe
with regard to opposing, reforming or justifying absolute monarchy than
3in analysing its role in external politics.
Anquetil-Duperron was utterly opposed to the motion that in the East, 
for example Persia, Turkey and India, the native system of government was 
a so-called despotism. He argued that the idea of the absence of the
S.N. Linguet, Theorie des lois civiles ..., o p . c i t p. 467.
2 Jeremy Bentham, Traites de legislation civile et penale, ed- Et- Dumont,
3 vols., 2nd ed., Paris, 1820, Vol. 1, p. 138.
3 See Franco Venturi, 'Oriental Despotism', Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 24 (Jan.-March 1963), p. 137.
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rights of private property in Asia was a fiction employed by colonialists
who favoured the confiscation of native estates. Their reasoning was that
in Asia conquest automatically bestowed ownership of all land on the 
1conqueror.
In his later life, Anquetil-Duperron appeared on the margin of the
prolonged controversy over the nature of land-tenure in Bengal, which
involved this very question of whether conquest bestowed a proprietory
right to all the land in Asiatic countries. It was partly the use of the
concept of Oriental despotism for such 'colonialist' purposes which led
Marx to reconsider the notion of the absence of property in land at the
2time of the annexation of Bengal.
Anquetil-Duperron can only be regarded as exceptional in his treatment 
of the concept of Oriental despotism. It was far more usual for eight­
eenth-century writers to adopt the model of Oriental despotism most suited 
to their political purposes at home, regardless of how little it might 
correspond to the reality of Asiatic society.
Thus, as seen in reference to du Halde, the eighteenth-century aspir­
ation to political stability, under the shadow of revolution, found its 
expression in an exaggerated admiration for the longevity of the Chinese 
political order. This quality had long been associated with Oriental 
despotism, but had not received the same stress in the past. On this 
subject Quesnay wrote:
Does not this vast empire, subjected to the natural order, 
present an example of a stable, permanent and invariable 
government, proving that the inconstancy of transitory 
governments has no other basis or rule except the inconstancy 
of men themselves? 3
Ibid., p. 139.
2 E.g. [Plans for English Colonization in India], N.Y.D.T., 3 April 1858, 
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 262. Other instances of 
the colonial exploitation of the concept with regard to land policy were 
noted by Marx and Engels in connection with the French in Algeria and the 
British in Ireland.
3 Frangois Quesnay, Despotism in China, loc.cit., p. 304.
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For many eighteenth-century thinkers, as for Aristotle and Polybius, 
the ideal system of government and society was static in form, by its 
very unchangingness expressing its close conformity to unchanging natural 
law. For this reason the 'eternal standstill' (Ranke) of China could 
be viewed as wholly admirable, and proof that natural law formed the 
basis of Chinese society.
A change in this general attitude came about fairly rapidly at the 
end of the eighteenth century with the political and philosophical develop­
ments associated with the French Revolution and the economic development 
and conception of economic progress associated with the industrial 'revol­
ution'. Nineteenth-century economists, such as Marx, might agree with 
the Physiocrats that the notable stability of the Oriental system arose 
out of the particular organisation of the economy it represented. How­
ever in the nineteenth century this stability was regarded as stagnation.
Empires Belonging to Space and not to Time
The philosophical developments which culminated in the work of Hegel 
meant that popular concepts of natural law gradually gave way to the idea 
of history as the dynamic process of self-development of men and nations. 
The tendency to measure historical progress in terms of approximation to 
external and unchanging laws of reason was abandoned in favour of viewing 
history itself as the progressive revelation of reason.
In the light of these new ideas a more critical image of the East 
once more reigned in the West. Static systems were no longer regarded 
favourably, as reflecting truly the operation of universal and static 
natural laws - instead they were seen as unnatural hangovers from the past, 
that had simply not shared in the historical development of the Western
nations.
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The transition between these two sterotyped evaluations of Oriental 
despotism appears clearly in the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder.
Already in 1784 Herder was outlining a theory of history which presaged 
in many ways the nineteenth-century approach to historical development.
What Herder in fact did was to up-date Montesquieu's theories of 
geographical determinism by introducing elements to account for dynamic 
progress and change in human society. Firstly, he depicted man's historical 
relationship with nature in terms of mutual interaction: men through
their activity changed nature, which in turn, in its new aspect, influenced 
men.'*' Secondly, according to Herder, this interaction between man and 
nature was simultaneously influenced by the organic national traditions 
of the people concerned.
2Herder wrote that 'The natural state of man is society', and for
him society was no longer the polis of Aristotle, but a national society.
It was man, with the powers developed within the medium of particular
national societies, who created history. However, although the nation
was the vehicle of progress, not all nations in fact sustained progress.
For example, the form which man's interaction with nature assumed in
the process of production might be detrimental to the progress of the
nation. Herder had a particular distrust of the effects of agricultural
production on man's social organisation. Agricultural production was
liable to give rise to a 'frightful despotism' wherein the ground 'ceased
3to belong to man, but man became the appertenance of the ground'. Such
despotism was a characteristic feature of Asia, where the effects of the
climate and of the mode of production were reinforced by national traditions
4Herder described 'Asiatic despotism' as a non-developmental political 
form, which did not permit the restless pursuit of knowledge which was the
Johann Gottfried von Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of 
Man, tr. T. Churchill, London, 1800, reprinted N.Y., Bergman, n.d. p. 176
Ibid., p. 244.
3 Ibid., p. 207.
Ibid., p. 315.4
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driving force of Western nations. China, for example, 'stands as an old
ruin on the verge of the World'.3- Confucian traditions inhibited any
further progress in education or politics, and despotism prevented any
2rival school of thought from competing with Confucianism. Hence national 
traditions, combined with the effects of climate and a non-progressive 
mode of production, produced a completely static social system.
Once a despotism was instituted, the political and intellectual 
strait-jacket it imposed doomed the system to perpetuate itself into 
eternity. The Chinese empire was in fact 'an embalmed mummy wrapped in 
silk, and painted in hieroglyphics: its internal circulation is that of
a dormouse in its winter sleep'.1 23 4
The idea that Eastern nations lacked within themselves the conditions
for further organic development was to become the dominant theme of
nineteenth-century writing on Oriental despotism. As such, it was to be
absorbed by Marx, and to form the basis of his analysis of the non-Western
world. It was closely linked with the notion that Asia could only be
restored to the path of progress through the intervention of the West.
Herder's concept of the stasis of the East was further systematised
by Hegel. According to Hegel's historical schema the first phase of
world history took place in the Orient, but subsequently the scene of the
development of the world spirit had moved elsewhere. In the East empires
persisted that belonged to space and not to time, thus perpetuating
4'unhistorical history'.
1 Ibid., p. 297.
2
Ibid., p. 298.
3
Ibid., p. 296. Cf. Marx's description of China: 'Complete isolation was
the prime condition of the preservation of Old China. That isolation 
having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must 
follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically 
sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air.' 
Revolution in China and in Europe (printed as leading article), N.Y.D.T.
14 June 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 69.
4 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree, 
London, Bell, 1905, p. 112.
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Hegel's philosophical analysis of the historical phase in which the 
Eastern nations had become suspended was as follows: the Eastern nations
had been the first to attain the phase of 'substantial freedom','*' 
embodied in the state. However, they had not progressed to the principle 
of subjectivity, and only the will of the despot was free. Morality 
existed only in the form of external demands imposed on the individual.
2In China, which Hegel took as the 'classic type' of the Oriental state, 
even family relations were externalised and enforced by law. Moreover, 
in countries such as Egypt and India, man was still in the thrall of 
mystified nature.
Hegel presents a not unflattering picture of the Chinese educational- 
system and bureaucracy - in line with contemporary German bureaucratic 
reformers. Hegel, however, dismisses these virtues of the Chinese system 
as necessities in a situation where all political decisions stemmed from 
one will, and the interests of the governed were not consulted.
The political conception of Oriental despotism that appears in Hegel 
stems directly from Montesquieu, and retains the bias of Montesquieu's 
model. The principal feature of Oriental despotism was the absence of 
any system of corporate or individual rights, vis a vis the state, and 
hence the absence of intermediary bodies. The absolute equality prevail­
ing in the East (apart from the servants of the state with their conditional
3tenure of office) constituted the very foundation of despotism.
Hegel also, like Herder, absorbed Montesquieu's methodology into his 
own system, while ridding it of its static quality. The wTay in which 
Hegel amalgamated Montesquieu's geographical determinism with his own 
'idealist' view of history as the self-unfolding of the world spirit was
 ^ I.e. the negation of the arbitrariness arising from the unreflecting and 
uncontrolled instinctual gratifications of 'natural man'.
2 'China is quite peculiarly Oriental'. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 
op.cit.f p. 119.
3 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op.cit., pp. 124-125.
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as follows.
Firstly, the general movement of the world spirit through time was
from East to West.1 234 Civilisation began where nature provided the optimal
conditions for the development of agriculture - the river-plains of the 
2East. Agriculture necessarily gave rise to private-property rights and
3hence to the development of the state form to mediate these rights. The
development of the state form in itself represented a great advance in
human civilisation, in man's creation of objective universals.
The limits of progress possible within the river-plain civilisations
were, however, soon reached. Such civilisations were inward-looking and
undifferentiated, affording a monotonous attachment to the soil. The next
stage of human development could only take place in a completely
different geographical context - i.e. the Mediterranean. It was the
existence of geographic diversity in territories brought into communication
with one another by convenient sea-lanes that gave rise to individualism
and the growth of pluralistic forms of society.
Hegel's impressive attempt to incorporate universal history into a
philosophical system, and to combine objective idealism with geographical
determinism, served him in one respect only to arrive at that nineteenth -
century commonplace - that it was 'the necessary fate of Asiatic Empires
4to be subjected to Europeans'. In no other way could the Asiatic nations
1 This idea was of great antiquity, apparently stemming from the astrologi­
cal belief that the course of civilisation followed the course of the sun. 
Hegel felt that the future unfolding of world history would take place in 
the Americas. (Ibid., p. 90.)
2 Ibid., p. 93.
3 Marx's notion that the state form was indissolubly linked with the rise of 
private-property relations was foreshadowed by Hegel. Hegel also preceded 
Marx in the view that the development of the state form was correlated with 
the development of classes, and that where the latter were weakly developed, 
as in America, the state power with its unifying function was also weakly 
developed. (Ibid., p. 89.) On the former point see also Adam Smith, accord­
ing to whom, 'Till there be property there can be no government, the very 
end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor.'
(Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, ed. Edwin Cannan, 
first published 1896, reprinted N.Y., Kelley & Millman, 1956, p. 15.)
4 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op.cit., p. 149.
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rejoin the developing process of world history. The Slavs represented
a half-way house between Asia and Europe. As a nation they had partaken
in world history only very late, and even then had not completely broken
free from their connections with Asia.'*'
The most immediate influence of Hegel's analysis of the non-Westem
world was, however, manifested among the internal critics of the Prussian
government. The Young Germany movement in the 1830s and 1840s used Hegel's
model of China as a negative example of the results (in terms of utter
stagnation) of oppressive state power. 'China' functioned both as the
symbol of pure conservatism and reaction, and as a popular metaphor for
2the Prussian government.
In general, political romanticism and political liberalism coincided 
in the nineteenth century in their negative image of Asiatic society.
In Asia, the free development of society (or the nation) had been brought 
to an artificial halt for thousands of years, thanks to Oriental despotism.
The Contribution of Political Economy: The Relation of Private Property
to Progess
It was the British political economists who were responsible for the 
first serious attempt to analyse 'Oriental despotism' as an economic 
system. The Physiocrats had pointed the way, but their theories were still, 
to a certain extent, shrouded in metaphysics. Adam Smith, on the other 
hand, in the Wealth of Nations, presented a model of Oriental despotism 
couched purely in economic terms.
Ibid., p. 107.
2 See E. Rose, 'China as a Symbol of Reaction in Germany 1830-1880', 
Comparative Literature, Vol. Ill (1951-1952), pp. 57-76. Heinrich Heine's 
'Der Kaiser von China', published in the Pariser Deutsche Zeitung, 1842, 
is a good example of the use of the metaphor for political criticism.
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According to Smith, there existed a distinctive Asiatic political
economy, characterised by the fact that the sovereign derived the whole,
or a considerable part, of his income from a variable land-tax or land-
rent. A corollary of this was the particular attention Asiatic sovereigns
paid to the interests of agriculture and to public works, in order to
maximise the value of produce, and thence their own income.^
The involvement of the executive power in the public economy
distinguished Asiatic countries from the agricultural countries of Europe,
where the sovereign did not have such a direct interest in productivity,
and hence did not engage in the same public works. In Egypt and Hindostan,
according to Smith, the public works engaged in by the state included
2irrigation schemes, which directly increased productivity. In Hindostan
and China, they included public roads - and in China also navigable canals -
3which served to extend markets by providing cheap transport.
In the process of freeing economics from the grip of natural law,
Smith was able to introduce a more genuinely comparative note into the 
economic analysis of the East. Even if Quesnay's idea of natural law 
was no more than the distinguishing of fundamental relations of production 
and exchange from the secondary phenomena of political forms and 
legislation,^the fact that the Physiocrats linked economics to natural law 
meant that ultimately they saw one set of economic relations as universally 
appropriate to man.
By contrast, Smith found the Asiatic system to be suited to the
agrarian countries of the East, but unsuited to the countries of Europe,
where there were greater local complexities which would render a central
5distribution of funds awkward to handle. In fact Smith was opposed in
 ^ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, London, Routledge, 1898, pp. 535-537; 
pp. 572-573.
2 Ibid., p. 535.
3 Ibid., pp. 572-573.
4 This was how Marx analysed Quesnay's idea of natural law (MEGA I/VI, 
pp. 612-613).
5 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, op.cit., p. 573.
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principle to the performance of economic functions by a centralised 
executive at home, though he found it appropriate in parts of Asia.
Smith shared with the Physiocrats and other eighteenth-century 
writers a relatively favourable attitude towards the Asiatic form of 
society and economy. The later political economists were to provide a 
marked contrast in this respect. In an early essay (Essay on the History 
of Astronomy) Smith had raised the question of whether the despotic 
systems of Chaldea and Egypt might not have prevented the growth of phil­
osophy in those countries, but had not answered it. In the nineteenth 
century, James Mill was to praise Smith for having raised this question, 
but to censure him for leaving it open, thus compromising with ’popular 
opinion and his own imperfect views'^-i.e. by portraying Asiatic society 
too favourably.
Mill, in his History of India, pledged himself to remove those
illusions about the East which had been propagated in particular by the
2'Popish missionaries'. He attempted to demonstrate that the Hindus,
for example, had made 'but a few of the earliest steps in the progress to
civilisation'. The point was that they should be governed accordingly,
and not as though they were a 'quite civilised nation'.
Mill relied on the kind of model of Oriental despotism introduced by
Herder. The Asiatic social system was one in which all progress had
3ceased thousands of years before. Superficial movement had taken place 
in these systems, with conquest or dynastic change, but the texture of
4society, and its basic component, the village, had remained unchanged.
James Mill, The History of British India, nine vols., ed. and with 
commentaries by H.H. Wilson, London, J. Madden, 1840-48, Vol. II, 1840, 
pp. 231-32.
2
Ibid., Ch. X ('General Reflections'), pp. 152-233.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 213-215.
Ibid., p. 164.4
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Here we are seeing the definite emergence of the village as an integral
component of Asiatic despotism - the village which through its economic
self-sufficiency inhibits the development of a more complex social division
of labour and which is the lynch-pin of the stability of the East.
Like the other nineteenth-century British political economists, Mill
held that exogenous factors had to be introduced into the Asiatic system
(i.e. by the British) for the sake of Progress. Unlike the other political
economists, however, Mill believed that the basic economic structure of
Oriental despotism should be retained - i.e. the government appropriation
of the surplus. The reason for Mill's rather radical approach to this
question was his fear that the creation of 'strong' private-property rights
in India would lead to the creation of an unproductive and reactionary
class of landed aristocrats. Marx's analysis of his motives was as
follows: *We understand such economists as Mill ... demanding that rent
should be handed over to the state to serve in place of taxes. That is
a frank expression of the hatred the industrial capitalist bears towards
the landed proprietor, who seems to him a useless thing, an excrescence
upon the general body of bourgeois production'.^
The utilitarians in general, other than Mill, regarded private
property as the prime desideratum for India. Private property would bring
competition and incentive into the Indian economy. They argued that under
the native system private property could not be said to exist, because the
2tax in kind had been so high as to make land unsaleable. The individual
was bound to the land by his obligation to contribute taxes. Marx was
to write that it was difficult for the English mind to understand that
'fixity of tenure may be considered a pest by the cultivator himself' (where
3the government appropriation of the surplus was particularly onerous).
 ^ Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, N.Y., International Publishers, 1963, 
p. 161.
2 For a good account of the utilitarian analysis of the Indian economic 
system see Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford University 
Press, 1959, esp. Ch. II (Political Economy and the Land Revenue), pp. 81-139.
Marx, [Marginal note on Irwin's The Garden of India], Ex Libris, p. 103.
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It was Mill's contention, however, that the government appropriation 
of the surplus need not retard the economy if the surplus was calculated 
scientifically, according to the utilitarian theory of rent. Should the 
zemindars, or tax collectors, be allowed to retain the surplus, like 
European gentry, they would be most unlikely to put it to productive 
purposes.^- On the other hand it was unlikely that the ryots would put 
the surplus to profitable use either, if they were permitted to retain 
the major part of it. It was better, according to Mill, that the govern­
ment should collect directly from the producers the whole 'rent' of the 
soil (that is the surplus after costs and an average profit had been 
calculated and deducted).
The expressed desire to preserve the economic basis of Oriental 
despotism (the 'nationalisation of the soil') is the most interesting 
aspect of Mill's work on the subject. Moreover, although the denial of 
the right to private rent-property was unacceptable to the colonial author­
ities, his theory of rent was an important influence on the British admin­
istration throughout idle nineteenth century.
Mill aimed to rid colonialism of its role as an annexe of the obsolete 
land-owning class at home. This class needed to be prevented from extending 
its own lifespan and from reproducing itself overseas. Mill was particul­
arly concerned to distinguish clearly between India's Asiatic system and 
Western feudalism in order to defeat those who argued that the foundations 
existed on which to build up a native land-owning aristocracy. He argued 
his case both in terms of land-tenure systems,and in terms of institutional 
complexity - he claimed that the Indians were not capable of the layered
and articulated political and military organisation which had been present
2in Western feudalism.
Mill, The History of British India, op.cit., Vol. V, 1840, Ch. V (Lord 
Cornwallis's Financial and Judicial Reforms), pp. 468-640.
Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 197-200, pp. 210-212; Vol. V, pp. 480-482.2
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John Stuart Mill, like the rest of the British political economists, 
saw the basic character of the Asiatic form of society as determined by 
the government appropriation of the surplus.^ However this idea had been 
undergoing a metamorphosis. In the Physiocratic model, government approp­
riation was complementary to private property; in John Stuart Mill's 
model it prevented the necessary and proper development of private property.
J.S. Mill was influenced by his father's radicalism to the extent 
that he was prepared for landlord rights to be limited to some extent by 
government protection of the ryots. He also allowed that the surplus 
appropriated by the state from the direct producers in the Asiatic system 
had served certain functions of public utility. It was employed in
irrigation works; in supporting government functionaries (and favourites);
2and in supporting a craftsman class.
The gains from this system were, however, according to J.S. Mill, 
far outweighed by the debits; through it the state achieved an over­
weening power, which was detrimental to the rights of the individual. The 
burden of liberal doctrine, as represented by J.S. Mil], was that respect 
for the rights of the individual, particularly as embodied in the rights 
of private property, was essential for a healthy society. Hence Mill attrib­
uted the lack of progress in Oriental states to the endemic lack of
personal rights and security (particularly of property) vis a vis the 
3state. He explained this as follows:
John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, ed. Ashley, London, 
Longmans, 1923, p. 12.
2 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
3
Ibid., pp. 18; 113. Marx followed Mill closely in arguing that histor­
ically, the development of strong forms of property was necessary for pro­
gress, and that the state could not provide an alternative economic dynamic. 
On the other hand, Marx and Mill shared an ambivalent attitude towards the 
disappearance of communal forms of landownership. Mill was to write that:
'the system under which nearly the whole soil of Great Britain has come to 
be appropriated by about thirty thousand families ... is neither the only 
nor the oldest form of landed property, and ... there is no natural necessity 
for its being preferred to all other forms', and furthermore, that 'we have 
done and are still doing, irreparable mischief, by blindly introducing the 
English idea of absolute property in land into a country where it did not 
exist and never had existed...' (J.S. Mill, 'Mr Maine on Village Communities,'
nhf- 7 n P p t / 7  pw. \7r>1 . T Y .  Npm .  f M a v  . r-iri a n r l
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The only insecurity which is altogether paralysing to the active 
energies of producers, is that arising from the government, or 
from persons invested with its authority. Against all other 
depredators there is hope of defending oneself
In Western Europe Rigour and Progress had stemmed from the existence
of independent social institutions as a counterweight to the state,
2buttressed by customary right and public opinion. Mill differentiated 
sharply between the 'nominally absolute' governments of Europe and the 
absolutisms of Asia. In the former,established usage and social institut­
ions protected the individual from the depredations of the government,
3and private property was in a relatively strong position.
J.S. Mill shared the opinion of his father and the other British
political economists that Asiatic systems had no dynamic principle within
them, and that this must be provided by the introduction of exogenous
factors; ultimately it was only the invasion by foreign capital which
could bring to an end the homeostatic tendencies of such systems. The
importation of capital would establish the principle of accumulation, and
hence substitute economic progress for the circularity of the old system.
The importation of foreign capital, ... by instilling new 
ideas and breaking the chains of habit, if not by improv­
ing the actual condition of the population, tends to create 
in them new wants, increased ambition, and greater thought 
for the future. 4
Or as Marx was to put it, the penetration of British capital into India
was necessary to break up the 'self-sufficient inertia in the villages,'
each of which had existed 'with a given scale of low conveniences, almost
without intercourse with other villages, without the desires and efforts
5indispensable to social advance.' The other conditions of progress were
Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op.cit., pp. 113-114.
2 Ibid., pp. 114-115. Cf. Marx, 'The British Rule in India , N.Y.D.T., 
25 June 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 85. Here 
both Marx and Mill compare (favourably) the performance of common tasks 
by voluntary social organisation in Flanders and Italy, with the perform­
ance of such tasks by Asiatic governments.
3 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op.cit., p. 115.
4 Ibid., p. 190.
5 Marx, 'The Future Results of British Rule in India', N.Y.D.T., 8 Aug. 
1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 135.
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that the Asiatic form of government should be changed for one that did 
not impose arbitrary taxation on property, and that economically dysfunct­
ional belief systems should be dispersed through education.^
The political economist of this period who was to develop the economic 
analysis of Asiatic society most systematically was not, however, either 
of the Mills, but their contemporary Richard Jones. It was Jones who was 
to exercise the greatest single influence on Marx's idea of Oriental 
despotism.
Jones shared the basic assumptions of the other political economists
2on what constituted 'Asiatic Despotism'. He claimed that the root cause
of this socio-political form lay in the fact that the sovereign was the
3sole proprietor of the land, and enjoyed exclusive title to it. It was
the 'universal dependence on the throne for the means of supporting life'
4which was the explanation of the unbroken despotism of the East.
Such dependence was detrimental to any economic progress as the rents
extracted from the direct producers discouraged the expenditure of skill
5and energy in agriculture. The ryot rents of the Orient (mixed to some 
extent with labour and metayer rents) served to perpetuate the despotic 
system in which they had their origin, in that they prevented any indep­
endent accumulation.^
The distribution of income in Asiatic despotism was determined by
7the centralised ownership of the basic means of production (land) . From
Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op.cit. , p. 189.
2 Jones deals specifically with Persia, Turkey, Hindostan and China, and 
in his later works with Egypt also.
3 E.g. Richard Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, London, 1831, re­
printed N.Y., Kelley and Millman, 19-56, pp. 7-8. Jones relied heavily on 
Frangois Bernier (see above) .for primary source material in regard to this, 
and ih regard to the role of the city and the status of crafts in the East.
^ Ibid., p. 8.
5 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
 ^ Ibid., p. 138.
7 Cf. Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, from whom Marx was to quote liberally in 
1853 and in succeeding years: 'There is no hereditary rank, nothing to
oppose his will [that of the Islamic despot of Java], Not only honours, 
posts, and distinctions, depend upon his pleasure, but all the landed prop­
erty of his dominions remains at his disposal, and may, together with its
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this starting point, Jones developed his analysis of ’labour funds' in 
East and West, or the functions of different methods of distributing 
wealth. His models represented a significant attempt to develop a compar­
ative science of economics.
Jones divided labour funds (i.e. the amount of wealth devoted to 
maintaining labour) into three main categories: firstly, the self-produced
labour funds found in peasant agriculture; secondly, funds paid out of 
revenues; and thirdly, funds paid out of capital.'*’ Jones used Bernier's 
description of the fate of Indian craftsmen, completely dependent on 
the revenue centrally distributed by the sovereign and his servants, in 
order to illustrate the disadvantage of the second category of labour funds 
over the third. Payment from capital provided a security of remuneration, 
and the possibility of an efficient division of labour, unknown where 
artisans were directly dependent on the consumers of their goods. The 
insecurity experienced by the Eastern craftsman was evidenced in the sudden 
ruin of Asiatic cities when the sovereign, with his monopoly of the 
revenues of the soil, decided to change his capital.
The influence of Jones' analysis of labour funds on Marx will be
discussed elsewhere. One might note here, however, Marx's criticism of
the limiting of types of (non-self-produced) labour funds to the type
derived from revenues 'belonging to classes distinct from the labourers',
and the capitalist type. Marx claimed that Jones had overlooked both
the Asiatic community, with its unity of agriculture and industry, and the
2medieval city corporation.
Jones did, in fact, describe the Indian village community, quoting
cultivators, be parcelled out by his order among the officers of his house­
hold, the ministers of his pleasures, or the useful servants of the state. 
Every officer is paid by grants of land, or by a power to receive from the 
peasantry a certain proportion of the produce of certain villages or 
districts.' (The History of Java, London, Black, Parbury and Allen, 1817, 
Vol. I, p. 267.)
Richard Jones, Political Economy, ed. W. Whewell, London, Murray, 1859, 
pp. 440-454; pp. 219-221.
2 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, op.cit., Part III, p. 417.
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the same Report of the Committee on East India Affairs as Marx did.
Jones, described the support of village craftsmen from communal revenue 
as follows: 'The artizans in rural districts are, however, provided for
there in a peculiar manner ... Such handicraftsmen and other non­
agriculturalists as were actually necessary in a village were maintained
by an assignment of the joint revenues of the villagers,... The villagers
2were stationary and abiding ... and so were their handicraftsmen ...'
According to Jones the village system on the one hand tended to 
support the ryot against the pressure of a despotic government, but on the 
other hand functioned to keep the level of industry and agriculture stat­
ionary, by its exclusion of competition. The division of labour remained 
hereditary and immutable within its enclosed world, and the villagers 
were cut off from any more general division of labour within society as 
a whole, which could only have been brought about by the exchange of 
commodities. The village was, in fact, the 'substratum of the Hindoo
3social system, and the cause and pledge of its character and permanency'.
As for the Asiatic town or city, we have already noted Jones' account
of the complete dependence of the townspeople on the expenditure of the
sovereign and his servants. Politically, also, industry and commerce
suffered in Asiatic despotisms from the absence of independent urban 
4corporations. As a contemporary historian (from whom Marx weis to borrow) 
put it: 'the towns had no common funds or real self-government, so that
The Fifth Report of the Committee on East India Affairs, 1812. This 
section of the parliamentary report seems to have captured the contemporary 
imagination. Jones (Political Economy, op.cit., pp. 214-215) quotes it 
via George Robert Gleig's The History of the British Empire in India, 4 
vols.,London 1830-35. Marx reproduces it (in 'The British Rule in India',
N.Y.D.T., 25 June 1853, and in Capital) from Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles'
The History of Java, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 285. He would also have encount­
ered it in one of his major sources on India, George Campbell's Modern 
India: A Sketch of the System of Government, London, Murray, 1852, pp. 84-85.
2 Jones, Textbook of Lectures on the Political Economy of Nations, Hertford, 
1852, pp. 73-74, quoted by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value, op.cit., Part 
III, p. 435.
Jones, Political Economy, op.cit., p. 446.
Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, op.cit., pp. 138-139.4
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large non-agricultural municipalities cannot be said to have existed'.
J.S. Mill had also commented on the different functions of Oriental and
Occidental cities in his explanation of why a bourgeois class had emerged
2in the West but not in the East.
Here one finds the beginnings of the comparative analysis of the role
of the city in feudalism and in Eastern society. This was to become of
major significance in the work of Marx and Weber, in explaining the unique
historical development which brought into being Western capitalism.
Further on this subject, Jones observed that Eastern sovereigns did not
have the need, which had existed in Western feudalism, to foster the political
influence of the towns (and hence of an emergent bourgeoisie) as a counter-
3balance to a body of powerful landed proprietors.
With regard to the future of Asiatic despotism, Jones aligned himself
with the faction which believed that the necessary 'cure' for it was the
4development of a landed aristocracy with status-based power. As we have
seen, this idea had been current at least since the rise of absolutism in
Europe, and was popularised in particular by the opponents of Mazarin and
Louis XIV, and by Montesquieu. It occurred naturally to those itinerant
noblemen, de Custine and Von Haxthausen, when observing Tsarist bureaucracy
5in the nineteenth century. Jones, viewing Russia from a greater geo-
George Campbell, Modern India ..., op.cit., p. 78. Campbell, who was 
recommended by Marx (Capital, Vol. I, p. 358, fn. 1), provided a classic 
definition of the distinction between Oriental despotism and feudalism. He 
wrote that the tendency of the Mahommedans has always been 'to the formation 
of great empires, having nothing feudal in their composition, but every­
thing centralised - the only aristocracy being official, and the officials 
the creatures of the sovereign'. {Ibid., p. 75.) He added that the 
throne was subject to 'the irregularities of revolutions and changes of 
dynasties common to all Oriental despotisms' {Ibid., p. 76.)
2 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, op.cit., pp. 17-18.
3 Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, op.cit., p. 139.
4
Ibid., p. 59. As we have seen, the Mills, while advocating the European­
isation of Asiatic society were selective in respect to which aspects of 
European society they wished to see transplanted overseas. They were 
strongly opposed to the creation in India of a class of aristocratic land- 
owners, a class they regarded as already anachronistic in the European context
5 De Custine, Russia, abridged ed., London, Longmans, 1855, passim; von 
Haxthausen, The Russian Empire, its People, Institutions and Resources,2 vols. 
London, Chapman Hall, 1856, reprinted Frank Cass, 1968, Vol. II, Ch. VIII 
(pp. 200-217).
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graphical and social distance than de Custine or von Haxthausen, believed,
unlike them, that the aristocracy had succeeded in providing a check on
Russian absolutism 'sufficient to distinguish it from Asiatic despotism*.^
Jones in fact borrowed heavily from Montesquieu in his analysis of
the political aspects of Asiatic society. He copied in particular the
latter's emphasis on the unhappy consequences of a lack of intermediary
bodies between the sovereign and the direct producers: it was the
atomisation of the population vis a vis the central power which constituted
2the political framework for a self-perpetuating despotism.
The key to the Asiatic form of society remained, however, for Jones, 
the economic explanation - i.e. the government monopoly of land. None­
theless, in explaining the first causes of this exclusive proprietorship, 
Jones fell back on a non-economic explanation, that of the 'right of
conquest'. State ownership had arisen from the fact that all these
3countries had been conquered by foreigners. As already mentioned, this 
idea had been employed by earlier colonial apologists, such as Alexander 
Dow (On the Origin of Despotism in Hindostan, 1772) who used it as a 
justification for the confiscation of land.
Jones did not posit any prior factors to account for the singular 
results of such conquests in Asia, apart from a half-hearted attempt to 
establish that the conquering hordes of the East were inured to habits of 
military submission because of the dangers of the exposed plains, whereas 
the Germanic hordes had contracted habits of freedom in the security of
4the1 *34fastnessesand morasses of [their] native woods'. Hence the differing 
results of conquest in the case of the Germanic and Eastern hordes.
Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, op.cit., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 113.
3 Jones, Political Economy, op.cit., p. 221. Popular arguments were that 
it was either conquest by steppe nomads or by Islamic nations that instituted 
despotic systems. Both of these arguments are reflected in Marx's work, 
though they are not included in his central model of Oriental despotism.
The conquest theory goes back to Jean Bodin and Montesquieu (see above).
4 Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, op.cit., p. 110.
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Where the British political economists, and Richard Jones in 
particular, succeeded was in investing the concept of Oriental despotism 
with an element of systematic economic analysis which previously it had 
lacked. This in turn was only made possible by developments in the 
science of economics associated with the progress of capitalism. As 
Marx said:
... bourgeois economics arrived at an understanding of 
feudal, ancient, oriental economics only after the self- 
criticism of bourgeois society had begun.
The political economists did not however arrive at the idea that
the Oriental political system derived from the need for the state to
2provide the conditions of production. This was the contribution of 
Marx and Engels, to which we now turn.
Marx, Grundrisse, Introduction, p. 106; and used by Marx in A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. S.W. Ryazanskaya, 
Moscow, Progress, 1970, p. 211.
2 Wittfogel's account of Jones, (e.g. Karl A. Wittfogel, 'The Marxist 
View of Russian Society and Revolution', World Politics Vol. 12 (1959- 
1960) , p. 490, fn. 21), misleadingly suggests that Jones saw the need for 
irrigation as the key to Asiatic despotism. What Jones actually said in 
the passage referred to by Wittfogel is that, because of the special need 
for irrigation which existed in Persia, 'some valuable modifications* 
of the Asiatic system of ryot rents' had been introduced there. (An 
Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, op.cit., p. 119.) These modifications 
comprised more secure guarantees of property, in order to encourage the 
building of 'cannauts'. The Persian despots wished to encourage the 
productivity of the soil because, as elsewhere in Asia, they were the 
'supreme owners' of the produce of the soil, by right of conquest.
Although Jones, and for that matter Adam Smith and the Mills, described 
the expenditure by Asiatic governments on public works, they did not treat 
such expenditure as symptomatic of the need for state intervention in 
providing the conditions of production in the East. The general argument, 
from the Physiocrats through Adam Smith, had been that the interventionist 
role of the Asiatic state in agriculture derived from its controlling 
interest in agricultural productivity, not vice versa.
* My emphasis.
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2
THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION
Absichtlich ist es vermieden worden, 
an dem für uns weitaus wichtigsten 
Fall idealtypischer Konstruktionen 
zu demonstrieren: an Marx.
Max Weber
Marx's Perception of the Non-Western World
Marx and Engels took no specific interest in the nature of 
non-Westem society before 1853. Up till then they simply adopted Hegel's 
characterisation of the Orient as the relic of a past era of human
history, destined to succumb to the more dynamic civilisation of the
1
West. The impact of capitalist commodities was already bringing about a • 
revolution in the social structure of India and China, for example, 
forcing these countries out of their ahistorical vegetation. This is 
the point that Engels makes in his report to the London Workingmen's 
Educational Society on the effects that the discovery of America has 
had on the opening up of a world market:
Since the English have made themselves masters of world trade 
and brought the state of their manufacturing to such a height 
that they can furnish almost the entire civilised world with 
their products, and since the bourgeoisie have attained political 
power, they have also succeeded in making further progress in 
Asia; the bourgeoisie have achieved ascendancy there also.
Through the rise of machinery the barbarian condition of other 
countries is continually ruined. We know that the Spanish 
found the East Indies at the same level of development as did
Marx and Engels refer specifically to Hegel's account of Oriental 
society only in The German Ideology (written 1845-1846) , Moscow, Progress, 
1968, pp. 176-183. Hegel's characterisation of Oriental society, however, 
colours everything that Marx and Engels wrote on the subject in this 
period.
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the English, and that the Indians have nevertheless continued 
to live for centuries in the same manner, i.e. they have 
eaten, drunk and vegetated, and the.grandson has tilled his 
soil just as the grandfather did - with the exception that a 
number of revolutions have taken place which however, amounted 
to nothing more than a conflict between various races for the 
government. Since the arrival of the English and the spread 
of their commodities the Indians have had their livelihood 
torn from their hands, and the consequence has been that they 
have departed from their stable situation. The workers there 
are already migrating and through mingling with other peoples 
are becoming for the first time accessible to civilisation.
The old Indian aristocracy is completely ruined, and the people 
are being set against each other as much there as here.
Subsequently, we have seen how China, the land which has 
stubbornly resisted development and all historical change for 
more than a thousand years, has now been overthrown and 
dragged into civilisation by the English and their machines.
In Engels' report, one can observe both the theme of the revolut­
ionary impact of Western capitalism on countries which had resisted 
change for millennia, and the theme of the contrast between the super­
ficial (political) turbulence of traditional Oriental society and its 
fundamental (social) changelessness - a theme already encountered in 
relation to Herder and Hegel, and which was to reappear in Marx's 
articles for the New York Daily Tribune.
The theme of the revolutionary effects of the capitalist world
market on countries previously 'more or less strangers to historical 
2development' was also developed by Engels in his Principles of Communism
and became part of the Communist Manifesto. Western capitalism, in
compelling 'all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois
3mode of production', also brought the possibility of socialism to the
See the [Protokollauszüge über die von Marx und Engels in Londoner 
Bildungs-Gesellschaft für Arbeiter am 30 November und am 7 Dezember 
1847 gehaltenen Vorträge], MEGA 1/VI, p. 638.
2 Engels, Principles of Communism (written October 1847), tr. Paul M. 
Sweezy, London, Pluto, n.d., p. 8.
3 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, MESW, Vol. I, pp. 36-37.
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non-Western world. Moreover, its role in bringing all nations of
the world into contact with one another ensured that:
Whatever happens in civilised countries will have reper­
cussions in all other countries. It follows that if the 
workers in France and England now liberate themselves, this 
must set off revolutions in all other countries - revolutions 
which sooner or later must accomplish the liberation of their 
respective working classes.1
The Communist Manifesto describes the impact of capitalism on trad­
itional societies both in terms of the destruction of traditional 
manufactures and in terms of the stimulation of material wants, long 
underdeveloped in Eastern societies. Marx and Engels followed Hegel 
in the belief that man’ developed his potential powers in the process of 
satisfying everchanging and diversifying material needs. Hegel wrote 
that:
An animal's needs and its ways and means of satisfying them 
are both alike restricted in scope. Though man is subject to 
this restriction too, yet at the same time he evinces his 
transcendence of it and his universality, first by the 
multiplication of needs and means of satisfying them, and 
secondly by the differentiation and division of concrete need 
into single parts and aspects which in turn become different 
needs, particularised and so more abstract .2
Marx and Engels applied this idea to the functions of the world 
market:
In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the 
country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction 
the products of distant lands and climes. In place, of the old 
local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have inter­
course in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. 
And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The 
intellectual creations of individual nations become common 
property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become
Engels, Principles of Communism, op.cit., p. 9.
2 Hegel, Philosophy of Plight, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1942, § 190, p. 127.
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more and more impossible ...
Marx and Engels were also interested in the non-Western world from 
the point of view of its role in prolonging the life of European capit­
alism (through the provision of raw materials and markets). This 
argument became particularly important to Marx and Engels in and after 
1850, with the disappointment of their early revolutionary hopes.
But although Marx and Engels foreshadowed their later analysis of
the dynamics of interaction between East and West during this period,
they did not as yet attempt any explanation of the special character
of the Oriental world (as they understood it from Hegel). This was in
spite of the fact that their reading in these years encompassed many of
the authors referred to in Chapter One, who put forward explanations of
the character of Oriental society. Marx had taken copious notes from
Montesquieu's De 1'esprit des lois as early as 1843, and in the following
2years he began his study of the British political economists. He read 
and made extracts from Richard Jones' Essay on the Distribution of 
Wealth in 1851, though the latter's analysis of Asiatic society only made
Marx, Engels, Communist Manifesto, l o c . c i t p.36. Cf. Marx's later 
description of the impact of British capitalism on the traditional Indian 
village - a community which had 'existed with a given scale of low 
conveniences, almost without intercourse with other villages, without the 
desires and efforts indispensable to social advance. The British 
having broken up this self-sufficient inertia of the villages, railways 
will provide the new want of communication and intercourse'. ('The 
Future Results of British Rule in India', N.Y.D.T., 8 August 1853, Karl 
Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 135.)
2 For details of Marx's reading in these years see Maximilien Rubel,
'Les cahiers de lecture de Karl Marx: 1840-1853', International Review
of Social History, New Series, 2, 1957, pp. 392-420. Marx's notes on 
Smith are reproduced in MEGA 1/3, pp. 457-492. Other writers on the 
subject of Asiatic despotism with whom Marx came into contact at this 
time were the Physiocrats, Linguet, and W.A. Mackinnon. (The latter of 
whom argued that the basis of Oriental despotism was the ownership of all 
land by the sovereign combined with a lack of moral principle brought 
about by the absence of a middle class.) See W.A. Mackinnon, History of 
Civilisation and Public Opinion, 2 vols., 3rd ed., London, Henry 
Colbourn, 1849, Vol. II, pp. 185-215.
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a real impact on Marx after he had read Jones’ most important source, 
Francois Bernier, for himself in 1853.^
In 1853, in connection with his articles for the New York Daily 
Tribune, Marx began for the first time to consider seriously the socio­
economic nature of Oriental society. It is then that the impact of
his earlier reading becomes apparent, in conjunction with the further
2research he nov; undertook. Through looking at Marx's correspondence 
with Engels, it is possible to observe fairly closely the formation of 
the working model of Asiatic society which was to serve Marx for the 
rest of his life.
Marx's starting point was Bernier, whose writing convinced Marx
that the essence of Oriental society lay in the fact that the 'king is
3
the one and only proprietor of all the land in the kingdom...'.
'Bernier', Marx wrote to Engels, 'correctly discovers the basic form
of all phenomena in the East - he refers to Turkey, Persia, Hindostan -
to be the absence of private property in land. This is the real key
4even to the Oriental heaven...'. Engels raised the question why the
5'Orientals did not arrive at landed property, even in its feudal form'. 
Geographical factors in the East, he declared, made irrigation 'the first
See Marx to Engels, 2 June 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modern­
ization, pp. 450-451.
2 The Institute of Social History in Amsterdam holds four notebooks 
dating from this period which contain Marx's notes on his research into 
the nature of Oriental society. The works read by Marx in 1853 included 
Bernier's Voyages ..., James Mill's The History of British India, George 
Campbell's Modern India and Raffles' History of Java. For further details 
of these see the previous chapter.
3 Marx to Engels, 2 June 1853, loc.cit., p. 450.
4 Ibid., p. 451.
Engels to Marx, 6 June 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modern­
ization, p. 451.
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condition of agriculture' and that this was 'a matter either for the
communes, the provinces or the central government'.  ^ Private property
in land did not develop, in other words, because the private individual,
as such, was unable to supply the conditions of agriculture.
In his article 'The British Rule in India\ Marx took over Engels'
explanation of why Oriental society had assumed its particular features -
the need for the government to perform 'an economical function' in
2providing public works such as irrigation. Complementary to the
'centralizing power of Government' was the dispersal of the population
in small villages, each representing a self-sufficient world in which
3agricultural and manufacturing pursuits were combined.
Thus by June 1853 Marx had already developed the distinctive Marxist
model of Oriental society. This model was similar to that employed by
the political economists, in that the central feature of Oriental
society was seen as the government monopoly of land (soon to be expressed
by Marx in terms of the government monopoly of surplus value), but the
explanation given for this monopoly was new. The idea that the state
had attained its economic pre-eminence in Asiatic society because of
the need for the central power to provide the conditions of production
such as irrigation and communication appears to be original to Marx 
4and Engels.
Ibid., p. 452.
 ^ Marx, 'The British Rule in India', N.Y.D.T. 25 June 1853, Karl Marx 
on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 90. See also Capital, Vol. I. p.
514, fn. 2: 'One of the material bases of the power of the State over
the small disconnected producing organisms in India, was the regulation 
of the water supply'.
3 Marx, 'The British Rule in India', loc.cit., pp. 92-94.
4 There are, of course, inconsistencies in Marx, as when he claims that 
'it seems to have been the Mohammedans who first established the principle 
of "no property in land" throughout the whole of Asia'. (I.e., a combin­
ation of the religious and conquest explanations of Oriental despotism.)
See Marx to Engels, 14 June 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization,
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Marx almost immediately began to modify his initial thesis 
concerning the absence of private property in land in the Orient.^ As 
he came across the controversy among British writers on this subject 
Marx revised his opinion about the complete 'absence of property in land' 
in the East. He arrived at a more complex argument which distinguished 
nominal and symbolic ownership from traditional rights of possession 
and usufruct, and which allowed for communal and even individual title 
to the land. Since the 1840s Marx has stressed that the first form of 
ownership was tribal/communal, and by 1857 he had returned to the position 
that such communal property preceded the rest of the system of Oriental 
despotism.^
Asiatic society had its genesis in a form of communal ownership more
resistant to the evolution of private property than either the Greco-
3Roman or Germanic forms. Hence the development of private-property
based classes did not precede or coincide with the creation of state
power, as in Western societies. In Asiatic society, the state came into
being to perform certain public tasks which could not be fulfilled at
the village level. Furthermore, these public tasks included vital
economic functions which in the West could be fulfilled by the voluntary
association of private enterprise, but not in the Orient, because there
'civilization was too low and the territorial extent too vast to call
4into life voluntary association'. The low level of civilization'was 
itself conditioned by the communal village structure, which inhibited 
the development of a more complex social division of labour; and which
p. 457. See also Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 791, fn. 44, for another instance 
of Marx's employment of the conquest explanation of Oriental despotism.
See Marx to Engels, 14 June 1853, loc.cit., pp. 456-457.
2 See Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op.cit., p. 33; Marx, 
Grundrisse, pp. 472-473; p. 484. 'Amidst Oriental despotism and the 
propertylessness which seems legally to exist there, this clan or communal 
property exists in fact as the foundation...'. (Ibid., p. 473.)
3 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 471-498.4 Marx, 'The British Rule in India', loc.cit., p. 90.
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brought about instead the multiplication of homologous, self-sufficient 
communities united only through their common relationship to the central 
power and individually too weak to undertake large public tasks.
The importance of the economic functions which thus devolved on 
the central government enabled the state to exert a claim prior to that 
of the commune over the surplus produced by its members. ('The [higher] 
unity is the ... real presupposition of communal property'.)1 Hence 
the commune, although the original 'owner' of the land, which its members 
possessed in virtue of their membership of the community, was reduced 
to the status of intermediary in the appropriation of the surplus value 
from the direct producers by the central government.
The key feature then of Marx's mature model of Oriental society
was that the state, rather than the slave-owner or feudal lord found in
Western pre-capitalist societies, was the 'principal owner of the surplus 
2product'. This, together with the general absence of 'strong' private- 
property rights which could give rise to powerful social classes was 
the basic distinction which Marx was to draw between the pre-capitalist 
societies of the East and of the West. The Eastern system conserved, and 
was conserved by, an archaic social base - villages, which in their 
communal arrangements bore some relationship to the primitive kinship 
communities in which men first settled on the land.
The combination of the monopoly by the state of economic initiative
Marx, Grundrisse, p. 473.
2 E.g., Capital, Vol. Ill, pp. 326; 331; 791; 794. The translation
of Tributverhaltnis as 'vassalage' (ibid., p. 326) is quite inaccurate 
in the context - Marx is here contrasting the role of the 'tribute­
collecting state' with that of the slave-owner or feudal lord. As he 
wrote elsewhere, 'In Europe, im unterschied vom East, in place of the 
produce tribute was substituted a dominion over the soil - the cultivators 
being turned out of their land u. reduced to the conditions of serfs or 
labourers'. (xMarx's conspectus of Sir John Budd Phear, The Aryan Village 
in India and Ceylon [London, 1880, notes written Aug.-Sept. 1881], Lawrence 
Kräder ed., The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, Assen, Van Gorcum, 
1972, p. 284.)
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and the surplus product, and the lingering on of village communalism 
(which also inhibited the rise of the private entrepreneur), meant that, 
in Marx's view there was a complete lack of dynamism within the Oriental 
system. There was the possibility neither of the development of commodity 
production, as in the Western slave-holding formation, nor of the devel­
opment of the urban commune, and urban manufacture, as in Western 
feudalism.
Alternative Interpretations: The Question of the Continuity or
Discontinuity of Marx's Model of Asiatic Society
It has been argued by Donald M. Lowe that three different models
of the Asiatic mode of production appear in the work of Marx and Engels:
one dating from 1853, one from Capital, and one from the Anti-Duhring
of Engels. According to Lowe:
The 1853 version used the self*-enclosed village community and the 
state water works to explain the persistence of the political 
phenomenon of Oriental despotism. The Capital version used the 
self-enclosed village community and the state consumption of 
surplus value to explain the economic phenomenon of under­
development in commodity exchange. The Anti-Dühring version 
emphasized the self-enclosed village community, but pointed 
to the eventual transition from communal landownership to 
small-peasant landownershp (sic).l
The implications which Lowe draws from this alleged change of 
models are as follows:
'The shift in argument away from state water works and Oriental 
despotism, I believe, has to be explained basically by the 
change in approach from that of political economy to that of
Donald M. Lowe, The Function of 'China' in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, 
University of California Press, 1966, p. 14. Lowe's interpretation 
of Anti-Dühring will be dealt with in a later section of this chapter 
which is devoted specifically to Engels.
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economics. Therefore, the political-economic approach 
indicated the interaction between Oriental despotism and 
Asiatic economy, and the economic approach explained the 
Asiatic mode of production in purely economic terms'.1
Lowe's argument for a shift in models, and the reasons he adduces 
for this shift, stem basically from a misapprehension concerning the 
model Marx arrived at in 1853. This misapprehension centres around the 
term 'Oriental despotism', which Lowe appears to interpret in the Wittfogel 
manner, as signifying a system of political totalitarianism. But already 
in 1853, thanks to his acquaintance with political economy, 'Oriental 
despotism' signified for Marx not so much a political phenomenon, as a 
non-progressive economic form marked by state intervention in the economy. 
In fact Marx went to some pains in 1853 to explain how little the 
central government impinged on the archaic self-governing institutions 
of the Oriental village community. Thus Marx quoted this description 
of the village:
The inhabitants gave themselves no trouble about the breaking 
up and divisions of kingdoms; while the village remains 
entire, they care not to what power it is transferred or to 
what sovereign it devolves; its internal economy remains 
unchanged. The potail is still the head inhabitant and still 
acts as the petty judge or magistrate, and collector or 
rentor of the village.2
Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the political
 ^ Ibid.
2 Marx, quoting from the Fifth Report of the Committee on East India 
Affairs (1812), in 'The British Rule in India', loc.cit., p. 93. Cf.
'In the East, under the village system, the people practically governed 
themselves...' (Marx's conspectus of Sir John Budd Phear, The Aryan 
Village in India and Ceylon, loc.cit., p. 284.) The italicised words 
are those underlined by Marx. Jean Chesneaux sees the capacity of the 
central power to reduce its intervention at the village level to a mini­
mum as indicative of the high development of the art of government in 
'Asiatic' society: 'le caractere elabore, rationalise, conscient, des
mecanismes de la societe "asiatiqueu, dans laquelle le pouvoir central 
tirait parti au maximum de la capacite "automotrice" des communautds de 
village et grace a sa science, reduisait au maximum son intervention'. 
(Jean Chesneaux, "Ou en est la discussion sur le 'mode de production 
asiatique1?", La Pensee, No. 122 (Aug. 1965), pp. 54-55.)
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economists did not, as Lowe implies, regard the governmental control
of water works as the key to the Oriental system. They described the
essence of the Asiatic system as being the state monopoly of the land
and land revenue, probably stemming from the conquest of the native
people by nomadic invaders.'*' Because the Asiatic state had a direct
interest in the revenue of the soil, it frequently provided public works
such as irrigation schemes to enhance productivity, but this was not
seen as the cause of its exclusive proprietorship.
Marx never seriously took up the conquest explanation of how the
state came to achieve its dominating position in the Eastern economy.
He argued on the contrary that the Asiatic system of exploitation owed
less to foreign conquest than did Western forms of exploitation
2such as slavery and serfdom. The explanation he did adopt from 1853 on 
was Engels' idea that the Asiatic state owed its economic position to 
the fact that it played a necessary entrepreneurial role in providing 
the conditions of production, a role forced on it by geographical 
conditions.
It is true, as Lowe points out, that Marx does not continue the
discussion in Capital concerning why the Asiatic state came to have an
effective monopoly over the land. In the Grundrisse, however, where
pre-capitalist formations are specifically under analysis, as they are
not in the published sections of Capital, he does discuss this issue,
and irrigation functions are listed prominently among the factors giving
3rise to Oriental despotism. Likewise, in an article of 1858 Marx wrote
E.g., '...all the great empires of Asia have been overrun by foreigners; 
and on their rights as conquerors the claim of the present sovereign to 
the soil rests'. (Richard Jones, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth,
1831, reprinted N.Y., Kelley and Millman, 1956, p. 110.)
2 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 493.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 473-475.
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that works of public utility were 'more indispensable in Asiatic
countries than anywhere else... ' ^
Hence there is a continuity in Marx's explanation of the Eastern
system which Lowe overlooks. Marx did not cease to believe that the
state monopoly of the surplus in the East was closely linked with the
need for the Eastern state to play an organising role in actualising
2the productivity of the soil. It was simply that in Capital itself
he was looking more closely at the consequences of such a state monopoly
of revenue, although in a way completely foreshadowed in 1853 (the lack
3of development of Western-style cities etc.) The role of the village
system in hampering the development of a nation-wide division of
labour and commodity exchange v/as also foreshadowed in 1853.
Eric Hobsbavnn, in his introduction to the first English translation
of the Pre-Capitalist Formations, pursues an argument which is apparently
the source of Lowe's three models of the Asiatic mode of production.
Hobsbawm writes as follows:
Ignorance of the Formen has resulted in the discussion 
of the oriental system in the past being based chiefly 
. on Marx and Engels' earlier letters and on Marx's articles 
on India (both 1853), where it is characterised - in 
line with the views of the earliest foreign observers - 
by 'the absence of property in land'. This was thought 
due to special conditions, requiring exceptional central­
isation, e.g. the need for public works and irrigation 
schemes in areas which could not otherwise be effectively 
cultivated. However, on further consideration, Marx 
evidently held that the fundamental characteristic of this 
system was 'the self-sustaining unity of manufacture and
Marx, [Taxes in India], leading article, N.Y.D.T., 23 July 1858, Karl 
Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 335.
2 Or providing the 'communal conditions of real appropriation through 
labour' as Marx expressed it in the Grundrisse, pp. 473-474.
3 The continuity of Marx's analysis is particularly evident in his hand­
ling of the question of the effects of the centralised distribution of 
revenue on the Oriental city. His first letter on the subject of Oriental 
society stressed Bernier's description of this, while his later work util­
ised Richard Jones' systematisation of Bernier's material. (See Marx to 
Engels, 2 June 1853, loc cit., the Grundrisse, pp. 474, 479; Theories of 
Surplus Value, Part III, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972, pp. 401, 416, 
435. )
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agriculture, which thus contains all the conditions for 
reproduction and surplus production within itself .. . 1
Pace Hobsbawm, the 'self-sustaining unity of manufacture and
agriculture' in no way explains what Marx regarded as the key to any
socio-economic formation - i.e., the way in which the 'unpaid surplus-
2labour is pumped out of direct producers'. Marx continued to believe 
that in Asiatic society the major proportion of the surplus value 
accrued to the state, in contrast with the situation in Western socio­
economic formations, and that this was primarily because the Asiatic 
state had a special role in providing the communal conditions of prod­
uction. Indeed Marx suggested that the particular conditions of prod­
uction in Asia which rendered the state the chief exploiter of labour 
were also the reason why the original Oriental village community was 
so much more resistant to the forces of dissolution than were the 
Western forms of communal ownership. In the West, circumstances arose
in which individual property did not require communal labour for its 
3valorisation. In Asiatic society, by contrast, the individual was 
doubly dependent on the community, i.e. the community both in the forms 
of the village community and of the state, for the provision of the 
conditions of production. Thus exploitation by representatives of the 
larger community took the place of exploitation by the private individuals 
who in the West came to control access to the means of production.
Hobsbawm's and Lowe's reaction to Marx's use of the term 'Oriental 
despotism' and their desire to prove that Marx moved away from such a
4concept towards a more 'consistently economic and more cogent' argument
Introduction to Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1964, p. 33.
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 791.
3 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 475. Nicolaus' translation is not directly 
quoted here, as it is exceptionally awkward, and furthermore renders 
'verwertet' rather loosely as 'realised'.
4 Donald M. Lowe, The Function of 'China1 234 in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, op.cit., 
p. 14.
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epitomises the many attempts to 'save* Marx from Wittfogel. These
attempts are misguided insofar as Marx used the terms 'Oriental despotism',
'Asiatic despotism', 'Oriental despot' etc., all his life, although he
did not mean by them what Wittfogel means.
What Marx says in the section on Labour Rent in Capital, for example,
is that 'there need exist no stronger political or economic pressure'
on the direct producer where the state is his direct landlord, and rent
and taxes coincide, than where he is confronted by a private landov/ner,
as in the West.'*' Marx regarded contemporary Western governments as more
potentially oppressive than Oriental despotisms - to get free of an
oppressive social situation was much more difficult in the conditions
of social interdependence of modern centralised government than under
2'the much more "fluid" Asiatic despotism or feudal anarchy'.
In any 'Asiatic' system the exploitation of the direct producers
was limited, as in the feudal systems of the West, by the predominance
of natural economy. Marx analysed the situation in the following manner:
'It is, however, clear that in any given economic formation of society where
not the exchange-value but the use-value of the product predominates, surplus-
labour will be limited by a given set of wants which may be greater or
less, and that here no boundless thirst for surplus-labour arises from
3the nature of the production itself'.
Accordingly, where rent rather than profit is the chief means of 
accumulation (i.e. where the capitalist mode of production has not yet 
become predominant) the direct producer not only retains that part of
Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 791.
2 Marginal note by Marx on H.C. Irwin's The Garden of India, London, 
Allen, 1880, p. 263, see Ex Libris, p. 103.
3
Capital, Vol. I, p. 235.
63
his production equivalent to his own wages, but is almost always able
to retain a proportion of the surplus value he creates. As Marx wrote:
...as long as the greater part of the surplus labour and 
surplus product which does not accrue to the worker 
himself, goes to the landowner (the State in Asia) and, 
on the other hand, the worker reproduces his labour fund 
himself, i.e., he not only produces his own wages himself, 
but pays them to himself, usually, moreover, (almost always 
in that state of society) he is also able to appropriate 
at least a part of his surplus labour and his surplus 
product ...
This is contrasted by Marx with the capitalist mode of production, where
...the capitalist directly appropriates the whole surplus 
labour and surplus product in the first instance, although 
he has to hand over portions of it to the landowner...^
Because of the centralisation of revenue, the Asiatic state had
the power to command large-scale co-operation, but:
This power of Asiatic and Egyptian Kings, Etruscan theocrats,
& c,has in modern society been transferred to the capitalist, 
whether he be an isolated, or as in joint-stock companies, 
a collective capitalist.2
Marx took over from Hegel and other sources the notion that the 
East was stagnant. What he sought from political economy was a 'scientific* 
explanation for this Oriental stagnation, not an explanation, for Oriental 
political oppression or excessive economic exploitation. Marx 
perceived Oriental government as arbitrary, but as intervening less than 
Western governments with respect to the underlying structure of society.
In his treatment of the Oriental village system, as we shall see, he was 
to reject all suggestions that the state played an active role in moulding 
the infrastructure of society.
Basically Marx never added very much to the model of Oriental society
Marx, Theories of Surplus 
that in Asia rents and taxes 
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p.
Value, Part III, op.cit., 
coincide.
334.
pp. 420-421. Note
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he derived from the £:>olitical economists, apart from his explanation 
of the origins of the system, which he had already arrived at through 
Engels in 1853. In Capital Marx simply adds some points of 
detail to the model, like the effects of the Asiatic tax in kind in 
further inhibiting the development of commodity exchange.1 Marx did 
go beyond the political economists in his investigation into the kinship 
origins of the community property forms found in the Orient, but this 
did not affect his working model of Oriental society. There are also 
some discontinuities in Marx's attitude towards the potential development 
of the Oriental village system, which will be discussed elsewhere.
The continuity of Marx's thought about Asiatic society stemmed from 
the fact that in political economy Marx found an explanation for the 
backwardness, or non-developmental character, of the Orient which fitted 
in completely with his own life-long anti-etatist views. The monopoly 
of economic initiative by entrepreneurial state power resulted in stag­
nation, as would be argued by any nineteenth-century liberal, including 
Marx who shared the views of the liberals about the role of state power.
Marx's Analysis of Asiatic Society in the General Perspective of his 
Social Theory
Marx acknowledged the Asiatic mode of production to be a socio­
economic formation of comparable historical importance to the ancient,
2feudal and 'modern bourgeois' modes of production. At first sight this
Capital, Vol. I, pp. 140-141; Vol. Ill, p. 796.
2 Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. 
S.W. Ryazanskaya, Moscow, Progress, 1970, p. 21. Other problems raised by this 
passage, relating to whether Marx saw these formations as logically or 
chronologically progressive, and how this notion of progression can be fitted 
into a multilinear theory of history, will be discussed below in Chapter Five.
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acknowledgement appears to be an anomaly within Marx's theory of society. 
The anomaly arises because in the Asiatic mode of production, as defined 
by Marx, the development of self-conscious classes and class struggle 
was of negligible importance, whereas according to his social theory 
'The history of all hitherto-existing society is the history of class 
struggles'.^
One approach to the problem has been to read the concept out of 
the Marxist canon, as was done in the Soviet Union between 1931 and 
1964. As one of the spokesmen who presided over the exorcism was to 
say:
The Asiatic mode of production ... is theoretically
unfounded, because it contradicts the foundations of 
. the Marxist-Leninist teaching on classes and the state.
The apparent anomaly can be eliminated on a facile level by resort­
ing to Marx's notion that Asiatic society was in fact incapable of history, 
or only of perpetuating 'unhistorical history', precisely because of 
the absence within it of classes and class struggle. However, a further 
problem then arises concerning the functions of state power. According 
to Marx's analysis, the state form, as contrasted with primitive kinship 
organisation, was essentially part of the superstructure of society, 
brought into existence when class antagonisms had become so severe that 
they could only be held in check by a repressive power. But Marx did not 
attempt to relate the rise of state power in Asiatic society to the 
repressive functions required by class society.
In Marx's model the Asiatic state is not only part of the super­
structure of society, but also part of the productive base, the state
1 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, MESVJ, Vol. I, p. 33.
2 E. Iolk, in Diskussiia ob aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva, Moscow, 1931, 
quoted in Y. [E.] Varga, Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism, Moscow, 
Progress, 1968, p. 350.
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being required to provide the communal conditions of production, such
as irrigation. As the soil was unproductive without the entrepreneurial
or organisational role of the state, the state assumed a controlling
interest in the soil and its surplus product. Agriculture in Asia
could not be sustained 'on the British principle of free competition,
of laissez faire and laissez aller.'^  This was unlike the situation
in slave or feudal societies, where state intervention was not an
economic necessity in order to make land productive, and stronger forms
2of private appropriation of the land developed. In these societies 
the slave-owner or the feudal lord were able to establish the private 
control of the means of production, and hence to enjoy that surplus
3product of the land which in the East was monopolised by the state.
The relationship of the state to the base was mediated by dominant econ­
omic classes, which largely discouraged direct state intervention in 
the economy.
In his analysis of Western society Marx treated social and political 
power as being in a dependent relationship to the (private) ownership 
of the dominant means of production. Political structures were shaped 
in accordance with the interests of property-owning classes, and political 
ruling groups represented these interests, protecting them where need 
be by force. In the East, where the state 'owned' the dominant means
4of production, and hence itself formed part of the economic base, this
Marx, 'The British Rule in India', loc.cit., p. 91.
2 See the passage already cited in Marx, Grundrisse, p. 475.
3 For the comparison between the appropriation by the slave owner and 
feudal lord in the West, and the state in the East, see, in particular, 
Capital, Vol. Ill, pp. 326; 331.
4 'It is always the direct relationship of the owners [in this case 
"owner"] of the conditions of production to the direct producers ... 
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social 
structure ...'. (Ibid., p. 791.)
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S i t u a t i o n  was r e v e r s e d .  Economic and  s o c i a l  p r i v i l e g e  d e r i v e d  from  
p o l i t i c a l  f u n c t i o n ,  and  w ere  d e p e n d e n t  on s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  s t a t e  r a t h e r  
t h a n  on th e  o w n e r s h ip  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ;  ^ t h e  s y s te m  o f  b e n e f i c e s  
d i d  n o t  become h e r e d i t a r y  and  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  s e r v i c e  as  i n  t h e  W est.
Hence t h e r e  i s  a  b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  
M a rx 's  g e n e r a l  model, o f  s o c i e t y  and  i n  h i s  model o f  A s i a t i c  s o c i e t y .
In  h i s  g e n e r a l  m odel t h e  s t a t e  b o r e  o n ly  an  i n d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  
t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  b a s e ;  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h ich  c o n s i s t e d  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i v e  ( p r i v a t e )  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d ­
u c t i o n  t h a t  w ere  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  econom ic  p r o g r e s s  up t o  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  
s t a g e .  In  h i s  m odel o f  A s i a t i c  s o c i e t y ,  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  g i v e n ,  i t  was 
s t a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  p r i v a t e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  w h ich  l a y  a t  t h e  b a s e  o f  t h e  
s y s te m .
Marx h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i s e d  on t h e  f a c t u a l  g ro u n d s  t h a t  t h e  A s i a t i c
s t a t e  had  f a r  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  d i r e c t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f
p r o d u c t i o n  ( e . g .  i r r i g a t i o n ,  com m un ica t ion )  t h a n  he  assum ed . F o r  ex am p le ,
B a r r i n g t o n  Moore h a s  a r g u e d ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  I n d i a ,  t h a t  t h e  A s i a t i c  s t a t e
was e c o n o m ic a l ly  s u p e r f l u o u s ;  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  e v e n  have  t o  p e r f o r m
m in im a l  s t a t e  f u n c t i o n s  ( l i k e  t h e  W e s te rn  s t a t e )  s u c h  a s  k e e p in g  o r d e r ,
a s  t h i s  was done by t h e  c a s t e  sy s te m ;  and  t h a t  i t  p l a y e d  no p o s i t i v e
2
r o l e  i n  l o c a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  Marx h i m s e l f  commented t h a t  w here  i n d e p e n d e n t  
n a t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  c o m m u n it ie s  e x i s t e d ,  as  i n  I n d i a ,  t h e  s u r p l u s  c o u ld  
o n ly  be  e x t o r t e d  from  them  by ' o t h e r  t h a n  econom ic  p r e s s u r e ,  w h a te v e r  t h e
C f .  G.V. P le k h a n o v :  ' t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s e s  we m e e t  w i t h  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y
o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  h e l d  t h e i r  more o r  l e s s  e x a l t e d  s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n  owing 
t o  t h e  s t a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  c a l l e d  i n t o  b e in g  by  t h e  n eed s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  
p r o d u c t i v e  p r o c e s s ' .  ( The M a t e r i a l i s t  C o n c e p t io n  o f  H i s t o r y , f i r s t  p u b l i s h e d
i n  Novoe S l o v o ,  1897, No. 9 , Moscow, F o r e ig n  L anguages  P u b l i s h i n g  H ouse,
1946, p .  21*)
2
B a r r i n g t o n  Moore, S o c i a l  O r i g i n s  o f  D i c t a t o r s h i p  and Democracy,  London, 
P e n g u in  P r e s s ,  1967 , p .  791.
68
form assumed may be'. The non-economic pressure Marx had in mind here
2was that deriving from conquest, although elsewhere he also discusses 
the role of social norms:
... surplus labour takes the form of tribute etc., as 
well as of common labour for the exaltation of the unity, 
partly of the real despot, partly of the imagined clan­
being, the god.* 23
Marx's model of Asiatic society certainly contained an exaggerated 
view of the role of the state in providing the direct conditions of 
production, and as we see, he became aware of this exaggeration to a 
certain extent. However he was unable to find an alternative 
and hence to him ultimately satisfying explanation of how the Asiatic 
state came to 'own', or control the means of production in such a way 
that it could wrest the surplus product from the direct producers. Here, 
as with other aspects of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, 
Marx provides only hints, which need to be considerably developed by 
others (and many have contributed to this process) to provide a satisfact­
ory Marxist historiography of non-Western society. These difficulties 
present in Marx's analysis do not, however, affect the fundamental 
distinction he drew between Western society, where control over the 
social suirplus was exercised by social classes comprised of the private
Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 791.
2 'Following the conquest of a country, the immediate aim of a conqueror 
was to convert its people to his own use'. {Ibid., fn. 44.)
3 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 473. Cf. Nikolai Bukharin, who analysed the 
symbolic functions of the Asiatic state vis a vis the direct producers 
as follows: 'Why, for instance, was so vast a quantity of national labour
in ancient Egypt devoted to the construction of the huge pyramids, great 
Pharaonic statues, and other monuments of feudal (sic) art? For the 
simple reason that Egyptian society could not have maintained itself with­
out constantly impressing upon the slaves and peasants the sublimity and 
divine power of their rulers.' '... it was therefore a sine qua non for 
this society and took an enormous share of the country's labor budget.'
I.e. non-economic pressure was the most important factor in the extortion 
of surplus value from the direct producers in this particular socio-economic 
formation. (Nikolai Bukharin, Historical Materialism, (first published 
Moscow,1921), N.Y., International Publishers, 1925, p. 220.)
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ow ners o f  t h e  means o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  and  E a s t e r n  s o c i e t y  w here  such  
c o n t r o l  was u l t i m a t e l y  m o n o p o l is e d  by th e  s t a t e .
Max Weber was to  a t t e m p t  t o  r e s o l v e  M a rx 's  p ro b le m s  by  r e t a i n i n g
an econom ic  o r  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e s i s  o f  t h e  O r i e n t a l
s t a t e ,  b u t  a d d in g  t o  i t  a  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  autonom ous d e v e lo p m e n t  o f
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Once a s t a t e  s t r u c t u r e  ( i . e .  b u r e a u c r a c y )
was s e t  up to  d e a l  w i th  some l a r g e  econom ic  t a s k ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f
c o m p e t in g  s o c i a l  a g e n c i e s ,  i t  w ould  c o n t i n u e  t o  expand  i t s  a r e a  o f  c o n t r o l ,
w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  a  more g e n e r a l  econom ic  r a t i o n a l e . ^ Marx h a d  a l r e a d y
a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e s e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  gov e rn m en ts  came i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  where
t h e r e  was an a b s e n c e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  c a p a b le  o f  d e a l -
2i n g  w i t h  l a r g e - s c a l e  c o r p o r a t e  t a s k s .  He th u s  assum ed t h a t  t h e r e  were 
no s t r o n g  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  f o r c e s  w h ich  m ig h t  check  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  s t a t e  
s t r u c t u r e s  beyond  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  (econom ic) p u r p o s e .  In  f a c t  W e b er 's  
a rg u m e n t  i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  Marx, and  e x p l a i n s  h i s  c o n s t a n t  e m p h a s is  on th e  
c o r r e l a t i o n  b e tw e en  t h e  v i l l a g e  s y s te m ,  w hich  i n h i b i t e d  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  
o f  any l a r g e - s c a l e  s o c i a l  com m un ica t ion  o r  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and 
O r i e n t a l  d e s p o t i s m .  Marx f a i l e d  t o  make t h i s  a rg u m e n t  e x p l i c i t  b e c a u s e  
h e r e ,  as  e l s e w h e r e ,  he  was r e l u c t a n t  t o  p l a c e  to o  much w e i g h t  on th e  
i n t e r n a l  momentum o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as  an e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e .
A l th o u g h  Marx a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  A s i a t i c  s t a t e  a more d i r e c t  r o l e  i n  
p r o d u c t i o n  th a n  he  d i d  t o  t h e  W e ste rn  s t a t e ,  he  by  no means r e g a r d e d  
t h i s  as a  v i r t u e .  As a l r e a d y  s e e n ,  Marx s h a r e d  w i t h  t h e  l i b e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  
e c o n o m is ts  t h e  v iew  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  c o u ld  n o t ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  b e  t h e  
e n g in e  o f  human p r o g r e s s .  The n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  m onopoly o f  t h e
Max Weber, Economy and S o c i e t y ,  V o l .  I l l ,  N .Y . ,  B e d m in s te r  P r e s s ,  1968,
p p .  126 0 -1 2 6 2 .
Marx, 'T he  B r i t i s h  R u le  i n  I n d i a ' ,  l o c . c i t . , p .  90 .
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surplus and the weak development of private property might prove an 
advantage in the modernisation of Asiatic society was quite alien to 
his theoretical premises. Although Marx stressed the role of the state 
in the process of primitive accumulation in the West, he never conceded 
that the state might play a positive role as an industrial entrepreneur.
(His comments on Russia in this connection suggested that state enter­
prise of this kind was doomed to a revolutionary overthrow which would 
liberate private enterprise - in the language of contemporary political 
science, once characteristic industrial roles had been artificially 
introduced, these stimulated the appearance of the structures and functions 
with which they were originally associated.
One of the fundamental premises of Marx's mature political theory 
was that social progress took place as the consequence of the struggle 
of coherent social groups. Social groups arose embodying new modes of 
production, and struggled to impose a new configuration on society, 
appropriate to their needs (and the needs of progress). Asiatic society 
lacked this historical dynamic.
Thus for Marx the East was stagnant because the state, with its 
monopoly of surplus value,prevented the growth of competing economic 
classes. For the liberals it was stagnant because the state monopoly 
prevented the growth of individual competition and incentive. Both Marx 
and the liberals saw private property in land as the 'great desideratum 
of Asiatic society'.'*" Marx believed as strongly as the political economists
'The Future Results of British Rule in India', loc.cit., p. 133. At 
least one Indian communist has employed Marx's analysis of Asiatic society 
to quite opposite effect. Palme Dutt wrote: 'In India, as we have seen,
landlordism is an artificial creation of foreign rule, seeking to trans­
plant Western institutions, and has no roots in the traditions of the 
people. In consequence, landlordism is here more completely functionless 
than in any other country, making no pretence even of fulfilling any 
necessary role of conservation or development of the land, but, on the 
contrary, intensifying its misuse and deterioration by short-sighted
71
t h a t  a  s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g  c a p i t a l i s t  s y s te m  (o r  one f r e e  from  th e  s t a t e -
i n t e r v e n t i o n  t y p i c a l  o f  t h e  E a s t )  was n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r
. . . t o  c r e a t e  t h e  m a t e r i a l  b a s i s  o f  t h e  new w o r ld  -  on t h e  one 
hand  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  i n t e r c o u r s e  fo u n d ed  upon th e  m u tu a l  
dependency  o f  m ankind , and th e  means o f  t h a t  i n t e r c o u r s e ;  
on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  pow ers  
o f  man and  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  m a t e r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n t o  
a  s c i e n t i f i c  d o m in a t io n  o f  n a t u r a l  a g e n c i e s . 1
The d i f f e r e n c e  o f  c o u r s e  was t h a t  Marx saw t h i s  m a t e r i a l  b a s i s  as  
p r o v i d i n g  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l i s m  r a t h e r  t h a n  s im p ly  o f  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i s a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l i s m .
The City in  East and West
A c c o rd in g  t o  M arx, t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  s t a t e  monopoly o f  s u r p l u s  v a lu e  
w ere  su c h  as  t o  p r e c l u d e  any a u to c h th o n o u s  advance  to w a rd s  i n d u s t r i a l  
c a p i t a l i s m .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  r i s e  o f  town communes, one  o f  t h e  p r e ­
r e q u i s i t e s  o f  W e s te rn  c a p i t a l i s m  i n  h i s  a c c o u n t ,  c o u ld  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  
w i t h i n  t h i s  s y s te m .
Marx r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  O r i e n t a l  town t o  be  
fo u n d  i n  R ic h a rd  J o n e s .  J o n e s  p r o v i d e d  Marx w i t h  a  ready -m ade  a n a l y s i s  
o f  t h e  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e i r  common s o u r c e ,  F r a n g o i s  B e r n i e r ,  i n  te rm s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  economy.
A c c o rd in g  t o  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t h e  O r i e n t a l  town was no more t h a n  an 
a n c i l l a r y  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s t a t e .  E x c e p t  w here  t h e  l o c a t i o n  was p a r t i c u l a r l y
e x c e s s i v e  dem ands. I t  i s  a p u r e l y  p a r a s i t i c  c l a i m  on t h e  p e a s a n t r y  . . . '  
( R a ja n i  Palme D u t t ,  I n d i a  Today,  2nd r e v .  I n d i a n  e d i t i o n ,  Bombay, P e o p l e ' s  
P u b l i s h i n g  H ouse , 1949 , p .  2 4 8 . )
^ 'T h e  F u t u r e  R e s u l t s  o f  B r i t i s h  Rule  i n  I n d i a ' ,  l o c . c i t . , p .  138 .
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f a v o u r a b l e  t o  e x t e r n a l  t r a d e ,  i t  was s im p ly  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c e n t r e  o r  
g a r r i s o n ;  a p o i n t  w here
. . . t h e  h e a d  o f  t h e  s t a t e  and  h i s  s a t r a p s  exchange  t h e i r  
r e v e n u e  ( s u r p l u s  p r o d u c t )  f o r  l a b o u r ,  [and] sp e n d  i t  a s  
l a b o u r - f u n d . 1
As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,
I n  A s i a t i c  s o c i e t i e s ,  w here  t h e  m onarch  a p p e a r s  a s  t h e  
e x c l u s i v e  p r o p r i e t o r  o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s  p r o d u c t ,  
w hole  c i t i e s  a r i s e ,  w h ich  a r e  a t  b o t to m  n o t h in g  more 
t h a n  w a n d e r in g  encam pm ents , from  t h e  exchange  o f  h i s  
r e v e n u e  w i t h  t h e  ' f r e e  h a n d s ' ,  as  S t e u a r t  c a l l s  them .
3
The f o l l o w i n g  d ia g ra m ,  t a k e n  from  Ig n a c y  S a c h s ,  shows up n e a t l y  
t h e  c o m p a r a t iv e  r o l e  o f  t h e  c i t y  i n  t h e  M a r x i s t  m odels  o f  W e s te rn  
f e u d a l i s m  and t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n .
(a)
lo n g  d i s t a n c e  t r a d e
1
town s o v e r e i g n
f e u d a l  l o r d
i n d i v i d u a l
p e a s a n t s
Marx, G r u n d r i s s e , p .  474 . See a l s o  i b i d . ,  p .  479 . I n  R u s s ia  
C haadayev  h a d  a l r e a d y  w r i t t e n :  ' i n  o u r  we a r e  l i k e  nomads -  r*e-^ ach'c
t h a n  th e  t r i b e s  o u r  s t e p p e s ,  b e c a u s e  t h o s e  t r i b e s  a r e  more
a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e i r  s t e p p e s  t h a n  we a r e  t o  o u r
* P«v*rha . M ■ Grei‘th£s\{c* \ t 1 ' M Oicc*) t 1 ,m b  • 7 j
c d . e s . . . '  f F i r s t  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
L e t t e  r j   ^ This~uTeme was t o  be  d e v e lo p e d  by T r o t s k y  and P a r v u s , who 
e x p l a i n e d  c o n te m p o ra ry  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r y  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  
W e s t e r n - s t y l e  c i t y .
Marx, G r u n d r is s e ,  p .  467. I . e .  t h e  r e v e n u e  o f  t h e  m onarch i s  t h e  
e x c l u s i v e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  wages fu n d  f o r  t h e  w o rk e rs  i n  m a n u f a c tu r e s  (h e re  
h a n d  c r a f t s )  -  t h o s e  w o rk e rs  ' f r e e d '  from  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a b o u r .
3
Ig n a c y  S a c h s ,  'Une n o u v e l l e  p h a s e  de l a  d i s c u s s i o n  s u r  l e s  f o r m a t i o n s ' ,
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As represented in this diagram, the Eastern city did not enjoy 
the same range of economic relations as the Western city. In the West, 
the city had a plurality of sources of revenue, and hence was able to 
achieve a far greater economic and political independence. Within it 
there developed corporative political life and burgher rights. All this 
enabled the kind of economic and social innovation which led to Western 
capitalism.
Once again, it was to be Max Weber who developed the hints found 
in Richard Jones and Marx into a full-blown theory.'*' Weber accepted 
the notion that the role of the city was of crucial significance in 
explaining the particular historical development which brought capitalism 
into being. He was more eclectic, however, than- Marx, in his explanation 
of why the Oriental city did not achieve the independent and innovative 
role of its counterpart in the West.
Recherches internationales a la lumiere du marxisme, No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 
1967) (special volume devoted to 'Premieres societds de classes et mode 
de production asiatique'), pp. 304-305. Sachs was at the time of writing the 
article the director of the Institute for the Study of Developing Economies 
in Warsaw.
1 See, in particular, 'The City (Non-Legitimate Domination)', in Max 
Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. Ill, op.cit., pp. 1212-1339.
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Weber's explanation attributed great importance to religious 
variables. He claimed equal importance, however, for the political 
factors brought into play by the conditions of production in the East. 
As seen, he argued that the need for irrigation, for example, brought 
into being patrimonial bureaucracies. These were initially intended 
for construction tasks only, but they soon absorbed all political life, 
including that of the city.^
Both Marx and Weber believed that Asiatic society was incapable 
of giving rise to the kind of urban formation which developed within 
Western feudalism. Hence the East was also incapable of giving rise 
to that historically most revolutionary class - the bourgeoisie.
The Ancient East
Marx's paradigm of the Oriental city was not only of relevance to 
an explanation of the contemporary backwardness of the East; it was 
also of relevance to an explanation of the origins of human civilisation. 
The Oriental city had provided in the distant past the particular envir­
onment in which the development of written culture, the codification 
of law, etc., first took place. Within Marxist theory, the Oriental city 
is a vivid illustration of the dialectical process of history, whereby 
structures appropriate to a certain stage of human history become 
obstacles to further progress.
Marx never directly concerned himself with the question of why it 
should have been Oriental despotism and its associated type of city which
1 Ibid.r pp. 1260-1262.
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provided the framework in which 'civilisation' first developed. He 
did, however, write that:
It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the 
control of society, of economising, of appropriating or 
subduing it on a large scale by the work of man's hand 
that first plays a decisive part in the history of 
industry.^
The harnessing of 'natural forces' on a large scale meant the difference
between famine and plenty in some areas inhabited by ancient man. Hence
there was a strong impulse towards such large-scale organisation. This
in itself represented a great step forward in human history, in that
the development of co-operation multiplied the effectiveness of human 
2labour power. The institutional corollary of this early large-scale 
organisation of the work-force was the centralised 'despotic' state 
which directed it.
The primary relationship between Oriental despotism and the founding 
of the ancient civilisations appears, then, to reside in the creation 
of an organised work-force. The harnessing of a natural force (such 
as the great rivers associated with the early civilisations) by means 
of this organised labour brought about a tremendous upsurge in product­
ivity. The fact that the despotic state, through its organising role 
in production, was able to exercise a monopoly over the surplus meant 
that this increase in productivity was not absorbed in increased con­
sumption by the direct producers. Rather, it provided the means for the 
state to support an army of non-agricultural labourers within the
Oriental town, and hence the specialised development of arts and crafts. 3
1
2
3
Capital, Vol. I, p. 514. 
Ibid., pp. 333-334.
Ibid.
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In the long run, however, the monopoly of the surplus by the 
state tended to keep the development of agriculture, on which the whole 
edifice depended, at a standstill. The ossification of a crude division 
of labour, through its reinforcement by caste, provided another brake 
on development."^"
The question of the relationship of Oriental despotism to the
development of the ancient civilisations was to be treated more fully by
G.V. Plekhanov, for example in his review of Mechnikov's book, La
2Civilisation et les grands fleuves historiques. Mechnikov argued in
this book that civilisation first arose within the political framework 
of Oriental despotism simply because the circumstances which first led 
man to harness a great natural power also led to despotism.
In the fertile river valleys of the ancient world flood control 
meant the difference between disaster (floods) and high productivity. 
Mechnikov suggested that such flood control required a precise allocation 
of social tasks by a central authority. The absolute power of the 
latter over society was both a condition and a consequence of its power 
over nature. The close co-operation and work discipline demanded of 
all sections of society by the central authority provided the basis for 
the first flowering of civilisation.
Plekhanov fully endorsed this part of Mechnikov's argument, which 
stressed the importance of central planning in this early phase of man's 
economic development. Such central planning first came into existence
Ibid., pp. 357-358 (India); pp. 366-367 (Egypt). See also Marx and 
Engels, The German Ideology, op.cit., p. 52.
2 Plekhanov's review was published in Sotsial Demokrat, No. 1, 1890, and 
in Neue Zeit, Jg. IX., No. 1 (1891), pp. 437-448. Other aspects of 
Plekhanov's and Mechnikov's views on ancient civilisation will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.
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in response to the challenge provided by the great historical rivers, 
and it was only when the technological progress it had fostered gave 
rise to the need for a more flexible system that it became an encumb­
rance .
An approach to the question of the ancient civilisations, which 
supplements that of Mechnikov and Plekhanov, is to be found in the work 
of the late V. Gordon Childe. Childe chose to stress a different aspect 
of Marx's analysis of the ancient East; he employed the idea of the 
concentration of the surplus, rather than the idea of the organised 
nature of the economy, to explain the first flowering of civilisation.
By the third millenniumB.C., Childe argued, the 'urban revolution' 
had taken place in Sumer, Egypt and the Indus valley. In all these 
areas, according to Childe, conditions of production had given rise to 
characteristic institutional correlates. These were, on the one hand, 
a state apparatus, which typically consisted of a god/king and a 
functional elite of priest/bureaucrats, and on the other hand a village 
system. The former accumulated despotic power at the expense of the 
latter.
The despotic power of the state apparatus brought about the con­
centration of large economic surpluses, pumped out of the direct producers 
by agents of the state. These surpluses, in turn, supported the growth 
of specialised crafts, and the development of technology, most importantly, 
of metallurgy.^ The increasing technical sophistication of the basic 
agrarian economy brought in its train the development of writing (largely 
used for administrative purposes) and of the exact sciences (e.g. 
mensuration).
There were definite limits, however, to the economic progress which
V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself, London, Watts, 1948, pp. 146-178 
('The Urban Revolution').
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could take place within the archaic despotic states; they were doomed 
to decay. Childe filled out Marx's explanation of the fate of these 
empires with the help of Weber, adopting the latter's emphasis on the 
corporate goals of institutional structures, particularly with regard 
to self-maintenance.
As we have seen, Marx's own account of the sources of retardation 
was presented on two levels: above, the monopolisation of economic 
initiative and surplus value by a centralised state apparatus; below, 
the perpetuation of a natural economy in socially isolated, self- 
sufficient village communities. Childe saw a causal link between these 
two levels in the corporate striving by state functionaries to consoli­
date the existing social base. The further economic and intellectual 
development of society at large would be an almost certain threat to 
their own position.
On one point, the language used by Childe led him into a position 
apparently counter to his general acceptance of the Marxist view of 
social dynamics. He asserted that it was the establishment of a 
ruling class in Oriental society that was responsible for the retard­
ation of progress.'*' According to Marxist historiography, the establish­
ment of class divisions, and hence of a ruling class, was an essential 
concomitant of progress rather than a retarding factor.
The apparent discontinuity in Childe's analysis arises from the 
fact that what he called a ruling class in the context of the ancient 
East differed in type from Marx's model of a ruling class. The latter 
consisted of a class which, owning the dominant means of production, 
moves into politics mainly for its protection value. The priestly 
corporations and public servants about whom Childe was talking, on the
1 Ibid.r p. 229ff.
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other hand, derived their power and economic perquisites from their
'functional' state roles. If they were in a position to cause social
stagnation, it was, on Childe's own argument, not because they formed
a ruling class as such, but because they embodied the state power in a
society where monopolistic political structures had hypertrophied at
the expense of other forms of social structure.
Marx himself did not describe the office-holders of the East as a
ruling class.^ He regarded Oriental society as being antithetical to
the real development of the private ownership of the means of production,
on which his definition of class rested. Although military and civil
officials might be beneficed, their tenure remained precarious and the
2state was always 'the real landlord'.
If the priestly corporations of the East were able to hamper the
progress of rational science and the dissemination of knowledge as
3completely as Childe argued, then on both the traditional and the 
Marxist analysis it would be because of the particular relationship of the 
state to society as a whole, rather than because of the establishment of 
a ruling class. The same applies to the overconcentration of purchasing
This was not, as Wittfogel implies, because Marx was afraid that a 
parallel might be drawn between the ruling bureaucracy of Oriental society 
and a similar elite likely to be brought into existence under his pro­
posed 'state socialism' (Wittfogel's expression). (See K.A. Wittfogel, 
Oriental Despotism, New Haven, Yale U.P., 1957, pp. 380-388.) Pace Wittfogel, 
Marx did not commit a 'sin against science', and obscure the facts of 
bureaucratic rule because he 'could scarcely help recognizing some 
disturbing similarities between Oriental despotism and the state of his 
program'. (Ibid., p. 387.) Rather than attempting to conceal any 
similarity between Oriental society and state socialism, Engels, who is 
also alleged to have 'sinned', made the comparison quite explicitly in 
his letters to Bebel, 18 Jan. 1884, and to Kautsky, 16 Feb. 1884.(Werke,
Vol. 36, pp. 88 and 190.) 'State socialism', however, had nothing to do 
with Marxist principles, regardless of Bakunin's accusations.
2 Marx, 'Indian Affairs', N.Y.D.T., 5 Aug. 1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism 
and Modernization, p. 130.
3 E.g. V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History, London, Max Parrish,
1960, pp. 110-111; Man Makes Himself, op.cit., pp. 230-231.
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power, which Childe claimed was another reason for the eventual retard­
ation of growth in the states of the ancient East."^
The Oriental city, as the point where surpluses were accumulated 
on a scale never seen before in human history, provided the forcing- 
ground for the technological inventions of the Bronze Age. The factor 
which brought about the original pre-eminence of the Oriental city was, 
however, in the Marxist analysis also responsible for its eventual 
decline: that is, the assumption by the state of the role of economic
entrepreneur, and all the consequences of this.
The Asiatic Village System: Passport to the Future?
The village system, which formed the social base of the system of
2Oriental despotism, aroused conflicting attitudes in Marx. On the 
one hand, he held that the particularistic and inward-looking nature of 
these small village communities was at least partially responsible for 
the fact that the unity of Asiatic society was only realised within the 
despotic state. Moreover, in Marx's account the Asiatic village 
community was a fossilised form of one of the earliest and most primitive 
forms of social organisation: within it the principle of individuality
What Happened in History, op,cit., p. 113.
2 Cf. Stepniak (S.M. Kravchinsky) on the Russian village community: 'The
common folk live in their liliputian republics like snails in their shells. 
To them official Russia - the world of tchinovniks, soldiers, and police­
men - is a horde of foreign conquerors who from time to time send their 
agents into the country to demand the tribute of money and the tribute of 
blood - taxes for the Tzar's treasury and soldiers for his army. Yet by 
a startling anomaly ... these rudimentary republics, which enjoy so large 
a measure of social and personal freedom, are at once the surest found­
ations and the strongest bulwarks of despotic power'. (Russia under the
Tzars, tr. W. Westall, first published 1885, new ed. London, Downey, n.d., 
p. 9.)
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had not yet developed; it also perpetuated man's subordination to 
nature and to tradition which ruled him as a natural force.
On the other hand, the Asiatic village represented to a certain 
extent what we would now call the Gemeinschaft principle of solidarity 
and co-operation, as opposed to the competitive and divisive principle of 
society based on private property and the cash nexus. It provided 
some kind of mutual defence against exploitation, and above all, the 
possibility of a bridge into socialism, which would obviate some of the 
worst excesses of capitalism.
During the 1850s it was the negative aspects of the village community
which were given the most prominence in Marx's writing; in this period
he assumed the progressive nature of the impact of Western capitalism
on these structures.^ In his later writings, however, Marx placed
more stress on the positive aspects of the village communities, and
apparently became less convinced of the historical necessity of their
destruction. By the 1870s the ambivalence in his views had become at
2least partially resolved in favour of Narodnichestvo.
Although even at this time Marx wrote that it must be sickening 'to 
witness these myriads of industrious, patriarchal and inoffensive social 
organisations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into 
a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their 
ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence...', 
'The British Rule in India', loc.cit., p. 94. In the original N.Y.D.T. 
text there is a comma after 'civilization'. This is but one example of 
the many minor errors in the Avineri edition, like the spelling of 
'village community' without the hyphen it had in the original, further on 
in this sentence. The advantages of the Avineri edition, however, out­
weigh its disadvantages, in the absence of a definitive edition of Marx's 
works in the original languages they were published in.
2 Cf. George Lichtheim, 'Oriental Despotism', in The Concept of Ideology, 
N.Y., Random House, 1967, p. 75. Marx's early ambivalence was reinforced 
by the fact that in his mind the Russian village community, or Ohshchina 
was inextricably linked with Herzen and Bakunin; with the idea of the special 
historical mission of holy Russia; and with Pan-Slavism. As he wrote of 
Alexander Herzen: 'in his hands the Russian community only serves as an
argument to prove that rotten old Europe should be regenerated by the 
victory of Pan-Slavism.' (Marx to the Editors of Otechestvennye Zapiski,
Nov. 1877, MESC, p. 311.)
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Some signs of this change in emphasis are visible by at least 1859. 
In his article, 'Trade with China*, Marx described the advantages held 
by communal production over the 'most advanced factory system in the 
world'.^ He argued that such communal production would continue to 
hold off the challenge from the mass-produced commodities of British and 
American capitalism. The economic advantages of the old communal forms 
of production, deriving from co-operation and from the absence of the 
faux frais of circulation, were to be discussed further by Marx in 
Capital.^
Thus, already in 1859, Marx was to a certain extent denying his 
earlier view, that pre-capitalist communal forms of production would 
naturally decay under the impact of capitalism, and that this could not 
be avoided. He wrote that the British had only succeeded in converting 
the self-sustaining village communities of India into mere commodity- 
producing farms through their position as supreme landlords in the
3country; in China they were unlikely ever to wield this power.
In 1881, in the third draft of his famous letter to Vera Zasulich, 
Marx went so far as to say that the forcible breaking up of the village 
community in East India by the British had been an act of vandalism, 
which meant a step backwards rather than a step forwards for the natives. 
Again, in the first and third drafts of this letter, Marx praised the 
form of the community developed by the Germans as having been the only 
refuge of popular freedom through the middle ages. By inference, if 
the village community could survive as a refuge for popular freedom 
through different social epochs in the West, it might also survive social
Marx, 'Trade with China', leading article, N.Y.D.T., 3 Dec. 1859, 
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 396.
2
Capital, Vol. I, p. 328; Vol. Ill, pp. 333-334.
3
Ibid., p. 398.
4 Werke, vol. 19, p. 402.
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change  i n  t h e  E a s t .
M a rx 's  N arodn ik  s y m p a th ie s  a l s o  em erge  i n  h i s  n o t e s  on K o v a le v sk y ,
composed a t  a b o u t  t h e  same t im e  a s  t h e  Z a s u l i c h  l e t t e r .  Marx was
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  K o v a l e v s k y 's  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  F re n c h  r u l e  i n
A l g e r i a ,  and  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  communal p r o p e r t y  by  t h e  c o l o n i a l  pow er .
A c c o rd in g  t o  t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  t h e  F re n c h  h a d  b e e n  q u i t e  r u t h l e s s  i n  t h e i r
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  communal fo rm s o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  p r i v a t e
p r o p e r t y  was t h e  ' i n d i s p e n s a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  any p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l
and s o c i a l  s p h e r e ' , ^  and  p a r t l y  f o r  l e s s  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  r e a s o n s .
I n  h i s  own comm ents, Marx d e s c r i b e d  as  ' o u t r i g h t  r o b b e r y '  t h e
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  by t h e  c o l o n i a l  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  w a s t e l a n d s  w h ich  had
b e e n  i n  t h e  communal u s e  o f  t h e  Arab c l a n s ;  he  c o n t r a s t e d  t h e  t e n d e r
r e g a r d  o f  t h e  F re n c h  f o r  t h e  s a c r e d n e s s  an d  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e
2
p r o p e r t y  w i t h  t h e i r  r a m p a n t  p i l l a g i n g  o f  communal p r o p e r t y .  Marx 
ad d e d  t h a t :
Through  t h e  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  o f  l a n d e d  p r o p e r t y  a p o l i t i c a l  
g o a l  i s  a l s o  a c h i e v e d  -  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  [ c l a n ]  s o c i e t y . 3
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e s e  s y m p a th ie s ,  M a rx 's  w r i t i n g  on
A s i a t i c  communal fo rm s i s  p e rm e a te d  by  an i m p a t i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  e n s la v e m e n t
t o  n a t u r e  and  t r a d i t i o n  p e r p e t u a t e d  by t h e s e  fo rm s .  E n g e ls  r e c o r d s  M a rx 's
v iew s  on p r i m i t i v e  communalism a s  f o l l o w s :
. . . t h e  t r i b e ,  t h e  g ens  and t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w ere  s a c r e d  
and  i n v i o l a b l e ,  a  s u p e r i o r  pow er ,  i n s t i t u t e d  by n a t u r e ,  
t o  w h ich  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r e m a in e d  a b s o l u t e l y  s u b j e c t  i n  
f e e l i n g ,  t h o u g h t  and  d e e d .  I m p r e s s i v e  a s  t h e  p e o p le
M a rx 's  c o n s p e c tu s  o f  M.M. K o v a le v s k y 's  O bshchinnoe z e m l e v l a d e n i e , 
p r i c h i n y , khod i  p o s l e d s t v i i a  ego  r a z l o z h e n i i a  (Moscow, 1879 , n o t e s  made 
1 8 8 0 -1 8 8 1 ) ,  Problem y V o s t o k o v e d e n i ia , No. 1 , 1959 , p .  9 .  Marx a d d s ,  ' i n  
t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  F re n c h  b o u r g e o i s ' .
2
3
I b i d . , p .  17. 
I b i d .
of this epoch may appear to us, they differ in no
way from one another, they are still bound, as Marx ^
says, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community.
In the same period (i.e. the height of Marx's adherence to 
Narodnichestvo) Marx stressed in his notes on Maine, the naive and un­
reflecting relationship of primitive men to their social environment,
and their submersion in the satisfying and comforting bondage of the
2primitive community. Marx linked the emergence of mankind out of pre­
history with the breaking loose from this bondage, and the creation of
3its antithesis - a one-sided development of individualism.
Thus co-operation within these communal forms as they survived in
the self-enclosed village structures of the East was not synonomous with
socialist co-operation. The latter could only signify a conscious, self-
determined relationship of the individual to the community, a historically
produced relationship. Primitive co-operation, on the other hand, was a
natural relationship; it took place in the unfree situation where the
individual was not yet differentiated from the community, and indeed the
4latter assumed the form of natural necessity.
In Capital itself, despite his comments on the advantages of the 
natural production communities cited above, Marx was damning on the
5subject of the economic stasis associated with the communal structures.
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Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, MESW, 
Vol. II, p. 255. Engels himself tended to adopt a less Hegelian and more 
Rousseauan approach towards the primitive communities. Cf. Erhard Lucas, 
'Marx's Studien zur Frühgeschichte und Ethnologie 1880-82', Saeculum,
Vol. 15 (1964), pp. 327-343.
2 'Erst Losreissung der Individualität von d. ursprünglich nicht despot­
ischen Fesseln (wie blockhead Maine es versteht), sondern befriedige[n]den 
u. gemuthlichen Banden der Gruppe, der primitiven Gemeinwesen, - damit d. 
einseitige Herausarbeitung der Individualität '. Marx's conspectus of 
Sir Henry Sumner Maine's Lectures on the Early History of Institutions 
(London, 1875, notes made 1880-81), The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl 
Marx, ed. Lawrence Kräder, op.cit., p. 329.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Cf., Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic 
Formations, op.cit., pp. 14-16, for an account of how Marx viewed capitalism 
as dissolving all social relationships into commodity relationships, but at 
the same time creating the preconditions of social relationships between 
fully developed individuals.
5
Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 796.
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The natural economy perpetuated in these self-enclosed communities 
meant that man remained through the ages a 'mere accessory to the land' - 
a slave of, instead of the master of, nature.^ The conditions for the 
development of social labour as well as the conditions for the develop­
ment of individuation were absent:
The original unity between the worker and the conditions 
of production <abstracting from slavery, where the 
labourer himself belongs to the objective conditions of 
production> has two main forms: the Asiatic communal
system (primitive communism) and small-scale agriculture 
based on the family (and linked with domestic industry) 
in one form or another. Both are embryonic forms and 
both are equally unfitted to develop labour as social 
labour and the productive power of social labour. Hence 
the necessity for the separation, for the rupture, for 
the antithesis of labour and property (by which property 
in the conditions of production is to be understood) . The 
most extreme form of this rupture, and the one in which 
the productive forces of social labour are also most 
powerfully developed, is capital. The original unity can 
be re-established only on the material foundation which 
capital creates and by means of the revolutions which, 
in the process of this creation, the working class and 
the whole society undergo.2
What happened, in the 1870s in particular, was not that Marx changed 
his mind on the character of the village communities, or decided that 
they could become the basis of socialism as they were; rather, he came 
to consider the possibility that the communities could be revolutionised 
not by capitalism but by socialism.
In the 1870s socialism suddenly appeared to be making unexpected 
headway in a country which still had a largely pre-capitalist economy - 
namely, Russia - and this opened up a new line of approach to the 
village community. Marx's hesitations on this question are well known, 
but he does seem to have entertained seriously the hope that with the
1
2
Ihid., p. 616.
Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, op.cit., Part III, pp. 422-423.
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intensification of social communication and the modernisation of 
production methods the village system could be incorporated into a 
socialist society. In 1882 this still appeared to Marx to be a genuine 
alternative to the complete disintegration of the obshchina under the 
impact of capitalism.
Marx suggested that social communication between the isolated
villages of Russia could be quite easily intensified, for a start, by
the substitution of peasant assemblies for the existing units of local
government. Such assemblies would be elected by the various village
communities comprising the district, and serve as district-level
2economic and administrative organs. The increase in social interaction
thus brought about would create a supra-village social consciousness,
and bring an end to that particularism, or 'rural idiocy', which Marx
attributed to the traditional peasantry. It may be extrapolated that
Marx assumed a further federal structure based on these assemblies,
3similar to the proposals he discussed in The Civil War in France.
The modernisation of methods of production within the Russian 
village community would be simplified, according to Marx, by the fact 
that the Russian peasants were already to a degree prepared for collective 
work. The configuration of the Russian countryside also lent itself to
See the Preface written by Marx and Engels for the 1882 Russian edition 
of the Communist Manifesto, MESW, Vol. I, pp. 23-24. The Russian Marxists 
were shortly to expend much effort in proving that the obshchina was no 
longer economically viable, and had disintegrated beyond reclamation.
2 First draft of Marx's letter to Zasulich of 8 March 1881, Werke, Vol. 19, 
p. 390. Bakunin had discussed the problems involved in surmounting the 
isolation of the village communities, and in intensifying social communi­
cation between them, in terms strikingly similar to those used by Marx, 
in a letter addressed to Nechaev, 2 June 1870. Bakunin suggested that a 
federal structure, organised from village commune upwards was necessary 
to raise the level of popular awareness. See Michael Bakunin, letter to 
Sergei Nechaev, 2 June 1870, published for the first time in Encounter,
July 1972, pp. 89-90.
3 E.g. Marx, The Civil War in France, Peking, Foreign Languages Press,
1966, p. 69.
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large-scale, mechanised cultivation.
Among the many qualifications that Marx attached to this optimistic 
view of the future of the obshchina was the stipulation that a success­
ful proletarian revolution must take place in the West before the process 
of dissolution had become irreversible; such a revolution would 'show 
the way' to Russia.
Engels tended to be less restrained than Marx in his attitudes
towards primitive communalism. He went so far as to attribute a defeat
inflicted by Bulgaria on Serbia to the fact that gentile institutions
(the vestigial Southern Slav communalism) had survived in the former
but not in the latter. In Serbia, independence from Turkey had meant
the substitution of a bureaucracy and legislature (on the Austrian model)
for the old gentile constitution; Bulgaria, thanks to the continued
2overlordship of the Turks, had so far escaped this fate. Moreover, 
the Serbian case was unfortunate because 'the gentile institutions would
3have provided a striking link for the passage to communism'.
With the passing of the years, it appeared less and less likely, 
even to Engels, that the remnants of primitive communalism would survive 
into the new age. In 1893 he summed up the possibilities which the 
socialist discovery of vestigial communism had opened up for a time as 
follows:
...no more in Russia than anywhere else would it have been 
possible to develop a higher social form out of primitive 
agrarian communism unless - that higher form was already
First draft of Marx's letter to Zasulich, loc.cit., p. 405. Interest­
ingly, Marx added that Russian society, which had fed for so long off the 
village community, at least owed it the necessary advance for this trans­
formation.
2 Here, as elsewhere, the rule of Oriental despotism preserved archaic 
forms of social organisation; the appropriation of the surplus by the 
state was not accompanied by the kind of legislative intervention in social 
relations found in European states.
3 Engels to Bernstein, 9 Oct. 1886, Cahiers de l ' I . S . E . A Vol. Ill,
No. 7 (July 1969), pp. 1442-1443.
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in existence in another country, so as to serve as a 
model.1
The Contribution of Engels to the Marxist Analysis of the Non-Western 
World
As seen earlier, Marx's mature model of Oriental society was orig­
inally evolved in partnership with Engels in 1853, and Engels continued 
to. employ this model intermittently until the end of his life. None­
theless, Engels' treatment of the subject created certain problems which 
later contributed to the eclipse of the concept of a specifically
'Asiatic' mode of production - Oriental despotism.
2As Wittfogel has pointed out, Engels' two major pieces of writing
on the state, Anti-DUhring and the Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State, served to confuse the relationship between the
concept of Oriental despotism and the (Western-oriented) Marxist theory
of the state. These works of Engels assumed a special importance in
the Marxist tradition because Marx himself never wrote his projected
3work on the state.
In Anti-Dühring Engels did initially outline a theory of the 
development of state power which could accommodate the Marxist model of
Engels to N.F. Danielson, 17 Oct. 1893, MESC, p. 464. In letters 
written to Danielson on 29-30 Oct. 1891; 15 March 1892, and 18 June 1892, 
Engels had already conceded that the chance to bypass the full develop­
ment of capitalism in Russia had been lost.
2 K.A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, op.cit., pp. 383-386.
3 In January 1845 Marx concluded a contract with a German publisher, 
promising to produce within a few months a work entitled A Critique of 
Politics and Political Economy. This work did not materialise, and neither 
did the section on the state projected for his major work, of which Capital 
was the first section. (See the Introduction to the Grundrisse, pp. 108-109.)
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Oriental society.’^ According to this theory, state power was cognate
with the delegation by a community of the performance of public tasks
2to certain of its members. State power arose where productivity was 
high enough to support such a specialised stratum, and it was destined 
to exist as long as productivity was not high enough to enable all 
members of the community to participate in performing public functions.
The delegation of public functions occurred first of all in the 
small agricultural communities themselves, and then later in larger 
aggregates of such communities. General functions performed by this 
administrative stratum included, in particular, military functions in 
the West, and water-control functions in the East. The public servants 
performing these generalising functions achieved a position of master­
ship over the primitive communities of direct producers they were 
supposedly serving. Correspondingly their positions tended to become 
hereditary.^
At this point Engels went beyond Marx, in that he stated that 
these public servants became an actual ruling class:
...this independence of social functions in relation to
society increased with time until it developed into
Engels, Anti-Duhringf tr. E. Bums, London, Lawrence and Wishart,n.d. 
printed with minor revisions from the 1934 edition, pp. 167; 200-206; 309-310. 
2 This explanation of the development of state power was to be seized 
upon by Plekhanov for the very reason that it was consistent with the 
Marxist concept of Oriental despotism. Plekhanov linked the development 
of the state power in the East with the fulfilment of the public function 
of irrigation; and the development of the state power in Russia with the 
fulfilment by the prince and his druzhina of the public function of 
defence. See G.V. Plekhanov, History, pp. 53, 77.
3 An idea vividly alluded to in the following note by Marx: 'Maine
ignores das viel Tiefere: dass d. scheinbare supreme selbständige Existenz
des Staats selbst nur scheinbar u. dass er in allen seinen Formen eine 
excrescence of society is; wie seine Erscheinung selbst erst auf einer 
gewissen Stufe der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung vorkömmt, so verschwindet 
sie wieder, sobld d. Gesellscft einer bisher noch nicht erreichte Stufe 
erreicht hat'. (Marx's conspectus of Maine, loc.cit., p. 329.)
4 Engels, Anti-Dühring, op.cit., pp. 201-202.
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domination over society; ...what was originally the servant 
developed gradually, where conditions were favourable into 
the lord ... finally the separate individual rulers united 
into a ruling class.1
Engels, however, made no attempt to reconcile such a function-based
definition of class with the classical Marxist definition of class in
2terms of ownership of the means of production. The analogy between 
political/administrative elites and economic classes becomes most 
troublesome where the development of the two forms of ruling class are 
made concomitant. Engels appears unable to relate them except through 
the implications of crude juxtaposition. Thus: 'alongside of this
development of [administrative and administered] classes another was
3taking place' - i.e. the development of private-property based slavery.
To begin with, it becomes clear from the subsequent paragraphs that 
this concomitant development was posited as taking place only in the 
West, and that in the East (including Russia) private-property based 
classes did not emerge, but on the contrary the ancient communes continued
4to exist for 'thousands of years'. Engels seems to have been trying 
to say that in the West the original class divisions between rulers and 
ruled based on political/military functions gave way to divisions based
5on the ownership or non-ownership of private property. In the East, 
per contra, the original class division based on political/economic funct­
ions perpetuated itself, and the original communal forms of property 
did not give rise to private-property based classes.
Ibid./ p. 201.
2 Engels found another function-based class in contemporary Russia. He 
described the 'large army of bureaucrats which overflows Russia' as a 
'real class'. See his 'Soziales aus Russland', Der Volksstaat, 1875, tr. 
as 'Russia and the Social Revolution', The Russian Menace to Europe, p. 208.
3 Engels, Anti-Duhring, op.cit., p. 202.
4 Ibid., p. 203.
5 And that in this process functional elites sacrificed their distinctive 
'class' interests in favour of the economic class they came to represent.
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According to Engels, the original type of class division corresponded 
to the 'heroic' period of Western society, and elsewhere to 'the most 
barbarous form of state, Oriental despotism', which had held sway from 
'India to Russia'.^ In this primitive form of the state 'political 
force has made itself independent in relation to society', whereas in 
the more advanced forms of state, based on the institution of private 
property, political force became the instrument of the dominant economic 
class.
Unfortunately, a few paragraphs later one finds that Engels has
forgotten that he had described the primitive division between rulers
and ruled as a class division; he goes on to say that in the historical
conditions of the ancient world (in particular, Greece) 'the advance to
a society based on class antagonisms could only be accomplished in the 
2form of slavery'. Thus the idea of class division in societies based 
on communal property is scrapped. The reference to the ancient world 
also appears to be an attempt to modify, by specifying the particular histor­
ical environment in which it holds good, his original argument that the 
introduction of slavery was the natural solvent of primitive communalism
- an argument untenable in the light of his understanding of the trans-
3ition from tribal communalism to feudalism in German history.
The composite analysis of the state which emerges from Anti- 
Dühring is confused because Engels does not resolve the tension between 
the analysis of the state as the natural consequence of the delegation 
of communal tasks to a specialist stratum, and the analysis of the state 
as 'an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the main-
1
2
3
Engels, Anti-Duhring, op.cit., p. 203.
Ibid., p. 204.
See for example, his essay on the Mark, Werke, Vol. 19, pp. 315-330.
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t e n a n c e  o f  i t s  e x t e r n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ' . The m o s t  t h a t  he 
d o e s  i s  t o  s e p a r a t e  t e m p o r a l ly  and g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  th e  a r e a s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  
o f  t h e  two a n a l y s e s .
T h is  c o n f u s io n  i s  n o t  p r e s e n t  i n  E n g e l s '  O r i g i n  o f  t h e  F a m i ly ,
P r i v a t e  P r o p e r t y  and t h e  S t a t e ,  f o r  t h e  good r e a s o n  t h a t  i n  t h i s  work
E n g e l s  d o e s  n o t  m e n t io n  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  O r i e n t a l  d e s p o t i s m ,  o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s
o f  t h e  o r i g i n  o f  s t a t e  pow er w i t h  w h ic h  i t  was l i n k e d .
E n g e ls  w ro te  t h i s  book s h o r t l y  a f t e r  M a rx 's  d e a t h ,  on t h e  b a s i s  o f
t h e  n o t e s  Marx h a d  made on M o rg a n 's  A n c i e n t  S o c i e t y .  Morgan h a d  o u t l i n e d
a schem a o f  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  human s o c i e t y ,  l a r g e l y  b a s e d  on h i s
r e s e a r c h  i n t o  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  I r o q u o i s  I n d i a n s .  H is  schema
was a  s t a d i a l  o n e ,  w i t h  an e m p h a s is  on t h e  u n i v e r s a l  p r o g r e s s i o n  from
g e n t i l e  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i e t y  w hich  to o k  p l a c e  i n  t h e
2
c o u r s e  o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n .
T h is  u n i v e r s a l  p r o g r e s s i o n  was a s s o c i a t e d  by Morgan w i t h  im provem en ts  
i n  m ethods o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  w h ich  l e d , i n  t u r n ,  t o  i n c r e a s e d  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  
and  t o  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  and  i n h e r i t a n c e  
t h ro u g h  t h e  'monogam ian f a m i l y ' .  The s o c i a l  s t r e s s e s  and  s t r a i n s  i n t r o ­
d u c e d  by t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  c o u ld  n o t  be  d e a l t
3
w i t h  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  w i t h i n  g e n t i l e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s .  Hence t h e r e  came 
a b o u t  a n e c e s s a r y  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i e t y  b a s e d  on t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
u n i t  r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  k i n s h i p  u n i t ,  and  b a s e d  on p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y
E n g e ls  A n t i - D u h r i n g , o p . c i t . ,  p .  308. Or t o  p u t  i t  a n o t h e r  way, he 
does  n o t  r e s o l v e  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  s t a t e  as  ' t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  i r r e c o n c i l ­
a b i l i t y  o f  c l a s s  a n t a g o n i s m s ' , *  and t h e  i d e a  o f  c l a s s  a n ta g o n is m s  as  
t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  s t a t e  s t r u c t u r e .
* L e n in ,  S t a t e  and R e v o l u t i o n ,  S e l e c t e d  Works,  V o l .  2 / 1 ,  p .  205 .
2
Lewis H. M organ, A n c i e n t  S o c i e t y ,  B e l lk n a p  P r e s s  o f  H a rv a rd  U .P . ,
1964 ( r e p r i n t e d  from  t h e  1878 e d i t i o n ) , p p .  2 9 0 -2 9 1 .
3 E n g e l s  q u o te d  d i r e c t l y  from  M a rx 's  n o t e s  t h e  comment t h a t :  ' p r o p e r t y
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a  g e n s  c h an g ed  t h e  community o f  i n t e r e s t  i n t o  a n ta g o n is m  
b e tw e e n  members o f  a  g e n s ' .  ( E n g e l s ,  The O r i g i n  o f  t h e  F a m i l y , P r i v a t e  
P r o p e r t y  and t h e  S t a t e ,  l o c . c i t . ,  p .  3 1 4 . )
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rather than on communal forms of property.
Engels interpreted this transition stage as representing the alien­
ation of public powers from the community as a whole, and the creation 
of a state power separate from the community.'1 23' In the Origin of the 
Family ... Engels tied the alienation of public powers strictly to 
the rise of private property and slavery, and the need for a coercive 
power to maintain such exploitative relations of production. Although 
mentioning briefly the transformation of elective military offices in 
the gens into hereditary offices, etc., he insisted that 'the first great
social division of labour, and hence the first great division of society
, 2was into the two classes of masters and slaves' - i.e. not the
division between public functionaries and free direct producers.
Thus, in the Origin of the Family..., Engels simplified his previous
analysis of the origins of state power, and at the same time, following
Morgan, he attempted to outline a universal pattern of social development.
Quite apart from the general demerits of unilinear schemas, to be
3discussed in a later chapter, the use of the gentile constitution of
Ibid., p. 252. Morgan's own account of the initiation of political 
society was much more sympathetic. He saw Greek and Roman democracy as 
inheriting the spirit and principles of gentile democracy, the form of 
government natural to man, which became perverted only through excessive 
greed for private property. In general, Morgan held an evolutionary view 
of human history, according to which continuous human progress was 
hampered only by the evils arising from excessive preoccupation with 
private property. Engels tended to idealise the primitive community to a 
greater extent than Morgan, and to be more critical of the ensuing stage 
of human development in which class society was held together by the state. 
According to Engels' dialectic, the final synthesis towards which history 
was leading was a synthesis of primitive communalism with the technical 
progress made during the period of private property and the state.
2 Engels, The Origins of the Family..., loc.cit., p. 310.
3 The term unilinear is used here and throughout later chapters not in its 
technical sense, indicating an unbroken curve on a graph, but rather to 
convey the idea of a single,universally occurring sequence. Hence the use 
of the term unilinear is not meant to deny the existence of radical breaks 
in the progression.
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the Iroquois tribes as a paradigm for the early stages of all human
societies made necessary an extremely selective treatment of European
and Asian prehistory. In this work Engels did not mention the early
river-basin agricultural civilisations, presumably because they did not
fit neatly into the pattern according to which communal property equals
gentile constitution and private property equals the state.^
Before reading Morgan, Marx and Engels had concluded that the key
to the original forms of communal constitution, those present when
tribal communities first became settled, was to be found in Asia or 
2India. Vestiges of later forms were still to be found in Eastern Europe,
etc., but it was presumed that these had all developed from the original
‘Asiatic1 23 forms. lifter reading Morgan, Engels, at least, was convinced
that the key to the original forms of communal constitution was to be 
3found in America.
A reflection of this change of paradigm appears in a variation in the
Paradoxically, although both Morgan, and Marx's notes on Morgan, on 
which Engels' work was based, suggested a unilinear pattern of human 
development, Plekhanov was to use this work to argue, that Marx had 
become converted to a multilinear theory. Plekhanov took the fact that a 
version of social development was being outlined here in which there was 
no stage of Oriental despotism (as in the preface to the Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy) to mean that these were alternative 
models rather than that one unilinear pattern was being replaced by 
another. Gentile society might evolve into either ancient society, as 
depicted in The Origin of the State... or into Oriental society as suggested 
by Marx and Engels previously. See G.V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of 
Marxism,tr.J. Katzer, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House,n.d.,pp.63-64
2 E.g. Marx to Engels, 14 March 1868; Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, 
ed. Eric Hobsbawm, o p . c i t p. 139.
3 In a footnote to the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto,
Engels wrote: 'In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organiz­
ation existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since 
then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer 
proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races 
started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or 
have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland.
The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid 
bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true 
nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe'. (MESW, Vol. I, p. 33.)
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text between the third German edition of Capital, Vol. I, and the English
edition which was based on it, and prepared under the general supervision
of Engels (after reading Morgan). The English text reads as follows:
Peasant agriculture on a small scale, and the carrying 
on of independent handicrafts ... also form the economic 
foundation of the classical communities at their best, 
after the primitive form of ownership of land in common 
had disappeared, and before slavery had seized on 
production in earnest.^
The German edition reads:
... after the primitive Oriental* form of ownership 
had disappeared . . .2
Nonetheless, although Engels abandoned the Indian village community 
as the paradigm of early social forms, and although his preoccupation 
with patterns of development based on the development of the American 
gentile system led him, in his most important work on the state, to neglect 
alternative modes of development based on the Asiatic paradigm, he 
continued to find useful the concept of Oriental despotism.
In 1882 Engels wrote:
From Ireland to Russia, and from Asia Minor to Egypt - 
in a peasant country the peasant exists only to be 
exploited. It has been so since the Assyrian and Persian 
empire. The satrap, alias pasha, is the chief Oriental 
form of the exploiter, just as the merchant and the 
jurist represent the modern Western form.2
The description of Oriental society in this letter encompasses both the
state appropriation of the surplus and another important feature, the lack
Capital, Vol. I, p. 334, fn. 3.
2
Das Kapital, Vol. I, Berlin, Dietz, 1953, p. 350, fn. 24. See Daniel 
Thomer, 'Marx on India', Contributions to Indian Sociology, Dec. 1966, 
p. 60. Another example of the 'suppression' of the idea of a specific 
Asiatic mode of production in the English edition appears on p. 79 of 
Capital, Vol. I. Here the German 'In den altasiatischen, antiken usw. 
Produktionsweisen...' (Das Kapital, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 45-46) is
rendered as 'In the ancient Asiatic and other ancient modes of production.. 
- thus blurring the distinction between the Asiatic and the ancient modes 
of production.
3 Engels to Bernstein, 9 Aug. 1882, Karl Marx on Colonialism and 
Modernization, p. -472.
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of effective class structure. Marx and Engels shared the view that the 
peasantry, as such, could never form an effective class; correspondingly, 
the population in predominately peasant countries consisted of an 
undifferentiated mass of atomised social units, particularly susceptible 
to despotic control from the centre.^ Although in the West the state did 
not have the same economic monopoly, countries with a predominantly 
peasant population had a tendency towards a political form of despotism - 
a relatively independent role for the state apparatus vis a vis the 
population.^
In 1890, Engels went on the describe 'Turkish, like any other Oriental
domination' as being incompatible with a capitalist economy because
property was insecure, and the surplus was liable to be appropriated by
3representatives of the state. As already stated, the concept remained
4an essential part of his vocabulary up till the end of his life.
Engels' continued reliance on the concept of Oriental despotism as 
an analytic tool was not however to be of such importance as his essential 
failure to integrate the concept into the Marxist theory of the state.
This failure foreshadowed the neglect of the concept by the Marxist move­
ment in general. Marx's own analysis of the non-Western world came to 
be superseded by Marxist theories of imperialism, in particular after the
Whether these units are individual, or communal as in the original 
Marxist model.
2 See in particular, Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 
MESW, Vol. I, passim.
3 Engels, 'The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism', Sotsialdemokrat,
No. 2 (1890), The Russian Menace to Europe, p. 40. For reasons outlined 
earlier in this chapter, Marx and Engels were unable to construe 'Oriental 
despotism' as providing a possible framework forthe industrialisation of 
the East.
4 See for example Engels' 'Soziales aus Russland', which he had had 
republished, with a new afterword confirming his original view, in the 
collection Internationales aus dem Volksstaat (1871-1875), Berlin, 1894.
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publication of Lenin's pamphlet in 1917. Lenin's theory tended to 
suggest that colonial areas such as Asia had enjoyed the normal (i.e. 
Western) pattern of historical development until being subjected to the 
effects of Western imperialism.'1' 'Backwardness' thus became extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic to Asiatic society; and a conceptual weapon 
against Western colonial policies rather than an argument for their 
historical necessity.
'Asiatic Feudalism'
In general, then, the Marxism of the third world ignored Marx's own
analysis of non-Western society. Marx's belief that Western capitalism
was fulfilling an essential role in 'the annihilation of old Asiatic
society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society 
2in Asia' was unacceptable in view of the rising mood of nationalism 
in the East. But instead of taking Marx's model of Oriental society 
and giving it a positive rather than a negative evaluation as an altern­
ative, non-Westem way forward into industrialism and socialism, non- 
European Marxists imposed a European pattern on their own history.
If class struggle was the dynamic factor which was to bring about the
Lenin did in fact quote approvingly in his pamphlet a passage from 
Hilferding which followed Marx in describing imperialism as the force 
destined to bring the non-European nations back into history: 'The old
social relations become completely revolutionized, the agelong agrarian 
isolation of "nations without history" is destroyed and they are drawn 
into the capitalist whirlpool'. (Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism, Selected Works, Vol. 1/2, pp. 560-561.) This aspect of 
the theory was not incorporated into the Marxism-Leninism of the third 
world.
2 Marx, 'The Future Results of British Rule in India', loc.cit., pp. 132- 
133.
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desired transition to socialism in Europe, then equivalent classes and 
forms of class struggle had to be discovered in Asia. Social revolution 
could then, at least, be conceptualised as the end-product of an 
indigenous development parallel to that of the West rather than as a 
byproduct of Western imperialism.
The desire to eliminate completely the notion of Asiatic exception- 
alism and its connotations of Western paternalism resulted in the following 
type of methodological approach being officially prescribed in the Soviet 
Union from 1931:
For us, there exists no division of peoples and countries 
into an Orient and an Occident, which are opposed to one 
another and which it would be appropriate to study in a 
different manner. In our Union, the Orient has the same 
rights as the Occident, and we study it with the same 
Marxist methodology as the Occident. There has been, and 
there is, class struggle in the East, just as much as in 
the West. The history of the Orient knows the same 
formations as those of the West. Such are the fundamental 
principles which govern our study of the Orient.1
These principles, based on the notion that any concession to Asiatic
particularism would be a weapon in the hands of the Western colonial 
powers and their native allies, remained the official line in the Soviet
Union until about 1964.
One result of such an approach was that the agrarian social system 
which Marx had termed Oriental despotism was relabelled by Soviet and 
Eastern Marxists as feudalism, or at least as 'Asiatic feudalism' - a 
slightly modified version of the historifal Western European formation, but 
one which had basically the same dynamic qualities. For example, M.S. Godes 
was to write that,in India and China,the process of primitive accumulation
S. Ol'denburg (Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences), statement 
made in 1931, quoted in J. Pecirka, 'Discussions sovietiques' (first 
published in German, Eirene [Prague] 1964, No. Ill), Recherches inter­
nationales a la lumiere du marxisme, No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 1967), p. 65.
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began:
...on the basis of the disintegration of feudal relations 
and the birth of new forms of production; it began 
independently of the direct influence of European 
capital ... The misfortune of Asia, and of the two 
greatest of its peoples - the Indians and Chinese - 
consists in the fact that the period of the complet­
ion of the process of primitive accumulation in 
Europe found China and India in the first stage of this 
process.1
Soviet authors were to admit that the state played an important
economic role in 'Asiatic feudalism', but they argued that the existence
of state ownership of the means of production was insufficient reason to
categorise the Asiatic formation as a mode of production distinct from
feudalism. One form of the Soviet argument has been that modes of
production are distinguished by characteristic forms of exploitation -
the subjection of the individual by violence in slavery, exploitation
through monopoly of the possession (sic) of the soil in feudalism, and
2exploitation through wage-labour in capitalism. According to this
argument the question of property relations, or who monopolises the soil -
3i.e. the state or private landowners - is not central. Another form of 
the argument, which however retains the essence of the above, has been 
that:
M.S. Godes, Spornye voprosy metodologii istorii. Diskussiia ob 
obshchestvennykh formatsiiakh, Kharkov, 1930, pp. 216-217. Cf. Marx,
'However changing the political aspect of India's past must appear, its 
social condition has remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, 
until the first decennium of the nineteenth century.' ('The British 
Rule in India', l o c . c i t p. 91.)
2 See, for example, V.N. Nikiforov, 1 23Zakliuchitel*noe slovo po dokladu1 
in Obshchee i osobennoe v istoricheskono razvitii stran Vostoka, Izd. 'Nauka', 
1966, tr. in Recherches internationales a la lumiere du marxisme, No. 57-58 
(Jan.-April, 1967), p. 243.
3 Cf. S.M. Dubrovsky, K voprosu o sushchnosti 'aziatskogo' sposoba 
proizvodstva, feodalizma, krepostnichestva i torgovogo kapitala, Moscow,
1929, passim.
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...given the cultivators work on their own land with the 
aid of their own implements, and that they alienate 
their surplus labour in the interest of a third person 
or third persons, they are therefore subject to feudal 
exploitation. ^
But as stressed earlier, Marx believed that it was the relationship
between those who owned the conditions of production and the direct
2producers which provided the key to any given social epoch. The 'public 
ownership' and 'public' appropriation of the surplus value in the Asiatic 
formation clearly distinguished this formation from 'feudalism', which 
for Marx was characterised by the private ownership and private approp­
riation of surplus value.
Marx himself frequently protested against what he regarded as
erroneous comparisons between Oriental society and Western feudalism
(for example, 'La Touche d. facts verfälscht dch phraseology borrowed
3from feudal Europe' ). Such comparisons were based part3.y on the fact, 
as he observed, that institutions of commendation and benefice could be
4identified in e.g. India. Many of the early writers on Western feudalism 
had drawn an analogy between the early phases of the system of fiefs in 
Western Europe (before they became heritable) and the Turkish timar 
system - which could in turn be assimilated to the Persian/Indian jaghir 
system.^
From the account given by L.A. Sedov, 'La societe angkorienne et le 
Probleme du mode de production asiatique', La Pensee, No. 138 (March- 
April 1968), p. 72.
2
Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 791.
3 Marx's conspectus of Sir John Budd Phear, The Aryan Village in India 
and Ceylon, loc.cit., p. 283. For other examples see ibid., pp. 256, 262.
4 Marx's conspectus of Kovalevsky, op.cit., Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 
1958, No. 5, p. 12.
5 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
Cambridge U.P., 1957, pp. 30, 82, 97, 132, 134. Pocock observes that the 
analogy drawn in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between the 
Turkish system of timars and early European feudalism was based on the 
'apparently universal delusion that "feudal law" was an hierarchical
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Marx's own specific rejection of the analogy between feudal forms 
of benefice and the timar or jaghir forms’*- has not inhibited later 
Marxists, with access to the relevant material, from providing defini­
tions such as the following:
Jagirdars - representatives of the Moslem feudal gentry 
in the Great Mogul Empire who received in temporary use 
big estates (jagirs) for which they did military service 
and supplied contingents of troops. When the Empire 
disintegrated the jagirdars became hereditary feudal 
owners.^
One of the most important reasons why Marx shunned the analogy
between Oriental society and Western feudalism was that his approach to
social analysis was couched in terms of the potential development of
systems. According to his model of Eastern society, the institutions of
benefice existing there did not have the same potential for development
which had been intrinsic to their Western counterparts, and hence they
were of a completely different character.
One of the specific differences between Western feudalism and Oriental
society which was enumerated by Marx was the absence in the latter of
anything approaching the Western system of feudal law. Marx followed
Palgrave in describing feudal law as being based on the assumption of
the right of the individual, whether free or enserfed, to legal protection
3from his feudal lord. Moreover in the empire of the Great Mogul, for 
example, civil law excluded patrimonial justice (the exercise of juridical
system imposed from above as a matter of state policy. (Ibid., p. 97.)
In fact the Turkish system was a matter of state policy, but European 
feudalism arose from the collapse of the state, a fundamental difference 
between European and non-European systems of benefice.
 ^ Marx's conspectus of Kovalevsky, Problemy Vostokovedeniia, 1959, No. 1,
p. 7.
2 Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, Moscow, Foreign Languages Press, n.d. 
(published during the 1960s), pp. 356-357, fn. 38.
3 Sir Francis Palgrave, The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth,
The Anglo-Saxon Period, Part 1 (first published 1832), new ed., Cambridge 
U.P., 1921, p. 11; Marx's conspectus of Kovalevsky, Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 
1958, No. 5, p. 12.
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functions by the feudal lord),"*- whereas in Western feudalism 'the
2functions of general and judge, were attributes of landed property.'
The work which stimulated many of Marx's strictures on applying 
the concept of feudalism to Asiatic society was that of M.M. Kovalevsky 
on communal land-tenure, a copy of which the author sent to Marx on 
publication in 1879. Elsewhere in his book, Kovalevsky stated that 
under Mohammedan rule in India,allodial land tenures had tended to change 
into feudal ones, and free landowners had become dependent. Marx 
rejected the inferences which had led Kovalevsky to this conclusion. He 
argued that the mere fact that under the Mogul benefice system the land 
tax was paid to an appointee of the treasury rather than directly to the 
treasury, by no means implied the feudalisation of India. In general,
the Indian land tax no more converted landed property into feudal
3property than did the land tax in contemporary France. The fact that the 
tax was used by the government as a payment to its appointees did not 
make the latter into feudal lords. Marx also observed that in the East 
there was no poetisation of the soil (Bodenpoesie) comparable to that
of Western feudalism, and the principle of nulle terre sans seigneur did
4not obtain, land being alienable to other than nobles.
More evidence concerning Marx's views on the notion of 'Asiatic feud­
alism' can be gleaned from the material he copied from Kovalevsky and
Ibid.
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 332. As will be seen, E. Varga, one of the 
most important Soviet proponents of the concept of the Asiatic mode of 
production, also stressed this distinction; Western feudalism was character­
ised by the private appropriation (e.g. by the feudal lord) of those admini­
strative, juridical and symbolic functions which in the Asiatic formation 
were monopolised by the state. (E.g. Y. [E.] Varga, Politico-Economic 
Problems of Capitalism, op.cit., pp. 345-346.
Marx's 
18.
conspectus of Kovalevsky, Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, No. 4
Marx's conspectus of Kovalevsky, Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, No. 5
p. 12.
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heavily emphasised, in particular, Kovalevsky's account of why Turkish
rule in Algeria did not lead to feudalisation. Feudalisation was:
...impeded by the strong centra.lisa.tion of the crvilian- 
military administration of Algeria; the latter excluded 
the possibility of the hereditary seizure of local 
positions, or the conversion of the holders of th^m into 
huge landowners almost independent of the 'dayi'. The 
local day is and qa'ids who customarily had the lease of 
the collection of taxes in the districts transferred to 
them, all retained these functions for only three years.
The law strictly prescribed this change, and in practice 
it took place even oftener.^
I.e., there was nothing resembling the 'motley pattern of conflicting,
medieval plenary powers' which Marx saw as characterising French feudal- 
3ism; the state guarded jealously its monopoly over surplus value.
Marx's analysis of the non-Western world was far too closely tied
to earlier concepts of Oriental despotism for the notion of an Asiatic
feudalism to be acceptable to him, except in the special case of Japan:
Japan, with its purely feudal organisation of landed 
property and its developed petite culture, gives a 
much truer picture of the European middle ages than all 
our history books, dictated as these are, for the most 
part, by bourgeois prejudices.4
Otherwise, Marx categorically denied the relevance of his categories of 
pre-capitalist V7estem society to non-European areas.
'Dayi' was an honorific title given to janissaries of certain ranks.
In Algeria it was used specifically for the janissary who held the 
regency, but also apparently for lower-ranking janissaries.
2 Marx's conspectus of Kovalevsky, Problemy Vostokovedeniia, 1959, No. 1, 
pp. 8-9.
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, MESW, Vol. I, p. 301. 
Capital, Vol. I, p. 718, fn. 1.4
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rPhe Asiatic Mode of Production and the Sino-Soviet Split
Apart from the more general rejection of the idea of Asiatic 
exceptionalism for the reasons outlined above, the fortunes of the 
concept of the Asiatic mode of production have also been closely tied to 
the state of Sino-Soviet relations. The disappearance of the concept 
from Soviet writing in 1931 reflected what both the Chinese communist 
leadership and their Soviet allies saw as the needs of the Chinese revol­
ution. The reappearance of the concept in 1964 was, in part, governed 
by the Soviet desire to discount the claims of the Chinese model of 
socialism, by demonstrating the particularity of Chinese history.
Between 1925 and 1931 there were widespread discussions in the Soviet
Union on the topic of the Asiatic mode of production, reaching a peak
in terns of published material in 1930.^ The discussions touched both
on the general historiographical problem of periodisation, and on the
specific problem of the nature of the Chinese revolution. During this
period the leading protagonists of the Asiatic concept in relation to
2China were E. Varga and L. Mad'iar, while other supporters of the 
concept included T.D. Berin, A.I. Lomakin and S.A. Dalin. There was as yet 
no access to the relevant sections of the Grundrisse, but these men were 
able to draw on Plekhanov and Weber, to supplement Marx and Engels: a
theoretical legacy evident in their writings, although they were also able
For a recent Soviet account of the 1925-1931 'diskussiia' which is 
reasonably fair, in spite of the fact that the author has been one of the 
leading opponents of the concept during the second stage of the debate, see 
V.N. Nikiforov, 'Diskussiia sovetskikh istorikov ob obshchestvenno- 
ekonomicheskom stroe Kitaia (1925-1931)', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1965, No. 5, 
pp. 75-91. This article forms the basis of Chapter Five of the author's 
Sovetskie istoriki o problemakh Kitaia, Moscow, izd. 'Nauka', 1970.
2 Varga and Mad'iar were both veterans of the Hungarian communist revol­
ution of 1918-1919. Varga was to survive to welcome the rehabilitation 
of the concept in 1964, while Mad'iar disappeared during the purges (date 
of death unknown).
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to find ample textual authority in Marx and Engels for their statements.
For example, L.I. Mad'iar was merely echoing Änti-Dühring when
he wrote in the preface to his famous book on China that:
... the fundamental class division of Eastern society 
occurs between the peasant masses, united in village 
communes, and the former servants of the communes who 
have separated themselves out of the communes and con­
stituted themselves as a ruling class (the priests in 
Egypt, the literati of ancient China, etc.)l
Economic exploitation by such ruling classes takes the form of taxation -
2in the absence of private property in land rent and taxes coincide.
Meanwhile the Chinese communist leadership at its Sixth Congress 
had resolved that the concept of the Asiatic mode of production was 
not relevant to the Chinese situation, and this view was to gain 
increasing official support in the Soviet Union. The acceptance of the 
concept was alleged to lead to erroneous political conclusions, part­
icularly concerning the role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution. 
For example, A.I. Lomakin, one of the supporters of the concept, wrote 
that popular (peasant/ revolutions were to a large extent responsible 
for the durability of Asiatic states,being the 'fundamental cause of
the equilibrium of Eastern societies, condemning them to an immobile,
3stagnant condition, broken only by the incursion of imperialism'. The 
popular revolutions acted as a safety-valve when the tendencies of 
officials to transform themselves into a feudal ruling class became too 
strong, and they brought about the 'formation of a new "popular" govern-
4ment, with the whole inevitable bureaucratic hierarchy'. In the same
L. Mad'iar, Preface to his Ekonomika sei1 *34skogo khoziaistva Kitaia,
Moscow, 1928, p. iii. A second edition of this work appeared in 1931, with­
out, however, the section on the Asiatic mode of production.
Ibid.
3 'Diskussiiao sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh formatsiiakh' (report of an 
open session of the sociological section of the Society of Marxist 
Historians, 17-24 May, 1929), Istorik-Marksist, Vol. 16 (1930), p. 123.
4 Ibid., p. 122.
106
vein,S.A. Dalin described the Taiping rebellion as a revolutionary
movement striving for a return to the 'original primitive forms of
'Asiatic' society, rather than creating a new mode of production'.^
During the period when the changeover from an urban-based strategy to
a peasant-based strategy was taking place in China, and with it the
consolidation of Stalin's position over that of Trotsky in the Comintern,
it v/as not surprising that the supporters of the concept of the Asiatic
mode of production should be criticised as being objectively in the
2same camp as the Trotskyites. As we shall see,Trotsky did not himself
use the concept of the Asiatic mode of production,but his view of the
role of peasant rebellions in Asiatic society was compatible with it.
E. Varga in 1964 was to sum up the opposition to the concept
of the Asiatic mode of production in 1931 as follows:
This problem was of both scientific, political and 
strategic interest to China. The opponents of the 
Asiatic mode of production declared that everybody 
(including the author of this book) who did not 
recognise the social order in China of the twenties 
as ordinary feudalism was a political enemy.3
Since 1964, and the deepening of the Sino-Soviet rift, Soviet 
historiography has become much more receptive to the idea that Chinese 
history represents an alternative to and not just an Asiatic version of 
Western European history. This tendency is crystallised in a recent article 
by L.S. Vasil'ev which employs the 'Asiatic' concept in analysing Chinese 
society sind does so at a new level of sophistication which betrays in 
part the influence of the Grundrisse (as we have seen,unavailable to
S .A. Dalin, Taipini [Sbornik statei], Moscow, 1928, pp. 15-16.
2 E.g. see A.G. Prigozhin, 'Problema obshchestvennykh formatsii', Pod 
znamenem marksizma, 1930, No. 7-8, pp. 159-160.
3 Y. [E.] Varga, Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism, op.cit., 
p. 349.
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the earlier protagonists of the concept).
Vasil'ev begins with an attack on Chinese historiography for its
failure to come to grips with the nature of Chinese history. The
reason for this failure, Vasil'ev argues, is that Chinese historians
have attempted to cram the three thousand years of Chinese civilisation
into the framework of the five-stage theory of development 'created on
the basis of European material1 23.'*' One of the most glaring results of
working from such a schema and not from 'the facts', according to
Vasil'ev, has been a wildly fluctuating periodisation, particularly in
2relation to the origins of feudalism. The continuation of this argument 
is that:
... the solution of the problems of the social structure 
and the tendencies of evolution of ancient Chinese society 
can only be discovered through determinedly eschewing 
schemas which have failed to justify themselves. The socio­
economic analysis of pre-capitalist societies witnesses to 
the multilinear evolution, and different paths of development 
of these societies. But this analysis by itself is insuffici­
ent to deal with the whole complexity of the problem. The 
study of the history of China and of the role within this 
history of social, political and ethical factors, gives 
considerable foundation to the point of view, with which the 
great Sinologist V. Eberhard is in substantial agreement, that the 
law of dynamics of Chinese society depends to a large degree 
on socio-political rather than socio-economic factors [momenty].
The way to solve the problems of Chinese history, Vasil'ev suggests,
is through the concept of the Asiatic mode of production and through the
analysis of the role of non-economic factors. In describing the nature
of ancient Chinese society, Vasil*ev differs from the earlier Soviet
supporters of the concept in that he places less emphasis on the entre-
L.S. Vasil'ev, 'Sotsial'naia struktura i dinamika drevnekitaiskogo, 
obshchestva', L.V. Danilova (et al.) ed.fProblemy istorii dokapitalisti- 
cheskikh obshchestv, Kniga 1, Moscow, Izd. 'Nauka', 1968, p. 456.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 457.
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p r e n e u r i a l  r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  b r i n g i n g  t h e  s y s te m  i n t o  b e i n g  and more 
e m p h a s is  on th e  e n a b l i n g  f a c t o r  o f  communal p r o p e r t y . ^  How ever, l i k e  
h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  V a s i l ' e v  makes e x p l i c i t  some o f  t h e  u n s t a t e d  i m p l i ­
c a t i o n s  o f  M a rx 's  m o d e l ,  such  a s  t h a t  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  e l i t e  assum es
2
t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  a  r u l i n g  c l a s s  u n d e r  t h i s  s y s te m ,  and t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  i s
p a r t  o f  t h e  econom ic  b a s e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  m e re ly  p a r t  o f  th e  s u p e r -
3
s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y .  V a s i l ' e v ,  u n l i k e  M a d ' i a r  o r  V a rg a ,  i s  c a r e f u l  to
d e s c r i b e  th e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  e l i t e  as  a s su m in g  th e  f u n c t i o n s  ( i n c l u d i n g
t h a t  o f  econom ic  e x p l o i t a t i o n )  o f  a r u l i n g  c l a s s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a c t u a l l y
b e in g  a  r u l i n g  c l a s s ;  he  does  t h i s  b e c a u s e  i n  M a rx 's  model o f  A s i a t i c
s o c i e t y  s o c i a l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tem s  from  s o c i a l  i n e q u a l i t y  r a t h e r  th a n
4
from  p r o p e r t y  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  and  t h e r e  i s  an a b s e n c e  o f  ( p r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y  
b a s e d )  c l a s s e s  o r  c l a s s  a n ta g o n is m  i n  th e  W e ste rn  s e n s e .  V a s i l ' e v ' s  
t e r m i n o l o g i c a l  n i c e t y  e x t e n d s  a l s o  t o  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  p e a s a n t r y  i n  t h i s  
s y s te m  as  an e s t a t e  r a t h e r  th a n  a c l a s s .  ( C h i n a 's  'm o s t  i m p o r t a n t  e s t a t e  -
5
a f t e r  o f f i c i a l d o m ' . )
H av ing  d e s c r i b e d  th e  n a t u r e  o f  o l d  C h in e s e  s o c i e t y ,  V a s i l ' e v  t u r n s  
t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i t s  d y n a m ic s .  The m o st  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  g o v e r n in g  
th e  d y n a m ic s ,  o r  more p r o p e r l y  s p e a k in g  th e  l a c k  o f  dynam ics  i n  C h in e se  
s o c i e t y ,  V a s i l ' e v  s e e s  as  t h e  r o l e  o f  C o n fu c ia n  i d e o l o g y .  The i n f l u e n c e  
o f  C o n fu c ia n  i d e o l o g y  was to  i n h i b i t  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  
w i t h i n  C h in e s e  s o c i e t y ,  and  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  i t  a  b a c k w a r d - lo o k in g  con­
s e r v a t i s m .  ^
M a d ' i a r  and  V arga  h a d  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  ' t y r a n n y  o f  th e  c l a n '  
i n  p r o v i d i n g  th e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a  f u n c t i o n a l l y - b a s e d  r a t h e r  th a n  a 
p r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y  b a s e d  r u l i n g  c l a s s .
I b i d . ,  p .  483.
^ I b i d . ,  p .  495 .
4
Though th e  fo rm e r  t e n d s  to  g iv e  r i s e  t o  t h e  l a t t e r .  See i b i d . ,  p .  478.
5 I b i d . ,  p .  483.
6 I b i d . ,  p .  511 .
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Here Vasil'ev is touching on one of the most important questions
raised by the revival of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production
(and one which will be treated at greater length in another chapter).
Since the absence of the private ownership of the means of production
(land) is central to this concept, and where the importance of the
economic functions of the state (in providing irrigation etc.) is
denied or belittled as has frequently been the case with more recent
exponents of the concept, the role of non-economic factors in the
expropriation of the surplus and in providing the general dynamic of
society looms very large. As Vasil'ev concludes:
In short, socio-political factors, Confucian ideology 
in particular, have played an important, and often a 
decisive role in determining the social structure of 
China and the dynamics of its further evolution. There 
is no doubt that conservative Confucian doctrine has 
impeded the development of China - for example, through 
the disparagement of the role of trade and traders, 
the efforts of the state to restrict private initiative 
and introduce monopolies, the admiration for the institutions 
of antiquity, the distrust in innovations, etc..'*"
The peculiarities of China's past, including the lack of individ­
uation are now being held responsible in the Soviet Union for the 
directions taken by the Chinese revolution - i.e. non-socialist directions
'rooted in China's socio-economic and ideological development, and her
2Confucian traditions and history.1
While this situation has to some extent encouraged the re-emergence 
of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production within the Soviet Union, 
there is still far from universal acceptance of it. As used for pro­
paganda purposes in the Sino-Soviet dispute it easily becomes a two-edged 
weapon, as can be seen from the following:
Ibid., p. 515.
2 E.g., A Critique of Mao Tse-tung's Theoretical Conceptions, tr. Y. 
Sdobnikov, Moscow, Progress, 1972, p. 72.
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..* Marx pointed out with marvellous historical insight 
that the patriarchal peasant commune which was the 
social basis for various forms of despotic rule in the 
past could only become the foundation for 'barrack 
communism'. This deep insight can now be illustrated 
by the trend developments have taken in China caused 
by attempts to substitute a petty bourgeois theory and 
practice of Maoism for true Marxism.
Despite all his hate of capitalist exploitation ... 
Marx considered capitalism as a historically progress­
ive system serving as a springboard for socialism.!
However, as we shall see, propaganda purposes apart, there is 
great interest among Soviet scholars in the possibilities opened up by 
the 'Asiatic' concept for a new Marxist historiography; an historiography 
which does not apply concepts to non-Western history which are appropriate 
only to West European history; an historiography which also av;ards 
a greater significance to the role of non-economic factors in the 
economic infra-structure. This is one aspect of the present quest 
taking place in Soviet historical institutes for a new and satisfying 
framework in which to synthesise the rapidly increasing store of 
specialised empirical knowledge about the countries outside Europe.
A. Milejkovskij [Mileikovsky], 'Marx and economic planning', Marx 
and Contemporary Scientific Thought, The Hague, Mouton, 1968, p. 356. 
(Mileikovsky is a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.)
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THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO THE PLACE 
OF GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
Marx and Engels on the Role of Geographical Factors in Historical Development 
Marx viewed history as the unfolding of successive inodes of material 
production, culminating in industrial capitalism. He did not, however, 
regard these modes of production as evolving independently of the influ­
ence of the natural environment. For him, geographical factors played 
an important, and sometimes,crucial, role in determining forms of 
production and of social organisation.
In this Marx followed Montesquieu and Hegel. As we have seen, 
Montesquieu had linked geographical factors with forms of political 
organisation in an analytic and comparative framework,^" and had stressed 
the direct influence of environment on man's character and predilections. 
Hegel, on the other hand, had described the interaction between man and 
nature in a historical framework, showing the influence of geographical 
factors on social organisation as taking place through what Marxists were 
to term the 'mode of production'. For him, too, different geographical
factors came to be of decisive importance at different stages of histor- 
2ical development.
Since the publication of the Grundrisse it has become more generally 
recognised that Marx saw the early stages of human history in terms of 
a plurality of modes of production developing under the influence of 
specific local geographic, ethnographic, and historical circumstances.
3
For the influence on Marx of Montesquieu's emphasis on geographical 
factors see, for example, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 512-515.
2 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree, London, 
Bell, 1905, pp. 82-107 ('The Geographical Basis of History').
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In the Grundrisse Marx wrote, for example, that:
...the extent to which this original community [the 
earliest form of landed property, that based on kinship] 
is modified will depend on various external, climatic, 
geographic, physical etc., conditions as well as on 
their particular natural predisposition - their clan 
character.1
Under the influence of such conditions, Marx argued, the original community
develops into three major alternative forms, the Asiatic, classical
(Greek or Roman) and Germanic, while the Slavonic form appears as a
mixture of the Asiatic and Germanic types.
Marx summarises the major forms of pre-capitalist development, the
forms in which free labour does not yet exist, in the following manner:
....these different forms of the commune or tribe members' 
relation to the tribe's land and soil - to the earth 
where it has settled - depend partly on the natural 
inclinations of the tribe, and partly on the economic 
conditions in which it relates as proprietor to the 
land and soil in reality, i.e. in which it appropriates 
its fruits through labour, and the latter will itself 
depend on climate, physical make-up of the land and soil, 
the physically determined mode of its exploitation, the 
relation with hostile tribes or neighbour tribes, and the 
modifications which migrations, historic experiences, 
etc. introduce.2
The description of human history to be found in the Grundrisse might 
be represented schematically as follows:
1
2
Marx, Grundrisse, p. 472 
Ibid., p. 486
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MARX'S GRUNDRISSE SCHEMA OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
(emphasis placed on the geographical factor)
Primitive Agricultural Community
Roman Asiatic
sU
Slavery*
\I/
A.M.P.
Slavonic
\PFeudalism
A.M.P.
Germanic
Feudalism
\P
^  Capitalism
NP
Socialism
Legend
Non-progressive, but can develop into 
capitalism under pressure from pre­
existing capitalist systems.
Non-progressive and self-destructing.
This is in contrast with the description of human history to be 
found in most accounts of historical materialism, which is presented in
the next diagram:
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THE UNILINEAR SCHEMA 
(emphasis placed on the social factor)
Primitive Agricultural Community
A.M.P.*
\PSlavery
vV
Feudalism
Capitalism
\/Socialism
* Has sometimes been omitted as it 
causes difficulty for a schema of 
universal application.
The most unequivocal use of a geographical explanation in Marx's 
writing on pre-capitalist societies is his stress on the need for exten­
sive irrigation in the East. According to Marx, as we have seen in Chapter 
Two, this factor was largely responsible for the development of a special 
mode of production, and a corresponding form of political organisation."''
Other geographical factors specifically cited by Marx as playing an 
important role in determining human history are firstly propinquity of 
different natural environments to each other, and secondly the extensiveness 
of a given territorial unit. The first factor gives rise to the exchange 
of goods between tribes inhabiting different natural environments and the
1 E.g. , Marx, Grundrisse, p. 474.
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development of the division of labour. The second factor, extensive­
ness of territory, Marx saw as having some connection with the creation
2of despotic systems. Marx did not, however, follow Montesquieu in
arguing that empires of a certain size have definite institutional
3correlates regardless of other variables. Nor did he take up Hegel's 
position that:
...States - other things equal (sic) - derive a different 
qualitative character from magnitudinal difference. Laws 
and constitution become something different when the extent 
of the State and the number of its citizens increases.
The State has a certain measure of magnitude, and if 
forced beyond this it collapses hopelessly under that very 
same constitution that was its blessing and its strength 
for as long as its extent alone was different.* 234 5 [I.e., 
the transformation of quantity into quality.]
Marx's theory of history, however, diverged from contemporary
theories which stressed the role of geographical factors not so much in
5the geographical factors he regarded as of decisive importance as in the 
temporal limitations he placed upon their importance. According to Marx's 
conception of historical progress, geographical factors, as contrasted 
with social factors, diminished in importance pari passu with the develop­
ment of man's productive powers.^ Progress, for Marx, consisted in the
Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 351-352; Vol. Ill, p. 177.
2 Marx, Second draft of letter to Vera Zasulich, 8 March 1881, Werke,
Vol. 19, p. 399.
3 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. 1, London, Colonial Press, 
1900, p. 122.
4 Hegel, Science of Logic, tr. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, Vol. I, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1929, p. 390.
5 Or in how they exercised their influence on society, whether directly, 
as Montesquieu tended to claim, or through the mode of production as the 
Germans, from Kant through Herder and Hegel, had argued.
 ^ Pace Wittfogel, whose examples of Marx's supposed recognition of the 
decisive importance of geographical factors in 'advanced' countries are 
extremely weak (e.g. the shift from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic 
and then to the Pacific as the centre of world trade.) See Werke, Vol. 7,
pp. 220-21.
116
movement from naturally determined human relationships to historically 
evolved social relationships.^
The forms of production originally evolved under the direct impress 
2of natural conditions. But as man developed his technological capacities,
3the importance of geographical influence moved into the background, 
and his productive activity assumed forms that contained a historical 
logic of their own. This process culminated in the development of 
capitalism which tended to universalise itself, regardless of local 
particularities.
Marx's concept of the receding importance of geographical factors 
was to be faithfully reproduced by the Soviet historian Pokrovsky in his 
widely used textbook, The Brief History of Russia. According to Pokrovsky 
Russia's natural environment was a prime cause of its economic retard­
ation during the greater part of its history. While agriculture was the 
basic mode of production, Russia suffered from the disadvantage that the 
Central European plain could only be cultivated for about five months of 
the year, for climatic reasons. This disadvantage was overcome with the 
onset of industrialism, because factories could operate for 12 months of 
the year, using imported raw materials where necessary. At the same time 
the creation of a railway network compensated for the lack of natural 
waterways for the transportation of goods. Hence Russia was able to
catch up rapidly with the rest of Europe, and its original geographical
4disadvantages became increasingly irrelevant.
Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. S.W. 
Ryazanskaya, Moscow, Progress, 1970, p. 213.
2 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 472-473.
3 This is not the case with predominantly agricultural nations which 
remain to a great extent determined by the natural conditions of production. 
Marx tended to share Hegel's views on the Slavs as an unhistorical nation 
restricted in their development of consciousness by their naturally deter­
mined mode of production. See also their views on Asiatic nations.
4 M.N. Pokrovsky, A Brief History of Russia, 10th ed., 2 vols.,
Mirsky, London, Martin Lawrence, 1933, Vol. I, pp. 31-33.
tr. D.S.
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Or, as a more recent Soviet historian puts it:
...the influence of the geographic environment upon a given 
society is inversely proportional to the degree to which 
that society is equipped with technology. In other words, 
the lower the technological level of society's develop­
ment, the more strongly it is influenced by the geograph­
ical environment, and vice versa. The obviousness of this 
proposition can hardly be challenged.1
The effect of capitalism in eliminating the multiplicity of locally
determined modes of production was described by Marx as follows:
Thus capital creates the bourgeois society, and the 
universal appropriation of nature as well as of the 
social bond itself by the members of society. Hence 
the great civilizing influence of capital; its 
production of a stage of society in comparison to which 
all earlier ones appear as mere local developments 
of humanity and as nature-idolatry. For the first time, 
nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely 
a matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a 
power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of 
its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to 
subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of 
consumption or as a means of production.^
In the same vein Marx wrote:
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, 
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are 
products of human industry; natural material transformed 
into organs of the human will over nature, or of human 
participation in nature.^
These passages 
Marx's works of the 
account, nature was 
with human activity
from the Grundrisse reflect the general account in
relationship between man and nature. According to this
destined to become 'humanised' - completely imprinted
4and appropriated to human ends. Already under
M.A. Korostovtsev, 'On the Concept "The Ancient East"', Vestnik drevnei 
istorii, 1970, No. 1, tr. in Soviet Studies in History, Vol. IX, No. 2 
(Fall, 1970), p. 110.
2 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 409-410.
3
Ibid.fP. 706. See also ibid.f p. 705 for man's 'understanding of 
nature and his mastery over it' embodied in existing forces of production 
which only need to be reappropriated by man in order for socialist man to 
develop on their basis.
4 Marx,[Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts], in Early Writings, ed. T.B. 
Bottomore, London, V7atts, 1963, p. 15 7.
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capitalism man had come close to ‘mastering' nature, and only the
distorting influence of existing social relations prevented him shaping
it to serve completely human purposes. Under capitalism, nature as
something independent of human activity no longer existed 'except perhaps
2on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin'. However the kind 
of new geographical environment (let alone the social environment) 
created by the advances of technology under capitalism was not necessarily 
benign. For example, river water ceased to be a suitable medium of 
existence for the fish
as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon 
as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and 
navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is 
diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive 
the fish of its medium of existence.3
Elsewhere Marx wrote in connection with the human mediation of 
nature that:
Climate and the Vegetable World Throughout the Ages, 
a History of Both, by Fraas (1847), is very interest­
ing, especially as proving that climate and flora have 
changed in historic times.... He maintains that as a 
result of cultivation and in proportion to its degree, 
the 'moisture' so much beloved by the peasant is lost,
.(hence plants migrate from south to north) and event­
ually the formation of steppes begins. The first 
effects of cultivation are useful but in the end it 
turns land into wastes owing to deforestation, etc....
The conclusion is that cultivation when it progresses 
spontaneously and is not consciously controlled (as 
a bourgeois he of course does not arrive at this), 
leaves deserts behind it - Persia, Mesopotamia, etc., ^
Greece. Hence again an unconscious socialist tendency!...
The image of 'mastery over nature' is one that is constantly recurring 
in Marx, particularly in the Grundrisse. It is expressed as the 'Subject­
ion of Nature's forces to man' in the Communist Manifesto, MESW, Vol. I, 
p. 37.
2 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow, Progress, 1968, p. 59.
Ibid., p. 55.
Marx to Engels, 25 March 1868, MESC, p. 202.4
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Marx's whole concept of socialism rested on the proposition 
that man was acquiring the capacity not simply to create his environ­
ment but consciously to plan his environment in such a way that he 
could both know and control even the remote consequences of his 
activities. This proposition is essential to Marx's theory of alienation. 
The alienated condition of man could not be overcome unless it had become 
possible for man to control the products of his activity rather than to 
be controlled by them. Marx's statements in the Grundrisse to the 
effect that nature becomes universally appropriated by man (and hence 
is to be regarded as in fact an extension of man) imply that the dial­
ectic between man and nature comes to an end under socialism. Not only 
has nature become permeated by human activity, but man has become capable 
of controlling the results of his activity, keeping them subordinate to 
his purposes. In Capital itself a rather different approach to this 
question appears. There is no longer the concept of a full reconcili­
ation of subject and object (man and nature) as the culmination of the 
dialectical development of world history.'*' Although nature is humanly 
mediated, it still retains an independent objective existence, and still 
holds man in the grip of necessity in so far as production of the basic 
means of existence is concerned.
In Capital, Vol. I, Marx writes:
For a full account of the change in Marx's concept of the ultimate 
relationship between man and nature, see Alfred Schmidt, Der Begriff der 
Natur in der Lehre von Marx, Frankfurt a.M., 'Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
1962. Schmidt argues that the young Marx (as for example represented in 
the EPM) took over from Hegel the view that the dialectical process re­
presented the overcoming, step by step, of everything not identical with 
the subject (Schmidt, p. 117). Schmidt claims, with some justification, 
that in Marx's mature materialism this view was replaced by a belief in 
the ultimate irreconcilability of subject and object.
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The labour-process, resolved as above into its simple 
elementary factors, is human action with a view to the 
production of use-values, appropriation of natural 
substances to human requirements; it is the necessary 
condition for effecting exchange of matter between man 
and Nature, it is the everlasting Nature-imposed 
condition of human existence, and therefore is independent 
of every social phase of that existence, or rather is 
common to every such phase.
In this passage Marx projects the continued determination of man by
non-human factors. This view is presented even more strikingly in the
famous passage in Capital, Vol. Ill, which reads:
Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy 
his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must 
civilised man, and he must do so in all social form­
ations and under all possible modes of production.
Even under socialism this interchange with nature remains a 'realm of
necessity.'^
Marx also wrote that,apart from the degree of development in the 
form of social production, the productiveness of labour in general was 
'fettered' by physical conditions. Thus in the early stage of human 
development, productiveness was determined by natural wealth in the means 
of subsistence, such as fertile soil, while at a higher stage of develop­
ment, it was determined by the accessibility of natural sources of 
3energy.
In Capital, Marx appears to have come a little closer to the views
4on the relationship between man and nature normally ascribed to Engels.
Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 183-184.
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. Ill, p. 820.
3 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 512.
4 Although Engels is inconsistent on this as on other topics. In most 
of his later works he describes man's coming mastery over nature in terms 
of his increasing knowledge of the laws of nature and of natural necessity, 
but he is also capable of statements such as that socialism represents 
'humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom' 
(Anti-Dühring, tr. E. Burns, London, Lawrence and Wishart, n.d. (reprinted 
with some minor revisions from 1934 ed.), p. 312.)
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Engels had also begun with the proposition that socialism represented
the 'reconciliation of man with nature and with himself.'^ The form
which this reconciliation took in Engels' 'mature' works (after he had
absorbed the influence of Darwin), is as follows:
If this were so [if consciousness and thought were 
accepted as being in contrast to being, to Nature], 
it must seem extremely remarkable that consciousness 
and Nature, thinking and being, the laws of thought 
and the laws of Nature, should be so closely in 
correspondence. But if the further question is raised: 
what then are thought and consciousness, and whence 
they come, it becomes apparent that they are products 
of the human brain and that man himself is a product 
of Nature, which has been developed in and along with 
its environment; whence it is self-evident that the 
products of the human brain, being in the last analysis 
also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of 
Nature, but are in correspondence with it.^
Whereas for Marx the reconciliation of man and nature (where he 
projects it) represents the assimilation of nature by man, for Engels 
it appears to represent the assimilation of man by nature. Engels 
interpreted the future in terms of man's increasing recognition of those 
'general laws' which govern both man and nature, and in terms of man's 
increasing ability to apply correctly those laws. In Engels as well as in 
Marx, the dialectic between man and nature is transcended, but in Engels 
this is because when men 'not only feel, but also know, their unity 
with nature ... the more impossible will become the senseless and anti-
3natural idea of contradiction between mind and matter, man and nature ...'
Because man was becoming able to apply correctly the laws of 
nature, each 'conquest over nature' would no longer bring retribution in 
some form to the conquerors (such as the consequences of the destruction
Engels, 'Umriss zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie' ,TWerkef Vol. I, 
p. 505.
2 Engels, Anti-D'ühring, o p . c i t pp. 44-45.
3 Engels, The Dialectics of Nature, tr. C.P. Dutt, London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1940, p. 293.
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of forests to obtain land to cultivate).'*' The removal of the profit- 
motive by the advent of socialism would ensure this harmony between man 
and nature.
It has often been observed that Engels, under the influence of 
Darwin, came to subsume human history under the operation of general laws 
of nature. By the time he was writing Anti-D'ühring, Engels had arrived 
at views on the relationship between human history and 'laws of nature' 
that were diametrically opposed to those expressed thirty-odd years before 
in the German Ideology. In Anti-D’ühring, Engels could make the bald 
statement that 'Nature is the test of dialectics', thus contradicting all 
the strictures laid down in the German Ideology on the subject of using 
nature to prove social truths.
In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels were criticising the 'true
socialists' who, among other failings, ascribed to nature certain features
which in fact represented a 'pious wish about human affairs' (my 
2emphasis). The true socialists imported into nature that harmony which 
they wished to establish in human society, and then invoked nature as a 
proof of their social theories.
This is merely one instance given in the German Ideology of the
ideological treatment of nature. Marx and Engels also described how it
was possible for a capitalist to discover in nature the competitive system
of capitalism; for a supporter of feudalism to perceive a feudal system,
for example in the cosmos; or for a supporter of absolute monarchy (i.e.
3Hobbes) to see in it the war of all against all. Marx and Engels argued,
Ibid., p. 292
2 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op.cit., p. 533.
3
Ibid., pp. 531-533. Cf. Marx's later comment: 'It is remarkable how
Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society with its 
division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, 'inventions', 
and the Malthusian 'struggle for existence'. It is Hobbes's bellum omnium
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however, that none of the characteristics ascribed to nature could have 
any necessary bearing on man's social arrangements or provide 
additional evidence of the necessity of any given social arrangement. 
Hence although they found Hobbes' description of the law of nature (the 
war of all against all) more satisfactory than the assumption of a 
harmony inherent in nature, they by no means concluded that absolute 
monarchy rather than socialism was the most satisfactory, or the 
necessary form of social arrangement for man.
According to The German Ideology: 'The same general energies and
properties, which man has in common with 'all things', are cohesion, 
impenetrability, volume, gravity, etc., which can be found set out in 
detail on the first page of any textbook of physics.'^ None of these 
properties could be construed as a reason for any particular form of 
human behaviour.
Nonetheless, in his later works Engels came to see man as part of
the eternal movement of matter, governed by those general laws that
2apply to both the history of nature and the history of society.
But although man would, in the future, continue to be determined
by these general laws, local particularities of nature would no longer
exercise an important influence on man, or on the forms of his social
organisation. For example, the antithesis between town and country
perpetuated by the capitalist form of production would be abolished, thus
3putting an end to the 'present poisoning of the air, water and land.'
contra omnes, and one is reminded of Hegels Phenomenology, where civil 
society is described as a 'spiritual animal kingdom', while in Darwin the 
animal kingdom figures as civil society ...' (Marx to Engels, 18 June 
1862, MESC, p. 128.)
1 Ibid., p. 532.
2 See Engels, The Dialectics of Dature, op.cit., pp. 24-6; Engels, 
Anti-D'uhring, op.cit. , pp. 15 7-159.
3 Engels, Anti-Diihring, op.cit., p. 325.
124
Moreover, under socialism the location of industry would no longer
be determined by the location of raw materials. Engels wrote that
capitalist industry had already 'made itself relatively independent of
the local limitations arising from the location of sources of raw
materials^ The new productive forces brought into being by socialism
2would complete this independence.
Thus Marx and Engels, in spite of differences in the views they 
expressed on the relationship between man and nature, concurred in 
believing that geographical factors would be of negligible importance in 
determining future forms of social organisation. Capitalism was in the 
process of making over the world in its own image and once capitalism 
was established it was inevitable that the inherent tendencies of the 
system should unfold, including the basis of its ultimate negation.
The general bias of their views on the historical role of geo­
graphical factors was to be quite accurately summed up by Pokrovsky, 
although he under-emphasised the relation between geographical factors 
and socio-economic diversity in the pre-capitalist era, in favour of 
the retarding/accelerating thesis (discussed in the next section):
Man, then, depends on nature, and the rate of progress 
of a given nation depends to a considerable degree on 
its natural environment. But this power of nature over 
man is not unlimited. Man can master nature, and it is 
not nature that is the foundation of his economic 
activity. Nature is only the material for this activity.
The foundations of the economic activity of man is man's 
labour; the more highly developed his labour, the more 
persistent and skilful he is, the less does his dependence 
on nature become. It is easy to foresee that in the 
future, when science and technique have attained to a 
perfection•which we are as yet unable to visualize, nature 
will become soft wax in his hands which he will be able 
to cast into whatever form he chooses.^
Ibid.
2 Though neither Marx nor Engels seems to have envisaged the possibility 
that extractive industry might cease to be the major source of raw 
materials.
M.N. Pokrovsky, A Brief History of Russia, op.cit., pp. 33-34.3
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The passage ff cm Pokrovsky brings out the confusion arising from 
Marx's failure to provide an adequate definition of the 'natural 
environment' in which man's productive activity took place. It is 
clearly stated by Marx that nature is a historical product, changing 
under the impact of man and reacting back on him. Yet when Marx talks 
of the receding significance of natural factors, or of the environment, 
it appears that he is not talking about such factors as themselves 
products of human activity. This has been a problem of great significance 
in contemporary Soviet Marxism, as we shall see later in this Chapter; 
other Marxists such as Plekhanov, to whom we now turn, were concerned 
about the underestimation of the role of geographical factors, but did 
not appreciate the central confusion from which it sprang.
The 'Geographical Deviation’: Plekhanov
The works of G.V. Plekhanov first introduced into Marxism what I 
shall call the 'geographical deviation' - i.e., the belief that geograph­
ical factors do not necessarily diminish in importance with the develop­
ment of man's productive powers. (Though for Stalin, emphasising the 
geographical factor at all was to represent a geographical deviation.) 
Plekhanov played a pre-eminent role in systematising Marx's philosophy 
of history, contributing at the turn of the nineteenth century to 
French, Russian and German socialist journals. He gave authoritative 
expression to the 'theory of historical materialism' in the following 
writings: The Development of the Monist View of History (1895); Essays
in the History of Materialism (1896); 'The Materialist Conception of 
History' (Novoe Slovor 1897); and Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908).
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In 1914, in spite of political differences which had become irrecon­
cilable, Lenin wrote that 'On the question of Marx's philosophy and 
historical materialism, the best exposition is given by G.V. Plekhanov.'^
In systematising Marx's theory of history, Plekhanov considerably
strengthened the elements of geographical determinism which Marx had
2inherited from Montesquieu and Hegel. Plekhanov himself was deeply
influenced by the work of the contemporary geographical determinists,
3 4Mechnikov and Ratzel.
The geographical deviation becomes clearly visible in Plekhanov's 
analysis of the concept of 'forces of production.' Whereas Marx tends 
to treat the stage of development of the forces of production as the 
terminus ab quo in the analysis of social relations and social structures, 
Plekhanov's terminus ab quo consists in the natural or geographical 
determinants of those forces. Plekhanov believed that the primary condition 
for the development of any given productive force must be sought in the
5properties of the environment. He argued that:
... the properties of the geographical environment 
determine the development of the productive forces, which,
V.I. Lenin, 'Karl Marx', Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 86.
2 It is significant that in his tribute to Hegel, Plekhanov singles out 
Hegel's emphasis on the determining role of geographical factors for 
special praise. See 'For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death',
Selected Philosophical Works, Moscow, 1961, Vol. I, pp. 455-483.3 See Leon Metchnikoff [Lev Ilich Mechnikov], La Civilisation et les grands 
fleuves historiques, Paris, 1889. See also a Russian edition, tr. by M.D. 
Gorodetsky, St. Petersburg, 1898. Interestingly enough, the state publishing 
house brought out an edition in Mosccw in 1924, of which the reviewer in Pod 
znamenem marksizma remarked that it was unnecessary to recommend it any further 
after the well-known articles of Plekhanov. As will be seen in the next 
section, theories of geographic determinism had not yet been denounced as 
incompatible with historical materialism in the 1920s, and in any case a 
certain flexibility was displayed in such theoretical matters.
4 See Friedrich Ratzel, Anthropo-Geographie; oder Grundzüge der Auf­
wendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte, Stuttgart, 1882.
5 G.V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism, tr. J. Katzer, Moscow, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d., p. 55.
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fW. e c o n o m i c  C-mi c f  a/I
i n  i t s  t u r n  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a l l  o t h e r  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s .
The d i v e r g e n c e  from  Marx i s  b r o u g h t  o u t - q u i t e  c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  f o l l o w in g
p a s s a g e  from  Marx, and i n  P l e k h a n o v 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  i t .  Marx w ro te :
In  t h e  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e ,  men i n e v i t a b l y  
e n t e r  i n t o  d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n s  w h ich  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  
t h e i r  w i l l ,  nam ely  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  
a  g iv e n  s t a g e  i n  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e i r  m a t e r i a l  f o r c e s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The t o t a l i t y  o f  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d ­
u c t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  econom ic  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  
t h e  r e a l  f o u n d a t i o n ,  on w hich a r i s e s  a l e g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . . . 2
P l e k h a n o v 's  g l o s s  on t h i s  p a s s a g e  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
M a rx 's  r e p l y  t h u s  r e d u c e s  t h e  w hole  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  economy t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  c a u s e s  d e t e r ­
m in in g  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  f o r c e s  a t  t h e  
d i s p o s a l  o f  s o c i e t y .  I n  t h i s ,  i t s  f i n a l  fo rm , i t  i s  
s o l v e d  f i r s t  and f o r e m o s t  b y  th e  ( s i c )  r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
n a t u r e  o f  th e  g e o g r a p h i c  e n v i r o n m e n t .  2
The g e o g r a p h i c a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  M a rx 's  m a t e r i a l i s m  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e
rapproch em e n t  b e tw e en  M arxism and D arw in ism  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  one o f
P l e k h a n o v 's  m ost  n o t o r i o u s  s t a t e m e n t s :  'M arx ism  i s  D arw in ism  i n  i t s
4
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e . '  I . e . ,  w here  D arw in ism  shows how t h e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a n im a ls  and  v e g e t a b l e  s p e c i e s  o c c u r s  u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  
o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  M arxism shows how th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
t y p e s  o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t .  E ls e w h e re  P le k h a n o v  e x p r e s s e d  t h i s  a n a lo g y  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  
z o o l o g i c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  n a t u r a l  o r g a n s  u n d e r  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  as  com pared  w i th  t h e  M a r x i s t
I b i d . ,  p .  49.
2
Marx, P r e f a c e  t o  A C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  C r i t i q u e  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy,  
o p . c i t . ,  p .  20 .
3
G.V. P le k h a n o v ,  Fundamental  Prob lems o f  Marxism, o p . c i t . ,  p .  47.
4 G.V. P le k h a n o v ,  In  Defence  o f  M a t e r i a l i s m , The Deve lopment  o f  t h e  
M onis t  View o f  H i s t o r y ,  t r .  A. R o t h s t e i n ,  London, Law rence and W is h a r t ,  
1947, p .  244 , f n .
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investigation into the development of artificial organs (i.e. tools,
forces of production) under the influence of the natural environment.^
While the Darwinian analogy has a certain superficial appeal, in
so far as it is plausible to view man's historical evolution in terms of
the differentiation of his artificial organs (the development of the
division of labour, specialisation, etc.), its dangers are readily apparent.
One of the reasons why Plekhanov suffered pitfalls of this kind was
the fact that most of Marx's early writing, and the relevant sections of the
Grundrisse, were still unpublished and unavailable. He does not seem to
have been aware of Marx's account of the historical dialectic between man
and nature; and of the historical creation of the geographic environment
by man. Plekhanov tended to treat the geographical environment as a given
factor, rather than as a historical product, although man's relationship
with it would vary from epoch to epoch, depending on the development of
man's productive forces. For example, he wrote:
The peoples who inhabited England in the time of Caesar 
experienced the influence of the same geographical environ­
ment as the English of Cromwell's day.^
(But Cromwell's contemporaries possessed much greater productive forces
than the peoples of the time of Caesar.) This is the kind of argument which
3Marx rejected utterly in Feuerbach, and it is quite clear that the swamp and 
forest environment of iron-age Britain had given way to a historically 
created environment of cleared and cultivated land in the seventeenth century.
A contemporary of Plekhanov's, the philosopher Antonio Labriola, who 
also played an important part in elaborating the theory of historical
G.V. Plekhanov, Essays in the History of Materialism, tr. by Ralph Fox, 
reprinted N.Y., Fertig, 1967, p. 213.
2 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
3 'He does not see ha// the sensuous world around him is not a thing given 
direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of
industry and the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is a
historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of 
generations ...', '...in the Campagna of Rome he finds only pasture lands and 
swamps, where in the time of Augustus he would have found nothing but the vine
yards and villas of Roman capitalists.' (Marx and Engels, The German
Ideology, op.cit., pp. 57, 58.)
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m a t e r i a l i s m ,  ^ w r o te  an a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  man and 
n a t u r e  t h a t  was i n  some ways c l o s e r  t o  Marx. T h is  was p r o b a b l y  b e c a u s e  
L a b r i o l a  a d h e re d  more c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  H e g e l ia n  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  
t h a n  P le k h a n o v  d i d .
L a b r i o l a  to o k  a  s i m i l a r  p o s i t i o n  t o  P l e k h a n o v 's  i n  s o  f a r  a s  he
p o s t u l a t e d  m a n 's  c o n t i n u e d  dep en d en ce  on g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  and d i d
n o t  e n v i s a g e  a l e s s e n i n g  o f  t h i s  d e p e n d e n c e ,  o r  M a rx 's  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n
o f  man and n a t u r e .  L a b r i o l a  w r o te  t h a t  t h e  k i n d  o f  change  i n  t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  man and  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by  m an 's
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  was t h e  change  from  th e  p r i m i t i v e  dependence  on
s t o n e s  and  o s i e r s  and  w i l lo w s  f o r  t h e  raw m a t e r i a l s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t o  t h e
a d v a n c e d  d ep e n d en c e  on c o a l  and  t h e  m a t e r i a l s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p ro d u c e  
2
e l e c t r i c i t y .
However, L a b r i o l a  was a l s o  c a p a b le  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v i e w p o in t :
'H i s t o r y  i s  t h e  work o f  man i n  s o  f a r  as  man can  c r e a t e  and  im prove  h i s
i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  l a b o r ,  and w i t h  t h e s e  i n s t r u m e n t s  can  c r e a t e  am a r t i f i c i a l
3
e n v i r o n m e n t  whose c o m p l ic a t e d  e f f e c t s  r e a c t  l a t e r  upon h i m s e l f .
H aving  e s t a b l i s h e d  P l e k h a n o v 's  ' g e o g r a p h i c a l  d e v i a t i o n ' ,  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  s t r e s s  he  l a i d  on g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r s  a s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  
o f  any  g iv e n  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  one can  ' look  a t  some o f  t h e  w i d e r  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h i s  d e v i a t i o n .  A c c o rd in g  t o  P le k h a n o v * s  t h e o r y ,  g iv e n  
a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  p r o d u c t i v e  f o r c e s ,  d i f f e r e n t  g e o g r a p h i c a l  e n v i ro n m e n ts  
w i l l  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o r r e l a t e s .
S e e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  h i s  E s s a y s  on t h e  M a t e r i a l i s t  C o n c e p t io n  o f  H i s t o r y ,  
t h e  F re n c h  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  v /h ich  was r e v ie w e d  f a v o u r a b ly  by  P le k h a n o v  i n  
Novoe S l o v o ,  1897. The book was p u b l i s h e d  i n  a  R u s s ia n  e d i t i o n  i n  S t .  
P e t e r s b u r g ,  1898.
2
A. L a b r i o l a ,  E s s a y s  on t h e  M a t e r i a l i s t  C o n ce p t io n  o f  H i s t o r y , t r .  
C h a r l e s  K e r r ,  f i r s t  p u b .  C h ic a g o ,  K e r r ,  1903, r e p r i n t e d  N. Y. ,  M onth ly  
Review P r e s s ,  1966, p .  119.
3
I b i d . ,  p .  120. L a b r i o l a ,  and  P le k h a n o v  i n  h i s  wake ( i n  h i s  r e v ie w  
a r t i c l e  o f  L a b r i o l a ) , g e n e r a l l y  u se  t h e  te rm  ' a r t i f i c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t '  t o  
r e f e r  t o  t h e  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  man c r e a t e s .  H e re ,  h o w e v e r ,  a  w id e r  
m ean ing  seem s t o  be  i n t e n d e d .
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Plekhanov's major example concerns the type of social organisation 
which develops out of clan society when the growth of productive forces 
in the latter causes its break-down. On the basis of the same level 
of productive forces there appeared one kind of social system in the 
West (the slave-based classical state) and another in the East. According to 
Plekhanov, the Oriental and the ancient modes of production represent two co­
existing types of economic development, owing their distinctive features 
to 'the influence of the geographical environment, which in one case 
prescribed one kind of aggregate production relations ... and in the 
other case, another kind . ..'^
This is one of the most significant features of the geographical 
deviation in historical materialism - the fact that it reinforces a 
multilinear rather than a unilinear interpretation of history. As we 
have seen, Marx's own analysis of the early stages of history (where 
geographical and other local circumstances play a more important role in 
shaping social institutions than under capitalism) supports a multi­
linear schema, but one which only applies to the period before technology 
masters geography.
Although Plekhanov v;as true to Marx, in suggesting a multilinear, 
or at least a bilinear schema of pre-capitalist development, he 
suggested a far more deterministic relationship than did Marx, between 
geographical factors and social structures. For example, Plekhanov criti­
cised Mechnikov for deferring to the geographical 'possibilism' of 
2Elisee Reclus, as expressed in the view that in ancient Egypt the given
Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism, op.cit., p. 64.
2 Like Reclus, Mechnikov was an anarchist, and he was involved in several 
of Bakunin's secret societies. Anarchist doctrine lent itself to volunt­
arist rather than determinist views. In the sphere of geography this led 
towards 'possibilism* - i.e., the idea that: 'nature does not drive man
along one particular road, but offers a number of opportunities from which 
man is free to select' (taking into account his level of technology). The 
general tone of Mechnikov's writing was, however, determinist.
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geographical factors of the Nile Valley still left open the choice be­
tween despotism and a form of association based on the equality of all.'*'
According to Plekhanov, given the geographical factors of the flooding 
of the Nile, and the narrow margin between successful utilisation of the 
waters of the Nile and the ruin represented by floods, and on the other 
hand, given the level of man's technology in ancient Egypt, the creation 
of a despotic state apparatus was completely determined.* 2 34 Elsewhere 
Plekhanov quotes approvingly a passage from G. Maspero which concludes
with the words 'the Nile thus determined the political as well as the
3physical constitution of Egypt.'
Having mentioned the links between geographical determinism and the 
multilinear theory of history, it is necessary to add that Hegel and L. 
Mechnikov, both influential upholders of theories of the crucial importance of 
geography, succeeded in uniting these theories with unilinear theories of 
history. Hegel did so in the following way: each progressive stage of
world history corresponded to the working out of one particular natural
4principle. The first stage of world history, the development of forms
G.V. Plekhanov, '0 knige L.I. Mechnikova' Sochineniiaf Vol. VII, p. 24.
2 V7ittfogel's first articles on the place of natural factors in historical 
materialism followed Plekhanov closely here. (E.g. 'Geopolitika, geo- 
graficheskii materializm i marksizm', Pod znamenem marksizma, 1929, No.
2-3 (Feb.- March), p. 8.) Wittfogel appears to have modified his position 
in recent years (by 1971), and has come down in favour of a negative 
causal relationship between natural conditions and social response. E.g. 
he suggests that while geographical factors preclude certain options, and 
may favour one particular form of social response, the possibility remains 
open of more than one institutional correlative for any given geographical 
environment.
3 Maspero had written that the centralised co-ordination of irrigation 
was essential to overcome the strife between communities arising from one 
community seizing the supply of water or discharging it at pleasure, regard­
less of whether this deprived another community of water, or alternatively, 
flooded it. See G. Maspero, The Dawn of Civilization, 14th ed., London, 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1901, p. 70. Quoted by 
Plekhanov in his History, p. 77, fn. 2, from the French edition entitled 
Histoire ancienne des peuples de 1'Orient classique, Paris, 1895, Vol. I, 
p. 70.
4 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1942, pp. 217-18. (§ 346-47).
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of substantial freedom took place in, and could only take place in,
the 'valley plains' of the Orient.’*' The geographical factors here were
particularly favourable to the development of agriculture, aid hence to
the development of the institutions of private property and of the 
2state. However, according to Hegel, the next stage of the unfolding of 
world history could only take place in a completely different geographical 
environment. The multiformity and diversity of natural features in the 
Aegean area,linked by sea, was essential for the rise of individualism, 
as opposed to the glorification of the unity which has arisen naturally 
in the Orient, where one great natural feature (i.e. the river)
3dominated an otherwise monotonous plain.
4Mechnikov's reconciliation of geographical determinism with the 
unilinear theory of history differs slightly from Hegel's. Firstly, 
Mechnikov puts more stress on the incentive to centralised social 
organisation provided by the river-valley environment, where large-scale 
planning and work discipline meant the difference between high product­
ivity and disaster (i.e. floods). This strict social organisation in 
turn gave rise to both civilisation and the despotic state. However, 
the progress of technology and the growth of wealth, which took place in 
this epoch, created the need for international relations of exchange, a
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op.cit., p. 93.
 ^ Ibid.
3
Ibid., pp. 234-235. I have not mentioned Hegel's third and fourth 
stages (the Roman and German worlds) or Mechnikov's third epoch (the 
Oceanic), as I feel that the transition between the first two stages, in 
both cases, most clearly illustrates how the geographical interpretation of 
history can still be unilinear.
4 With the revival of interest in the 'geographical deviation' in the 
Soviet Union there has also been a revival of interest in Mechnikov. See 
for example M.A. Korostovtsev, 'On the Concept "The Ancient East"' loc.cit., 
pp. 107-132. V.A. Anuchin, Teoreticheskie problemy geografii, Gos. izd. 
geog. lit., Moscow, 1960; M.G. Fedorov, Russkaia progressivnaia mysl'
XIX v ot geograficheskogo determinizma k istoricheskomu materializmu, 
Novosibirsk, 1972,
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need which could not be satisfied in the geographical environment of 
the river valley. The Mediterranean was the environment most suited to 
the unfolding of the second major epoch in Mechnikov's schema of world 
history, the epoch based on diversity and exchange - i.e. commodity 
production. According to Mechnikov, the new geographical environment in 
which history unfolded its second phase also had its specific socio­
political correlates.
Another way in which the transition from the geographical environ­
ment of the river valley to the geographical environment of the 
Mediterranean has been depicted as one of the logical progressions of 
world history is to be found in the work of the late Professor V. Gordon 
Childe.'*' According to Childe, the despotic state was the correlate of 
the needs of production in the river valley. The vast surpluses 
accumulated by this state form provided the means by which Mediterranean 
civilisation was able to reach take-off point without a despotic system 
of its own. Eastern surpluses supported the development of craft 
specialisation in the West, and precisely the fact that in the West the 
state did not have to play such a leading role in the economy, meant that 
in the long run Western civilisation was more adaptable and progressive.
All these efforts to reconcile theories of geographic determinism 
with a universal schema of world history (consisting of progressive 
epochs) are interesting in themselves, but as arguments are more difficult 
to sustain than the equation of geographical pluralism with pluralism of 
modes of production and social forces not linked in any logical progression. 
The latter equation is certainly applied by Marx to the earlier phases 
of human history, and Plekhanov was an important figure in redirecting 
attention to this.
See, e.g., V.G. Childe, What happened in History, London, Max Parrish, 
1960; Man Makes Himself, London, Watts, 1948; 'The Bronze Age', Past 
and Present, No. 12 (Nov. 1957), p. 11.
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However, Plekhanov is inconsistent on this point in his own writing, 
and wavers between a geographically-determined pluralism, and the 
universal development of a determinate series of social formations 
according to the immanent logic of material production. When leaning 
towards the latter view, Plekhanov uses the formula, apparently taken 
from Elisee Reclus, that nature can have only an accelerating or retard­
ing influence on the development of society. Thus Plekhanov wrote:
The physical environment acts on social man through those 
social relations which arise on the basis of the prod­
uctive forces, which at first develop more or less 
quickly according to the characteristics of the physical 
environment. •*-
As we shall see, the accelerating/retarding formula was adopted by Stalin,
and appeared in all Soviet text-books on historical materialism up till
196 3. (And is still appearing in some contexts.)
However, the significance of Plekhanov's contribution to historical
materialism lay not in the popularisation of the accelerating/retarding
formula, but in the alternative view of geographical factors which
dominates his work: that the role of the geographical environment is
always of fundamental importance in determining the character of social 
2relations. This contribution was significant because it helped to 
bring out Marx's multilinear perception of pre-capitalist society: that
given the same level of productive forces, alternative forms of social 
organisation or modes of production emerged in accordance with differing 
local geographical and historical circumstances. Plekhanov's contri­
bution also provided a counterpoise to the view, to be found in Marx and 
Engels, that technological development in the capitalist era led to the 
nullifying of the natural environment as an independent influence on 
human societies.
G.V. Plekhanov, In Defence of Materialism, op.cit., p. 244.
2 G.V. Plekhanov, 'Once again Mr Mikhailovsky, once more the "triad" ' , 
Appendix to In Defence of Materialism, o p . c i t p. 291.
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The 'Geographical Deviation*: Wittfogel
Although Plekhanov stressed the continuing importance of geograph­
ical factors in historical development, he did not go as far as certain 
twentieth-century Marxists, who have argued that the geographical factor 
becomes of greater rather than of lesser importance with the growth of 
the material forces of production.
The first important exponent of this view was K.A. Wittfogel, who 
expressed it in an article published serially in 1929 in the leading 
theoretical journal of Soviet Marxism.'*' Wittfogel argued that the more 
man developed his power to 'actualise' nature, .the more important was the 
role of natural factors in production. This was particularly evident 
in the sphere of the actualisation of various natural sources of energy which 
came to replace human labour in the process of production. The fact that 
these sources of energy could only be 'actualised' not created ex 
nihilo by man meant that he was even more at the mercy of the properties 
of his geographical environment in respect to the development of his 
forces of production.
In his early articles, Wittfogel criticised those exponents of
historical materialism,such as Kautsky and Lukäcs, who dematerialised
history by treating the social conditions of production as comprising
2the basis of history. According to Wittfogel, this viewpoint was
)
idealistic, in so far as it involved the underestimation of the natural 
conditions of production.
Wittfogel later illustrated his argument with the example of the 
French capitalism. According to his account, the French revolution created 
all the social preconditions for the expansion of capitalist economic
See K.A. Wittfogel, ' Geopolitika, geograficheskii materializm i mark sizin' , 
in Pod znamenem marksizma, 1929, Ho. 2-3 (Feb .-March) , pp. 16-42; No. 6 
(June), pp. 1-29; No. 7-8 (July-Aug.), pp. 1-28.
2 K.A. Wittfogel, 'Geopolitika, geograficheskii materializm i marksizm',
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forms in France. Yet, in spite of the existence of the social and 
technological preconditions French industrial capitalism made little 
progress throughout the nineteenth century. Wittfogel found the explan­
ation for France's failure to develop at this stage in her natural 
environment; in the lack of good quality iron ore for the production 
of steel; in the lack of extensive coal deposits; and in the unfavour­
able location of those coal deposits that France did have.
In his own account of historical materialism, Wittfogel attempted 
to establish a clear-cut distinction between naturally-determined forces 
of. production and socially-determined forces of production. In the 
former category he placed factors such as water, steam, wind, warmth, 
electricity, etc., and in the latter category factors such as technology, 
organisation of labour (or co-operation) , instruments and machines.
The combination of both sets of factors resulted in a particular mode 
of production, which in turn determined the relations of production, etc.
Wittfogel found natural factors to be of decisive historical importance,
though they were not constant in form, different natural factors being
actualised at different periods. Thus a natural resource such as falling
water might be of determining importance in one era (with the water-
powered mill), might be of negligible importance in the next era (with
the use of steam-powered machinery), and then come into its own again
2with the invention of the hydro-electric turbine.
Wittfogel applied his theory of ultimate determination of social 
relations by the natural forces of production to all of the Marxist stages
Pod znamenem marksizma, No. 6 (June 1929), p. 17.
 ^ K.A. Wittfogel, 'Die natürlichen Ursachen der Wirtschaftsgeschichte', 
Archiv Für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Vol. 67 (1932), Part I, 
p. 467.
 ^ Ibid., Part I, p. 485.
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of history. He began with the Australian aborigines. These tribes had 
never been able to advance along the path of human history because of 
the natural absence in their environment of animals suitable for domest­
ication or cereals for cultivation. The mode of production was limited 
by natural factors, and any development to pastoral and agricultural 
activity, with their corresponding social forms was thus blocked."*"
As far as the antique mode of production (which he limits to West 
Rome) was concerned, Wittfogel saw as the determining natural force the 
fact that the land was suited to extensive agriculture. However, this 
mode of production led only into a blind alley, as it depended on 
slave labour, and when slaves could no longer be pumped into the system
2(because the technical limits of empire had been reached) it collapsed.
While the economy of Western Rome declined to a lower stage, that 
of East Rome remained stable. Once again Wittfogel finds an explanation 
for this in the constellation of natural forces. In the East, the lack 
of rainfall meant that irrigation was necessary and hence intensive 
methods of agriculture. These in turn precluded the wide-scale use of 
slaves in agriculture and so the system was more stable.
Where large-scale irrigation/flood-control works were necessary 
there developed the centralised bureaucratic state which participated 
directly in the economy. In this situation the 'actualisable1 natural 
forces of production gave rise to a mode of production and social 
relations which did not permit further development into a higher economic, 
stage. There was an irreconcilable contradiction between, for example, 
the classic irrigation economy and industrialism. In this case [e.g. 
China], both the technological level and the raw materials necessary for
Ibid., pp. 488-492. See also Ellen Churchill Semple, Influences of 
Geographic Environment, On the Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthropo- 
Geography, N.Y., Henry Holt, 1911, p. 63.
2 K.A. Wittfogel, 'Die natürlichen Ursachen der Wirtschaftsgeschichte', 
loc.cit., Part II, pp. 596-600.
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industrialisation were present, but the bourgeoisie did not have the 
bulwark of the Occidental city in which to develop their form of 
production.^
The widespread need for irrigation in agricultural society did not
necessarily give rise to the institutional complex known as Oriental
despotism (i.e. a centralised bureaucratic state); where the natural
factors demanded small-scale intensive irrigation,on the Japanese model,
2the institutional correlate would be a variety of military feudalism.
As already mentioned, Wittfogel has modified in recent years these 
extremely deterministic views on the relationship between natural environ­
ment and social development.
One final example of Wittfogel's geographical interpretation of
history is his account of why the German bourgeoisie never developed into
a strong independent class. He quotes Revolution and Counter-Revolution
in Germany to support his view that the main cause of the backwardness
of German industry up to 1900 was Germany's geographical position; i.e.
isolation from the Atlantic Ocean, the highway of world trade since 
31500. Wittfogel expands his account of the influence of geographical 
factors on contemporary history with a geographical interpretation of the 
next dialectical stage of Germany's development. In the nineteenth century, 
other natural factors became actualised, such as Germany's advantages 
in iron and coal, and a concentrated development of industry took place; 
this belated development created a significant proletarian class
Ibid., p. 607.
2
Ibid., Part II, p. 587.
3 Ibid., Part III, p. 715. See Marx, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, 
ed. Eleanor Marx Aveling, London, Unwin, 1971, p. 4. (This series of 
articles has since been shown to have been written by Engels. See Rubel, 
Bibliographie.)
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simultaneously with the final emergence of a capitalist class (which 
was hence forced into the arms of the feudal reaction).
Basically, as we see here, Wittfogel placed much more emphasis on the 
interaction between man and his geographical environment, which developed 
under the impact of man's transforming and actualising activity, than 
on the inner laws of development of material production and its 
corresponding social institutions.
Historical Materialism Versus Geographical Determinism: Stalin
and Beyond
The kind of latitude in the Soviet interpretation of historical 
materialism, illustrated by the publication (despite editorial reser­
vations) "^ of Wittfogel's article 'Geopolitika,geograficheskii materializm 
i marksizm', was soon to be brought to an end. Stalin, in the first 
official statement to be made in the Soviet Union on the subject of 
geographical determinism, established an official line that was to remain 
in force until 1963. Stalin wrote that:
Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the 
constant and indispensable conditions of development of 
society and, of course, influences the development of 
society, accelerates or retards its development. But its 
influence is not the determining influence, inasmuch as 
the changes and development of society proceed at an 
incomparably faster rate than the changes and development 
of geographical environment. ...Changes in geographical 
environment of any importance require millions of years, 
whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are 
enough for even very important changes in the system of
Not only did the editor of Pod znamenem marksizma express reservations 
about the original article (published in three parts), but the follow-up 
article was rejected, and Wittfogel published it elsewhere. (For the 
follow-up article, see above, K.A. Wittfogel, 'Die natürlichen Ursachen 
der Wirtschaftsgeschichte', Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial­
politik, Vol. 67 (1932), Nos. 4, 5, 6.)
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human society.
This formula was repeated more or less mechanically in Soviet
2expositions of historical materialism, even after Stalin's death. It 
signified the complete abandonment of any dynamic conception of the 
interaction between man and nature, and the characterising of the geo­
graphical environment as a static given, in which 'changes of any
3importance require millions of years.' The fact that against this 
static background different social systems developed and superseded 
each other showed that the geographical environment by no means 
exercised a determining influence over human society, but could only 
accelerate or retard its development. The key to human history con­
sisted in the laws of development of material production, which alone 
explained:
Why the primitive communal system is succeeded precisely 
by the slave system, the slave system by the feudal 
system, and the feudal system by the bourgeois system, 
and not by some other.^
Hence Stalin's denigration of the role of geographical factors served 
to underpin his five-stage schema of world history.
Stalin's rigid demarcation between 'external nature' and human 
society, and the overwhelming precedence given to the social factor, also
Stalin, 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' (September 1938), in 
Problems of Leninism, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947, 
p. 482. This article, and statement on the role of the geographical 
environment was written for the 1938 History of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, Short Course.(London, Cobbett, 1943, pp. 106-07.)
2 See, for example, G.W. Kuusinen ed., Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, 
Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, p. 145; 'The geographical 
environment, on the one hand, and population, on the other, form the natural 
material prerequisites for the process of production. However, although 
these natural material conditions exercise a considerable influence on the 
course of social development, either accelerating or delaying it, they do 
not form the basis of that historical process.'
3 Stalin, 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' (September 1938), in 
Problems of Leninism, op.cit., p. 582; History of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, Short Course, op.cit., p. 107.
4
Ibid.
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gave rise to 'voluntaristic' attitudes in Soviet planning. Given the 
correct social relations, Soviet man could transform the face of the 
environment. It was this aspect of his formulation which was first to 
arouse criticism, which stemmed initially from geographers.
The Revolt of Soviet Geographers against Stalin
While Stalin's line on the geographical environment remained 
orthodoxy until 1963, the revolt among geographers against his inter­
pretation began quite early. In 1940, N.N. Baransky of Moscow University, 
read a paper at a theoretical conference of the Geographical Faculty of 
Moscow University on the subject of 'Marx and Engels on the Geographical 
Environment'. This paper presented evidence contradicting Stalin's 
position. The fact that Plekhanov's geographical theory exercised a 
very important influence on Baransky is evident from his work published 
as early as the 1920s.^
In 1960, when the debate was once more being opened up, Baransky
brought forward arguments identical to those expressed by that other
disciple of G.V. Plekhanov, Wittfogel, in the 1920s, although of course
without direct reference to Wittfogel himself. For example, Baransky
criticised the tendency to what he called 'geographical nihilism' on the
grounds that by isolating society from its material environment it led 
2to idealism. Thus Baransky employed the same argument against Stalin
See Ian M. Matley, 'The Marxist Approach to the Geographical Environ­
ment' , Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 56 (1966), 
p. 99. Baransky was not only an extremely eminent geographer, but had 
been a friend of Lenin, which may have helped to preserve him in his 
outspokenness.
2 N.N. Baransky, 'Uchet prirodnoi sredy v ekonomicheskoi geografii', in 
Ekonomicheskaia Geografiia - Ekonomicheskaia Kartografiia, Moscow, 1960, p.40.
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as Wittfogel had employed against Kautsky and Lukacs more than thirty 
years previously.
Baransky also followed Wittfogel in affirming that advances in
technology do not mean a lessening of the influence of natural factors
on the mode of production. Instead, new natural factors, such as the
location of oil, have a determining influence on, for example, the
distribution of industry and transportation.^
Baransky died in 1963, and it has been the younger geographer,
V . A . Anuchin, who has provided much of the inspiration for the de-
Stalinisation of theoretical geography, which in turn has led to the
revision of Stalin's interpretation of historical materialism. Anuchin's
first critique appeared in Voprosy Geografii in 1957, and was entitled
'On the essence of the geographical environment and manifestations of
2indeterminism in Soviet geography.' In this article Anuchin launched 
an attack on Stalin's nihilistic formulation of the geographical environ­
ment as the unchanging background to dynamic social development. He 
described 'geographical indeterminism' as being much more harmful than 
geographical determinism; geographical indeterminism led to an 'idealist' 
conception of the relationship between society and its natural environ­
ment, and on the other hand, to the conception of the laws of social
3development as an absolute. Anuchin was to write of the Stalinist 
era that:
The opinion became current that nature's role in the 
development of society was insignificant, that human 
life was wholly determined by social structure and that 
nature could be remade almost at will.4
Ibid., p. 54, fn. 49.
2 V.A. Anuchin, '0 sushchnosti geograficheskoi sredy i proiavlenii 
indeterminizma v sovetskoi goegrafii', Voprosy Geografii, 1957, No. 41, 
pp. 47-64.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 48, 55, 57.
4 V .A . Anuchin, 'A Sad Tale about Geography', in Literaturnaia Gazeta,
18 Feb. 1965, tr. in Soviet Geography, Vol. VI, 1965, No. 7 (Sept.), p. 28.
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Anuchin blamed this anti-environmentalist dogma for the harm done to
Soviet land-resources through a stereotyped approach to cropping, etc."*"
In 1960, Anuchin's doctoral thesis, 'Theoretical Problems of
Geography', was published in Moscow. This thesis had been failed at
2Leningrad, presumably because of its radical character. A large part
of the book was taken up with a historical analysis of theories of
geographical determinism. Anuchin himself rejected the 'pre-Marxist'
form of geographical determinism which made geographical factors into the
basic cause of social development. His own position was that while
the main impetus for development arose from within social forms, the
direction of social development might indeed be altered by the influence
of specific geographic factors on the mode of production.* 3 *5
As we have seen, Anuchin strongly criticised the Stalinist
dichotomy between nature and society, on the one hand, and between laws
of nature and social laws, on the other, and attempted to revive the
4view of nature as a historical product. He wrote:
Landscapes also follow the laws of nature in their 
development. But man is able to manipulate natural 
laws to alter their effect. Therefore any study of 
landscape simply from the point of view of 'pure' 
natural science means limiting the possibilities of 
cognition (my emphasis). It amounts to trying to 
ascertain the effect while ignoring the causes.^
As Marx once said: 'Nature ... taken abstractly, for itself, and
rigidly separated from man, is nothing for man.
Ibid., p. 31. 
o With the change in the official line, Anuchin has since become Deputy 
Chairman of the Council for the Study of Productive Forces, Gosplan.
3 V.A. Anuchin, Teoreticheskie problemy geografii, op.cit., pp. 149-150.
 ^ V.A. Anuchin, '0 sushchnosti geograficheskoi sredy ...', loc.cit., p. 47.
5 V.A. Anuchin, 'The Problem of Synthesis in Geographic Science', (in 
Voprosy Filosofii, 1964, No. 2), tr. in Soviet Geography, Vol. V (1964),
No. 4, p. 35.
Marx, [Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts], in Early Writings, 
ed. T.B. Bottomore, op.cit., p. 217.
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In fact, in spite of his formula, Stalin did regard natural laws
as subject to human activity; this can be seen from the Stalin Plan
for the Transformation of Nature. However, the formula of unchanging
nature did enable Stalin to dismiss the geographical environment as a
dynamic element in human affairs, and in general to belittle its
importance as an independent factor, /muchin's work, on the other hand,
is based on the assumption that the geographical environment is an
extremely important determinant of social development and stresses the
nature of the environment as a developing system formed from a combin-
2ation of social and natural elements.
Because man's impact on the geographical environment is becoming
increasingly complex and intensive, Anuchin argues that it is especially
important to establish co-ordinated studies of any given geographical
environment, i.e. a 'unified geography'. For
...without knowledge of these complexes as a whole it is 
impossible to predict all the possible consequences 
that may result from man-induced changes in the environ­
ment. And if that is so, we will inevitably be confronted 
with unexpected and undesirable results of man's activity.
The likelihood of undesirable consequences will increase 
with the level of technological progress (my emphasis).
An especially serious threat to nature has now arisen as 
a result of man's assuming control over atomic energy.-*
(I.e. the environment will take its revenge on man.)
Another Moscow University geographer, who, together with Baransky,
supported Anuchin's stand and wrote extremely favourable reviews of his
See S.V. Kalesnik, 'Some Results of the New Discussion about a "Unified" 
Geography', in Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva, 1965, 
No. 3, tr. in Soviet Geographyf Vol. VI (1965), No. 7, p. 18. The 'Stalin 
Plan for the Transformation of Nature' was first publicised in Pravda, 
October 1948; see Ian M. Matley, 'The Marxist Approach to the Geograph­
ical Environment', loc.cit., p. 102.
V .A . Anuchin, '0 sushchnosti geograficheskoi sredy i proiavlenii indet- 
erminizma v sovetskoi geografii', loc. cit., p. 50.
3 V.A. Anuchin, 'The Problem of Synthesis in Geographical Science', 
loc.cit., p. 35.
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book, ' was Iu. G. Saushkin. Saushkin agreed that a wall had been
built between the natural and social sciences in the 'period of the
personality cult' in order 'to provide a "theoretical" justification
for voluntarism in the solution of problems in the development of
2society and in projects for the transformation of nature.' Stalin had
bypassed the problems of the interaction between nature and society, which
arose from the fact that society creates changes in its geographical
environment and is in turn affected by this new environment."^ Saushkin
consciously or unconsciously harks back to the 'young Marx' of the Paris
Manuscripts in describing the geographical environment as 'humanised
4nature', as opposed to a purely natural category. Saushkin has tended
to take the idea of humanised nature to extremes, as in his notion that
in the foreseeable future the geographical environment will be, to a
5large extent, constructed from synthetics such as plastics.
The whole debate on the theoretical significance of the geographical 
environment, which broke out with the publication of Anuchin's book, led 
to an important reversal of the official 'line' in 1963. In October 
of that year, an ideological spokesman (and Secretary) of the C.P.S.U.'s 
Central Committee, L.F. Ilichev, delivered a speech before the presidium 
of the Academy of Sciences in which the Stalinist definition of the
Although Saushkin joined in the widespread criticism of the way in 
which Anuchin included society in the geographical environment.
2 Iu. G. Saushkin, ‘Methodological Problems of Soviet Geography as inter­
preted by some Foreign Geographers', in Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, 
No. 4 (1964), tr. in Soviet Geography, Vol. V, (1964), No. 8, p. 4.
3 Iu.G.Saushkin, 'The Interaction of Nature and Society', in Geografiia v 
shkole, 1964, No. 4, tr. in Soviet Geography, Vol. V (1964), No. 10, 
pp. 39-40.
4 Iu. G. Saushkin, 'Methodological Problems of Soviet Geography...', 
loc.cit., p. 62. Saushkin attributes the term to N.V. Morozov.
5 Iu. G. Saushkin, 'Concerning a Certain Controversy', in Vestnik 
Moskovskogo Universiteta, Seriia geografii, 1965, No. 6, tr. in Soviet 
Geography, Vol. VII (1966), No. 2, p. 13.
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relationship between nature and society was completely renounced and an
environmental view put forward. This speech was published in the journal
of the Academy of Sciences^ and, in a briefer version, in Voprosy 
2
Filosofii, and represents the new official line (although Ilichev lost
his former position with the fall of Krushchev).
Ilichev, among other things, denounced the rigid division between
the natural and the social sciences, and the Stalinist concept of the
3geographical environment as something external to society. He stressed 
instead the mutual interaction of nature and society, as illustrated by 
the continuous changes taking place in the natural environment as a result 
of man’s activities, and the reciprocal influence of these changes on 
society. Ilichev blamed Stalin's rigid division between human society 
and geographical environment, and his onesided definition of the relation­
ship between them, for various errors in planning and in the approach to 
economic development.^
The new line, stressing the need for an integrated study of the
5interaction between nature and society did not pass completely unchall­
enged. S.V. Kalesnik, for example, was to maintain the old line that:
'In the development of any form of matter the determining role is played 
by laws that are specific to that form.' From this axiom it must follow 
that:
See Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSR, 1963, No. 11, pp. 14-15.
2
Voprosy Filosofii, 1963, No. 11, pp. 6-7.
3 'L .F. Ilichev's Remarks about a Unified Geography', tr. in Soviet Geo­
graphy, Vol. V (1964), No. 4, p. 32.
4 Ibid., pp. 32-3.
5 On the need to create a unified theory of the process of interaction, 
in order to consciously control such interaction see A.G. Doskach, et.al., 
'The Problem of Interaction of Nature and Society and Present-Day Geography', 
Voprosy Filosofii, 1965, No. 4, pp. 104-115.
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neither can the geographical environment be the decisive factor 
in social development, nor can society be the decisive factor 
in the development of the environment, since society is incapable 
of cancelling the laws of nature.!
Despite such rear-guard action, the new approach was widely publicised 
in the 1960s (even through comparatively popular journals such as the 
Literaturnaia Gazeta) in association with an increasing level of concern 
over environmental problems (e.g. the Lake Baikal issue). In the 
sphere of history, the new approach manifested itself in both practical 
and theoretical writing, intended to redress previous neglect of the role 
of geographical factors in social development.
The Reassessment of the Place of Geographical Factors in Historical 
Materialism
Since the 1960s, there has been an increasing stress on geographical
2factors in historical writing. The rejection of the Stalinist formula
is reflected in statements such as the following:
...the geographic factor was, in the process whereby the 
most archaic cultures arose, not only an accelerating 
factor, but in considerable measure a factor determining 
' the political structure of the most ancient states. It 
is hardly possible to deny this fully obvious connection.^
Considerable discussion has also been stimulated by the work of
S.V. Kalesnik, 'Some Results of the New Discussion about a "Unified" 
Geography', loc.cit., pp. 20-21. Kalesnik, the editor of one of the two 
leading Soviet geographical journals, was one of those who failed Anuchin's 
doctoral dissertation.
2 See the survey by A.V. Dulcv , 'Literatura o roli goegraficheskoi sredy 
v istorii obshchestva', Voprosy Istorii, 1973, No. 8, pp. 142-148.
3 M.A. Korostovtsev, 'On the Concept "The Ancient East"', loc.cit., p. 112.
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L.N. Gumilev, Otkrytie K h a z a r i i in which he links the rise and decline
of the central Asian nomadic civilisations with cyclonic patterns (periods
of increased rainfall providing an increase in pasturage for the nomadic
herders). His subsequent articles have emphasised the need to take into
2account the changing geographical background to human history.
The overthrow of the Stalinist conception of the geographical environ­
ment as an unchanging external factor with minimal influence on the 
internal development of human society is demonstrated most clearly in one 
of the latest Soviet textbooks on historical materialism. In this we 
find that:
Geographical environment is historical for it is changing 
ever since the appearance of man, both under the impact 
of natural terrestrial or cosmic causes and also as a 
result of the transforming activity of men ...
It follows from the above that geographical environ­
ment today is not some sort of 'pure* nature, nor the 
result of the operation of natural laws alone. The 
present geographical environment is also a result of 
preceding human activity, of the colossal labour effort 
of the earlier generations. Consequently it is the 
result of the interaction of natural and social laws.
The text-book not only echoes Marx's description of how the sphere
of 'humanised' nature expands to include the whole earth, but claims that:
man's flight into outer space ushered in the transformation 
of his natural surroundings from terrestrial into inter­
planetary environment.4
L.N. Gumilev, Otkrytie Khazarii, Moscow, 1966.
2 E.g., L.N. Gumilev, 'Mesto istoricheskoi geografii v vostokovednykh, 
issledovaniiakh', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1970, No. 1, pp. 85-94.
3 G. Glezerman and G. Kursanov, Historical Materialism, tr. D. Fidlon, 
Moscow, Progress, 1968, pp. 52-53. (The English is their translator's.)
4 Ibid., p. 55.
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The way in which the new emphasis on geographical environment has 
been interwoven with the revival of interest in the concept of the Asiatic 
mode of production, and with the attempts to break free of Stalin's 
five-stage schema of social development, will be discussed at greater 
length in subsequent chapters. Here we confine ourselves to mentioning 
one tentative proposal for the classification of pre-industrial societies 
that emerged in a discussion on the Asiatic formation at the Institute 
of the Peoples of Asia (May, 1965). The Soviet historian, L.A. Sedov, 
suggested that pre-industrial societies might be grouped into three main 
types: those based on agriculture without artificial irrigation; those
based on agriculture with artificial irrigation; and those based on 
herding. These different productive bases gave rise to different socio­
economic structures, which developed according to their own characteristic 
laws. Thus (large-scale) irrigation agriculture gave rise to a society 
dominated by a bureaucratic elite, while herding gave rise to a society
dominated by a military aristocracy. Sedov's taxonomy here owes much 
2to Wittfogel, and the determining role of the geographical environment 
is clearly in evidence.
Thus (the newly-revived) emphasis within Soviet historiography on 
the importance of geographical factors is once more linked, as it has been
See L.A. Sedov, '0 sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh tipakh razvitiia', in 
G.F. Kim, V.N. Nikiforov et al. ed., Obshchee i osobennoe v istoricheskom 
razvitii stran Vostoko, Moscow, Izd. 'Nauka', 1966, pp. 48-55.
2 Cf. the later Wittfogel's classification of pre-industrial societies 
into (a) stratified pastoral societies; (b) hydraulic societies; (c) 
helotage-based, free peasant-based or slave-based non-feudal societies;
(d) feudal societies. (K.A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotismf New Haven, 
Columbia U.P., 1957, p. 419.) Stratified pastoral societies have been 
notoriously difficult to fit into the five-stage unilinear schema. As we 
shall see in Chapter Five, as soon as an alternative mode of production 
(the Asiatic) was discovered, attempts were made to apply it to the 
nomadic pastoral societies. However, the Asiatic concept was designed for 
bureaucratic agricultural societies, and is inapplicable to pastoral 
societies, which perhaps can best be viewed as Sedov has done, as yet 
another alternative mode of production determined by local circumstances.
At least one passage from Marx could be adduced as authority for this
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in the past in Marxist historiography, with a tendency to view pre­
industrial society in terms of a plurality of modes of production, 
rather than in terms of a logical sequence of stages.'*'
* * * * *
point of view: 'Among the nomadic pastoral peoples, the commune is
indeed constantly united; the travelling society, the caravan, the horde, 
and the forms of supremacy and subordination develop out of the conditions 
of this mode of life.' (Marx, Grundrisse, p. 491.)
Soviet historiography has finally been discovering in the Grundrisse 
the view that Asiatic society, slavery and serfdom are simply the 
consequences of different 'distortions' [izvrashchenii] of the primitive 
community, determined by particular geographical and historical circum­
stances. (See Iu. A. Kizilov,'Predposylki perekhoda vostochnogo slavianstva 
k feodalizmu', Voprosy Istorii, 1969, No. 3, pp. 94-104.)
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A NOTE ON THE POPULATION FACTOR
Y et a n o t h e r  f a c t o r ,  n o t  d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  to  o u r  them e , was 
m e n t io n e d  by Marx i n  t h e  G r u n d r i s s e , i n  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r o l e  o f  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r s  i n  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  -  i . e .  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  
p r e s s u r e .  The im p a c t  o f  d e m o g ra p h ic  f a c t o r s  on d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  p r i m i t i v e  
s o c i e t y  i s  v e ry  much l i n k e d  t o  more p u r e l y  g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  i n  t h a t  
i t  i s  i n  th e  c o n t e x t  o f  ?jn e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  c i r c u m s c r i b e d  a r e a  o f  u s a b le  l a n d  
t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  becom es s i g n i f i c a n t .
D e s p i t e  S t a l i n ' s  a t t a c k  on t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e  as  
a  d e t e r m i n in g  f a c t o r ' 1' ( l i n k e d  w i th  h i s  a t t a c k -  on th e  c o n c e p t  o f  geo ­
g r a p h i c a l  d e t e r m i n i s m ) , i t  i s  c l e a r  from  th e  G r u n d r i s s e  t h a t  Marx 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e  c o u ld  o p e r a t e  a s  an i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  
i n  econom ic  and  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h a t  e a r l y  s t a g e  o f  human 
h i s t o r y  w here  n a t u r a l  r a t h e r  th a n  h i s t o r i c a l l y - p r o d u c e d  f a c t o r s  w ere  t h e  
m a jo r  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t .  Marx w ro te  t h a t :
F o r  e x a m p le ,  w here  e a c h  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  s u p p o s e d  
to  p o s s e s s  a  g iv e n  number o f  a c r e s  o f  l a n d ,  t h e  advance  
o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  a l r e a d y  u n d e r  way. I f  t h i s  i s  t o  be  
c o r r e c t e d ,  th e n  c o l o n i z a t i o n ,  and t h a t  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e s  
w ars  o f  c o n q u e s t .  W ith t h a t ,  s l a v e s  e t c . . . .  Thus t h e  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  o l d  community i n c l u d e s  t h e  d e s t r u c t ­
i o n  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  on w hich  i t  r e s t s ,  t u r n s  i n t o  i t s  
o p p o s i t e .  I f  i t  w ere  t h o u g h t  t h a t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  on t h e  
same l a n d  c o u ld  be  i n c r e a s e d  by d e v e lo p in g  t h e  f o r c e s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  e t c . . . . ,  t h e n  t h e  new o r d e r  w ould  
i n c l u d e  c o m b in a t io n s  o f  l a b o u r ,  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  th e  day 
s p e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  e t c . ,  and  t h e r e b y  a g a in  s u s p e n d  
th e  o l d  econom ic  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  comm unity.
The c o n c e p t  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  as  an i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i n  
econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  ( i . e .  t h e  c o n c e p t  h e r e  p r e f i g u r e d  by  Marx) h a s  b een  
em ployed  i n  much r e c e n t  work on th e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  p r i m i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s .
I n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  c o n c e p t  by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  was reaw ak en ed  w i t h  t h e  
p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  E s t e r  B o s e r u p 's  i n f l u e n t i a l  book The C o n d i t i o n s  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  Growth  i n  1965. B o s e r u p 's  b a s i c  a rg u m e n t  was t h a t  b e c a u s e
S t a l i n ,  D i a l e c t i c a l  and H i s t o r i c a l  M a t e r i a l i s m , N. Y. ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P u b l i s h e r s ,  1972 , p p .  2 6 -2 7 .
Marx, G r u n d r i s s e , p p .  4 9 3 -4 9 4 .
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t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r a c t i c e s  (from  h u n t i n g  and  g a t h e r i n g
th ro u g h  s l a s h - a n d - b u m  a g r i c u l t u r e  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  m u l t i c r o p p in g )  i n v o l v e s
an e v e r  lo w e r  r e t u r n  p e r  u n i t  o f  l a b o u r  i n p u t ,  su c h  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  does
n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  e x c e p t  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  and
c o r r e s p o n d in g  l a n d  s h o r t a g e .  I f  one can  assum e t h a t  t h e  w o rk in g  day o f
h u n t e r s  and g a t h e r e r s  a v e ra g e d  a b o u t  f o u r  o r  f i v e  hours, '* ' and t h a t  o f  lo n g
f a l l o w  s l a s h - a n d - b u m  c u l t i v a t o r s  n o t  much more ( i n  t h e  b u s y  s e a s o n
2
p e r h a p s  f o u r  h o u r s  f o r  men and s i x  h o u r s  f o r  women) , r e s i s t a n c e  to
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r a c t i c e  f o l l o w s  as  a n a t u r a l  c o r o l l a r y .
One m ig h t  a rg u e  t h a t  even  g iv en  t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n ,
t e c h n i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  m ig h t  be  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  lo w e r  t h e  l a b o u r  i n p u t  w i t h
g iv e n  m ethods  o f  c u l t i v a t i o n .  B oserup  a rg u e s  t h a t  w i t h  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l
c o n t a c t  t h i s  does  i n d e e d  h a p p e n ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t  o f  th e
s t o n e  axe by th e  f a c to r y - m a d e  axe among t h e  s l a s h - a n d - b u m  c u l t i v a t o r s  
3
o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  and  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  new c e r e a l  c ro p s  t o  O c e a n ia ,  A f r i c a ,
4e t c . ,  from  S o u th  A m erica  i n  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  and  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r i e s .
However su c h  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  w h ich  t a k e s  p l a c e  w i t h o u t  t h e  d r i v i n g  
f o r c e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e  w i l l  r e m a in ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  B o s e ru p ,  w i t h i n  
r e l a t i v e l y  n a rro w  p a r a m e t e r s  -  e . g .  , t h e  im provem en t o f  -the t o o l  o r  c e r e a l  
c ro p  em ployed , r a t h e r  th a n  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new ones  w hich  w ould  
i n v o l v e  a more i n t e n s i v e  mode o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  and a h e a v i e r  l a b o u r  i n p u t .  
More r a d i c a l  form s o f  t e c h n i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n ,  f o r  exam ple  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  t h e  hoe  o r  p lo u g h  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  d ig g in g  s t i c k ,  w ere  i r r e l e v a n t  to  
t h e  f o r e s t  f a l l o w  o r  s l a s h - a n d - b u m  c u l t i v a t i o n  w h ich  p r e v a i l e d  as  lo n g  
a s  t h e r e  was s u f f i c i e n t  l a n d  t o  a l lo w  f o r  r e g e n e r a t i o n  o f  f o r e s t  f o r  
a  tw e n ty  t o  t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r  p e r i o d  a f t e r  c r o p p i n g .  Under t h i s  k i n d  o f
See M a r s h a l l  S a h l i n s ,  'T he  O r i g i n a l  A f f l u e n t  S o c i e t y ’ , i n  h i s  S t o n e  Age  
E c o n o m ic s , C h ic a g o ,  A l d i n e - A t h e r t o n ,  1972, p .  17 .
2 E s t e r  B o s e ru p ,  The C o n d i t io n s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  G row th , C h ic a g o ,  A ld in e ,  
1965 , p .  46.
^ I b i d . ,  p .  27 .
4 I b i d . ,  p p .  6 7 -6 9 .
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c u l t i v a t i o n  any t o o l  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  d i g g in g  s t i c k  t o  make h o l e s  f o r  s e e d
o r  r o o t s  was s u p e r f l u o u s  as t h e  s o i l  was l o o s e  and  w e e d l e s s .  Where
f a l l o w  p e r i o d s  a r e  s h o r t e r  b e c a u s e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e  and b u sh  f a l l o w
p r e v a i l s ,  t h e  hoe  becomes n e c e s s a r y  t o  c l e a r  w e e d s .  When c u l t i v a t i o n  o f
g iv e n  p l o t s  h a s  become so  f r e q u e n t  t h a t  t h e  a r e a  h a s  b e e n  c o n v e r t e d  t o
g r a s s l a n d ,  t h e  p lo u g h  becomes i n d i s p e n s a b l e ,  w h i l e  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o f
th e  r o o t s  o f  t r e e s  and b u s h e s  f a c i l i t a t e s  i t s  u s e .  A lso  t h e  c o n v e r s io n
o f  an a r e a  i n t o  a g r a s s l a n d  ( th r o u g h  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  c ro p p in g )  e n c o u ra g e s
t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  h e r b i v o r o u s  a n im a ls  w hich  can be  em ployed  i n  p l o u g h in g .  ^
Thus B o s e r u p 's  t h e o r y  r e s t s  on th e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r a c t i c e s  a lo n e  l e a d s  t o  t e c h n i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n ,  and t h a t
su c h  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  e x c e p t  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f
2p o p u l a t i o n  g ro w th .  T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  p r o v i d e s  a  new d im e n s io n  o f  a n a l y s i s  
w h ich  may s e r v e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  
t o  p r i m i t i v e  s o c i e t y ,  and  w h ic h ,  as  shown above from  t h e  G r u n d r i s s e  
e x t r a c t ,  i s  n o t  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  M a rx 's  own a p p ro a c h  t o  t h e  e a r l i e s t  
p h a s e s  o f  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t .  I t  may s e r v e  a s  a c o u n te r w e ig h t  t o  
t h e  o v e r l y - r e d u c t i o n i s t  v iew t h a t  th e  means o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a lw ays  f u n c t i o n  
as  t h e  m o st  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  v a r i a b l e  w i t h  s o c i e t y ,  t h e  v a r i a b l e  w h ich  f o r c e s  
change  on a l l  t h e  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  d e s p i t e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and 
l o n g e r  w o rk in g  h o u r s  w h ich  e a c h  i n n o v a t i o n  b r i n g s  a b o u t .
E. B o s e ru p ,  'T he  I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  Land Use and  T e c h n ic a l  C h a n g e ' ,  The 
C o n d i t i o n s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  G row th , o p . c i t . ,  p p .  2 3 -2 7 .
2
See E. B o s e ru p ,  'T he  V ic io u s  C i r c l e  o f  S p a r s e  P o p u l a t i o n  and  P r i m i t i v e  
T e c h n i q u e s ' ,  The C o n d i t i o n s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Growth , o p . c i t . ,  p p .  7 0 -7 6 ,  
f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  ' c o n t r o l '  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ich  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  does 
n o t  t a k e  p l a c e .  However i f  B o s e r u p 's  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  l i f t e d  o u t  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  p r i m i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s  and a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c o n te m p o ra ry  w o r ld  i t  i m p l i e s  
t h e  k i n d  o f  o p t im is m  w i t h  r e g a r d s  t o  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  w o r ld  r e s o u r c e s  w h ich  
h a s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  th e  c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  Club o f  Rome. I t  i s  p resum ed  t h a t  
m ethods o f  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  fo o d  r e s o u r c e s  can  become even  more i n t e n s i v e  
u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  w i t h o u t  v i t a l  r e s o u r c e s  b e in g  
e i t h e r  u se d  up o r  d e s t r o y e d  by t h e  b y p r o d u c t s  o f  su c h  a c t i v i t y .
154
The way in which Boserup's hypothesis may be fruitfully incorporated
into the analysis of pre-capitalist socio-economic development is shown
in a recent essay by the American anthropologist Robert McC. Netting.
Netting attempts to demonstrate a causal link between population growth
and the emergence of the state in the form of sacred authority.'*' More
intensive cultivation of the land leads to higher land value, more
complicated rules of ownership, and hence to an increasing number of
disputes. The only way in which these disputes may be resolved is through
the emergence of some form of sacred authority which is freed from the
narrower connection with village, lineage, etc., and which becomes the
basis of a permanent, territorially-based state structure and associated
specialised roles. Once the prestige of the new, more broadly-based
cult and cosmology is established, it will serve other functions (besides
that of inter-village dispute resolution etc.) created by increased
population pressure. Thus, according to Netting, the new state-promoted
symbols and ritual will serve to alleviate the social unease promoted by
increased pressure on the land and threat of famine, while the sacred
protection offered to markets and trade-routes facilitates the circulation
2of goods to areas of scarcity. Netting's emphasis on the sacred or symbolic 
functions of the emergent state structure in African societies is similar 
to that of the Marxist anthropologists applying the concept of the 'Asiatic 
mode of production' to the same societies, while the population thesis adds 
an extra dimension to such a Marxist analysis. Other ways in which the 
population thesis can enrich the Marxist analysis of the emergence of the 
state in kinship society will be discussed further in a subsequent chapter. 
Pressure on land may be viewed as giving rise to intensification of agri-
Robert McC. Netting, 'Sacred Power and Centralization: Aspects of
Political Adaptation in Africa', Brian Spooner,ed., Population Growth: 
Anthropological Implications, MIT Press, 1972, Ch. 9, pp. 219-244.
Robert McC. Netting, loc.cit., p. 236.2
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culture, the development of private-property rights, inequalities, class 
divisions, and a repressive state apparatus to hold these in check. On 
the other hand the impetus to state formation may be viewed as coming 
from an external source - conflict with an alien society over the diminishing 
supply of arable land, and the absorption of the defeated party as a 
slave-class into an expanded political unit.'*'
See for example, Robert L. Cameiro, 'From Autonomous Villages to the 
State, A Numerical Investigation', Brian Spooner, ed., Population Growth: 
Anthropological Implications, op.cit., pp. 64-77.
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4
MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIAN HISTORY: 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE
MODE OF PRODUCTION
THE
ASIATIC
For Western Europe and its peoples nature 
was. a mother; for the East and the peoples 
destined to act out their history there it 
was a step-mother.
Solov' ev'1'
We now present a case-study of Russian history in which two historio­
graphical approaches are contrasted: the one emphasizing the universal
and immanent laws of social production, the other (with roots both in 
Marx and in nineteenth-century Russian historiography), emphasizing geo­
graphical and historical pluralism, particularly as existing between 
Western European and Asiatic societies.
Marx’s Conception of the Character of the Russian State: Russia Contrasted
with Europe.
In his analysis of Russian history Marx used a qualified version of 
his model of Asiatic despotism. In Russia as in Asia, the state had assumed 
a preponderant role in socio-economic life, and social classes on the 
Western European model were correspondingly underdeveloped. Geographical 
factors were largely responsible, on Marx's analysis, for this 'non- 
European' variant of historical development.
This section confines itself to Marx's analysis of the (non-Western)
S.M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, Kniga VII (Toma 
13-14), Moscow, Izd. sots.-ekon. lit., 1962, p. 8.
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character of the Russian State. It does not attempt to deal with the
separate though related topic of the expectations held by Marx and Engels
concerning the possibility and character of a Russian revolution. That
topic is comprehensively covered in the recent volume edited by Maximilien
Rubel, Marx/Engels: Die russische Kommune. ^
It is true, of course, that the interest Marx sind Engels showed in
Russian affairs stemmed largely from their conviction that the fall of
the Russian autocracy was an essential ingredient in the success of the
2socialist movement in Western Europe. Hence their enthusiasm for any
revolutionary tendency which seemed capable of toppling the existing regime,
3regardless of its theoretical errors. ('What matters is not so much
4their theoretical clarity as their practical energy.') At no time,
however, did Marx or Engels consider the possibility that a revolution
5against the autocracy might be a socialist one ab initio. In spite of 
their 'Narodnik' sympathies, discussed in Chapter Two, the views of Marx 
and Engels gravitated around the proposition that the development of social­
ism in Russia, as in 7\sia, required the prior development of the 'material
M. Rubel ed., Marx/Engels: Die russische Kommune, Munich, Carl Hanser 
Verlag, 1972.
2 In later years their interest received a further stimulus in the form 
of the relative success in Russia of Capital.
3 Marx and Engels favoured the tactics of the terrorist (or 'Blanquist') 
Narodnaia Volia group, rather than the tactics of their own disciples. (E.g. 
Marx to Jenny Longuet, 11 April 1881, Werke, Vol. 35, p. 179; Engels to 
Vera Zasulich, 23 April 1885, MESC, pp. 383-385.) Engels was very critical 
of Plekhanov's book Nashi Raznoglasiia (1884) which was a full-scale attack 
on Russian Blanquism, and on the idea of a 'quick' revolution as opposed to 
solidly-based working class participation in a bourgeois revolution. See 
for example the extract from Voden's memoirs reprinted in M. Rubel ed., 
Marx/Engels: Die russische Kommune, op.cit., pp. 181-190.
4 Engels, conversation with Kautsky, as reported by Kautsky in a letter 
to Berstein, dated 30 June 1885, ibid., p. 177.
5 Although they did believe that if the revolution in Russia triggered off 
socialist revolutions in Western Europe these would influence the develop­
ment of the Russian revolution in a socialist direction.
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foundations of Western society; i.e., the unfettered development of 
capitalism on the English model and the abolition of the state inter­
ventionism of the past in order that the contradictions of capitalism 
might freely work themselves out. According to Engels 'all these 
contradictions [including those existing between pre-capitalist and capit­
alist elements in Russian society] are violently held in check by an
2unexampled despotism...1 2345 The allegedly imminent Russian revolution, 
therefore, would be a bourgeois democratic revolution, a 1789 and not a 
1793, even if it would in all probability emerge from a 'Blanquist' coup 
d'etat. As Engels wrote,
...the people who laid the spark to the mine will be swept 
away by the explosion, which will be a thousand times as 
strong as they themselves and which will seek its vent where 
it can, as the economic forces and resistances determine.'3
The revolution once initiated would bring to the top 'not the socialists
4but the liberals,' an outcome determined by the level of Russian develop­
ment^ and the absence of the material foundations of socialism (which could 
be provided only by capitalism).
Behind all this was Marx's view that the historical categories which 
he extrapolated from Western history and applied to it did not necess­
arily appertain to Russia's historical development although they became
Marx, 'The Future Results of British Rule in India', N.Y.D.T., 8 Aug.
1853, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 133. The original 
unity of the worker and the conditions of production, as found in the 
village communal system could be 're-established only on the material found­
ation which capital creates ...' (Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part III, 
p. 423.)
2 Engels to Vera Zasulich, 23 April 1885, MESC, p. 385.
3 Engels to Vera Zasulich, 23 April 1885, MESC, p. 384.
4 Engels, conversation reported in K. Kautsky to E. Bernstein, 30 June 1885, 
in M. Rubel ed., Marx/Engels: Die russische Kommune, op.cit., p. 117.
5 'After studying his [Flerovsky’s] book, one is firmly convinced that an 
appalling social revolution is unavoidable in Russia and is quite imminent - 
naturally a revolution in its lower forms corresponding to the present 
state of Muscovite development. That is good news. Russia and England are 
the two great pillars of the present European system'. (Marx to Laura and 
Paul Lafargue, 5 March 1870, Werke,Vol. 32, p. 659.)
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relevant in the present situation of a world capitalist market, and in the
socialist future. As we have noted, Marx and Engels followed the great
tradition of Western European political thought in classifying the Russian
state as an Oriental or at least a semi-Oriental despotism. Typical
of this tradition was Astolphe de Custine's four volume La Russie en 1839,
a book with which Marx and Engels almost certainly became acquainted in
1844, the year after its publication.^ De Custine provided a vivid sketch
2of the Asiatic and despotic character of the Russian state, emphasizing 
the failure of the nobility to serve as a check to the central power, the 
absence of a middle class of the Western European type, and the organisation 
of social classes from above, according to services performed for the 
state. Marx could have utilised de Custine's social analysis to his 
advantage, but the only direct reference to de Custine by Marx or Engels 
is one by Engels in the Russian section of his series of articles on 
European armies.^
Marx's writings on the Russian state, as Maximilien Rubel observes,
4can be divided into two major periods. During the first period, lasting
up till about 1858, Marx perceived Russia solely in terms of an internally
5immobile semi-Asiatic colossus, the bastion of European reaction- So,
Numerous articles discussing de Custine's book appeared in the Paris 
journal Vorv/ärts during 1844, the year in which both Marx and Engels 
contributed articles to the journal. Rubel emphasises the parallels to be 
found between de Custine's dicta on Russia and some of the anti-Russian 
writing of Marx and Engels. (M. Rubel ed., Marx/Engels: Die russische
Kommune, op.cit., pp. 288-292.) The significance of such parallels should 
not, however, be exaggerated as similar parallels could be drawn between the 
writings of Marx and Engels and those of many other of the writers cited in 
Chapter One, such as von Haxthausen.
2 De Custine wrote in a quotable aphoristic style, and his work on Russia 
included the now familiar epigram: 'The Russian government is an absolutism
tempered by assassination.'
3 Engels, 'The Armies of Europe' (Second Article), Putnam's Monthly, No. 
XXXIII, Sept. 1855, Werke, Vol. II, p. 451.
4 M. Rubel ed., Marx/Engels: Die russische Kommune, op.cit., p. 13.
5 Engels had anticipated the post-1858 position as early as 1853, when he 
wrote that: 'Also left out of account, of course are any internal movements
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on the whole, did Engels. Both he and Marx agreed that the only way in
which the character of the Russian state could be changed (in the absence
of an internal social dialectic) was through the impact of external
factors such as the victory of European democracy.'*'
Some of Marx's most sustained (and polemical) writing on the Russian
state is to be found in his Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth
2
Century, which dates from the pre-1858 period. The interpretation of
events to be found in the Secret History is couched in purely 'political'
terms, in fact in terms of 'great men', in this case a series of villains
who by craft and cunning bring about Russia's expansion into a great empire.
The Muscovite princes, according to Marx, achieved their supremacy through
absorbing and applying the political lessons to be learnt from the Tartars -
4i.e. on how to impose 'general slavery'. Needless to say, this is not the
in Russia, and a noble-bourgeois revolution in Petersburg, with an ensuing 
civil war inside the country, is quite within the realm of possibility.' 
(Engels to J. Weydemeyer, 12 April 1853, MESC, p. 74.)
E.g. Marx, 'The Real Issue in Turkey', N.Y.D.T., 12 April 1853, Karl 
Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, p. 63. This attitude lingered on in 
Marx's work after 1858, particularly in association with the suppression of 
the Polish uprising in 1863. For example he declared in 1867 that: 'There
is but one alternative for Europe. Either Asiatic barbarism under Muscovite 
direction will break over Europe like an avalanche, or Europe must re­
establish Poland, thus protecting itself from Asia by a wall of twenty 
million heroes, and gaining time for the completion of its social transform­
ation.' Marx, [Rede auf dem Polenmeeting in London am 22 Januar 1867],
Werke, Vol. 16, p. 204.
2 Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century (first published 
in full as 'Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century' 
in David Urquhart's Free Press, London, Aug. 1856 - April 1857), ed. L. 
Hutchinson, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1969. This work has been omitted 
from the official Soviet editions of the collected nocks of Marx and Engels 
(i.e. from the two editions of the Sochineniia, and from the Werke edition).
3
Ibid., Ch. 5, pp. 108-121. The 'great man' approach is supplemented by 
a Russophobia in which the so-called Mongolian legacy of the Russians is 
the ultimate term of abuse: 'The bloody mire of Mongolian slavery, not the
rude glory of the Norman epoch, forms the cradle of Muscovy, and modern 
Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.' (Ibid., p. 111.)
At a somewhat later date Marx was to praise the theories of the French 
geologist P. Trömaux ('a very important advance over Darwin'), and to note 
his point that physical terrain had led to the Tatarisation and Mongolisation 
of the Russian Slavs and to the contrast between the Russians and the Western 
Slavs and Lithuanians. (Marx to Engels, 7 Aug. 1866,Werke,Vol. 31,pp.248-249.)
4 Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, op.cit.,
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kind of approach adopted by Marx in relation to Western European history 
where he keeps the trend of economic development very much in the foreground. 
It seemed to him natural to apply a different order of explanation to the 
Eastern form of the state, here represented by the Tatar and Muscovite 
dynasties. (That is, assuming the underlying geographical and social 
conditions which made the area susceptible to this form of state in the 
first place.)
Although giving considerable weight to the autonomous role of political 
factors in his analysis of the Russian state, Marx drew back from some of 
the conclusions reached by the 'service-state' school of Russian history.
For instance, the Russian neo-Hegelian historian B.N. Chicherin argued that 
all Russian social institutions owed their existence to the creative activity 
of the state, including the obshchina or mir. On Chicherin's account‘d the 
mir in its contemporary form was a comparatively recent institution, created 
by the state for fiscal purposes. In the controversy which was generated 
by this aspect of the service-state theory Marx took the side of those v;ho, 
like von Haxthausen, regarded the mir as a vestigial remnant of the primi­
tive clan organisation of society. Marx wrote, for example, that Schedo- 
Ferroti: 'is greatly mistaken - he is altogether quite a superficial fellow -
when he says the Russian communal system originated as a consequence of
2prohibiting the peasant from leaving the land.' On the same point Marx 
later wrote: 'How could this institution (communal property) have been
pp. 112-121. 'At length Peter the Great coupled the political craft of the 
Mongol slave with the proud aspiration of the Mongol master, to whom Genghiz 
Khan had, by will, bequeathed his conquest of the earth.' (Ibid., p. 121.) 
This is one of the sources in Marx for Wittfogel's theory of the 'institut­
ional time-bomb' left behind by the Mongols.
 ^ See Chicherin's influential essay, 'Obzor istoricheskogo razvitiia sel'skoi 
obshchiny v Rossii' in Opyty po istorii russkogo prava, Moscow, 1858.
2 Marx to Engels, 7 Nov. 1868, MESC, p. 217.
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introduced into Russia merely as a fiscal measure and as a corollary of 
serfdom, while everywhere else it arose naturally and formed a necessary 
phase of the development of free peoples?
Nevertheless Marx admitted that the commune and its collective respon­
sibility for taxes was an efficient means of tying the peasant to the land 
and extracting a maximum proportion of the surplus for the benefit of the 
state. He wrote that:
...the more industrious a Russian peasant is, the more 
he is exploited by the state, not only for taxes but 
for the supply of produce, horses, etc., during the 
continual passage of bodies of troops, for government 
couriers, etc. 2
It was in connection with the movement for the emancipation of the
serfs that Marx first came to consider the possible sources of internal
change in Russia. His new perspective on Russia was marked by a letter to
Engels in which he wrote that:
...the movement for the emancipation of the serfs in 
Russia appears important to me in so far as it indi­
cates the beginning of an internal history in the 
country, which may cut across the traditional foreign 
policy itself.3
The phrase 'beginning of an internal history' reveals to what extent Marx 
viewed the autocracy in terms of his model of Oriental despotism, a system 
which was historyless and static.
Russia had always differed from the classical Oriental despotism in 
so far as its propinquity to Europe had forced the autocracy into modern­
ising programmes, in order to maintain a military superiority to its Western 
neighbours. However, in the period prior to the Crimean War such pro­
grammes had remained superficial in character on Marx's view, and had not
Marx to N.F. Danielson, 22 March 1873, Werke, Vol. 33, p. 577. (Marx's 
argument is here specifically directed against Chicherin.)
2 Marx to Engels, 7 Nov. 1868, loc.cit.
 ^ Marx to Engels, 29 April 1858, Werke, Vol. 29, p. 324. See also the 
article by Marx written later in the same year 'The Emancipation Question', 
N.Y.D.T., 17 Jan. 1859, given the title of 'Uber die Bauernbefreiung in 
Russland' in Werke, Vol. 12, pp. 673-678.
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affected the basic structure of the state. Peter the Great, for example, 
had obtained Western experts in order 'to drill Russians into that varnish 
of civilization that adapts them to the technical appliances of the Western 
peoples, without mbueing them with their ideas.'^ At the same time 
Peter the Great completed the old Muscovite (Asiatic) state system by
generalising it.
By the mid-nineteenth century however, in the wake of the Crimean
debacle, it was clear that a more thorough-going programme of economic and
social modernisation was essential if the military machine was to be
rendered capable of standing up to the Western powers. Russia's weakness,
which had been manifested in the Crimean War, was aggravated in Marx's
eyes, by Russia's dependence on the world market, which was predominantly 
3capitalist. As a consequence, the autocracy had itself been forced to 
take in hand the 'hot-house' development of the capitalist system in 
Russia.^
Because Marx's model of non-Western political economy specifically 
excluded the possibility of economic modernisation or industrialisation 
conducted from the above by the state in a framework of structural contin­
uity, he saw the policies inaugurated by the autocracy after the Crimean
5War as inimical to its survival in the long run. In the short run he
Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, op.cit., 
p. 125. Cf. de Custine; 'It is to Russia that we must go in order to see 
the results of the terrible combination of the mind and science of Europe 
with the genius of Asia ...', Russia, abridged ed., London, Longmans, 1855, 
p. 144.
2 Ibid., p. 121.
3 First Draft of Marx's letter to Vera Zasulich, Werke, Vol. 19, p. 393.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 393-394.
5 The autocracy would be overthrown by the representatives of the rising 
class of capitalist entrepreneurs - unless, as Marx prognosticated in his 
'Narodnik' phase discussed in Chapter Two, conditions arose in which the 
autocracy might be directly replaced by socialism.
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saw advantages accruing to the autocracy, from, for example, the emanci­
pation of the serfs. The emancipation effectively removed the checks to 
the central power which had been posed by the authority of the serf-owning 
landowners and of the village communities.^ Thus in Russia the state 
power continued to tower above society even while, in Marx's view, it was 
undermining its own foundations by setting in train a more dynamic and 
individual form of economy.
Marx and the Service-State Theory of Russian History: A Parallel Theory 
of the Non-European Character of Russian History.
Many parallels may be drawn between Marx's conception of the Russian 
state and that of the nineteenth-century school of Russian historians 
loosely referred to as the 'service-state' school. This school of 
historical writing, which concerned itself with the 'special nature' of 
Russian development, was founded by S.M. Solov'ev, and its most outstanding 
representative was V.O. Kliuchevsky. The conceptual apparatus of this 
school consisted in a compound of elements drawn from Western historio­
graphy: i.e. elements of geographical determinism borrowed from, in
particular, Kegel and Buckle; elements of economic determinism; and neo- 
Hegelian theories of the state as a creative entity.
Theories of geographic determinism had a particular appeal for these 
nineteenth-century Russian historians in their search for a scientific 
explanation of what they took to be the special character of Russian
Marx, Herr Vogt, Werke, Vol. 14, pp. 497-498; [Rede auf dem Polen­
meeting in London am 22 Januar 1867], Werke, Vol. 16, p. 203.
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history. Solov'ev, for example, wrote that the three conditions which
exercised a special influence on the history of a nation were: 'the
nature of the country in which the people settle; the nature of the tribe
to which the people belong; and the course of external events and
2influences, stemming from the surrounding peoples.'
Solov'ev saw Russian development as having been retarded by the
natural environment specific to the East European plain. Western Europe
enjoyed the advantage of being diversified by mountain ranges etc., which
gave rise to diversified development. This in its turn accelerated the
3pace of economic growth. Western Europe had the added advantage of long
sea borders, which both sharply demarcated the territorial limits of 
4states and provided ease of communication between its diverse regions.
The East European plain, on the other hand, suffered both from a
lack of internal diversity and from a lack of natural barriers to hostile
incursions. The undiversified nature of the plain led to an absence of
diversity in occupation and hence to a lack of diversity in customs,
morals and beliefs. This in turn meant an absence of strongly developed
5regional loyalties. As well as their homogenous nature and the absence
Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace bore witness to the vast success in Russia 
of Buckle's History of Civilization, with its crude theories of geographical 
determinism. He wrote: 'In the course of a few years no less than four
independent translations were published and sold. Everyone read or at 
least professed to have read, the wonderful book, and many believed that 
its author was the greatest genius of his time. During my first year of 
residence in Russia (1870) I rarely had a serious conversation without 
hearing Buckle's name mentioned. In books, periodicals, newspapers, and 
professional lectures, the name of Buckle was constantly cited ... and the 
cheap translations of his work were sold in enormous quantities.' See Sir 
Donald MacKenzie Wallace, Prussia (first published in 1877), 2 vols., London, 
Cassell, 1905, Vol. I, pp. 140-141.
2 S.M. Solov'ev, Nachalo russkoi zemli, Sb. gos. znanii, Tom IV, St. 
Petersburg, 1877, p. 1. (Cf. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 472; 486.)
3 S.M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, Kniga VII (Toma 
13-14), op.cit., p. 7. (Cf. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 351-352.)
Ibid.
S.M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossia s drevneishikh vremen, Kniga I (Toma 1-2), 
Moscow, Izd. sots.-ekon. lit., 1959, p. 60.
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of regionalism, there was a strong common bond between all the agricultural 
peoples inhabiting this plain vis a vis the nomadic plunderers from Asia 
who desired to live at their expense. This widely spread common bond 
was the basis for the development of a Russian state of corresponding 
proportions.^ Moreover, the state organisation was not only territorially 
extensive, but necessarily took on an exaggerated form as a substitute for 
the defence provided elsewhere by natural barriers.
As seen in Chapter Two, the idea that in the East extensive geo­
graphical units gave rise naturally to co-extensive political units or land 
empires was given currency by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century. It 
has always been an idea very popular with Russian historians in connection 
with the East European or Eurasian plain. A modern, typically unself­
conscious example of this reads as follows:
...With the annexation of the Amur Region and of Central 
Asia an important phase in Russian history came to an 
end. The possession of the entire Eurasian plain and of 
its geographical extensions had been secured, and the 
natural limits of greater Russia in every direction had 
been achieved.* 2
Solov'ev extended his account of the influence of geographical factors 
even further, into the sphere of class relationships. According to his 
rather facile argument, the mountain ranges of Western Europe not only 
provided the basis for diversified development and firm territorial 
demarcation, but they also provided material for the consolidation of 
feudalism. The mountains provided the stone necessary for the construction 
of castles, the bulwark of the power of the feudal lord over his serfs and 
vis a vis the king. In the East European plain, by contrast, the absence 
of stone meant that the nobility did not live separately and independently
 ^ Ibid., pp. 60-61.
2 A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, (first published 1933), Michigan, 
Wahr, 1965, p. 193.
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i n  t h e i r  c a s t l e s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  fo rm ed  a company (d r u z h i n a ) a ro u n d  th e  
p r i n c e ,  and f o l lo w e d  him th ro u g h  th e  w ide  u n l i m i t e d  s p a c e s .  The f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  p e a s a n t  b u i l t  i n  wood a l s o  e n c o u ra g e d  t h e i r  w a n d e r in g  h a b i t s ,  
and  i n h i b i t e d  t h e  s p o n ta n e o u s  g row th  o f  s e r fd o m  from  th e  l o c a l  l e v e l  
u p w a rd s .  S h o u ld  a c a r e l e s s  s p a r k  s e t  f i r e  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  wooden 
h u t s  ( i z b a s )  th e  v i l l a g e  s im p ly  moved e l s e w h e r e .
The s e r v i c e - s t a t e  t h e o r y  o f  h i s t o r y  w hich  was fo re sh a d o w e d  i n  
S o l o v ' e v ' s  work was more f u l l y  d e v e lo p e d  by th e  g r e a t e s t  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e t h -  
c e n tu r y  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r i a n s ,  V.O. K l iu c h e v s k y .  K l iu c h e v s k y  em ployed  th e  
c o n c e p t  e x t e n s i v e l y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  i n  h i s  l e c t u r e s  on 'T he  H i s t o r y  
o f  E s t a t e s  i n  R u s s i a ' ,  w hich  w ere  d e l i v e r e d  a t  Moscow U n i v e r s i t y  i n  1886. 
In  h i s  han d s  t h e  b a s i c  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  was t h e  acknow ledgem en t o f  
th e  p r im a c y  o f  th e  s t a t e  i n  t h e  econom ic  and s o c i a l  f o r m a t io n  o f  R u s s i a .  
Owing to  g e o g r a p h i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  -  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  E a s t  E u ropean  p l a i n ,  
i t s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  nom ad ic  r a i d e r s  e t c .  -  t h e  s t a t e  s t r u c t u r e  came t o  
p l a y  a p r e p o n d e r a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ,  u n l i k e  i t s  more 
s e c o n d a r y  r o l e  among t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  W e s te rn  Europe.'* '
F o r  d e fe n c e  p u r p o s e s ,  t h e  s t a t e  c a l l e d  i n t o  b e i n g  a m i l i t a r y / g e n t r y  
c l a s s  who w ere  g r a n t e d  l a n d  f o r  t h e i r  s u p p o r t ,  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e  
t o  th e  s t a t e .  The r e s t  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  were o b l i g e d  t o  p r o v id e  a g r i ­
c u l t u r a l  l a b o u r  on th e  e s t a t e s  o f  t h e  g e n t r y  o r  on s t a t e  l a n d , a n d  a lm o s t  
a l l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  d i r e c t  p r o d u c e r s , -  w h e th e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  o r  a r t i s a n ,
From a B o l s h e v ik  p e r s p e c t i v e  P o k ro v sk y  was l a t e r  to  d e s c r i b e  t h e  s i g n i f i ­
cance  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e - s t a t e  t h e o r y  as r e s t i n g  i n  i t s  acknow ledgem en t t h a t  
t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  ' S t a t e  p r i n c i p l e '  was d e te r m in e d  by o b j e c t i v e  c a u s e s .  
'T he  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  scheme was t h u s  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  th ough  q u i t e  uncon­
s c i o u s ,  c o n c e s s i o n  t o  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m .  The l a t e  J .  [ s i c ]  V.
P le k h a n o v  was so  f a s c i n a t e d  by t h i s  s t e p  i n  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  Marxism t h a t  
i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  h i s  H i s t o r y  o f  R u s s i a n  P o l i t i c a l  [ s i c ]  Though t  he 
a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y  e n d o r s e d  th e  C h ic h e r in -G ra d o v s k y -K ly u c h e v s k y  s c h e m e . '
(M.N. P o k ro v s k y ,  A B r i e f  H i s t o r y  o f  R u s s i a ,  1 0 th  e d . , 2 v o l s . ,  t r .  D .S . 
M irsk y ,  London, M a r t in  L aw rence , 1933, V o l .  I ,  p .  2 4 3 .)  P o k ro v sk y  i s  o f  
c o u r s e  s c o r n f u l  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  c a u s e s  s e l e c t e d  by th e  s e r v i c e - s t a t e  
h i s t o r i a n s  -  t h e  s t r u g g l e  w i th  th e  s t e p p e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  d o m e s t ic  c l a s s  
s t r u g g l e .
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contributed in taxes and services to offset the needs of the state.
In Kliuchevsky1 23s view, the genesis of Muscovite social classes in
the needs of the state differentiated them from the social corporations
or estates of Western Europe. The Muscovite classes remained ’service
divisions or grades, which were known, in the official jargon of Moscow 
2as tchini....' Kliuchevsky summed up the social constitution of
Muscovite Russia as follows:
...In general, Muscovite legislation was devoted, more 
or less, to the defining and apportioning of State 
obligations, and formulating or securing of rights, 
whether personal or corporate. In practice, the position 
in the State of the individual or class was defined by
r>his or its duties to the State...^
According to Kliuchevsky’s theoretical abstract, the Muscovite state
had created an elaborate administrative and fiscal structure in order to
ensure the service of all categories of the population, and to prevent
any land, the chief economic resource of the state, from 'going out of
service' - i.e. ceasing to contribute to the exchequer. From the end of
the sixteenth century, owing to a number of circumstances, this gradually
entailed the legal enserfment of the direct producers.
One of the major and most frequent criticisms made of Kliuchevsky is
that although on the conceptual level he attributed the formation of the
Russian class system to the initiative of the state, in his concrete
historical description he showed feudal relationships and enserfment as
arising out of the day-to-day struggle between landowners and peasants,
and out of the indebtedness of the peasantry - i.e., he described this
class relationship as developing in the same way in Russia as in Western
4Europe, as a consequence of particular conditions of rural production.
3 V.O. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, 5 vols., (this edition originally 
published 1911-1931), N.Y., Russell & Russell, 1960, esp. Vol. Ill, pp.52-53.
2 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 52.
3 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 53.
4 See especially Vol. IV of Kliuchevsky's History of Russia, op.cit.
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Leaving aside the question of the consistency between Kliuchevsky1 23s 
general conclusions and his more empirical work, one comes up against 
his rather narrow interpretation of Oriental despotism, according to 
which the Oriental system was characterised by the absence of social 
classes rather than by their particular genesis in the needs of the state 
for different kinds of service. This interpretation led Kliuchevsky to 
differentiate the Muscovite service state from Oriental despotism by 
reason of the existence of distinct classes within the Muscovite population, 
rather than by reason of some more cogent argument. He contrasted the 
Muscovite system with the 'case of Oriental despotisms, where general 
equality rests upon a general lack of rights.'^ As we have seen in 
previous chapters this belongs among the more polemical and unrealistic 
aspects of the Western concept of Oriental despotism.
One of the most systematic expositions of the service-state theory
qua theory is to be found in P. Miliukov's Ocherki po istorii russkoi
kul'tury, first published in 1896. According to Miliukov, the service-
state system arose because at a certain stage of Russian history there
occurred a major disparity between the external demands made on the state,
in terms of defence and territorial consolidation, and the economic and
2social development of the nation. In the absence of a monetary economy 
the state was obliged to have recourse to a service (military) class who 
were provided with support in the form of conditional land grants.
Miliukov, like the sixteenth and seventeenth century English theoreticians
3of feudalism, saw this process as analogous to the original land-grant 
system in medieval Europe.
V.O. Kliuchevsky, A History of Prussia, op.cit., Vol. Ill, p. 52.
2 P. Miliukov, Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury, Vol. I, 5th ed., St. 
Petersburg, Mir Bozhii, 1904, p. 144.
3 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
Cambridge U.P., 1957, passim.
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Miliukov argued, however, that the consequences of the imposition
of such a system in Russia were very different from the consequences in
Western Europe. In moving East one found an absence of the strong lOc^ .1
development of feudalism such as had developed in Western Europe out of
tribal arrangements.^  On Miliukov's account, the basis of feudalism had
existed in the South of Russia, where there were strong tribal formations
surviving in the agricultural settlements. But Miliukov accepted the
thesis put forward by Pogodin and Solov'ev concerning the effects of the
internal colonisation of Russia - i.e., that in the process of migration
into the empty lands of the North-East, the tribal configurations were
broken up, and it was relatively easy for the state in the form of the
prince, to assume control over the land. And as the centre of gravity in
Russian political life moved more and more from the South to the North,
2the more 'Eastern' development became inevitable.
Hence, in Russia, as in the East generally, the military land-grant
system gave rise to the service-state system rather than to feudalism as
found in Western Europe, where the central state structure maintained
little weight in the political equation. In the service state, social
classes or strata were essentially defined by the kind of service they
rendered to the state, rather than by the original pattern of tribal
subordination and superordination. Whether or not the functional elite
in the service-state system succeeded in converting their conditional
3estates into unconditional holdings, they remained a class dependent on
P. Miliukov, Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury, op.cit., Vol. I, 
p. 42.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 132-140.
3 Miliukov cites the two cases also cited by Marx - the British conquest 
of India and the French conquest of Algeria, in both of which service lands 
survived very late on a conditional basis, but were then converted by 
conquerors 'partly through misunderstanding' (Miliukov) into aristocratic 
forms of tenure. (See Miliukov, ibid., p. 142, and Marx's conspectus of 
Kovalevsky cited in Chapter Two.)
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t h e  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  s t a t e  and m oulded  by t h i s  d e p e n d e n c e .
One v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e - s t a t e  t h e o r y ,  w h ich  a n t i c i p a t e d  some o f
t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  made by P le k h a n o v  when a b s o r b in g  i t  i n t o  a  s p e c i f i c a l l y
M a r x i s t  a n a l y s i s ,  was p r o v i d e d  by t h e  f o r e i g n  o b s e r v e r  o f  n i n e t e e n t h -
c e n tu r y  R u s s i a ,  M ackenzie  W a l la c e .  He w r o te  as  f o l l o w s :
. . . T h u s ,  we s e e ,  t h e  o f t - r e p e a t e d  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
R u s s ia n  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  a r e  s im p ly  a r t i f i c i a l  c a t e g o r i e s  
c r e a t e d  by  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  t r u e ,  
b u t  i s  by  no means a c c u r a t e .
What i s  p e c u l i a r  i n  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
R u s s i a  i s  t h i s :  u n t i l  l a t e l y  sh e  r e m a in e d  an a lm o s t
e x c l u s i v e l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  Em pire  w i t h  an abundance  o f  
u n o c c u p ie d  l a n d .  H er h i s t o r y  p r e s e n t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
few o f  t h o s e  c o n f l i c t s  w h ich  r e s u l t  f rom  t h e  v a r i e t y  
o f  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  and  t h e  i n t e n s i f i e d  s t r u g g l e  f o r  
e x i s t e n c e .  C e r t a i n  s o c i a l  g ro u p s  w e r e ,  i n d e e d ,  fo rm ed  
i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t im e ,  b u t  t h e y  w ere  n e v e r  a l lo w e d  t o  
f i g h t  o u t  t h e i r  own b a t t l e s .  The i r r e s i s t i b l e  a u t o ­
c r a t i c  pow er k e p t  them a lw ays  i n  check  and f a s h i o n e d  them 
i n t o  w h a te v e r  form i t  t h o u g h t  p r o p e r ,  d e f i n i n g  m in u te ly  
and c a r e f u l l y  t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  r i g h t s ,  t h e i r  
m u tu a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  i n  ihe peiih'c^ l 
>o t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  R u s s i a  a lm o s t  no t r a c e  o f  t h o s e  c l a s s  
h a t r e d s  w h ich  a p p e a r  s o  c o n s p ic u o u s ly  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  
o f  W e s te rn  E u r o p e . !
The p a r a l l e l s  b e tw e e n  t h e  s e r v i c e - s t a t e  c o n c e p t  e v o lv e d  by  t h e
n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r i a n s  and  M a rx 's  c o n c e p t  o f  O r i e n t a l  s o c i e t y
a r e  m a n i f e s t ,  and  r e v e a l  t h e  s i m i l a r  a n c e s t r y  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t s  i n  t h e  g r e a t
t r a d i t i o n  o f  E u ro p e an  t h e o r i s i n g  a b o u t  n o n -E u ro p e a n  p o l i t i e s .  However,
R u s s ia n  M a r x i s t s  w ere  i n  g e n e r a l  t o  i g n o r e  b o t h  M a rx 's  m odel o f  an A s i a t i c
mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and h i s  q u a l i f i e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  m odel t o  R u s s i a ,
and  t h e  s e r v i c e - s t a t e  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  g r e a t  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r i a n s .  I n s t e a d  th e
R u s s i a n  M a r x i s t s  w ere  t o  do w h a t  Marx h a d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w a rn e d  a g a i n s t  i n
1877 : t h a t  i s ,  t o  'm e ta m o rp h o se  [ h i s ]  h i s t o r i c a l  s k e t c h  o f  t h e  g e n e s i s  o f
c a p i t a l i s m  i n  W e s te rn  E u rope  i n t o  an h i s t o r i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c  t h e o r y  o f  t h e
2
g e n e r a l  p a t h  e v e r y  p e o p le  i s  f a t e d  t o  t r e a d  . . . '
S i r  D ona ld  M ackenz ie  W a l la c e ,  R u s s i a , o p . c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p p .  4 5 5 -5 6 .  
Marx t o  t h e  E d i t o r s  o f  O t e c h e s t v e n n y e  Z a p i s k i ,  MESC, p .  313.
172
Russian History in European Dress: The Orthodox Marxist Approach
Much of Marx's analysis of the Russian state was both distasteful
and inconvenient to the Russian Bolsheviks. Moreover, for reasons to
be discussed, Bolshevik historiography came to enshrine the unilinear
schema of history, and to abandon the suggestion by Marx that there
existed alternative paths of historical development. Hence, 'orthodox'
Russian Marxist historiography ignored Marx and endowed Russian history
with a feudal stage, completely analogous to that of Western Europe, which
was supposed to lead through the operation of its own internal laws to
capitalism and hence to socialism."*'
The most important single influence on the formation of the orthodox
Marxist approach to Russian history was the work of N.P. Pavlov-Sil'vansky,
2published in the early years of the twentieth century. Pavlov-Sil'vansky 
was the first important Russian historian completely to deny the prevail­
ing nineteenth-century historical tradition of viewing Russia's develop­
ment as idiosyncratic in comparison with the development of the Western 
European nations.
An impressive amount of evidence was marshalled by Pavlov-Sil'vansky
in support of his contention that Russian feudalism was essentially of the
3same nature as the classic model extrapolated from French history. On
There has been another tendency, represented in recent years by A.P. 
Pogrebinsky and la. I. Livshin, that has stressed Russia's serai-colonial 
status in the pre-Revolutionary years, and the 'anti-colonial' rather than 
purely anti-capitalist nature of Russia's socialist revolution. See John 
L.H. Keep, 'The Rehabilitation of M.N. Pokrovsky', in Alexander and Janet 
Rabinowitch, etc. ed. Revolution and Politics in Russia, Bloomington,
Indiana U.P., 1972, p. 312.
2 During the popularisation of his work after the Revolution Pavlov- 
Sil'vansky was even labelled a 'spontaneous Marxist'. See K.F. Shteppa, 
Russian Historians and the Soviet State, New Brunswick, Rutgers U.P., 1962, 
p. 256.
3 Pavlov-Sil'vansky's major work was entitled Feodalizm v drevnei Rusi, St. 
Petersburg, Brockhaus-Efron', 1907, published the year before his death.
His ideas to a certain extent had been foreshadowed by A.G. Presniakov, who
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the basis of his evidence he was able to argue quite persuasively that 
feudalism had developed at approximately the same time and for the same 
reasons in Western Europe and in Russia - i.e. it arose out of the conflict 
between landowners and peasants, not out of the activity of the state.
By inference Russia shared in the laws of social development found in 
We s te rn E urope.
Pavlov-Sil'vansky's detailed rejection of the notion of the 'special 
nature' of Russian history was popularised by Soviet historians in the 
post-Revolutionary period. Most important among these Soviet historians 
was M.N. Pokrovsky, whose influence was pre-eminent in the period up to 
1934. Pokrovsky was eager to be rigorous in the application of Marxist 
categories, as he understood them, to Russian history and to play down any 
'special factors' such as territorial exigencies, international relations, 
the role of great men, or the possibility of the relatively autonomous role 
of the state vis a vis social classes.
Having eliminated such factors from his purview, Pokrovsky was 
confronted with the problem that Russian 'feudalism' looked rather odd in 
comparison with its European equivalent. Pokrovsky's solution to this 
problem was to juggle his periodisation. In order to explain away the 
Russian autocracy, which did not fit easily into the Marxist model of 
feudalism, Pokrovsky pushed back the rise of the Russian bourgeoisie to 
the sixteenth century. Thus the consolidation of the Russian autocracy 
was associated in his schema with the political requirements of merchant 
capital.
Because Pokrovsky was not aware of, or rejected, Marx's model of a 
non-Westem political economy, the appearance of the centralised state and 
bureaucratic structures were associated in his mind only with the period of 
the primitive accumulation of capital. He believed that 'bureaucracy can
was to continue to popularise them as a member of the Society of Marxist 
Historians after the revolution.
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only grow on a bourgeois soil', and hence the principal support of the 
Russian bureaucratic monarchy must ipso facto have been merchant capital - 
the first important stage in the development of industrial capitalism, 
and a stage that was exceptionally prolonged in Russia, lasting about 
four centuries.^
Although Pokrovsky's approach to Russian history was to attract almost
universal condemnation with the deliberate initiation of a more 'patriotic'
3historiography in 1934, his formulations were symptomatic of the attempt 
to view Russian history in terms of Western Europe. An alternative 
formulation of the genesis of the Russian autocracy, equally designed to 
minimise the significance of any particularities, was that the centralised 
state was brought into existence to defend the interests of the feudal 
landowners. Local unrest had arisen in the train of creeping enserfment, 
and the strong hand of the state was needed by the feudal lords to 
enforce the extension of their control over the state.
One way of avoiding the rather unconvincing characterisation of the 
Russian autocracy as merely the instrument of class rule by feudal lords was 
to fasten onto Marx and Engels' explanation of the relative autonomy of 
the absolutist state in Western Europe - i.e. that there was an equilibrium 
between economic classes which was exploited by the state. However, in
M.N. Pokrovsky, Preface to the 10th ed. of A Brief History of Russia, 
op.cit., Vol. I, p. 13.
2 This aspect of Pokrovsky's work never really gained wide acceptance and 
the official Soviet periodisation extended the feudal stage up to the middle 
of the nineteenth century, and pushed back its origins as far as possible.
3 In the period from 1934 the 'class' nature of the tsars was often played 
down completely, in favour of their heroic role in protecting all classes 
from foreign aggressors. The rise of the centralised state was also 
associated with defence factors rather than with economic class interests. 
Pokrovsky's characterisation of the Tsarist Empire as a 'prison of peoples' 
also fell right out of favour in this period.
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the Western context this equilibrium was portrayed as arising betv/een the 
feudal landowners and the rising bourgeoisie, and in the Russian context 
this would mean a return to Pokrovsky in so far as it pushed back the 
rise of the political significance of the bourgeoisie. One solution was 
to depict the equilibrium as arising between two sections of the same 
class - the aristocratic boyars and the lower-grade serving gentry.^ Once 
again such a solution had obvious problems - the serving gentry were very 
much the creature of the state, rather than enjoying independent economic 
power.
One area outside the autocracy itself which has presented special
problems to those attempting to fit Russian history to the Western pattern
has been the need to discover a structure comparable in nature and
functions to the medieval city in Western Europe. Noticeable among the
work done in this area is that of B.A. Rybakov. Rybakov claims that a
craft-guild system analogous to that of the West developed in Russia
2during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and that a third estate 
emerged in this period as a significant progressive force.
The unorthodox and ultimately 'heretical' Russian Marxists, such as 
Trotsky, were to stress on the contrary, the absence of craft-guild 
development in Russia, or the absence of craft-guild culture in the cities.
The work of M.N. Tikhomirov has also given prominence to the alleged
1 See John Keep, 'The Current Scene in Soviet Historiography', Survey,
Winter 1973, p. 9.
2 See B.A. Rybakov, Remeslo drevnei Rusi, Moscow, 1948, pp. 766, 775, 782.
For an analysis of Rybakov, see A. Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian Mirror, 
Four Lectures in Economic History, Cambridge U.P., 1970, pp. 142-143.
3 See particularly Trotsky's 'Reply to M.N. Pokrovsky' (first published in 
Pravda, 1st and 2nd July 1922), included in an abridged form as Appendix 
1 to Trotsky's The History of the Russian Revolution, tr. Max Eastman, Vol.
I, London, Gollancz, 1932, pp. 469-475. The unorthodox Marxist approach to 
Russian history will be discussed in greater depth in the next section.
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creation of a third estate or burgher class in Russia, according to his 
dating in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. 
Curiously, Tikhomirov'not only equates the role of the city in Russian 
history with the role of the city in the development of Western feudalism, 
but also with the city's role in the development of so-called Eastern or 
Asiatic feudalism.^
Marx, and after him Weber, saw the Oriental and Occidental city as
fundamentally differing, both in structure and functions. However, because
Tikhomirov was working within the unilinear model of history, he needed
to universalise the Western city, which provides the essential transition
between feudalism and capitalism in the model. According to Tikhomirov
the third estate was such a vital force in Russian history that not even
2the Tatar invasion could impede its rise and rise.
The Soviet historians have been concerned not only to prove that a
viable burgher class develops within Russian 'feudalism', but also, as
will be discussed in the next chapter, that Russian feudalism emerged at
least as early as Germanic feudalism, and in the same manner - directly
from tribal communalism. During the period 1929 to 1934 a number of
3authoritative writings by A.G. Prigozhin were published on the theme of 
the absence of a slave epoch in Russian history, though unfortunately the
M.N. Tikhomirov, Drevnerusskie goroda, Moscow, Gos. izd. pol. lit.,
1956, p. 436.
2
Ibid., p. 437. An important challenge to such a 'Western' interpret­
ation of Russian feudalism has come from one of the editors of Voprosy 
Istorii, A.M. Sakharov. Sakharov has rejected the view that in Russia there 
was a development of a third estate or urban revolutionary element
analagous to that in Western feudalism. He has argued that in fact guilds 
were unable to develop in Russia as they did in Europe, and that the Grand 
Duke of Moscow destroyed whatever municipal autonomy there was previously. 
(A.M. Sakharov, Gorody Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XIV-XV Vekov, Moscow, 1959, 
pp. 129, 138.)
3 See A.G. Prigozhin, Karl Marks i problemy sotsio-ekonornicheskikh formatsii, 
Moscow, 1933; the title essay in the collection Karl Marks i problemy 
istorii dokapitalisticheskikh formatsii, Moscow, 1934; and '0 nekotorykh 
svoebraziiakh russkogo feodalizma*, Izvestiia Gosudarstvennoi Akademii Istorii 
Material'noi Kultury, No. 72 (1934).
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a u t h o r  d e s c r i b e d  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  f e u d a l i s a t i o n  as b e g in n i n g  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
l a t e r  i n  E a s t e r n  E u rope  t h a n  i n  W e ste rn  E u ro p e  ( P r i g o z h in  was t o  b e  
p u r g e d  i n  1 9 3 5 ) .  T h is  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  o v e r s i g h t  was soon  r e c t i f i e d ,  and  
from  th e  m id d le  o f  t h e  1930s t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  p a r a l l e l  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
G erm anic  and S l a v i c  f e u d a l i s m  o u t  o f  t r i b a l  communalism was s t r o n g l y  
e n t r e n c h e d .  I t s  m ost  i n f l u e n t i a l  p r o p o n e n t  was B.D. Grekov ( 1 8 8 2 -1 9 5 3 ) ,  
t h e  h i s t o r i a n  o f  K ievan Rus. G rekov s e t  b a c k  th e  b e g in n i n g s  o f  f e u d a l i s m  
among t h e  E a s t e r n  S l a v s  t o  t h e  p e r i o d  b e tw e e n  t h e  s i x t h  and  e i g h t h  
c e n t u r i e s .  D u r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  i n  G r e k o v 's  a c c o u n t ,  t h e  f o r t i f i e d  t r i b a l  
s e t t l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  E a s t e r n  S l a v s  w ere  g r a d u a l l y  r e p l a c e d  by t h e  f e u d a l  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  u n f o r t i f i e d  v i l l a g e  and  f o r t i f i e d  m an o r .^  G rekov  c la im e d  
t h a t  t h e  K ievan  economy was b a s i c a l l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  ( r a t h e r  th a n  h u n t i n g /  
t r a d i n g )  and  t h a t  f e u d a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ere  p re d o m in a n t  i n  t h e  p e r i o d .  They 
to o k  t h e  form  o f  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  l a b o u r  s e r v i c e ,  w hich  p r e c e d e d  t h e  l e g a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  s e r fd o m  from t h e  end o f  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .
Hence S o v i e t  h i s t o r i o g r a p h y  h a s  b a s i c a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  i t s e l f  w i t h i n
t h e  u n i l i n e a r  schema o f  h i s t o r y  and t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  Marx e x t r a p o l a t e d  from
2h i s  s tu d y  o f  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  W e s te rn  c a p i t a l i s m .  T h i s  i s  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  
d e v i a t i o n s  m e n t io n e d ,  s u c h  as  t h e  a p p e a l  t o  s p e c i a l  (and  g l o r i o u s )  f e a t u r e s  
o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  p a s t  f o r  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  p u r p o s e s  on th e  one  h a n d ,  and  t h e
B.D. G rekov , K i e v  Rus,  t r .  from  th e  1949 R u s s ia n  e d i t i o n  by E. S d o b n ik o v ,  
Moscow, F o r e ig n  L anguages  P u b l i s h i n g  H ouse , 1959, p .  150.
2
T h e re  have  b e e n  r e c u r r e n t  t e n d e n c i e s  to w a rd s  d i v i d i n g  1 f e u d a l i s m '  i n t o  
W e s te rn  and E a s t e r n  m o d e ls ,  s t a t e  o w n e r s h ip  o f  t h e  l a n d  and s e r f s  b e i n g  an 
i m p o r t a n t  e le m e n t  i n  t h e  l a t t e r .  Under t h i s  c a m o u f la g e ,  an a p p ro a c h  t o  
t h e  m u l t i l i n e a r  c o n c e p t io n  o f  h i s t o r y  c o u ld  be  made, even  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
R u s s i a .  F o r  ex am p le ,  A.M. S a k h a ro v  h a s  w r i t t e n :  ' I t  i s  th u s  n e c e s s a r y  t o
s tu d y  t h e  p ro b le m  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l i s e d  [R u s s ia n ]  s t a t e  i n  w ide  te rm s  o f  t h e  
a n a lo g o u s  p r o c e s s e s  n o t  o n ly  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  W est,  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  E a s t . . .  s t a t e  o w n e r s h ip  o f  th e  l a n d  was e x t r e m e l y  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  i n  a  s e r i e s  o f  c e n t r a l i s e d  f e u d a l  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  E a s t . ' (A.M. S a k h a r o v ,
'P r o b le m a  o b r a z o v a n i i a  r u s s k o g o  t s e n t r a l i z o v a n n o g o  g o s u d a r s t v a  v s o v e t s k o i  
i s t o r i o g r a f i i ' Voprosy  I s t o r i i ,  1951, No. 9 ,  p .  8 8 .)
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attempt to identify with the historical experience of the third world 
countries on the other. In general, the attempt to interpret Russian 
history in Western European terms has served to identify Soviet socialism 
with Marx's concept of socialism (the logical outcome of Western European 
history), and to endow the Soviet example with universal validity.
Plekhanov on Russian History: The Alternative Marxist Approach.
The only Russian Marxist so far who has systematically applied Marx's 
concept of multilinear development to Russia's own history has been G.V. 
Plekhanov. Plekhanov employed the multilinear approach in his much 
neglected work, History of Russian Social Thought. Owing to his belief 
that movements in the economic base provided the real key to movements in 
the ideological superstructure, his account of the development of Russian 
social thought (unfinished when he died in 1918) was accompanied by an 
extensive account of Russian history. This outline comprises Part One of 
the History and will be discussed in detail in this section. It draws on 
the service-state theory as well as on Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode 
of production, and adds new dimensions to both.'*'
Considering the importance of Plekhanov's History in relation to Marxist 
historiography, it is unfortunate that this work has fallen into almost 
complete oblivion. The only place in which it has been published in full 
is in Volumes XX-XXII of Plekhanov's Sochineniia edited by David Riazanov 
and published in Moscow 1923-1927 - needless to say, a bibliographical rarity 
today. When the work was being originally published during Plekhanov's life­
time the overdue Volume III was snatched away from him by the publishing 
firm 'Mir' and printed at the end of 1916 without Chapters X-XII. These 
were published separately after his death, and the unfinished Chapter XIII 
was published by Lev Deutsch in the Sbomik No. 1 of the Gruppa ' Osvobozhdenie 
Truda'. However when a new three volume edition of the work appeared in 
Moscow, 1918, under the auspices of the People's Commissariat for Culture, it 
appeared without Chapters X-XIII of Part III. A second edition of this 
incomplete version appeared in Moscow, 1925. The only (partial) translations 
of the work which have been undertaken have been into French and English.
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A brief discussion of the theoretical importance of Plekhanov's 
History, which, however, completely misfires owing to the author's limit­
ations in the field of Marxist theory, is to be found in Samuel H. Baron's 
Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism. ^ Baron considers any departure
from the unilinear schema of history in which class struggle is the
inexorable engine of development as a departure from Marxism per se
2('from a Marxist it represented a large concession' ).
A more relevant, though very brief, discussion of Plekhanov's work,
relying on the French translation of Part One, is to be found in an article
3by Umberto Melotti in II Terzo Mondo, Vol. 3 (1970-1971). Melotti gives 
serious consideration to Plekhanov's attempt to work out the implications 
of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production in its relation to Russia, 
and in its relation to a Marxist theory of alternative forms of historical 
development.
Plekhanov begins his survey of Russian history with a discussion 
of the politically-oriented historiographical theories that postulated 
either Russia's complete peculiarity, or its complete adherence to the 
pattern of Western European development. In the first half of the nine­
teenth century, both the Slavophiles, such as Kireev, and the Westernisers, 
such as Belinsky, had stressed the special character of Russia's historical
Plekhanov's daughter, Mme. Eugenia Batault-Pldkhanova, translated Part One 
of the History into French, and this translation was published in Paris by 
Bossard in 1926. A mimeographed English translation (largely by Boris M. 
Bekkar) of one of the least interesting parts of the History, Chapters I,
II and III of Part III, was published in 1938 as a joint project between 
Columbia University and the New York City Board of Education. This was 
reprinted in 1967 by Howard Fertig, N.Y.
 ^ Samuel H. Baron, Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism, London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 295-307.
2 Ibid., p. 298.
3 Part Two of a series by Umberto Melotti entitled 'Marx e il Terzo Mondo,' 
II Terzo Mondo, Vol. 3, No. 11 (1970-1971), pp. 7-32.
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path - although their evaluations of this special character were diametri­
cally opposed.^-
Later in the nineteenth century the Narodniks provided smother
stream of political thought which stressed the unique character of Russia’s
historical path. The Narodniks in fact made some effort towards developing
a Marxist conception of Russian history which fully acknowledged the
peculiarities of Russia’s historical and geographical situation* The
Narodniks foreshadowed Trotsky's theory of combined development both in
their analysis of Russia's past and in the implications they drew for the
future. V.P. Vorontsov in particular argued strongly that Russia could
utilise the experience of the capitalist West in order to avoid a capitalist
stage and move straight into socialism - drawing on the traditional
2Russian village communalism. The Narodnik approach to Russian history
tended to lose credibility pari passu with the disintegration of the mir,
the pivotal element of the Narodnik conception.
By contrast to the Narodniks, the Russian Social Democrats, as seen
above, sought to accommodate Russian history completely within the paradigm
3of development abstracted from Western European history.
Plekhanov rejected the theory of the complete peculiarity of Russian 
development as being unscientific, in that it overlooked the operation of
G.V. Plekhanov, Istorii russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli, Vol. I, first 
published by 'Mir 1914, Sochineniia, Vol. XX (1925) p. 9. Vol. I includes 
the very important 'Introduction: an outline of the development of Russian
social relations' (comprising Part One of the History), and the very 
interesting 'Movement of social thought in pre-Petrine Russia' (comprising 
Part Two). In subsequent citations this volume and edition of Plekhanov's 
Istoriia will simply be referred to in the following manner: Plekhanov,
History, p. 9.
2 See Andrzej Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1969, for an account of V.P. Vorontsov's The Fates of Capitalism in 
Russia, St. Petersburg, 1882.
3 For Plekhanov1 23s criticisms of Pavlov-Sil1vansky, the authority for the 
'European1 interpretation of Russian history, see Plekhanov, History,
pp. 10-11.
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certain sociological regularities in all human societies. One such
regularity specifically noted by Plekhanov was the universal occurrence
of a feudal phase, both in the history of Western Europe and in Egypt,
2Chaldea, Assyria, Persia, Japan and China. Plekhanov however makes it
clear that in his view this sociological regularity was confined to the
existence at a given period of a system of service land; the form assumed
by 'feudalism' in the East was so different from that assumed by Western
feudalism that it constituted an alternative path of development. In the
East the landholders, despite their efforts, did not succeed in converting
their feoffs into heritable property: 'The seigneurs [despots] not only
in principle preserved the highest right to the land, but in practice
3continually availed themselves of it.'
The characterisation of Russian history adopted by Plekhanov
consisted in a theory of the 'relative peculiarity' of Russian development,
as compared with either Western Europe or the East. Plekhanov saw world
history as being divided into two major streams, the European and the
Asiatic, and he saw Russia as distinguished by its oscillation between 
4the two.
In analysing the reasons for Russia's singularity, Plekhanov first 
rejected the view, which he saw as epitomised in Kliuchevsky, that this 
singularity was due to the absence of tribal stratification. According to 
the view under attack, the impulse to the development of social classes in
Ibid., pp. 11-12. The existence of universal laws of social development 
was intrinsic to the theory of historical materialism which Plekhanov 
helped to establish through his systematising theoretical works.
2
Ibid., p. 11. Ernest Mandel has (wrongly) concluded from this isolated 
passage that: 'Plekhanov eventually rejected its [the concept of the
Asiatic mode of production's] relevance to Russia, and even to history in 
general.' (E. Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, 
London, NLB, 1971, p. 117.)
3 Plekhanov, History, p. 79.
4 Ibid., pp. 14, 77.
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Western Europe had been supplied by intertribal conquest, i.e.f the 
political factor [moment] took precedence over the economic factor in 
the creation of the social fabric. In Russia, on the contrary, according 
to Plekhanov's account of Kliuchevsky, there ruled a mixed process whereby 
the formation of classes was determined by political and economic factors 
in turn.^
Having rejected the conquest theory, Plekhanov turned to the theories 
of geographical determinism associated with the service-state historians, 
such theories being consonant with his own tendency to expand the geograph­
ical component of the Marxist conception of history. He drew upon Solov'ev 
in particular, and attempted to demonstrate the correctness of Solov'ev's 
thesis that:
...in our country, as everywhere, tire course of events 
has always been subordinate to natural conditions.
The relative peculiarity of the Russian historical process 
is indeed explained by the relative peculiarity of that 
geographical environment in which the Russian people came 
to live and work.2
Plekhanov, however, was critical of Solov'ev's more facile inter­
pretations of the way in which the geographical environment exercised its 
influence, for example Solov'ev's belief in the direct influence of geography
on national character and on class relations (as in his stone and wood
3thesis outlined above) . The hypothesis which Plekhanov found suggestive 
and useful was the correlation drawn by Solov'ev between the undiversified 
character of the East European plain and the relative slowness and 
peculiarity of Russia's social development.
Ibid.r P. 16.
2
Ibid., p. 99. V.A. Anuchin has cited this passage as an illustration of 
the tribute paid by Plekhanov to geographical determinism. As we have seen 
Anuchin believes that geographical determinism is a much less dangerous 
phenomenon in relation to Marxism than geographical indeterminism, which led 
to voluntarism. (V.A. Anuchin, Teoreticheskie problemy geografii, Moscow, 
Gos. izd. geog. lit., 1960, p. 157.)
3 Plekhanov, History, pp. 28-34.
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Plekhanov adopted this hypothesis, though with added emphasis on 
the consequences for the mode of production and hence for social develop­
ment in general.^ As seen in Chapter Three Marx had described diversity 
of natural conditions as a vital factor in the rise of the division of
labour, the stimulation of diverse wants and needs, the development of
2exchange and so on. The absence of such diversity and its stimulus meant, 
according to Plekhanov, that the level of economic development on the 
Russian plain remained very low.
In the sphere of social relations, the lack of diversity of natural
conditions resulted in a constant repetition of the same basic social unit.
3Plekhanov described the colonisation of the Russian plain in terms drawn 
from biology: when the land became overcrowded the basic production unit,
the village commune, underwent binary fission and a new identical one was 
established in the surrounding unpopulated spaces. The kind of differentia­
tion between these cells which would have enabled them to form parts of a
complex social organisation did not take place, as the natural conditions
4of production in the new unit tended to be the same as in the old.
Plekhanov's analysis of the agricultural commune as the self- 
reproducing foundation of Russian despotism appears to be somewhat at 
variance with his simultaneous espousal of the views of B.N. Chicherin and 
A. Efimenko on the active role of the state in creating the commune system. 
In agreement with Chicherin and Efimenko, Plekhanov wrote that with the
1 Ibid., pp. 34-38.
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 351-352; Vol. Ill, p. 177. Plekhanov, 
History, p. 36. Plekhanov quotes Capital, Vol. I, only.
3 The idea of the special significance of the colonisation process in 
Russian history stems, as previously mentioned, from Pogodin and Solov'ev. 
Plekhanov expressly says: 'The history of Russia was the history of a
country in which the process of colonisation was dragged out over many 
centuries.' (Plekhanov, History, p. 90.)
4
Ibid., p. 35. Thus what was brought into being was 'a certain aggregate 
of cells, living tissue, but no complex organism.'
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migration of population to the North-East towards the end of the Kievan
period, the new arrivals settled as free peasants on their own land. The
obshchina was artificially revived by the government through fiscal measures,
as the means of bonding the peasants to the state.^
Plekhanov had earlier written at greater length on the derivation
of the village commune in his polemic against the Narodnik, V.P. Vorontsov
(V.V .). In the mature Asiatic system as found in Russia, ancient Egypt,
Byzantium, China and India, the village structure was not the same as the
kinship structure found in primitive society, nor even a modified form of
this., but rather the historical product of the expropriation of the direct
producers by the state and by the upper classes or strata supported by the 
2state. According to Plekhanov the village system, as perfected in 
eighteenth-century Russia, for example, represented a form of the exprop­
riation of the direct producers - the expropriation not only of their land,
3but also of their personal freedom. In this area Plekhanov was substant­
ially modifying Marx's account of Oriental society by adding to it those 
elements of the service-state theory which appeared to fit the empirical 
evidence more closely. As we have seen earlier, Marx was reluctant to 
acknowledge the 'Asiatic' village system as part of the infrastructure
created by the state even where the state was inextricably involved in the
4process of social production.
Ibid., p. 71.
2 G.V. Plekhanov, Obosnovanie narodnichestva v trudakh g. Vorontsova (V.V.) , 
Sochineniia, Vol. IX, pp. 135-138.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Jean Suret-Canale has recently criticised Marx's account of the genesis 
of the 'Asiatic' village system in terms similar to Plekhanov's. For 
example, 'In Africa, we can verify that it is precisely the appearance of 
class society which has generalised the village form as a convenient frame­
work for class exploitation.' (Jean Suret-Canale, 'Problemes thdoriques de 
l'etude des premieres societes de classes,' Recherches internationales a la 
lumiere du marxisme,No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 1967), p. 15.)
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The other geographical factor which Plekhanov viewed as playing a 
vital role in the shaping of the mode of production and the development of 
social relations on the East European plain was the extensiveness of the 
arable land. This factor, together with the lack of diversity of the 
natural environment militated against the development of a complex social 
division of labour. Whereas the absence of diversity inhibited horizontal 
division, the availability of land inhibited vertical class division based 
on access to the means of production. Overcrowding on the Russian plain 
tended to lead to the colonisation of new areas rather than to the develop­
ment of exploitative class relations and class struggle.^-
According to Plekhanov it was only during periods when the possibility 
of migration was restricted, as during the period of the Tatar yoke, that 
the boyars were able to establish an independent grip over the population, 
and become an important economic class. With the rise of the Muscovite state 
however, and with the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the possibility of
migration was again opened up, and only the state had the power to achieve
2the eventual bonding of the peasants to the land.
The extensiveness of the Russian plain also neutralised the effects of
the emergence of disaffected elements in the population. In Western Europe,
according to Plekhanov, the disaffected elements on leaving the villages had
congregated in the cities because there was nowhere else for them to go.
Once congregated in the cities they had played a vital role in the creation
3of the new economic relations which eventually led to a monetary economy.
In Russia, on the other hand, the dissatisfied elements fled to the steppe 
where economic relations were even more backward than in the central regions
1
2
3
Plekhanov, History, p. 84. 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 104-105.
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of the state.'1 2345'
The steppe in fact came to act as a safety-valve, preserving the old
order from explosion. The Cossack revolts were themselves fruitless, in
2that they did not reflect the emergence of a new mode of production. As
in all 'Asiatic' systems, peasant rebellions provided superficial historical
3movement, without effecting any real social change.
Thus Plekhanov followed Solov'ev in viewing the extensiveness and 
lack of diversity of the East European plain as the factors primarily 
responsible for the retardation of Russia's historical growth and the weak 
development of Russian feudalism. We have seen how on Plekhanov's account 
these factors inhibited the emergence of feudal relations between land- 
owners arid peasants. Because the druzhinniki tended to receive their 
income directly from the prince, or from trading operations carried out 
under his aegis, rather than from independent manorial land-holding, their 
position was much weaker than that of the equivalent military servitor class 
in feudal Europe. 7\lthough the druzhinniki retained the right during the 
Kievan period to transfer their allegiance to another prince, Plekhanov 
interpreted such transfers as a sign of the weakness rather than of the 
strength of their position; they had no personal base from which to conduct
5a struggle with the prince for the satisfaction of their demands.
In spite of these peculiarities, Russia was closer to the West
Ibid., Cf. Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, op.cit., 
Vol. I, p. 23. Trotsky sums up the historical consequences of the extensive­
ness of the Russian plain as follows: 'The process of social differentiation,
intensive in the west, was delayed in the east and diluted by the process of 
expansion.’ (Ibid.)
2 Plekhanov, History, p. 105.
3 See Trotsky's analysis of the role of peasant rebellions within Asiatic 
society, discussed in the next section.
4 Plekhanov, History, pp. 51, 58.
5 Ibid., p. 51.
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( a c c o r d in g  t o  P l e k h a n o v 's  pendulum  view  o f  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r y )  d u r in g  th e
K ievan  p e r i o d  t h a n  d u r in g  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  M u sco v i te  period.'*" D u r in g  th e
K ievan  p e r i o d  R u s s i a  h a d  p a r t i c i p a t e d  more f u l l y  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange
w i t h  t h e  W est and th e  p r i n c e  h a d  b e e n  a b l e  t o  pay  th e  e x p e n s e s  o f  t h e
2
s t a t e  from  th e  p r o c e e d s  o f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  T here  was as y e t  no n e e d  f o r  
t h e  s t a t e  t o  e x e r c i s e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  d o m in a n t  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
( a g r i c u l t u r e )  o r  o v e r  t h e  d i r e c t  p r o d u c e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l  t h e  p u b l i c  
f u n c t i o n  o f  d e f e n c e .
A n o th e r  g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  E a s t  E u ro p ean  p l a i n
was l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  t u r n  away from  t h e  W est a t  t h e  end  o f  t h e
K ievan  p e r i o d .  T h is  f a c t o r  was t h e  o p e n n e s s  o f  t h e  p l a i n  t o  t h e  S o u th -
E a s t  and i t s  c o n t i g u i t y  w i t h  t h e  s t e p p e s  o f  c e n t r a l  A s i a ,  t h e  home o f  t h e
nom adic  h o r d e s  whose i n c u r s i o n s  were becom ing  more and more s e r i o u s  t o -
3
w ards  t h e  c l o s e  o f  t h e  K iev an  p e r i o d .  Such i n c u r s i o n s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a
m a jo r  s h i f t  o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  p o p u l a t i o n  away from  th e  S o u th -W e s t  to w a rd s
t h e  N o r t h - E a s t  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  t w e l f t h  c e n t u r y .
The g e o g r a p h i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  t h e  N o r th  was i n  g e n e r a l  even  more
u n f a v o u r a b le  t o  W e s t e r n - s t y l e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  th a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  S o u th .
T h e re  was no r e a d y  a c c e s s  from  t h e  N o r th  t o  m a rk e ts  f o r  t h e  lu x u ry  i te m s
( f u r s ,  wax, honey  e t c . )  w h ich  h a d  b e e n  th e  c h i e f  t r a d e - c o m m o d i t i e s  o f  
4
K ie v a n  R u s . F u r th e r m o r e ,  e x i s t i n g  t r a d e  r o u t e s  w ere  c u t  o f f  by  t h e  T a t a r  
i n v a d e r s .  D e p r iv e d  o f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  t h e  s t a t e  had  t o  m ee t  i t s  e x p e n se s
I b i d . , p p .  12, 52 .
2
I b i d . r  p p .  5 8 -5 9 .
3
I b i d . ,  p .  36. P le k h a n o v  i s  h e r e  commenting on S o l o v 'e v ,  who i n c l u d e d  
th e  o p e n n e ss  t o  nom adic  i n v a d e r s  as one o f  t h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c ­
i n g  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r y ,  b u t  i n  P l e k h a n o v 's  v iew u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  th e  im p o r ta n c e  
o f  t h e  s t r u g g l e  w i t h  t h e  nom ads.
4 I b i d . ,  p .  75.
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from the agricultural labour of the people (rather than from their auxiliary 
industries, such as hunting). Agricultural labour, in turn, was less 
productive in the North and the state demands were correspondingly more 
oppressive. 'In order to ensure the fulfilment of these demands it was 
necessary [for the state] to increase the extent of its direct power over 
the rural population. The history of the population of the Volga basin 
consists in the process of their gradual enserfment [zakreposhchenie] to 
the state.'^
The extension of state power over primary production meant that a
despotic system similar to that of the Asiatic empires came into being;
and as in Asiatic societies, centralisation flourished in the absence of
a complex social division of labour or social stratification. Plekhanov
completely rejected the view that Muscovite absolutism was merely the
political instrument of a feudal ruling class of the Western type. He
pointed out that if the feudal class in Russia had enjoyed sufficient
power to translate their aspirations into political terms, they would have
brought into being the kind of aristocratic constitution found in Lithuania
2and Poland, rather than a despotism which severely curtailed their rights.
The major difference between post-Kievan Russia and the classic
Asiatic despotisms, as described by Plekhanov, was that in Russia it was
not the need to provide economic pre-conditions of production such as the
irrigation and flood-control systems of the East which brought the despotic
3state into being, but rather the need for defence against nomadic raiders.
The nomadic peoples, because of their particular mode of production, 
(i.e. herding) were militarily stronger than the settled agricultural 
peoples of the Russian plain. The development of agriculture meant a
1
2
3
Ibid., p. 64. 
Ibid., p. 96. 
Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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division of labour between direct producer and warrior; the vast majority 
of the population became tied to the soil, while the military function 
devolved on a comparatively small group (i.e. the prince and his druzhina) 
who retained their mobility. Hence the weakness of the sedentary agricul­
tural peoples of the East European plain vis a vis the nomadic raiders, 
and their need to compensate for this weakness by 'uniting in one great 
political union',^ thus combining all their military resources. This in
turn brought about the expansion of the power of the prince as the
2'military watchman of the Russian soil'.
According to Plekhanov the Russian situation was paralleled in Asia
where it also happened that agricultural peoples were only able to prove
themselves stronger than the nomads after they had succeeded in forming
3great despotic states. This parallel had earlier been noted by Parvus, who 
had written:
...Russia ... was on the way to becoming an Asiatic despotism.
She even surrounded herself with a Chinese wall. To convince 
oneself of this, it is sufficient to cast a glance at the 
line of fortresses of the Moscow state, built by the way, like 
the Chinese wall, as a defence against the attacks of the 
nomadic Mongols. 4-
The Chinese wall and its equivalents were symbolic of the type of central­
ised political organisation and state-directed corvee labour required to 
protect these agricultural states from the constant threat of invasion.
Although Plekhanov acknowledged parallels between the kind of defence 
function fulfilled by the Russian state and that fulfilled by Eastern states, 
he still awarded primacy in the emergence of the classical Asiatic despot­
ism to the irrigation function. The defence burden was less onerous in the
Ibid., p. 47.
2
Ibid., pp. 53-54, 57. The appellation 'voennyi storozh' derives from 
Kliuchevsky.
 ^ Ibid., p. 100.
4 Parvus, Rossiia i revoliutsiia, St Petersburg, izd. N. Glagoleva, 1906, 
p. 96.
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l a t t e r  t h a n  i n  R u s s i a ,  b e c a u s e  R u s s i a  was c o n f r o n t e d  n o t  o n ly  by b a r b a r i a n  
nom ads, b u t  a l s o  by n e ig h b o u r s  t o  t h e  W est who h a d  a c h ie v e d  a much h i g h e r  
l e v e l  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t . ^
In  d i s c u s s i n g  th e  m i l i t a r y  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  t h e  nomads and  th e  d e f e a t
o f  K iev an  Rus, P le k h a n o v  was a t  p a i n s  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t s  by no means
d i s p r o v e d  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m .  The r e a s o n  th e y  m ig h t  be
th o u g h t  t o  do s o  was t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  m a t e r i a l i s t  c o n c e p t io n  o f
h i s t o r y ,  m i l i t a r y  v i c t o r y  was u l t i m a t e l y  d e te r m in e d  by th e  c o m p a r a t iv e  l e v e l
o f .e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  c o m b a ta n ts ;  and p a s t o r a l  a c t i v i t y  r e p r e s e n t e d
2
a lo w er  s t a g e  o f  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  th a n  a g r i c u l t u r e .
P le k h a n o v * s  m ethod o f  s a v in g  th e  t h e o r y  was t o  advance  a n o t h e r  t h e o r e t ­
i c a l  p o i n t ,  w h ich  c o u ld  a l s o  be fo u n d  i n  Marx. T h a t  i s ,  t h a t  p r o g r e s s  
d o e s  n o t  o c c u r  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  i n  a l l  s p h e r e s  o f  s o c i e t y .  The i l l u s t r a t i o n  
u sed  by P le k h a n o v  was t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  h u n t i n g  t r i b e s  o v e r  p e o p le  o f
more 'ad v an ced *  s t a g e s  o f  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  t h e  p l a s t i c  
3a r t s .  The same k i n d  o f  a s y m m e t r i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  was t h e  c a u se  o f  th e  
m i l i t a r y  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  t h e  nom ads. Nomadic h e r d i n g ,  w i th  i t s  c o n s t a n t  
m o b i l i s a t i o n  t o  s e e k  new p a s t u r e s ,  gave r i s e  t o  a  w a r l i k e  d i s p o s i t i o n  and 
c a p a c i t y ,  and th e  e v e n t u a l  m i l i t a r y  a d v a n ta g e  o f  s o c i e t i e s  b a s e d  on
If.
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  em erged  o n ly  v e ry  s lo w ly .
P le k h a n o v ,  H i s t o r y ,  p .  87.
2
The q u e s t i o n  o f  th e  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t y  o f  h e r d i n g  o v e r  a g r i c u l t u r e  i s  
one i n  w h ich  M a rx 's  a s s u m p t io n s  a p p e a r  t o  have  b e e n  s u p e r s e d e d  by th e  r e c e n t  
g ro w th  o f  a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  kno w led g e . See my N ote  on t h e  P o p u l a t i o n  F a c t o r  
and  a l s o  M. G o d e l i e r ,  'La  n o t i o n  de "mode de p r o d u c t i o n  a s i a t i q u e "  e t  l e s  
schem as m a r x i s t e s  d ' e v o l u t i o n  des  s o c i d t e s ' ,  S ur  l e  'mode de p r o d u c t i o n  
a s i a t i q u e ' , C .E .R .M ., P a r i s ,  E d i t i o n s  s o c i a l e s ,  1969, p .  53.
3
I b i d . ,  p .  44 .  C f .  Marx, G r u n d r i s s e ,  I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  p .  109 . The exam ples  
g iv e n  by Marx o f  t h e  'u n e v e n  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  m a t e r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n '  i n c l u d e  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  G reek  a r t  and o f  Roman p r i v a t e  lav;. Marx w arned  t h a t  t h e  
'c o n c e p t  o f  p r o g r e s s '  s h o u ld  n o t  be  c o n c e iv e d  i n  t h e  u s u a l  a b s t r a c t n e s s ' .  
( I b i d . )
4
P le k h a n o v ,  H i s t o r y ,  p .  44.
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conception of history and the 'facts' of Russian history consisted in
the argument that Kiev Rus was in reality at a lower level of development 
of productive forces than the nomadic raiders. The argument involved the 
claim that the basic mode of production in Kiev Rus was hunting combined 
with trade,^ hunting ranking below pastoral activity in any Marxist schema 
of history. Plekhanov completely rejected this argument, citing the 
historical evidence for his own view that the mode of production of Kiev 
Rus was basically agricultural, although the collection of furs and other 
forest products constituted an auxiliary industry which corresponded to the 
demands of the international (particularly the 'Greek') market.
The general functions of the centuries-long onslaught of nomadic 
invaders were, as Plekhanov stated them, the shifting of the centre of 
gravity of Russian history Northwards; the retardation of economic develop­
ment both through devastation and through the cutting of trade links with 
Europe; and the strengthening of the princely power to meet the constant 
military emergencies. The period of actual Tatar rule witnessed the further 
strengthening of the grip of the princes over the land and its inhabitants 
in order to fulfil the payments due to the Khan, the princes being answerable 
for these payments.
However although the Tatar invasions functioned to push Russian socio­
political relations into an ever more 'Eastern' framework, Plekhanov 
denied that this indicated in any way the so-called 'Tatarisation' of Russia. 
The actual borrowings were superficial, and could not be otherwise consider­
ing the relatively higher mode of production and greater complexity of
2social relations to be found among the Russians. In Plekhanov's words:
Plekhanov criticises this argument specifically as it appears in the work 
of V.A. Keltuiala, Kurs istorii russkoi literatury, Part I, Book 2, St. 
Petersburg, 1911. (Plekhanov, History, pp. 38-44.)
2 In an earlier part of his work Plekhanov had outlined the conditions of 
cultural borrowing as follows: 'the influence of one country on the con­
figuration of inner relations of another is possible only when in the latter
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...The inner mode of life of the Russian state did not 
become like the mode of life of the nomads, but rather, 
like the mode of life of the great agricultural despot­
isms of the East. These despotisms also suffered from 
the steppe horsemen and even borrowed from them a 
certain amount in the way of culture.-L
Plekhanov's criticisms of the concept of Tatarisation were directed against
the German historian A. Bruckner, and against the latter's 'idealist'
account of the influence of Tatar political ideas and methods on Russian 
2development.
Bruckner's approach to Russian history has still been very much alive 
in the twentieth century. The following is from Vernadsky's A History of 
Russia:
...The Mongolian state was built upon the principle 
of unquestioning submission of the individual to the 
group, first to the clan and through the clan to the 
whole state. This principle* was in the course of 
time impressed thoroughly upon the Russian people.
It led to the system of universal service to the state 
which all without differentiation were forced to give. 
Under the influence of Mongolian ideas*, the Russian 
state developed on the basis of universal service.
All classes of society were made a definite part of 
the state organization. Taken altogether, these 
ideas* amount to a peculiar system of state social­
ism (sic). The political theory* developed into a 
finished plan* later, in the Moscow Kingdom and the 
Russian Empire; but the basis of the idea* of state 
service was laid down during the period of Tartar 
domination.^
there are already social elements at hand, for whom it is advantageous to 
assume the role of bearer [of this influence].' Thus, for example, proto- 
feudal elements in the Lithuanian borderlands of Russia assumed the role of 
bearer of influence from Poland, where the rights and privileges of the feudal 
nobility had developed a more advanced form in accordance with the comparat­
ively advanced economic and social condition of the country. (Ibid., p. 33.)
^ Ibid., fn. pp. 247-248.
2 Baron, in his biography, mistakenly writes that: 'clearly recognizable in
Plekhanov's history are the ideas ... of Bruckner on the influence of the 
Mongols'. What is actually present in Plekhanov's work is a refutation of 
Bruckner's views. (See Samuel H. Baron, Plekhanov..., op.cit., p. 296.)
•k My emphasis.
3 George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, 3rd rev. ed., New Haven, Yale U.P., 
1951, p. 56.
Even K.A. Wittfogel, because of his very desire to correlate despotism 
and hydraulic agriculture^, has to some extent provided a similarly 
'idealist1 account of the impact of the Tatars on Russia. As the hydraulic 
mode of production did not exist in Russia, Wittfogel has portrayed the 
Tatars as a transmission belt, importing the despotic system of government 
from China to Russia. Once infected by these political ideas ('the 
Mongol bacillus'), the Russians developed their own system based on them.
Although disagreeing with the Tatarisation thesis, and viewing the
socio-political changes in Russia as a response to Tatar pressure rather
than as cultural borrowing, Plekhanov agreed that at the end of the period
of the Tatar yoke the newly emergent Muscovite state was quite different
in character from the absolute monarchies developing in Western Europe.
In France, for example, the rise of a monetary economy meant that kings as
early as Philip the Fair were able to begin liberating themselves from
dependence on a noble militia. On the other hand, the French kings were
2compelled to leave sacrosanct the rights of the nobles over their land.
The reverse of these two circumstances held true in Muscovy; the persist­
ence of natural economy meant continued reliance on a gentry army, and on 
the other hand, there was a steady retreat of allodial aristocratic forms 
of landholding (votchina) in favour of service land (pomest'e).
As sketched out above in reference to the changes between Kievan and 
post-Kievan Rus, there took place a gradual transformation of all land 
intoa'state fund forming the economic basis of a system of national defence' 
The population became bound to the state either as stipendiary civil and 
military servitors (the upper classes) or as producers of the goods
Wittfogel's geographical determinism is closely related to that of 
Plekhanov.
2
3
Plekhanov, History,p. 83. 
Ibid.
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necessary for the support of these echelons (the townspeople and peasantry).
To illustrate the differences between the Muscovite and Western
political systems, as perceived by contemporaries, Plekhanov drew on the
accounts of the sixteenth-century travellers, Fletcher and von Herberstein.
Dr Giles Fletcher, an ambassador from Elizabeth I to the Tsar Fedor in
1588, had written, for example:
...The Manner of their government is much after the Turkish 
fashion: which they seem to imitate as neare as the
countrie, and reach of their capacities in pollitique 
affayres, will give them leave to doo.^
Von Herberstein had summed up the situation of all ranks of society in
relation to the prince as follows: 'All confess themselves to be Chlopos
2
[kholopy], that is, serfs of the prince.'
In Plekhanov's interpretation, the bondage of the Russian population
to the state recounted by the travellers was 'the necessary consequence of
those conditions in which the Russian people had to struggle for their
historical existence once they had settled in the Upper Volga area and had
been gradually united by Moscow. Once having arisen, this consequence became
a cause - a powerful hindrance to the further economic and cultural progress
3of Greater Russia.'
One way in which the consequence of natural conditions became transmuted 
into an active cause was through the influence of ideology. The ideologist 
par excellence of Muscovite absolutism was, in Plekhanov's view, S.
G. Fletcher, Of the Russe Common Wealth (first pub. London, 1591), London, 
Hakluyt Society, 1856 (First Series, No. XX), p. 26. Quoted by Plekhanov 
from a Russian edition, History, p. 79.
2 Freiherr Sigmund von Herberstein, Rerum Hoscoviticarum Commentarii (first 
published Vienna, 1549), translated as Notes Upon Russia by Sigismund von 
Herberstein, Hakluyt Society, 1851, (First Series, No. X), reprinted Burt 
Franklin, N.Y., n.d., Vol. I, p. 95. This description was taken up by Jean 
Bodin in Book Two, Chapter Two of the Six Books of the Republic when he 
included Muscovy in the list of countries approximating to Aristotle's 
category of despotic government.
3 Plekhanov, History, p. 94.
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Peresvetov. Peresvetov was the contemporary of Jean Bodin, and the
differences in approach of these two ideologists reflected the different 
courses which the history of their countries were taking.
Bodin's work expressed the interests of the third estate in the 
period when they joined forces with the French monarchs for the purpose of the 
struggle against the feudal nobility. For this reason, Bodin supported 
the concept of an absolutism which would clear away feudal anachronisms, 
but would at the same time respect personal and civil freedoms and property 
rights.^
Peresvetov, on the other hand, reflected the outlook of the lower
echelons of the service class (the dvorianstvo), who in Muscovy replaced
the third estate as the chief support of absolutism in its struggle with
4the feudal classes (the boyars). Peresvetov, like indeed Bodin, held up 
the Turkish system of non-heritable service lands as a model to be preferred 
to the existing forms of noble land tenure. However Peresvetov's admiration
Peresvetov's writings had been republished shortly before Plekhanov began 
work on his history, in the addenda to V.F. Rzhiga, I.S. Peresvetov, publit- 
sist XVI veka, 2 vols., Moscow, 1908.
2 Plekhanov, History, pp. 150-169.
3 As seen in Chapter One, Bodin favoured what he called Royal (constitutional) 
Monarchy but not Seigneurial Monarchy (Aristotle's despotic government) which 
Bodin described as still existing in Asia, Ethiopia, Turkey, Tartary and 
Mus covy.
4 Cf. a recent Soviet history in which an account (by A.I. Pashkov) of 
Peresvetov appears under the rubric 'The Spokesmen of the Landed Nobility'. 
While acknowledging Persvetov's hostility to the 'boyars and big feudalists' 
Pashkov claims that: 'Peresvetov clearly expresses in his works the ideology
and interests of the nobility, as well as its political and economic demands, 
during the period of the formation of the centralised state.' (A History of 
Russian Economic Thought: Ninth through Eighteenth Centuries, ed. John M.
Letiche, University of California Press, 1964, p. 129.) Because orthodox 
Soviet historiography views the autocracy as the instrument of the feudal 
ruling class, the ideologists of the autocracy must ipso facto also represent 
the interests of that class. Accordingly, Pashkov describes Peresvetov's 
attacks on allodial land-holding, on the system of kormlenie, and on centri­
fugal feudal tendencies, as the work of a feudal spokesman.
5 Although Peresvetov also recommended monetary payment as the preferable 
form of reimbursement for service - one which would enforce the dependence of 
those in the state service on the central treasury. (Ibid., p. 160.) Cf.
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for the Turkish system was more thorough-going than that of Bodin, where 
main interest was in how the system held in check its class of military 
servitors. Peresvetov praised, for example, the organisation of janissaries, 
which he viewed as the Turkish equivalent of the oprichnina - an elite 
chosen for their qualities rather than for their birth. He also supported 
the pretensions of the Tsar to unlimited power and god-like authority. He 
did not demand, as Bodin did, that the monarch should obey natural law and 
protect property rights.
Ivan IV, Peresvetov's master, fully endorsed the interpretation of 
his role as seigneur or despot, both in practice and in his correspondence 
with Prince Kurbsky. 'Everything that belonged to the state or to the 
individual inhabitants of the state, was according to his firm conviction, 
the property of the state.'...'He was convinced that the boyars ate his 
bread.'^
Plekhanov described the historical significance of Ivan the Terrible
as resting on the fact that he more or less completed the conversion of the
2Muscovite state into a 'monarchy of the Eastern type.' As we have seen, 
Plekhanov believed that once this system was imposed, it had the same effect 
as it did in Asia proper, of contributing to a general socio-economic 
stagnation. The system of state control over the land and population (i.e., 
control over the production and allocation of surplus value) was, by the 
Marxist criteria discussed earlier, inevitably non-progressive, being 
inimica^JL to the emergence of potentially dynamic class from within itself.
Into such a system, the dialectic of social development could only be 
reintroduced through the impact of external factors. Both Marx and 
Plekhanov believed that in Russia these were provided by the presence of
Max V7eber, according to whom 'the development of a money economy ... is the 
primary social and economic condition of bureaucracy in its modern form...' 
Otherwise there is a constant tendency by officials towards the 'appropriation 
of prebends' and refeudalisation.
1
2
Ibid., p. 193. 
Ibid.
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neighbouring countries to the West which possessed more dynamic economies 
and which posed a military threat to Russia.
Due to the threat from the West, the very consolidation of the 
Muscovite state under Ivan III and Vasily III was accompanied by the first 
seeds of the eventual transformation of the system - the attempts to 
introduce Western military techniques. The gradual modernisation of the 
army over the centuries was to bring in its train changes in other spheres - 
the introduction to a certain extent of a monetary economy, the release of 
the upper classes from service, etc.^ The last area to be affected by 
these changes was the peasantry, the human resource on which the whole 
economy rested.
The simultaneous process of consolidation and transformation of the 
Asiatic system was illustrated by the reign of Peter the Great. Under 
Peter, in connection with the modernisation of the army, the nobility were 
to some extent emancipated from their service role, gained increased 
control over their land, and in general became more like the nobility of the 
Western absolutisms. In contrast, the service that the peasantry owed to 
the state and to the pomeshchiki became ever more onerous. 'Consequently 
the social position of the "well-born" was changing in one direction - in 
the direction of the West - at the same time that the social position of 
the "base-born" was continuing to change in the completely opposite 
direction - in the direction of the East. ' ^
Plekhanov's characterisation of Petrine Russia was very close to that 
of Marx - they both rejected the notion that Peter's reforms involved the 
genuine Westernisation of society. Plekhanov found great historical signifi­
cance, though doubtful authenticity, in the saying attributed to Peter that:
'We need Europe for a few decades - but then we must turn our backs on it.'2
Ibid., p. 118 
Ibid., p. 116.
1
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The question of the role of external military and financial pressure 
on internal development has always been a difficult one for Marxist 
historiography. To grant a determining role to external contingencies 
(the 'legitimation of chance'), has seemed a derogation of the laws of 
development intrinsic to the process of social production. Somewhat more 
elasticity has been shown in demonstrating the retarding role of some 
external contingencies- as in the Leninist theory of imperialism.
Pokrovsky, in his influential History of Russia, specifically rejected 
the- influence of external military and financial pressure as an explanation 
of Russia's 'turn to the West'. This explanation had been put forward by 
Solov'ev and Kliuchevsky, and Plekhanov argued that, pace Pokrovsky, there 
was no need for a Marxist to deny their findings. According to Plekhanov 
it was by no means metaphysical, as Pokrovsky suggested, to claim that the 
Asiatic form of state, holding as it did a monopoly over economic and social 
initiative, might itself introduce changes into the social structure as 
conscious policy.^ In the case of Russia this policy arose from the very 
real threat from without to the existence of the state, which might be 
called external necessity.
Moreover, although only those associated with the state apparatus were
in a position to be continually aware of the external threat and to draw up
long-term policies to meet it, there was also a direct response from the
2rest of the population to any situation of national danger. Thus Plekhanov
argued that co-operation between social classes in the face of external
threat had been more important as a factor in the development of social
3relations in Russia than the struggle between social classes. Hence the 
general acquiescence of the peasantry in their service to the gentry class 
while the latter were themselves visibly providing service to the state in
Ibid., pp. 246-263.
^ Ibid., p. 251.
3
Ibid., p. 13.
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military and other forms. ^
The editor of Plekhanov's Sochineniia, David Riazanov, in an uncharacter­
istically inept introduction to the History, refers, as his only comment on
the theoretical content, to the criticism of the class co-operation thesis
2made by Pokrovsky. For Pokrovsky, the proposition that under certain 
historical circumstances internal class struggle might be only of secondary 
importance betokened a direct betrayal of the working class; for example, 
it provided the theoretical basis for the 'defencist' attitude adopted by 
Plekhanov during the First World War. Riazanov modified what he termed 
Pokrovsky's 'polemical historiography' to the extent of describing 
Pleknanov's propositions as the logical outcome of the concrete political 
situation of the 1890's, when there was a need for the tactic of coalition 
with the liberal bourgeoisie. I.e., Plekhanov's theoretical ideas corres­
ponded to a phase of the workers' struggle that was past history, rather 
than constituting a deliberate betrayal of the working class.
Needless to say, neither Pokrovsky nor Riazanov were to discuss 
Plekhanov's History in the light of its employment of Marx's concept of 
the Asiatic mode of production. The political implications of systematising 
Marx's own comments on Russian history have remained until this day an 
effective deterrent to a serious Marxist analysis of Plekhanov's History.
Plekhanov's own political perspective was in fact very closely tied 
to his mature interpretation of Russian history, and to his belief in the 
possibility of alternative forms of historical development - the belief 
expressed theoretically in his adoption of Marx's concept of Asiatic society. 
Although Plekhanov saw the swing to the West as being well under way in 
Russia, with Russian capitalism developing along similar lines to Western 
capitalism, he was always hypersensitive to any tendencies which he felt
1
2
Ibid., p. 110.
Ibid., Editor's Preface, pp. xiii-xiv.
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might serve to reverse this swing. Thus while he had claimed that any
description of post-1861 Russia as a 'kind of European China* was utterly
false,^ he was still to speak out against the possibility of a restoration
2of 'our politico-economic Chineseness', a possibility Plekhanov associated 
with the Bolshevik policies of nationalisation of land.
With Russia's 'Asiatic' past always in mind, Plekhanov was opposed to 
any political programme that might tend to strengthen the central power 
and retard the devolution of social initiative from the state to Western- 
style political classes. Thus already in his polemics with the Narodniks, 
Plekhanov was warning against the dangers of a would-be socialist revol­
ution brought about when the economic and social conditions were not yet 
ripe for it. Should such a revolution take place when the masses were 
still incapable of bringing socialism into being on their own initiative,
'it [Narodnaia Volia] will have to seek salvation in the ideals of 
"patriarchal and authoritarian communism1 234', only modifying those ideals so
that the national production is managed not by the Peruvian "sons of the
3sun" and their officials but by a socialist caste.'
Apropos of another Narodnik, Plekhanov wrote: 'Let us suppose that
the peasant commune is really our anchor of salvation. But who will carry 
out the reforms postulated by Nikolai-on? Tsarist government? Pestilence 
is better than such reformers and their reforms I Socialism being introduced
4by Russian policemen - what a chimera1'
According to Plekhanov, the absolute pre-requisite of a true socialist
G.V. Plekhanov, Sochineniia, Vol. XXIV, p. 320.
2 G.V. Plekhanov,'K agramomu voprosu v Rossii', Dnevnik sotsial-demokrata, 
No. 5, March 1906, Sochineniia, Vol. XV, p. 37.
3 G.V. Plekhanov, Socialism and the Political Struggle (Geneva, 1883), 
Selected Philosophical Works, London, Lawrence and Wishart, Vol. I, 1961, 
p. 114.
4 Plekhanov to Engels, Perepiska K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa s russkimi politi- 
cheskimi deiateliami, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1951, p. 334. Cited in A. Walicki, 
The Controversy over Capitalism, op.cit., p. 127.
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revolution in Russia was a period of development under a democratic
constitution, which would 'guarantee the workers the 'rights of citizens'
as well as the 'rights of man' and give them by universal suffrage, the
possibility to take an active part in the political life of the country.'^
Once having committed himself to Marxism, in the early 1880's,
Plekhanov became deeply suspicious of any political programme that
depended on the revolutionary activity or participation of the peasantry.
The peasantry were categorised in Plekhanov's Marxist historiography as
the bulwark of the old order. They were revolutionary only in so far as
they wished to dispossess the gentry - whom they saw as usurping land which
had once been theirs by right of service, but to which they now had no 
2legitimate claim.
The peasantry instinctively sided with the autocracy against any attemp
on the part of the gentry class to increase their privileges; they were
also the staunch enemies of 'Westernisation1 2*4, which they identified with
3oppression by the upper classes. The Russian peasantry, like the
peasantry of the Asiatic despotisms (and under the influence of the same
mode of production with its social isolation and narrow horizons) regarded
the head of state as semi-divine, although occasionally misled by evil 
4advisers. The ultimate demand of the peasantry was for a redivision of 
all land, a demand that Plekhanov saw as an atavism reflecting the belief 
that all land belonged to the Tsar, who had a duty to keep it all in 
tiaglo by means of periodic redivisions.
G.V. Plekhanov, Socialism and Political Struggle, loc.cit., p. 116.
2 Plekhanov, History, p. 112.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 116-119.
4 Cf. the Russian saying quoted by Marx: 'The tsar is great, God is
greater still, but the tsar is still young'. (Marx, Die Neue Rheinische 
Zeitung, No. 129, 29 Oct. 1848, Werke, Vol. 5, p. 442.)
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The general function of revolutionary peasant movements within
Asiatic systems was simply to renew and revitalise the system on the old
basis - through a change of dynasty etc.
...Chinese social revolutions consisted in the confiscation 
of land from the 'retainers' [of the old regime] and 
returning it to the Leviathan-State, after which the old 
history began again, engendering new 'retainers', giving 
rise to new revolutions, restoring the old 'Chineseness' 
[Kitaishchina].
We do not need Chineseness. Therefore we support the 
peasant movement only to the extent that it destroys 
the old order, but not to the extent that it strives 
to restore something in comparison with which thi| old 
order is itself a new and progressive phenomenon.
The differing Marxist schemas of Russian history outlined in this
chapter, that stressing the Western (universal) character of Russian
history, and that stressing its non-Western (particularistic) character,
were to become an integral feature of the clash between the Bolshevik and
Menshevik factions of Russian Social Democracy, and on a personal level of
the clash between Lenin and Plekhanov. Lenin's first meeting with Plekhanov
in 1895, was marked by an argument in which Lenin, as Plekhanov recalled,
...tried to convince me that feudalism in Russia was of 
the same kind as in the West. I replied that the 
similarity in this instance was no greater than that 
between the 'Russian Voltaire' - Sumarokov - and the 
genuine French Voltaire; but my arguments scarcely 
convinced my companion.2
The argument from history reached a peak at the Fourth Congress of 
the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. The controversy over the proposals for nationalis­
ation of land which came to a head at the Congress, was essentially an 
argument between those who viewed Russian history in terms of West
Plekhanov, 'K agrarnomu voprosu v Rossii', loc.cit., p. 36. Cf. Trotsky, 
and also the supporters of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production 
during the discussions of 1925-1931 cited in Chapter Two.
2 Em. Gazganov, 'Istoricheskie vzgliady G.V. Plekhanova',
Vol. 7, 1928, p. 110.
Istorik Marksist
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E uropean  c a t e g o r i e s  arid t h o s e  who v iew ed  i t  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  i n  te rras  o f  
th e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The fo rm e r ,  su c h  as L e n in ,  drew th e  c o n ­
c l u s i o n  t h a t  f e u d a l  v e s t i g e s  w ere  t h e  main enemy and t h a t  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
was ti ie  means o f  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e s e  once  and  f o r  a l l .  The l a t t e r ,  i n c l u d i n g  
P le k h a n o v ,  M artov  and M artynov , saw t h e  c e n t r a l i s e d  a u t o c r a t i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
th e  R u s s ia n  s t a t e  as  th e  m ain  enemy, and r e g a r d e d  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  a s  t h e  
r e v i v a l  o f  t h e  o l d  s t a t e  m onopoly o v e r  t h e  l a n d ,  t h e  c o r n e r s t o n e  o f  t h e  
w h o le  d e s p o t i c  s y s te m  R u s s i a  h a d  s u f f e r e d  u n d e r .
The p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l  d e b a t e  was l a t e r  
sum m arised  by a  S o v i e t  spokesm an as  f o l l o w s :
. . . A t  t h e  F o u r th  (U n ity )  C o n g re ss  i n  S to c k h o lm , L e n in  r a i s e d  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  P le k h a n o v  was a t t e m p t i n g  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  t h e  M enshevik  c o n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  r e v o l u t i o n  
o u t  o f  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  ' A s i a t i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f  R u s s ia n  
d e s p o t i s m '  and o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  commune. I f  Marx and E n g e ls  
r e a l l y  to o k  th e  v i e w p o in t  o f  ac k n o w led g in g  an ' A s i a t i c '  mode 
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  R u s s i a ,  t h e n  i t  was n o t  L e n in  who was r i g h t  
as  we have  t h o u g h t  and  b e l i e v e d  up t i l l  now, b u t  P le k h a n o v :  
i t  was M enshevism t h a t  was r i g h t ,  and  n o t  B o l s h e v is m ! 1
An e x t r e m e l y  dam aging  a d m is s io n  as  we h av e  s e e n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
At t h e  c o n g r e s s ,  P le k h a n o v  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  l a n d  so
e n e r g e t i c a l l y  a d v o c a te d  by t h e  B o l s h e v ik s  as  t h e  econom ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
w h ich  R u s s i a  h a d ,  f o r  much o f  i t s  h i s t o r y ,  s h a r e d  i n  common w i t h  A s ia :
. . . T h e  a g r a r i a n  h i s t o r y  o f  R u s s i a  i s  more l i k e  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  
I n d i a ,  E g y p t ,  C h in a  and  o t h e r  E a s t e r n  d e s p o t i s m s  th a n  i t  i s  
l i k e  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  W e s te rn  E u ro p e .  T here  i s  n o t h in g  
s u r p r i s i n g  i n  t h i s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  e v e ry  
n a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  u n d e r  d i s t i n c t i v e  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .
W ith  us t h e  s i t u a t i o n  c o n s i s t e d  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l a n d  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  i t s  c u l t i v a t o r s  was bound  t o  th e  s t a t e ,  and  on 
th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  bondage  t h e r e  d e v e lo p e d  R u s s ia n  d e s p o t i s m .
I n  o r d e r  t o  s h a t t e r  d e s p o t i s m ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
i t s  econom ic  f o u n d a t i o n . 2
The M enshev ik  f a c t i o n  a t  t h e  C o n g re ss  f a v o u r e d  t h e  programme drawn up
A. P r i g o z h i n ,  'P ro b le m a  o b s h c h e s tv e n n y k h  f o r m a t s i i ' ,  Pod znamenem m arks i zm a , 
1930 , No. 7 -8 ,  p .  165.
2
G.V. P l e k h a n o v ,  Speech  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  M a s lo v 's  a g r a r i a n  program m e, d e l i v e r e d  
a t  t h e  F o u r th  C o n g re s s  o f  t h e  R .S .D .L .P . ,  i n  C h e t v e r t y i  ( o b ' e d i n i t e l ’n y i )  s ' e z d  
RSDRP: P r o t o k o l y , Moscow, G os . i z d .  p o l .  l i t . ,  1969, p .  59 .
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by P.P. Maslov for putting the distribution of land under the control of
municipal committees. These municipal committees would serve as a
concrete form in which to build up democracy from below and provide a
bulwark against the danger of restoration of the old order.^
The possibility of a restoration, such as that which occurred after
the French Revolution, was one that was heavily stressed by Plekhanov and
constituted an important element in the justification of the Menshevik
programme. The Bolsheviks argued that in fact the restoration in France
did not involve the restoration of feudalism - any attempt to confiscate
the land from the peasants and return it to the nobility would only have
succeeded in transforming the peasants once more from a reactionary into
2a revolutionary force and would hence have been self-defeating.
Martynov attempted to answer this argument of the Bolsheviks, albeit
in a manner which is rendered confusing by his rather loose employment of
the term 'feudal'. According to Martynov:
...The restoration of feudalism in our country would be 
impossible after the expropriation of pomeshchik land, 
if the basis of our feudalism consisted in pomeshchik 
agriculture. But the fact is that Russian feudalism is 
first and foremost state feudalism (sic.) It is formed 
on the basis of the enslavement of the nation by the 
state. And our pomeshchik landownership itself did not 
evolve out of a votchinnik (patrimonial) form of agri­
culture, but out of the service relationship of the 
pomeshchiki to the state. Therefore Plekhanov is right 
when he affirms that the principle of nationalisation 
would in no way change those economic relationships on 
the basis of which our Asiatic despotic structure grew 
up... 3
Plekhanov*s own defence of his propositions concerning the possibility 
of restoration and the consequent dangers of nationalisation was considerably 
more fluent:
See for example P.P. Maslov, (using the pseudonym John), Speech at the 
Fourth Congress, Protokoll}, op.cit., p. 57.
2 Matveev (Bazarov-Rudnev), Speech attacking Maslov's agrarian programme 
and Plekhanov's defence of it, Protokoly, op.cit., pp. 92-93.
A. Martynov, Speech on the agrarian question, Protokoll}, op.cit., p. 111.3
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...One comrade in answer to me has said: 'but in France
the restoration did not bring back the old order.' To 
this Comrade Martynov has already replied, to the effect 
that such an argument is untenable. The restoration did 
not bring back the vestiges of feudalism, so much is true.
But that which corresponds to these vestiges in our 
country is our old bondage of the land and its cultivators 
to the state, our old peculiar nationalisation of the land.
In the event of a restoration here, it would be that much 
easier to bring back this nationalisation as you yourselves 
demand the nationalisation of land, and as you remain unconcerned 
that this is a legacy of our old half-Asiatic order.
Besides which, it is generally known that the land belonging 
to the aristocrats which was not distributed in France during 
the revolutionary period, the land which remained in the hands 
of the state, was returned to its old owners.^ Do you really 
want the same thing to happen in our country?
Lenin's sole concession to Plekhanov on this issue was to admit that
the only guarantee against restoration, whether nationalisation, municipal-
isation or distribution of the land were attempted, was the success of the
socialist revolution in the West. The petit-bourgeoisie (peasantry), he
argued, would inevitably desert the revolution once they had achieved their
limited goals, and small commodity production was the dominant mode of
production in Russia. However, such a restoration taking place in the
unlikely event of the failure of the socialist revolution in Europe, would
constitute not an Asiatic restoration ('A sheer absurdity in the epoch of
2capitalism') but a restoration of capitalism.
The debate between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks over national­
isation consisted largely in the participants firing right past each other's 
heads. As seen, this was because their assumptions about Russian history 
and its political lessons were diametrically opposed.
The Mensheviks feared that, as before, revolution would come from 
above, the state would continue to monopolise political and economic 
initiative, and socialism in the Western sense of the word would disappear
G.V. Plekhanov, Concluding speech on the agrarian question, Protokoll], 
op.cit., pp. 140-141.
2 Lenin, Concluding speech on the agrarian question, Protokoly, op.cit 
p. 127; Report on the Unity Congress of the RSDLP (A letter to the St. 
Petersburg Workers) (first pub. 1906), Collected Works, Vol. 10, pp. 331-335.
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^on. They believed that the consolidation of Westernisation 
- f■ 1 prelude to socialism - a period of bourgeois liberalism 
he devolution of initiative from the state apparatus to the 
, . ,/ioome possible.
£ concept of Asiatic restoration was to be taken up in
t in his critique of Bolshevik policies. Martov wrote that
/,/ regime was merely continuing a bureaucratic dictatorship
, lrK ' c:romisation of the masses', and that it was acting to intensify
that atomisation - or 'incapacity for organised collective
,1 *./' h  Instead of socialism the Bolsheviks had brought about
2,,f Russia's 'monstrous system of Asiatic government.'
- ji-s' a-,nv and the Mensheviks in general the only way forward 
to through acquiring at least the latter phases of West 
dev'eLoument. Plekhanov, like Marx, believed that non-Western forms 
vere in themselves static, and incapable of giving rise to 
vages r.f development. Hence the historical convergence of paths 
'roero under the standardising influence of world capitalism was 
• -isary r.rerequisite of socialism, which would similarly be of a 
tern, and universal nature.
' :' in a Non-Western Milieu: Trotsky on Russia's Fast and Present.
' \r> te-onc but Plekhanov has applied Marx's concept of the Asiatic 
‘ :c*nr on to Russian history systematically, other Marxists have
' ’uiktatura i demokratiia, ' Za god, p. 30, quoted in I. Getzler,
* - v o e  U.P.* 1967, p. 186.
no A.N. Stein, 26 June 1920, quoted in I. Getzler, Martov,
' f* •
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concerned themselves with the special character of Russia's historical 
development sind the so-called 'Asiatic' features of this development. One 
such Marxist was L.D. Trotsky, who never wrote a full-length account of 
pre-Revolutionary Russia, but provided a number of sketches intended to 
throw light on the way the revolution might develop there.
Trotsky, like Plekhanov, borrowed a great deal from the service- 
state historians. Unlike Plekhanov, Trotsky never directly referred to 
Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, although he echoed it 
very closely at times. He commented, for example, on the effects of the 
state appropriation of surplus value in hampering the process of social 
crystallisation and the development of privileged classes.^ He did not go 
on from there, however, to a theory of the non-dynamic nature of such a 
system of state appropriation, as did Marx and Engels. In part this 
might be expected, as Trotsky by contrast with Marx and Plekhanov, viewed 
the peculiarities of non-Westem history as giving rise to non-Westem 
forms of revolutionary development.
The peculiarities of Russian history Trotsky attributed to the same 
kind of geographical and external factors as had seemed operative to 
Plekhanov. Indeed Trotsky brought into his explanation an additional 
geographical factor - the climate - which Plekhanov did not use except to 
explain the low level of productivity in the North-East. According to 
Trotsky, the long Russian winter, with its enforced respite from agricult­
ural labour, meant that manufacturing industry remained in the status of 
of an auxiliary to agricultural labour for far longer than in the West, 
where it became concentrated in the towns and more specialised in character. 
Hence the climate was at least partially responsible for the underdeveloped
Leon Trotsky, Results and Prospects in The Permanent Revolution and 
Results and Prospects, N.Y., Pioneer Publishers, 1965, p. 171.
2 Ibid., 179-180.
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character of the division of labour in this basic sphere of social life.
Trotsky also shared with Plekhanov an awareness of the problems 
raised for Marxist historiography by the large role they both attributed 
to external factors in the development of the Russian state. Trotsky 
wrote:
...It is difficult to say what shape Russian social 
development would have taken if it had remained isolated 
and under the influence of inner tendencies only. It 
is enough to say that this did not happen. Russian 
social life, built up on a certain internal economic 
foundation, has all the time been under the influence, 
even under the pressure of its external social-historical 
milieu.
As we have seen, Plekhanov argued that external factors had been a 
formative influence on Russian history. The constant pressure from the 
Tatars, in combination with the (geographically determined) low level of 
internal development, resulted in the defensive creation of a despotic 
system in Russia. As pointed out before, Plekhanov employed a theory of 
uneven development to account for the military superiority of the Tatars 
over an economically more advanced nation, and their corresponding large 
impact.
Plekhanov had then gone on to argue that external factors had played 
an even greater role in Russia than in other countries subject to the 
threat of nomadic incursions, because of the simultaneous threat from 
neighbours to the West who were at a higher level of development. However, 
external pressure not only gave rise to the ’Asiatic' system of centralised 
control over economic resources within Russia, but also, in the form of the 
threat from the West, provided the stimulus for the eventual development 
beyond this system. The Russian government had been forced to set in train 
the development of a more dynamic economic system in order to compete with 
the economic and military might of the West.
1 Ibid., p. 170.
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Trotsky's exposition of the role of external factors in Russian
history bypassed the problem (for Marxist historiography) tackled by
Plekhanov, the problem how a nation at a lower level of economic development
could influence the internal evolution of a nation at a higher level of
economic development. Trotsky explained the apparently large role played
by external factors in the inner development of Russia as follows:
external factors were of greater importance in Russia than in Marx's general
model of social development because the latter was extrapolated from the
development of the Western European nations. The countries of Western
Europe, in their mutual struggle for existence, depended on more or less
identical economic bases. Russia, however, in its struggle for existence,
had to contend with nations on a much higher level of development than
its own.'*' For this reason the 'normal' tendencies of internal economic
and social development were to a large degree superseded by the need for
the state to appropriate a disproportionately large part of the surplus 
2product.
Not only did the Russian state, under external pressure, consume a
comparatively large share of the surplus value, but it also attempted to
accelerate economic development from above, and to force the development of
3social differentiation on a primitive economic foundation. Thus while, as 
a result of extreme external pressures,the state structure in Russia was 
quite different from the state structures found in the West, it was also 
the agent which imported aspects of Western economic development into 
Russia.
Trotsky not only accepted Plekhanov's general thesis, that with Russia 
geography was destiny, but he also followed Plekhanov's morphology of
1
2
3
Ibid., p. 171. 
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 173.
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Russian history. He wrote that:
...She [Russia] was marked off from the European West, 
but also from the Asiatic East, approaching at different 
periods and in different features now one, now the other,..
Russia was unable to settle in the forms of the East 
because she was continually having to adapt herself to 
military and economic pressure from the West.l
Elsewhere Trotsky described Russia's class system as being somewhere
between the European situation where economic classes were strongly
developed and the Asiatic system where they were extremely weakly developed,
if at all (cf. Kliuchevsky).
It was not the equilibrium of the economically dominant 
classes, as in the West, but their weakness which made 
Russian bureaucratic autocracy a self-contained organ­
ization. In this respect Tsarism represents an intermediate 
form between European absolutism and Asia despotism, 
being, possibly, closer to the latter of these two. 2
Both Trotsky and Plekhanov paid lip-service to the notion that
Russia had gone through a feudal stage. For Plekhanov, Kievan Rus was in
many respects a feudal society, although he pointed to the underlying
features which distinguished it from Western Europeaai feudalism and which
paved the way for the subsequent emergence of an 'Asiatic' socio-economic
formation under Muscovite direction. Trotsky applied the term 'feudalism'
also to the post-Kievan period of Russian history - he was never to
acknowledge the Asiatic system as an autonomous socio-economic formation -
but he admitted that certain features which made feudalism a dynamic system
in the West were absent in Russia. He wrote that:
...The existence of feudal relations in Russia, denied by 
former historians, may be considered unconditionally 
established by later investigation.-^ Furthermore, the 
fundamental elements of Russian feudalism were the same as 
in the West. But the mere fact that the existence of the
Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, op.cit., Vol. I, 
p. 24.
2 Leon Trotsky, 1905, tr. from the July 1922 Russian ed. by Anya Bostok, 
London, Allen Lane, 1972, p. 8.
3 See the section 'Russian History in European Dress' above.
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feudal epoch had to be established by means of extended 
scientific arguments sufficiently testifies to the 
incompleteness of Russian feudalism, its formlessness, 
its poverty of cultural monuments.^
Trotsky came to view the absence of the Occidental city as the most 
important single feature distinguishing Russian 'feudalism' from Western 
European feudalism. Plekhanov had somewhat neglected this subject in his 
otherwise much more comprehensive historical survey. While he had 
commented on the general political inertness of the Russian cities under 
Muscovite rule, and the absence of anything approaching the Western Europ­
ean urban corporations, his remarks were largely directed against those
who argued that 'the social role of the urban population of the North-East
2Rus is close to nil.' This was one area in which Plekhanov played down 
the specificity of the Russian historical process.
Trotsky, on the other hand, saw the non-Western nature of the old 
Russian city as the key to Russia's distinctive history. Indeed the non- 
Westem character of the Russian city was an intrinsic element in the theory 
of permanent revolution developed by Trotsky and Parvus in 1905. According 
to this theory, the democratic revolutions which had occurred in Europe 
had been inspired by the most radical class of the period, the urban petty- 
bourgeoisie. In Russia the urban environment which might have nurtured 
such a class had been lacking ('Our cities are mere government fantasies' 
Ogarev had written in Kolokol). Therefore the task of accomplishing the 
belated democratic revolution,as well as the socialist revolution, had 
devolved upon the proletariat.
It was Parvus (Alexander Helphand) who first enunciated the signifi­
cance of the absence of the Occidental type of city for the development of 
the Russian revolution,and he did so in his preface to Trotsky's pamphlet 
'Until the Ninth of January', written in January 1905. As Trotsky was later
1
2
Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 24 
Plekhanov, History, p. 88.
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to write:
...The preface Parvus then wrote to the pamphlet entered 
permanently into the history of the Russian Revolution.
In a few pages he shed light on these social peculiarities 
of backward Russia which, true enough, were already well 
known, but from which no-one before him had drawn all the 
necessary inferences.^
What Parvus had said in his preface was as follows:
...In Russia, the cities in the pre-capitalist peric veloped 
more according to the Chinese than the European mode;. Thus 
they were administrative centres, bearing a purely official 
character and without the least political significance,* 2 34
while in the economic sense they were trade bazaars for the 
surrounding landlord and peasant environment. Their 
development was still very insignificant when it was termin­
ated by the capitalist process which began to create large 
cities after its own pattern, i.e., factory towns and centres 
of world trade. As a result in Russia there was a capitalist 
bourgeoisie, but there was not that petty-bourgeoisie, which 
provided the source and support for the revival of political 
democracy in Western Europe.3
The Trotsky/Parvus theory of permanent revolution indeed appears to
give even more weight to the political role of the urban petty-bourgeoisie
in the democratic revolutions of Western Europe than did Marx, who tended
to talk in more general terms of the bourgeois character of these revol- 
4utions. Trotsky wrote that 'It was precisely the craftsman class that 
constituted the bulk of the population in the most revolutionary quarters
Leon Trotski (sic), Stalin, tr. and ed. Charles Malamuth, London, Hollis 
and Carter, 1947, Appendix: 'Three Concepts of the Russian Revolution,'
p. 430.
2 Cf. Trotsky: 'The majority of our old towns played hardly any economic
role; they were military and administrative centres or fortresses, their 
inhabitants were employed in one or another form of State service and lived 
at the expense of the exchequer, and in general the city was an administrat­
ive, military and tax-collecting centre.... Thus, the Russian towns, like 
the towns under the Asiatic despotisms, and in contrast to the craft and 
trading towns of the European Middle Ages, played only the role of consumers 
(Results and Prospects, in The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects, 
op.cit., p. 179.)
3 Parvus, preface to N. Trotsky, Do deviatogo ianvaria, Geneva, R.S.D.L.P., 
1905, pp. v-vi.
4 Trotsky and Parvus drew chiefly on Marx's analysis of the petty-bourgeois 
base of the democratic parties of 1848 for their authority (Marx and Engels, 
Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, March 1850, MESW, 
Vol. I, pp. 98-108.)
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o f  P a r i s  d u r i n g  th e  G r e a t  R e v o l u t i o n ^  I t  was a l s o  t h e  ' s t u r d y  a r t i s a n s
2
and  in d e p e n d e n t  p e a s a n t s '  who p r o v id e d  t h e  b u lk  o f  C ro m w e l l 's  army.
The im m ed ia te  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  s t r e s s  on t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s i e  
was t h a t  T r o t s k y  and  P a rv u s  w ere  s e e k i n g  a s o c i o l o g i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  why 
t h e  l i b e r a l  d e m o c r a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n  as  su c h  h a d  n o t  s u c c e e d e d  and c o u ld  n o t  
s u c c e e d  i n  R u s s i a ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  a  c a p i t a l i s t  b o u r g e o i s i e .
They w is h e d  t o  r e l a t e  t h i s  f a i l u r e  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  
o f  1905) t o  t h e  i n t e r n a l  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  R u s s ia n  s o c i e t y ,  a s  w e l l  as  t o  t h e  
u n f a v o u r a b le  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .
On t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n
i n  R u s s i a  c o u ld  be e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  ' f a c t '  t h a t  t h e  b o u r g e o i s i e  i n  g e n e r a l
had .b eco m e  a r e a c t i o n a r y  e le m e n t  s u p p o r t i n g  ' l a w  and  o r d e r ' .  A c c o rd in g  t o
P a r v u s '  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  R u s s ia n  a u to c r a c y  h a d  o n ly  f o s t e r e d  th e
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a n a t i v e  c a p i t a l i s t  b o u r g e o i s i e  when t h i s  c l a s s  h a d  lo n g
s i n c e  c e a s e d  t o  be  i n  any s e n s e  a r a d i c a l  f o r c e  i n  E u ro p e ,  and  h a d  become
as  a c l a s s  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  d e f e n d e r  o f  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and o f  t h e  s t r e n g t h e n -
3
in g  o f  gov e rn m en t  p o w e rs .  The R u s s ia n  c a p i t a l i s t  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  as t h e  
c a d e t  b r a n c h  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  a l r e a d y  e m b a t t l e d  by  th e  r i s e  
o f  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  as a  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e ,  was i t s e l f  d r a i n e d  o f  any r e v o l u t ­
i o n a r y  p o t e n t i a l .
T r o ts k y  i n  h i s  w r i t i n g s  was t o  c o n f i rm  and e x p an d  P a r v u s '  a n a l y s i s  o f  
why t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  i t s  c l a s s i c a l  form  was doomed t o  f a i l  i n  
R u s s i a .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  as  m e n t io n e d ,  he  to o k  up P a r v u s ' i d e a s  on th e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  town and  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  a  r a d i c a l  u rb a n  t h i r d  e s t a t e .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  he  w r o te  t h a t :
Leon T r o t s k y ,  R e s u l t s  and P r o s p e c t s  i n  The Permanent  R e v o l u t i o n  and R e s u l t s  
and P r o s p e c t s ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  180.
2
Leon T r o t s k y ,  The H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  R u ss ian  R e v o l u t i o n ,  o p . c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  
p .  32.
P a r v u s ,  R o s s i i a  i  r e v o l i u t s i i a ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  109.
3
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. . . T h e  m ea g ren e ss  n o t  o n ly  o f  R u s s ia n  f e u d a l i s m ,  b u t  o f  
a l l  t h e  o l d  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r y ,  f i n d s  i t s  m o st  d e p r e s s i n g  
e x p r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  r e a l  m e d ie v a l  c i t i e s  as 
c e n t r e s  o f  commerce and c r a f t .  H a n d i c r a f t  d i d  n o t  
s u c c e e d  i n  R u s s i a  i n  s e p a r a t i n g  i t s e l f  f rom  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  
b u t  p r e s e r v e d  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  o f  home i n d u s t r y .  The o l d  
R u s s ia n  c i t i e s  w ere  c o m m e rc ia l ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ,  m i l i t a r y  
and m a n o r i a l  - ^ c e n t r e s  o f  c o n su m p t io n ,  c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  n o t  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n .
He d e s c r i b e d  t h e  l a c k  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r y  as  b r i n g i n g  R u s s i a
' n e a r e r  t o  I n d i a  th a n  t o  E u ro p e ,  j u s t  a s  o u r  m e d ie v a l  c i t i e s  w ere  n e a r e r  t o
t h e  A s i a t i c  t h a n  th e  E u ropean  t y p e ,  and  as  o u r  a u t o c r a c y ,  s t a n d i n g  b e tw e en
t h e  E u ropean  a b s o l u t i s m  and  t h e  A s i a t i c  d e s p o t i s m ,  i n  many f e a t u r e s
2
a p p ro a c h e d  th e  l a t t e r . 1 23
A c c o rd in g  t o  T r o t s k y ,  c o n te m p o ra ry  R u s s ia n  h i s t o r y  c o u ld  l a r g e l y  be
u n d e r s t o o d  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  u rb a n  c r a f t  i n d u s t r y ,  and  c r a f t  g u i l d s .  I n  W este rn  E u ro p e :
. . . g u i l d  c r a f t  was t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  m e d ie v a l  c i t y  c u l t u r e ,  
w h ich  r a d i a t e d  a l s o  i n t o  t h e  v i l l a g e .  M e d ie v a l  s c i e n c e ,  
s c h o l a s t i c i s m ,  r e l i g i o u s  r e f o r m a t i o n ,  grew o u t  o f  a 
c r a f t - g u i l d  s o i l .  We d i d  n o t  have  t h e s e  t h i n g s .  Of 
c o u r s e  t h e  embryo symptom s, t h e  s i g n s  can  b e  fo u n d ,  b u t  
i n  t h e  W est t h e s e  t h i n g s  w ere  n o t  s i g n s  b u t  p o w e r fu l  
c u l t u r a l  econom ic  f o r m a t i o n s  w i t h  a  c r a f t - g u i l d  b a s e .
I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  a  c r a f t - g u i l d  b a s e ,  i n d u s t r i a l  dem ocracy  was
u n a b le  t o  e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  i n  R u s s ia n  c i t i e s  and  s p i l l  o v e r  i n t o  p o l i t i c a l
r e v o l u t i o n .  T r o t s k y  com pared  th e  Pugachev  r e b e l l i o n  w i t h  t h e  F re n ch
r e v o l u t i o n  w h ich  to o k  p l a c e  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  l a t e r .  The P ug ach ev  r e b e l l i o n
was u n a b le  t o  t r a n s c e n d  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  as  a p o p u l a r  u p r i s i n g  and  become a
r e v o l u t i o n  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  f a t a l  l a c k  o f  a  t h i r d  e s t a t e .  'W i th o u t  th e
i n d u s t r i a l  dem ocracy  o f  t h e  c i t i e s  a  p e a s a n t  w ar  c o u ld  n o t  d e v e lo p  i n t o
a  r e v o l u t i o n ,  j u s t  a s  t h e  p e a s a n t  s e c t s  c o u ld  n o t  r i s e  t o  t h e  h e i g h t  o f  a  
4R e f o r m a t i o n . '
Leon T r o t s k y ,  The H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  R u ss ian  R e v o l u t i o n f o p . c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .2 7
2
I b i d . ,  A ppend ix  I ,  p .  472 .
3 I b i d . , p .  473 .
I b i d . f  p .  28 .4
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In Trotsky's eyes, the absence of the Occidental form of city in 
Asia and 'Ancient Russia' meant that history there took on a cyclical 
pattern rather than the progressive pattern found in Western Europe.
Peasant revolts which took place without the benefit of a radical urban 
element only succeeded in establishing a new cycle of the old order. The 
peasantry on their own were incapable of initiating a new political order 
because they did not represent a new form of production and culture.
On the other hand, in Europe peasant revolts did contribute to social 
progress because 'beginning with the emergence of the Middle Ages, each 
victorious peasant uprising did not place a peasant government in power 
but a Leftist burgher party. More precisely, a peasant uprising proved 
victorious only to the extent that it managed to establish the position of 
the city population's revolutionary sector.'^  For Trotsky, it was the fact 
that a radical urban class had at last been formed in Russia, i.e. the 
proletariat, that made it possible for peasant Russia to break out of its 
old circularity and take a leap forward into socialism.
From his analysis of the peculiarities of Russian history, which in many 
respects resembled Plekhanov's analysis, Trotsky drew conclusions which 
were diametrically opposed to those of Plekhanov. Whereas Plekhanov stressed 
the need for Russia to turn her back on her non-Western past, Trotsky in 
effect argued that it could be utilised for a non-Western development into 
socialism. Plekhanov was a 'Westerner' who believed that socialism was 
the logical culmination of Western civilisation, and that the pre-condition 
of socialism was the acquisition of socio-political forms already existing in 
Western society. This included the need for a bourgeois-democratic period 
and the rise of a mass workers' movement to political maturity within it.
The contrast in positions was brought out sharply by Trotsky himself: 
'While the traditional view [e.g., that of Plekhanov] was that the road to the
Leon Trotski, Stalin, op.cit., Appendix: 'Three Concepts of the Russian
Revolution', p. 425.
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dictatorship of the proletariat led through a long period of democracy,
the theory of the permanent revolution [e.g. Trotsky's theory] established
the fact that for backward countries the road to democracy passed through
the dictatorship of the proletariat.'^
However, in spite of his radically different political stance, Trotsky
was to defend Plekhanov's historiography from those such as Pokrovsky who
attacked it in the name of orthodoxy, and who attempted to derive Plekhanov's
political 'errors' from his theoretical heterodoxy. Pokrovsky, guided by
his principle that 'history is the politics of the past', claimed,as we
have seen, that Plekhanov's historical analysis reflected an erroneous
political analysis of the contemporary Russian situation. And Pokrovsky
argued that conversely, because Plekhanov under-emphasised the role of
class struggle in Russian history, he was led into advocating co-operation
with the liberal bourgeoisie, and eventually into supporting 'defencist'
2policies. Trotsky's reply to Pokrovsky (who had correctly associated
3Trotsky's historiography with that of Plekhanov ) was as follows:
...Plekhanov quite rightly dismisses the schematic theories 
of both the doctrinaire 'Westemisers' and the Slavophil 
Narodniks on this subject, and instead, reduces Russia's 
'special nature' to the concrete, materially determined 
peculiarities of her historical development. It is radically 
false to claim that Plekhanov drew any compromising conclusions 
from this (in the sense of forming a bloc with the Kadets, etc.), 
or that he could have done so with any semblance of logic.4
Trotsky was convinced that Plekhanov's historical propositions were
Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects, op.cit.,
p. 8.
2 E.g. M.N. Pokrovsky, 'G.V. Plekhanov kak istorik Rossii', Pod znamenem 
marksizma, 1923, No. 6-7, pp. 5-18.
3 Pokrovsky's attack on Trotsky's historiography appeared in Krasnaia Nov', 
May-June, 1922.
4 Leon Trotsky, 'On the Special Features of Russia's Historical Develop­
ment: A Reply to M.N. Pokrovsky,' 1905, op.cit., pp. 331-332. This chapter
is a more complete version of Trotsky's answer to Pokrovsky than the version 
already cited which is attached as Appendix I to Trotsky's The History of 
the Russian Revolution, op.cit., Vol. I.
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correct, even if Plekhanov had failed to see that the peculiarities of 
Russian history would be carried forward into the socialist revolution, 
rather than being eliminated in a lengthy period of bourgeois democracy.
In fact socialism in Russia would be achieved in circumstances quite 
different from those prevailing in the West, because Russia possessed the 
‘advantages of backwardness.' Among such advantages Trotsky listed 'the 
absence of accumulated bourgeois-individualistic traditions and anti­
proletarian prejudice among the peasants and intellectuals', although at 
the same time he added the provision that 'this absence of prejudices is 
not due to political consciousness but to political barbarism, social 
formlessness, primitiveness and lack of character.'^
Trotsky was utterly opposed to the notion put forward by Marx in his
preface to the first edition of Capital - the notion that: 'The country
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the
2image of its own future.' On the contrary, Trotsky argued, the countries 
which stood outside the charmed circle in which industrialism had first 
flowered in Western Europe were destined to follow a very different pattern 
of industrial development. This was the pattern of 'combined development' 
both in the economic and socio-political spheres. The non-Western countries 
would skip over the intervening stages of development which had taken place 
in Western Europe and which in turn had become obstacles to the development 
of the socialist revolution in those countries. As Kautsky had said, the 
less advanced countries would quite likely take their place in the forefront 
of development, 'because they are not burdened with the ballast of tradition
Leon Trotsky, Results and Prospects, in The Permanent Revolution and 
Results and Prospects, op.cit., p. 208.
2 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 8-9. Trotsky's respectful criticism was that 
'Under no circumstances can this thought be taken literally.' See Leon 
Trotsky, Karl Marx, 3rd ed., London, Cassell, 1946, p. 40.
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which the older countries have to drag along . ..,1
The peculiarities of Russia's history already provided the clues for
Trotsky as to how the socialist revolution might develop there - i.e.,
the form appropriate to the special conditions prevailing. The 'immensely
important' role played by the state in Russia in introducing capitalist
relations foreshadowed the kind of role the state might play there in
2introducing a socialist economy.
Trotsky's analysis of how non-Western types of historical development 
give rise to non-Western forms of the industrialisation process has been 
amply confirmed by events. His ideas on how the integrative force of the 
world economy would eventually bring about, though by different paths, a 
universal type of socialism based on the Western European conception of it, 
have not been confirmed in the same way.
K. Kautsky, American and Russian Workers, quoted without specific 
reference in Leon Trotsky, Results and Prospects, in The Permanent Revolution 
and Results and Prospects, op.cit., p. 237.
2 Leon Trotsky, 1905, op.cit., p. 9.
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THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO THE MARXIST 
ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS AND MODERNISATION
5
... the Savage, Patriarchal, Barbarous, 
and Civilised forms of society are but 
the thorny paths, the ladders which are 
to lead us up to the social state which 
is the destiny of Man, and outside of 
which all the efforts of the best rulers 
are unable in any way to remedy the ills 
of mankind.
Charles Fourier
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the implications of the 
concept of the Asiatic mode of production for the so-called 'stage theory' 
of history as found in historical materialism and to an examination of the 
way in which these implications have been gradually absorbed, or at least 
recognised, in Marxist historiography since the re-opening of the debate.
The Unilinear Schema of Social Development.
Before 1964 historical materialism was generally interpreted to mean 
that history displayed a single sequence of universally occurring stages of 
social development, each of them corresponding to a different stage in 
the development of productive forces. The immanent logic of the develop­
ment of material production was taken to be such that each stage of the 
succession would appear, unveil its inner contradictions, and give rise 
to the next, higher phase of economic production and social development. 
According to this law of social development, the same pattern or sequence 
of stages would be found in the history of any given society.
This interpretation of historical materialism, which never fitted at 
all well with the details of Marx's examination of history, stemmed largely 
from two of Marx's more programmatic pieces of writing. The first of 
these is the Communist Manifesto, which like the German Ideology, bears 
witness to the influence of Fourier's stadial analysis of human history.
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The second is the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy. In his Preface Marx wrote:
...In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and 
modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated 
as epochs marking progress in the economic development 
of society.1 234
This passage has been the subject of some controversy, particularly in 
2recent years, but it has also served as the primary authority for the 
unilinear conception of human history.
Apart from these sources, the works of Engels, particularly in the 
period after he wrote Anti-Dühring, contributed much towards the establish­
ment of the unilinear schema as dogma. Statements such as the following
assisted in the process: 'Without the slavery of antiquity, no modern
3socialism'. Engels also believed, with Marx, that:
...to accomplish this [modern socialism] we need not only 
the proletariat, which carries out the revolution, but 
also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces 
of society have developed to such a stage that they permit 
the final elimination of all class distinctions.... The 
bourgeoisie is consequently equally as necessary a pre­
condition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat 
itself.4
The tendency was to take this to mean that a full sequence of Western 
social stages was necessary for the eventual creation of socialism, and 
that there were no alternative routes.
Engels was also largely responsible for the adoption into Marxist 
theory of Morgan's anthropological system. Morgan's system minimised the 
significance of external influence on the internal development of human
Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
tr. S.W. Ryazanskaya, Moscow, Progress, 1970, p. 21.
2 See the section below entitled 'Chronological and Logical Problems 
Presented by the Stadial Analysis of World History'.
3 Engels, Anti-Dühring, tr. E. Burns, London, Lawrence and Wishart, n.d. 
(reprinted with minor revisions from the 1934 ed.), p. 203.
4 Engels, 'Russia and the Social Revolution', (originally published as 
'Soziales aus Russland', in Der Volksstaat, Leipzig, 21 April 1875), The 
Russian Menace to Europe, p. 205.
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societies, and hence reinforced the notion that social development 
progressed according to certain iron laws of its own, through a given 
sequence of necessary stages up to the socialist one.
The tendency to promulgate fixed laws of social development was 
linked with the more general tendency, also begun under the aegis of 
Engels, to transform Marxism into a 'science of society'. In its guise 
as a science of society, historical materialism was of great symbolic 
value to the European labour movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.^ It was the ideological buttress of the socialist parties, in 
so far as it demonstrated the 'objective necessity' of their cause; it 
had the further function, however, of assisting in the substitution of the 
party for the masses, as the repository of socialist consciousness. If 
historical materialism was a science it was more likely to be mastered 
by the scientists (i.e. the party theorists) than by the masses. The 
implication was drawn that the masses could never achieve class- 
consciousness spontaneously, even in the course of bitter class struggle; 
rather, they required the mediation of the party.
The diagram repeated below from Chapter Three represents the stage 
theory of 'vulgar' or institutionalised historical materialism, and is 
largely derived from the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy.
As recognised for example by Karl Kautsky in his Der Weg Zur Macht, 
Berlin, Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1909, passim. This organisational function 
of Marxist theory differed from the symbolic functions attributed by Georges 
Sorel to Marx's formulae of class struggle and revolutionary apocalypse.
For Sorel the latter formulae were the kernel of Marxism, in so far as they 
served to insulate the proletarian movement and its revolutionary purity 
from the corrupting influences of bourgeois society. (See Georges Sorel, 
Reflections on Violence and the Decomposition of Marxism.)
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THE UNILINEAR SCHEMA
Primitive Agricultural Community
Asiatic Mode of Production*
V'
Slavery
V
Feudalism
\kCapitalism
N/
Socialism
*Frequently omitted
The difficulties incurred in trying to fit what Marx conceived of 
as a geographically-specific mode of production, i.e., the Asiatic, into 
a universal schema of social development have been so formidable that they 
have frequently been resolved modo tatarico, as Wittfogel puts it, by 
simply cutting this socio-economic formation out of the schema. It was 
quite logical for this to happen in Lenin's influential lecture on The 
State, published for the first time in 1929, as Lenin was following closely 
Engels' Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. A more 
glaring example of deliberate extrusion may be found in the 1938 History 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course, where the
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unilinear schema from Marx's Preface is reproduced exactly, with the 
single omission of the reference to the Asiatic mode of production.^"
The concept of the Asiatic mode of production as a socio-economic form­
ation was, as we have seen in Chapter Two, virtually banned in the Soviet 
Union in 1931, for a variety of political reasons. In 1933 the view then 
held by V.V. Struve (after some vacillations), that the ancient Eastern 
civilisations belonged to the slavery formation, was officially adopted, and 
is still influential today. Struve has strongly supported the unilinear 
schema, and eliminated Marx's notion of an endlessly self-perpetuating 
Asiatic mode of production by ascribing a slave stage to the ancient East, 
and a feudal stage to the medieval East. Struve does admit that the slave 
stage in the ancient East was marked by some peculiarities, such as the 
existence of rural communities, from which tribute was exacted, but he
describes this as a transient survival of the tribute paid to the military
2aristocracy in patriarchal tribal societies. The more important form of
exploitation in these societies (because it represented a higher stage of
historical development) was, according to Struve, the exploitation of slaves
in the non-agricultural sector by the state (using the revenue collected
from the rural communities for their upkeep). Hence of the two forms of
exploitation present in the societies of the ancient East, the slave form
3provided the 'determining element' and the defining characteristic. Struve 
does not here regard the distinction between private slave-owners employing 
slaves chiefly for the purposes of primary production in a largely commodity 
based economy, and the state employing artisans and domestic slaves out of 
its tax revenue from rural communities in a predominantly natural economy, 
as an important distinction implying different modes of production. Further 
more Struve completely overlooks the point that Marx believed the character
Short History of the C.P.S.U., Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1939, p. 110.
2 See Vassili Strouve [Struve], 'Comment Marx definissait les premieres 
societies de classes', Recherches internationales h la lumiere du marxisme 
No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 1967), pp. 93-94. This article, widely quoted by 
Soviet scholars, first appeared in Sovetskaia Etnografiia, 1940, No. 3.
3 P*
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o f  3- s o c i o  sconom ic  f o r m a t io n  to  be  do t o r  mi n s  <3. by t h a t  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
fo u n d  i n  i t  w h ich  p r o d u c e s  t h e  b u lk  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s u r p l u s .  B ecause  o f  t h e  
v i r t u e  'd i s a p p e a ra n c e  o f  p r o t a g o n i s t s  o f  t h e  A s i a t i c  mode, S t r u v e ' s  p a s t  
p o l e m ic s  on th e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  a n c i e n t  E a s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s  w ere  m a in ly  
d i r e c t e d  - g a i n s t  t h o s e  who w is h e d  t o  e x t e n d  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  f e u d a l i s m  t o  t h e s e  
s o c i e t i e s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  ' a t t a c h m e n t '  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t s  t o  th e  s o i l ,  t h u s  
n e g l e c t i n g ,  he  a r g u e d ,  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s e q u e n c e  ' s l a v e r y ,  f e u d a l i s m '  and r e p l a c ­
i n g  i t  w i th  th e  s e q u e n c e  ' f e u d a l i s m ,  s l a v e r y '  a s  d i d  th e  'b o u r g e o i s  h i s t o r i a n s  
o f  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t  e p o c h ' . ' 1 2' Such p ro b le m s  w ou ld  c l e a r l y  be a v o id e d  i f  one 
a l lo w e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r m a t io n  w h ich  encom passed  b o th  th e  
a t t a c h m e n t  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t s  t o  t h e  s o i l ,  and s t a t e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  n o n - a g r i c u l t -  
u r a l  s e c t o r .  S t r u v e ,  how ever ,  h a s  b e e n  r e l u c t a n t  t o  concede  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
su c h  an a l t e r n a t i v e  p a t h  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  o r  i n d e e d  th e  concede  any
n o t i o n  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  p l u r a l i t y  t h a t  m ig h t  d e t r a c t  from  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a
2
' u n i t a r y  w o r ld  h i s t o r y ' .
The p o s t - S t a l i n i s t  t e x tb o o k  Fundam entals  o f  M arx ism -L enin ism  (1961) f a i t h ­
f u l l y  p r e s e r v e s  t h e  f i v e - s t a g e  S t a l i n i s t  schem a, d e s p i t e  t h e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t :
. . . H i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m  does  n o t  im pose  p r e c o n c e iv e d  
p a t t e r n s  on h i s t o r y  and does  n o t  a d a p t  th e  e v e n t s  o f  p a s t  
and p r e s e n t  t o  f i t  i t s  own c o n c l u s i o n s . 3 4
The K uus inen  t e x tb o o k  o u t l i n e s  t h e  f o u r  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  f o r m a t io n s  w hich  m ankind 
p a s s e s  th ro u g h  b e f o r e  a c h i e v i n g  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  s t a g e  t o  communism ( i . e . ,  s o c i a l ­
ism) , and t h e s e  e x c lu d e  th e  A s i a t i c  f o r m a t i o n . ^
A n o th e r  m ethod o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e
I b i d . ,  p .  97 .  O th e r  S o v i e t  h i s t o r i a n s  e x te n d e d  t h e  sc o p e  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
f e u d a l i s m  so  f a r  as  t o  a b s o rb  c o m p le te ly  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a  s l a v e - b a s e d  mode o f  
p r o d u c t i o n .  F o r  a  r e c e n t  exam ple, s e e  Iu .M . K o b ish c h an o v  who d e f i n e s  f e u d a l i s m  
a s  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  p e t t y  p r o d u c e r s  i n  a  n a t u r a l  economy by n o n -eco n o m ic  
means (as  o p p o se d  t o  t h e  econom ic  means em ployed  i n  an ex ch an g e  econom y), and 
c la im s  t h a t  s l a v e r y  i s  m e re ly  a s t r u c t u r e  t o  be  fo u n d  w i t h i n  la te -c o m m u n a l  
s o c i e t y ,  f e u d a l  s o c i e t y  o r  e v en  c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t y .  ( Iu .M . K o b i s h c h a n o v , ' F e o d a l -  
izm , r a b s t v o  i  a z i a t s k i i  s p o so b  p r o i z v o d s t v a ' , i n  G .F . Kim, V.N. N i k i f o r o v  
e t  a l . e d . ,  Obshchee i  o soben n oe  v  i s t o r i c h e s k o m  r a z v i t i i  s t r a n  V o s to k a ,
Moscow, I z d . 'N a u k a ' ,  1966, p p .  4 2 - 4 7 . )
2 V a s s i l i  S t ro u v e  [ S t r u v e ] ,  'L e  c o n c e p t  de M .P .A .:  l d g i t i m i t e  e t  l i m i t e s '
( f i r s t  p u b l i s h e d  i n  Narody A z i i  i  A f r i k i ,  1965, No. 1 ) ,  R ech erch es  i n t e r n a t i o n ­
a l e s  a l a  lu m ie r e  du m arx ism e,  No. 57 -5 8  ( J a n . - A p r i l  1 9 6 7 ) ,  p .  238.
3
O.W. K u us inen  e d . , Fundam entals o f  M arx ism -L en in ism , Moscow, F o r e ig n  
L anguages  P u b l i s h i n g  H ouse , 1961, p .  154 .
4_____ V h i  a Y~\Y-\
2 2 5
C O n ^ x f  o £  { W  u .ta J co ecu - S e W e ^ c -c ,  rn o re  C c ^ ^ c n  9 ^ c e .  I 7 t l +  h c i s .
e^Or-\ \-c  ci\. l>-vAe_ "V^  Coiact p^  j'f Kae Idsuvk c yv\tclt c'C prcc^c,’fit,*-, ih Suc^ v a
^ a e ^ o , ^ ' ^ kVl^ UV ajsp^ r -f© be p / ^ u O l t  exs a ^ i ^ f e s  o C  ~  p r w , U (  a m u c - W  s ^ c
. 3*^ - Ha«l re pf Vue Cft5C ucss (.©*-> c f  (Ut l%u^-4«lc yu_ccV-e p rc</>-«:-KL  ^ »V» -fl^e
S o v i e t  Union was s i g n a l l e d  by  th e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  E. V a r g a 's  Ocherk i  po
problemam p o l i t e k o n o m i i  k a p i t a l i z m a  w h ich  c o n t a i n e d  an e s s a y  on t h e  s u b j e c t .  
D i s c u s s i o n s  w ere  h e l d  i n  t h e  (Academy o f  S c i e n c e s )  I n s t i t u t e  o f  P h i lo s o p h y  
i n  December 1964, i n  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  H i s t o r y  on th e  5 t h ,  1 2 th  and  1 6 th  
March 1965, and  i n  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  t h e  P e o p le s  o f  A s i a  on th e  2 7 th  and 
2 8 th  o f  May, 1 9 6 5 .1 M eanw hile  t h e  F re n c h  M a r x i s t s  M. G o d e l i e r  and J .  S u r e t -  
C a n a le  h a d  p r e p a r e d  p a p e r s  on t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
S e v e n th  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n g re s s  o f  A n th ro p o lo g y  and  E th n o g ra p h y  h e l d  i n  
Moscow, A u g u s t  1964, and  t h e s e  p a p e r s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  r e p l y  from  V. S t r u v e ,  
w ere  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  j o u r n a l  Narody A z i i  i  A f r i k i  a t  t h e  b e g in n i n g  o f  
1965. S o v i e t  s c h o l a r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e m p lo y in g  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a  d i s t i n c t  
A s i a t i c  f o r m a t i o n  w ere  a b l e  t o  d i s c o v e r  from  G o d e l i e r  and  S u r e t - C a n a le  
a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  su c h  a  f o r m a t io n  w h ich  was c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
u n i l i n e a r  fram ew ork o f  S o v i e t  h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . ^  Thus:
. . . T h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  
i n  i t s  c u r r e n t  s t a g e ,  w ere  o f  t h e  o p i n io n  t h a t  by M a rx 's  
c o n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  one s h o u ld  
u n d e r s t a n d  n o t  so  much a s p e c i f i c  p a r t i c u l a r i t y  o f  t h e  
E a s t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  w orks)  a s  t h o s e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  
( z a k o n o m e r n o s t i ) c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  n e a r l y  a l l  e a r l y
F o r  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c o n f e r e n c e s  s e e  L .V . D a n i lo v a ,  'D i s k u s s i i a  d o  
v a z h n o i  p ro b le m e '  , Voprosy  I s t o r i i ,  1965 , No. 12 , p p .  1 4 9 -1 5 6 ;  O.A. A f a n a s 'e v ,  
'O b s u z h d e n ie  v I n s t i t u t e  I s t o r i i  AN SSSR p ro b lem y  " A z i a t s k i i  sposob  
p r o i z v o d s t v a " ' ,  S o v e t s k a i a  e t n o g r a f i i a ,  1965, No. 6 , p p .  122 -126 ;  L .S .  
V a s i l ' e v ,  'O b sh c h e e  i  o so b en n o e  v i s t o r i c h e s k o m  r a z v i t i i  s t r a n  V o s to k a 1,
Narody A z i i  i  A f r i k i ,  1965, No. 6 ,  p p .  9 6 -1 0 0 ;  I u .  M. G a r u s h i a n t s ,  'Ob 
a z ia t s k o m  s p o so b e  p r o i z v o d s t v a ' ,  Voprosy I s t o r i i , 1966, No. 2 ,  p p .  83 -100 ;
S .E .  K ra p iv e n s k y ,  'O s o b a ia  f o r m a t s i i  i l i  p e re k h o d n o e  s o s t a i a n i e  o b s h c h e s t v a ? ' ,  
Narody A z i i  i  A f r i k i ,  1966 , No. 2 , p p .  87 -9 0 ;  G .F . Kim and  V.N. N i k i f o r o v
e t  a l .  e d . ,  Obshchee i  o s o b e n n o i  v i s t o . i i c h e s k o m  r a z v i t i i  s t r a n  V o s to k a ,  
o p . c i t .
2
Tne P .C .F .  h a d  t a k e n  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  r e v i v i n g  th e  c o n c e p t  some y e a r s  
p r e v i o u s l y .  As e a r l y  a s  1958 S u r e t - C a n a l e , a  member o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  C om m ittee ,  
h a d  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  was i m p o s s ib l e  t o  a p p ly  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  f e u d a l  o r  s l a v e ­
owning t o  t h e  s o c i e t i e s  o f  t r o p i c a l  A f r i c a ,  and h a d  s u g g e s t e d  t h e  use  o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  A s i a t i c  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  ( L ' A f r i c u e  n o i r e  o c c i d e n t a l e  e t  
c e n t r a l e , g e o g r a p h i e , c i v i l i s a t i o n s , h i s t o i r e , P a k s ,  E d i t i o n s  s o c i a l e s ,
1958 , p .  94 . When th e  C e n t r a l  Com m ittee  s e t  up t h e  C e n t r e  d 'd t u d e s  e t  de 
r e c h e r c h e s  m a r x i s t e s  ( h e r e a f t e r  C .E .R .M .)  i n  1960 th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  
A s i a t i c  mode was i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  programme o f  t h e  O r i e n t a l  s e c t i o n ,  on th e  
s u g g e s t i o n  o f  C h a r le s  P a r a i n .  T h is  s e c t i o n  h e l d  w o rk in g  s e s s i o n s  on th e
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class societies, and which were retained over a pro­
longed period in many of the societies of Africa, Asia 
and pre-Columbian America.^
In the definition of the French Marxists and their Soviet followers, 
the Asiatic mode of production represented the original transition stage 
between classless and class society; the stage where the state had already 
come into being but private property did not yet exist. The stage was 
characterised by the existence of communal production and ownership at the 
village level, on the one hand, and by the appropriation of the surplus 
value by the state, and the existence of (state-directed) corvde labour on 
the other; economic classes did not yet exist, but there were elites 
associated with the state who performed religious, military and other 
public functions.
The broad definition of the Asiatic mode of production in general 
made it more or less a substitute for the somewhat problematic concept of 
'military democracy'.(Depicted in The Origin of the Family.,.as the 
universally occurring final phase of gentile society, illustrated for 
example by the Iroquois Confederation and Homeric Greece, a phase in which 
the institutions of public authority had taken on a certain complexity but 
class society based on private property and slavery had not yet come into 
its own.) The broad interpretation of Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode 
of production meant that it was shorn of its geographical connotations, 
and its connotations of highly developed entrepreneurial and/or bureaucratic 
activity on the part of the state. It thus became far more plausible as 
a universal stage of development to be found in the history of any given 
society.
Asiatic mode in 1962-1963, and the results began emerging in roneoed and 
published form in 1964 (the papers prepared for Moscow summarised the work 
doen by Godelier and Suret-Canale at the Centre). See Jean Chesneaux, 
'Diskussiia o ranneklassovykh obshchestvakh na stranitsakh zhumala "La 
Pensee"', Voprosy Istorii, 1967, No. 9, p. 192ff; cf. L.V. Danilova: 'At 
the present time, on the initiative of a group of French Marxist historians, 
J. Suret-Canale, M. Godelier, J. Chesneaux, C. Parain, P. Boiteau et al., 
the problem of the Asiatic mode of production has again become the subject of 
discussion'. 'Diskussiia po vazhnoi probleme', loc.cit., p. 150.
 ^ L.V. Danilova, 'Diskussiia po vazhnoi probleme', loc.cit., p. 156.
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The universalising of the concept of the Asiatic mode was exemplified
in the work of Jean Chesneaux (with whom the Western pattern became more
or less the exceptional case). Chesneaux wrote in 1964 that:
The Asiatic mode of production for the very reason that 
it has been the most general form of evolution of primi­
tive communist society, has established itself in very 
diverse regions, in societies on which both history and 
geography have imposed very different rhythms of develop­
ment. Brutally destroyed in the Mediterranean by the 
Dorian invasion at the beginning of the first millenium 
BC, liquidated by the Spanish conquest in America in the 
sixteenth century, it nevertheless continued slowly to 
evolve in countries such as China, Egypt, India, and 
Black Africa.1
During the discussion at the Institute of the Peoples of Asia 
held on the 27th and 28th of May 1965, Iu. M. Garushiants and M.A.
Vitkin in particular were to support the universalist definition of the 
Asiatic mode of production provided by the French Marxists, thus avoiding 
the multilinear implications of the definition given by the first gener­
ation of Soviet scholars working on the subject, such as E. Varga and L.I. 
Mad'iar. Vitkin argued that:
...the emphasis on the fundamental particularity of 
Asiatic history characteristic of nineteenth-century 
historiography underwent a sharp about-turn at the 
close of the century, so that the history of the East 
was assimilated to that of Europe. The particularity 
of the East was discovered to be only relative...because, 
as the latest information indicates, ancient Europe 
(Mycenae etc.) also experienced a stage similar to that 
which Marx described as characterising the ancient East.
The acceptable meaning of the Asiatic mode of production 
seems to be that it is the last stage of the primitive
J. Chesneaux, 'Le mode de production asiatique: quelques perspectives
de recherche', La Pens&e, No. 114 (Jan.-Feb. 1964), p. 53. See also J. 
Suret-Canale, 'Probldmes thdoriques le l'dtude des premieres socidtds de 
classes', Recherches internationales a la lumi&re du marxisme, No. 57-58 
(Jan.-April 1967), p. 14. For the application of the AMP concept to the 
Minoan, Etruscan, Hittite and Mycenaen civilisations see Charles Parain. 
Parain drew a parallel between the way the 'barbarian' invasions brought 
about the fall of the Roman empire and cleared the way for the development 
of a new 'higher' mode of production, and the way in which the Dorian 
invasions brought about the fall of the Mediterranean empires and cleared the 
way for the development of the new, private slave-based mode of production. 
(Charles Parain, 'Protohistoire mediterrandenne et mode de production asiat­
ique ' , La Pensee, No. 127 (May-June 1966), pp. 24-43.)
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communal formation, the transition stage to class 
society.1
Vitkin also differed from the first generation of Soviet scholars working 
on the problem, as did many of his colleagues, in the extreme caution he 
displayed in applying the term ’class' to those who expropriated the 
surplus product in the Asiatic mode of production (where private ownership 
was not yet significant).
Another departure from the views of those who supported the concept
in 1925-1931 was that according to the new definition, the Asiatic
formation had an internal dynamic, provided by the fact that its elites
would attempt to transform themselves into an economic class based on the
private ownership of the means of production (e.g. ownership of slaves
and land). The attribution of dynamic elements to the Asiatic formation
was a necessary aspect of the attempt to fit it into a universal progression.
However Marxists such as Parain, Chesneaux, Suret-Canale, Boiteau and
Godelier in France were also, in eliminating the proposition concerning
Asiatic stagnation, conscious of the need to make the hypothesis of an
Asiatic mode of production acceptable to the national sensitivities of
2third world countries. One Soviet Orientalist, who accepts the other 
elements of Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production has gone so 
far as to say that:
...it is difficult to imagine that dialecticians such 
as Marx and Engels might be parties to the possibility 
of absolute stagnation in societies of the type under 
consideration.3
M.A. Vitkin as reported by L.S. Vasil'ev, 'Obshchee i osobennoe v istorich- 
eskorn razvitii stran Vostoka', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1965, No. 6, p. 97. 
According to Vitkin,recognition of the existence of this universal stage had 
been delayed through the influence of Morgan on the Marxist analysis of 
primitive society (it was not present in Morgan's schema of development).
See M.A. Vitkin,'Podkhod k problerne aziatskogo sposoba proizvodstva', in 
G.F. Kim, V.N. Nikiforov et al. ed., Obshchee i osobennoe v istoricheskom 
razvitii stran Vostoka, op.cit., p. 104.
2 See Jean Chesneaux, 'Diskussiia o ranneklassovykh obshchestvakh na 
stranitsakh zhurnala "La Pensee"', loc.cit., p. 194.
3 L .A. Sedov, 'La societe angkorienne et le probl^me du mode de production 
asiatique', La Pensee, No. 138 (March-April 1968), p. 72.
229
However, the manner in which the French Marxists and those following
their formulation denied the proposition of Asiatic stagnation was itself
guided by criteria drawn from Western experience. Thus according to
Suret-Canale the persistence of collective property did not necessarily
mean that the Asiatic formations represented an impasse:
...their internal contradiction (collective property - 
class property) may be resolved by the dissolution of 
collective property and the appearance of private 
property.^
I.e. the French Marxists preserved Marx's viewpoint, formed under the
influence of the British political economists that the emergence of private
property was the key to progress whether in West or East.
The broad interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production as the
most primitive form of state exercised great appeal among French Marxists
in that it enabled them to find a pigeon-hole for the pre-colonial
societies of Black Africa which had resisted classification under any of
the other Marxist categories (and similarly it appealed to those Marxists
concerned with other problem areas, such as Pre-Columbian America and the 
2Pacific).
The extension of the concept to such diverse areas naturally required
considerable modification of some of the characteristics which Marx
attributed to Asiatic society: Godelier, for example, talked of two forms
3of the Asiatic mode, that with and that without 'great (public) works', 
the latter form being found in tropical Africa, where the functions giving
Jean Suret-Canale, 'Problemes theoriques de l'dtude des premieres soci£tes 
de classes', loc.cit., p. 14.
2 Apart from the bibliographical material published serially in La Pensee 
since 1964 by J. Chesneaux and M. Godelier, the bibliography attached to 
Iu. V. Kachanovsky; Rahovladenie, feodalizm ili aziatskii sposob proizvod- 
stva?, Moscow, Izd. 'Nauka', 1971, provides a consolidated index to recent 
literature on the subject.
3 M. Godelier, 'La notion de mode le production asiatique' et les schemas 
marxistes d'evolution des societes' (first published in 1964), Sur le 'mode 
de production asiatique', preface by Roger Garaudy, C.E.R.M., Paris,
Editions sociales, 1969, p. 88.
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rise to the state related to the control of trade, the protection of 
markets, etc. In the early euphoria resulting from the rediscovery of 
the concept Godelier also believed that it might provide the solution to 
the categorisation of the nomadic pastoral societies"'" - i.e., the concept 
was on the way to becoming a portmanteau classification of all societies 
which had slipped through the net of the five-stage schema.
The elimination of the geographically-specific features of the 
Asiatic mode has been one method of giving the concept universal applic­
ability and making it compatible with the unilinear schema of development.
An interesting attempt to retain the geographical specificity of the
2Asiatic mode, and its status as an independent formation, while also 
upholding the authority of the unilinear schema is to be found in the 
work of the Hungarian Sinologist Ferenc Tökei. Tökei argued that the 
Asiatic mode was essentially determined by conditions of internal and 
external isolation, which had prevented the universal laws of development 
from operating as they had done in Europe. However, according to Tökei, 
the existence of the (static) Asiatic formation by no means disproved
Ibid., p.87. Chesneaux himself, although sympathetic towards extending 
the concept to Africa, America, etc., was to warn against such an enter­
prise; the problematic area of early Mongol society was no more suscept­
ible to analysis by the Asiatic concept than by the old five-stage schema.
(J. Chesneaux, 'Diskussiia o ranneklassovykh obshchestvakh na stranitsakh 
zhurnala "La Pensee"' loc.cit., p. 194). Ernest Mandel has recently made 
a more far-reaching criticism of the tendency to extend the range of the 
concept beyond the agricultural societies of Asia and the Middle East. 
According to Mandel, 'By thus expanding the scope of the idea of the Asiatic 
mode of production (just as the 'dogmatic' Marxists who rejected this concept 
were forced to expand the scope of the idea of 'feudalism') these writers 
[Godelier, Chesneaux, Suret-Canale, Boiteau] risk losing altogether the 
specific meaning of the idea.' (E. Mandel, The Formation of the Economic 
Thought of Karl Marx, London, NLB, 1971, p. 125). Cf. also I. Sachs, 'Une 
nouvelle phase de la discussion sur les formations' (first published in 
Nowe drogi, March 1966), Recherches internationales ä la lumiere du marxisme, 
No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 1967), pp. 301-302.
2 Tökei, like the French Marxists, conceptualised the Asiatic formation as 
a transition stage from tribal to class society, but as having sufficient 
distinctive features to be regarded as an independent historical formation.
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the unilinear theory of the five stages: on the contrary, it bore
indirect witness to the operation of such a universal law. He asserted 
that despite the isolation of, for example, China, which had retarded 
its development, tendencies towards a slave stage had appeared in the 
era of antiquity, and tendencies towards feudalism had appeared in the 
middle ages. The fact that these tendencies manifested themselves (even 
in a weak form) in such an isolated society as China confirmed for Tökei 
the universal validity of the five-stage schema.^
The attempt to make the concept of the Asiatic mode of production 
compatible with the unilinear theory of history, and the tendency to 
overextend the concept (to cover all societies which had resisted classi-A
fication within the five-stage schema) are both typical of the initial 
phase of the de-Stalinisation of Marxist historiography. Marxist historians 
were eager to employ a concept, for which they now found there was ample 
authority in Marx, and which would serve to enrich the existing framework 
of Marxist historiography. But they were hesitant to explore the further 
implications of the concept, such as the implication that history was 
multilinear rather than unilinear, and that there existed other alternative 
modes of production not discussed by Marx because of his lack of inform­
ation. Hence they loosened the concept of the Asiatic mode of production 
itself rather than loosening their approach to history in general, and 
attempted to 'save' non-Westem societies from the grip of the five-stage 
schema by introducing a sixth category to accommodate all the exceptions.
F. Tökei, Sur le mode de production asiatique, Budapest, Akademiai 
Kiadö, 1966, p. 88. This line of argument may have been a ritualistic 
attempt by Tökei to come to terms with orthodoxy. It is inconsistent with 
much of the rest of his work which suggested a geographically determined 
multilinear pattern of development. For example, Tökei viewed the geo­
graphical configuration of the Japanese archipelago as serving the same 
function as the Germanic forests in inhibiting centralisation and giving 
rise to a feudal socio-economic formation. {Ibid., pp. 85-86. Cf. K.A. 
Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, New Haven, Yale U.P., p. 197.)
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The Hegelianised Version of the Unilinear Schema.
The extreme difficulty of fitting every human society into the 
unilinear schema has given rise to yet another 'saving device' within the 
unilinear view, that of treating it in a Hegelian way. According to 
Hegel, world history evolved through a certain sequence of necessary 
stages, but each stage was primarily embodied in only one nation or group 
of nations.
One reason why it seemed plausible to assert that the centre of 
human progress shifted from area to area was primarily geographical - that 
different geographical factors became of decisive importance at different 
stages of socio-economic development. The employment of this argument by 
Hegel, Mechnikov, Plekhanov and Wittfogel has been discussed in Chapter 
Three, pp. 131-133.
Another argument concerns the hypostatisation of a form of production 
in the society where it reaches its highest development. According to 
this argument, structures appropriate to a particular socio-economic 
formation, which also become associated with a period of national greatness, 
severely impede the development of structures appropriate to a later 
period.'*' Hence the next stage of human history tends to take place in a 
different arena, less cluttered with cherished institutional anachronisms.
The adoption of the 'Hegelian' version of the unilinear schema, whereby 
different societies represent the different epochs of human development, 
makes the concept of social laws governing the transition from one epoch 
to another even more difficult. There is a recurrence of the tension 
inherent in the Hegelian view of world history - i.e. world history consists
See A. Pannekoek, Weltrevolution und Kommunistische Taktik (Vienna, 1920) 
in Pannekoek et les conseils ouvriers, ed. S. Bricanier, Paris, EDI, 1969, 
p. 193. See also Antonio Gramsci on the comparative simplicity of 
making a socialist revolution in Russia, where capitalist civilisation and 
cultural hegemony was weakly developed.
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in an organic process of development through various logically necessary
stages, but within this process the leading role in some way passes
from one society or group of societies to another.^ The problem is to
demonstrate the logical relationship between the stages when the subject
of world history changes in such a manner. Nonetheless the concept of
necessary laws governing the transition between epochs has remained a
dogma within Soviet Marxism, even where the Hegelian notion of universal
2history has been most ardently embraced.
One interesting attempt to grapple with the problem of the logical 
relationship between stages of history represented by different societies 
is to be found in the work of V. Gordon Childe. Childe was concerned with 
the logical relationship between the Asiatic and ancient formations, as 
progressive stages of universal history occurring in geographically distinct 
areas. He argued that the relationship between the Middle Eastern civilis­
ations and Aegean civilisation was a symbiotic one, the surpluses accumulated
by the despotic states supporting the emergence of craft specialisation in 
3the West. The secure Eastern markets meant that bronze-age civilisation 
in the Aegean was able to reach ’take off' point without the despotic or 
centralised control of the surplus which had launched the Eastern civili­
sations. And precisely the fact that the emergence of civilisation in 
the Aegean had not depended on the leading economic role of the state 
meant that these societies had a greater potential for progress and change.
The need to discover the laws governing the development of universal history 
(i.e. the lav/s of transition from one stage to another) on the supra-societal 
level is stressed in V.N. Nikiforov, 'K voprosu ob istoricheskoi osnove 
literaturnoi periodizatsii', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1964, No. 3, pp. 86-90.
2 See for example, Iu. V. Kachanovsky, Rabovladenie, feodalizm ili 
asiatskii sposob proizvodstva?, op.cit., pp. 245-263. Kachanovsky's book 
represents the most systematic Soviet effort so far to relate the concept of 
the Asiatic mode of production to Marxist historiography, even though this 
is done from the negative standpoint that the concept is fundamentally in­
compatible with Marxist historiography.
3 V. Gordon Childe, 'The Bronze Age', Past and Present, No. 12 (Nov. 1957),
pp. 10-11.
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Childe's work has recently been utilised by the French Communist 
J.J. Goblot in a series of three articles presenting the case for a 
universal history in which objective laws of development govern the trans­
formations from one stage to another. One socio-economic formation does 
not necessarily engender the next higher formation through the logic of its 
own internal development, but it does produce the technical prerequisites 
of the next stage. Thus the 'Asiatic' civilisations of the Near East and 
the Mediterranean provided the technical basis for the development of 
Greek antiquity (on Childe's evidence) and the Roman Empire provided the 
technical basis of Northern European feudalism. In both these cases the 
development of a new, higher mode of production depended on the fusion of 
a potentially more dynamic form of social organisation, evolved within 
tribal societies external to the old civilisation with the technological 
achievements of the old civilisation.'*'
The Soviet attempt to modify in a Hegelian fashion the rigid unilinear 
schema of history was officially promulgated by a Soviet spokesman at an 
international history conference in 1960. This modification did not 
extend to the overthrow of Stalin's five-stage schema which extruded the 
Asiatic formation. But according to the statement made in 1960, the 
Germanic and Slav peoples did not pass through an epoch of slavery, for 
the reason that at the period when they were forming themselves into states, 
the full contradictions of the slave-based mode of production had already 
emerged in the Roman and Byzantine empires respectively. The 'fact' that 
the Roman and Byzantine empires represented the full working-out of slavery 
as a mode of production meant that the Germanic and Slav peoples, on emerging 
from clan society, could move straight into an economic formation based on
J.-J. Goblot, 'Pour une approche theorique des "faits de civilisation"', 
La Pensee, Nos. 133, 134, 136 (1967): see especially Part III, La Penseef
No. 136, pp. 78-88.
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t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  more p r o d u c t i v e  l a b o u r  o f  d e p e n d e n t  p e a s a n t r y . ^
I n  a s i m i l a r  v e i n ,  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o b s e rv e d  t h a t  among t h e  p e o p le s  i n c o r ­
p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  Union w ere  t h o s e  who h a d  b e e n  a b l e  t o  move s t r a i g h t  
from  t h e  f e u d a l ,  o r  even  th e  p a t r i a r c h a l  s t a g e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n t o  t h e  
s o c i a l i s t  o n e .  T h i s  was due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  o f  w o r ld  
c a p i t a l i s m  h a d  a l r e a d y  f u l l y  em erged  and  th e  s o c i a l i s t  epoch  h a d  b e e n  
u s h e r e d  i n  by t h e  t im e  t h a t  t h e s e  p e o p le s  em erged  from  t h e i r  s o c i a l  
i s o l a t i o n . ^
The above form s o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  may b e  summed up u n d e r  t h e  r u b r i c  o f  
' t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  b a c k w a rd n e s s '  -  i . e .  s o c i e t i e s  t h a t  d e v e lo p  l a t e ,  o r  
whose tempo o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  h a s  b e e n  s lo w e d  down by g e o g r a p h i c a l  o r  h i s t o r i c a l  
f a c t o r s ,  a r e  a b l e  t o  b e n e f i t  from  th e  e x p e r i e n c e  a c c u m u la te d  by o t h e r  
s o c i e t i e s .
The d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s o c i e t i e s  on t h e  p e r i p h e r y  o f  t h e  m a in s t r e a m  o f  
h i s t o r y  may a l s o ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  b a c k w a rd ­
n e s s .  Thus t h e  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n s  i n  p r o p i n q u i t y  t o  t h e
G reek  and Roman e m p i r e s  was d i s t o r t e d  by t h e  s y s t e m a t i c  rem o v a l  o f  manpower
3
and  i t s  a b s o r p t i o n  i n t o  t h e  s l a v e - b a s e d  i m p e r i a l  s y s te m s ;  and  l i k e w i s e
R e p o r t  made by E.M. Zhukov ( S e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  D i v i s i o n  o f  H i s t o r i c a l  
S c i e n c e s  o f  t h e  Academy o f  S c i e n c e s ,  U .S .S .R . )  t o  t h e  E l e v e n t h  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n g re s s  o f  H i s t o r i c a l  S c i e n c e s ,  S to c k h o lm , 1960. '0  p e r i o d i z a t s i i  v s e m i r n o i
i s t o r i i ' ,  Voprosy  I s t o r i i ,  1960, No. 8, p .  32. T h i s  l i n e  and i t s  c o r o l l a r y ,  
d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w ,  h a s  a p p e a r e d  w id e ly  among S o v i e t  h i s t o r i a n s  s u c h  a s  A.G. 
P r i g o z h i n  and  B.D. G re k o v  s i n c e  t h e  t h i r t i e s .  The e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  s l a v e r y  among th e  Germans was e l a b o r a t e d  by V.V. S t r u v e  i n  h i s  
a r t i c l e ,  'M arksovo  o p r e d e l e n i e  r a n n e k la s s o v o g o  o b s h c h e s t v a ' , S o v e t s k a i a  e t n o -  
g r a f i i a r 1940 , No. 3. B.D. Grekov drew o u t  t h e  p a r a l l e l s  b e tw e e n  t h e  i n t e r ­
a c t i o n  o f  t h e  S l a v s  w i t h  E a s t  Rome and t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  Germans w i th  
Rome i t s e l f .  (K i e v  R usf t r .  from  1949 R u s s ia n  e d i t i o n  by E. S d o b n ik o v ,  Moscow, 
F o r e ig n  L anguages  P u b l i s h i n g  H ouse , 1959, p .  3 7 ) .  G rekov summed up th e  S l a v i c  
c a s e  a s  f o l l o w s :  'A t  t h e  moment o f  t h e i r  a p p e a r a n c e  t h e  S l a v s ,  and  t h e i r  
e a s t e r n  b r a n c h  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d u r in g  th e  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p r i m i t i v e  
communal s y s te m  e n c o u n te r e d  a d e c a y in g  s l a v e - h o l d i n g  s o c i e t y .  They w ere  among 
t h e  g ro u p  o f  p e o p le s  who w ere  a b l e  t o  r e g e n e r a t e  m oribund  Europe  w i t h  t h e  a i d  
o f  t h e i r  community s y s te m .  The new p e o p le s  p o s s e s s e d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  a 
more p r o g r e s s i v e  s y s te m ,  t h e  f e u d a l  s y s t e m ' .  ( T b i d . ,  p p .  1 4 4 -1 4 5 .)
2
E.M. Zhukov, l o c . c i t . , p .  31.
3
I u .  V. K a c hanovsky , R a b o v l a d e n ie  f e o d a l i z m  H i  a z i a t s k i i  s p o s o b  p r o i z -  
v o d s t v a ? , o p . c i t . f  p .  103.
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the development of the societies on the periphery of Western Europe was 
later distorted by the effects of 'colonialism'.
As we have seen, the 'Hegelian' version of the unilinear schema puts
considerable stress on the relations between human societies, as compared
with the schema previously discussed in which the inner logic of social
development was the dominant factor.^ So that this emphasis on external
relations should not seem to enhance the role of contingency too far,
considerable effort has been devoted to creating a 'universal periodisation'
which would systematically present the dominant influence in international
relations in any given epoch. As a recent Soviet publication has expressed
it 'without calculating the leading line of a given epoch or, in other words,
without calculating the influence of the leading formation, every concrete
analysis loses its point - the description of the facts remains, but it
2becomes impossible to ascertain their laws of motion'.
According to the kind of universal periodisation described, the capit­
alist epoch of world history dates from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, and the socialist epoch from 1917. These dates are particularly 
important because the role of external influence becomes much more intense 
and generalised with the dawning of the capitalist era and the creation of 
the world market. Societies which are for the first time exposed system­
atically to external influence in these epochs are able to skip several 
stages of the five-stage schema. One aspect of Zhukov's periodisation which 
would meet with less favour today (1974) is his suggestion that the revol-
Marx himself appears to have considered such external (and contingent) 
relations to be of great importance. He lists the three possible results of 
conquest, for example, as: (a) the imposition of the mode of production of
the conquering people; (b) the preservation of the old mode of production and 
the mere imposition of a tributary relations; (c) the synthesis of the two 
modes of production. Which of these results would follow from conquest could 
not be established by any scientific law, although as seen, all of the alter­
natives are related to the modes of production in existence in the two parties 
(a negative determinism). Conquest of one people by another could not in 
itself give rise to a new mode of production,as was argued by some theorists 
of feudalism, in particular. See the Grundrisse, Introduction, pp. 97-98.
Iu. V. Kachanovsky, Rabovladenie, feodalizm ili aziatskii sposob proiz- 
vodstva?, op.cit., p. 106.
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utionary transformation from slavery to feudalism first took place in 
ancient China.^ A recent Soviet article has strongly criticised Chinese 
historiography, particularly that appearing in the journal Hung Ch'i, for 
claiming that the Asiatic nations were in the vanguard of world history until 
the fifteenth century, and for implying that the retardation of the East was 
only occasioned by the Western colonial powers. The Soviet author argues 
that on the contrary:
...In the countries of the East, the Ch'in, Khazar, Mogul,
Osmanli and other dynasties - supported by a centralised 
state apparatus - impeded the development of society; 
cultivated early feudal and pre-feudal forms of social 
relations; exhausted the strength of their peoples in 
predatory wars; destroyed the forces of production; and 
suppressed social thought. The feudal leadership of the 
absolute majority of Asiatic and African countries proved 
to be incapable of understanding the historical problems 
of the epoch - the preservationof-the independence of their 
countries. They betrayed their peoples. It was not for 
no reason that the majority of Asiatic dynasties ended up 
as the marionettes of foreign capital.'*'
Chronological and Logical Problems Associated with the Progressive 
Ranking of Socio-Economic Formations.
As seen above, 'the "Hegelian" modification of the unilinear schema 
consists essentially in viewing the schema as the pattern of world history, 
rather than as the pattern inherent in the development of every society. 
Nonetheless the 'Hegelian' version retains the standpoint that the trans­
itions between the stages are of a logically necessary character. A 
different approach to Marx's schema, which has been attempted recently, has 
been to view it as an analytic ranking of socio-economic formations, but not
E. M. Zhukov, '0 periodizatsii vsemirnoi istorii', loc.cit., p. 25.
2 F. B. Beleliubsky, 'Maoistskaia kontseptsiia vsemirnoi istorii i podlinnaia 
istoriia narodov Vostoka', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1972, No. 5, p. 64.
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as a fixed chronological sequence in which the contradictions of one 
stage necessarily give rise to the next. This approach has been 
attempted by Eric Hobsbawm and J .-J.Goblot. It is most obviously prompted 
by the fact that some societies (notably the Chinese) appear to have passed 
through several periods of feudal disintegration,^ or again not to have 
passed through certain epochs at all.
The main problem involved in the interpretation of the unilinear 
schema as an analytic ranking consists in establishing the analytic 
criteria whereby socio-economic formations are to be graded as more
progressive, or in 'crucial respects further removed from the primitive
 ^ . 2 state of man .
Hobsbawm's main criterion consists in the degree of 'economic 
individualisation' which exists in the given formation. Thus the most 
primitive socio-economic formations are those which conserve to the 
greatest degree communal forms of property, while the most advanced are 
those which contain the most elements of free labour and capital.
However the difficulty of viewing Marx's schema as an analytic rank­
ing according to this criterion is tacitly admitted by Hobsbawm himself 
when he states that
...a reversion to feudalism from formations which, 
while potentially less progressive, are in actual fact 
more highly developed - as from the Roman Empire to 
the tribal Teutonic Kingdoms - has always been allowed 
for. 3
Here Hobsbawm is admitting that the 'ancient' formation is more highly 
developed than the feudal formation, as it probably must be regarded as 
being if one employs the most common Marxist indicators, such as the
For example, the 'refeudalisation' that took place in China between 
the collapse of the Han dynasty and the Sui reunification of 589 A .D.
2 Introduction to Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1964, p. 38.
3 Ibid., p. 63.
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degree of division of labour, the level of commodity production and the 
productivity of labour in certain areas. Hobsbawm in the passage cited 
is claiming that feudalism should be ranked higher than 'ancient society' 
because it has more potential for progress. However this is less because 
the degree of economic individualisation is higher in the feudal form­
ation (Hobsbawm's analytic criterion) than because of the appearance of 
a particular urban structure within Western feudalism. Hobsbawm else­
where attempts to bridge these viewpoints by arguing that it was the 
degree of economic individualisation in the feudal countryside which made 
the system soluble, and enabled 'free labour' to be released to the 
cities, although even then he admits that this was only one of at least 
three important factors which contributed to the rise of the West 
European cities."^ Hobsbawm's ranking of feudalism above slavery really 
rests on the argument that the slave stage contains contradictions which 
lead inevitably to its collapse and not to the generation of higher 
structures within itself. The feudal formation, while based on a fairly 
primitive economy does appear to Hobsbawm to have this potential, even 
if only in the unique circumstances of Western Europe.
Hobsbawm retreats from an argument that the socio-economic formations 
represent an analytic ranking, without logically necessary connections, 
to an argument that one formation (i.e. feudalism) is more progressive than 
another because chronologically, and to some extent logically, it has 
given rise to the stage of capitalism.
The problem of attempting to view the schema of Marx's preface as 
an analytical ranking of socio-economic formations is a general one which 
extends beyond the work of Western Marxists such as Hobsbawm. It has 
been easier for Western Marxists, including Hobsbawm, to view the schema
Ibid., pp. 46-47. The others were the development of urban crafts 
and the availability of money derived from usury and trade.
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fairly flexibly, and to argue that the pre-capitalist formations are
not of the same universal nature as capitalism and socialism and hence
are not governed by the same kind of universal laws of transition.
The earlier formations may be seen as governed by specific historical
and geographical circumstances, and technological advances made in one 
rv\
stage in fact be lost in the succeeding stage owing to invasion or 
some other contingency such as the self-destroying tendencies of slave- 
based formations.^
Soviet Marxism has been far more committed to the line that Marx's 
schema represents both a chronological and an analytic summary of human 
progress, and that this progress is unidirectional. The criteria 
developed by Soviet Marxists to demonstrate that the five stages represent 
analytically more progressive stages of the development of production 
have been various. There has been a tendency to drop the criterion of 
development of division of labour, and hence of economic complexity, 
because of the complications, already suggested, with regard to the 
slave formation and feudalism. Other criteria associated with the degree 
of. development of production which have been suggested are the materials 
used in production (ranging from stone and bronze to polymers); the 
sources of energy used in production (ranging from man-power and animal 
power, through steam and electric power to nuclear and perhaps solar 
energy); and the forms taken by co-operation in labour, from the most
Although Hobsbawm does adhere sufficiently closely to the traditional 
view of historical materialism to argue that development of the forces of 
production must always ultimately result in the development of an even 
higher stage of social relations. What he is arguing against is the view 
that the formations laid down in Marx's schema are logically connected and 
must always follow one from another. Hobsbawm does want to argue, however, 
that socialism develops logically out of capitalism, where one might well 
argue that the contradictions brought about by the development of product­
ive forces within a capitalist system make the establishment of some new 
system of social relations necessary, but that only under very special 
circumstances will this result in a socialist system as Marx defined it.
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simple forms resting on the simple aggregation of individual effort to
the most articulated and complex forms of organisation.^
Kachanovsky, in the work cited above, takes the level of development
of productive forces as the basic criterion of the progressiveness of a
given epoch (i.e., in Marx's terms,the degree to which man has mastered
2the forces of nature, plus the productivity of human labour). According 
to Kachanovsky, however, two other criteria are of relatively high import­
ance. The first of these is the degree of juridical emancipation of the 
worker. This criterion correlates fairly closely with Hobsbawm's economic 
individualisation. The second is the role of class struggle in the 
economy. In the slave stage the role of class struggle in the economic 
process is posited as being insignificant, in the feudal stage much more 
important, and in the capitalist stage as being of pre-eminent importance 
in the realisation of economic laws and the determination of economic 
life. This criterion is particularly tendentious and based on an extremely 
simplistic view of the class structure of the ancient world.
The difficulty of Kachanovsky's major criterion, the development of 
productive forces, is firstly, as he himself admits, that it is extremely 
difficult to establish a comparative analysis of levels of productivity 
in different socio-economic formations. Secondly the criterion of the 
development of productive forces lends itself to any and every schema of 
history and not simply to the unilinear schema sometimes suggested by Marx. 
With Kachanovsky for example, it is used to justify the exclusion of the 
Asiatic socio-economic formation from Marxist historiography, because in 
Asiatic society the level of development of productive forces will correspond 
either to the level found in ancient society, or the level found in feudal
See E.C. Welskopf, Einleitung, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Berlin, 
1967, Part IV, cited in Kachanovsky, Rabovladenie, feodalizm ili aziatskii 
sposob proizvodstva?, op.cit., p. 86.
2 Kachanovsky, Rabovladenie, feodalizm ili aziatskii sposob proizvodstva?, 
op.cit., pp. 84-89.
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society. The criterion of development of productive forces could, however, 
with equal justification be applied to some such schema as hunting/gather­
ing, herding, subsistence farming, commodity production, industrial prod­
uction and post-industrial production.
The judging of socio-economic formations in terms of labour product­
ivity leaves out of account the factor which Marx described as central to 
the description of any socio-economic formation - i.e., the way in which 
the surplus is appropriated from the direct producers. The criterion of 
the way in which the surplus is appropriated would serve to distinguish 
sharply socio-economic formations which by the criterion of basic labour 
productivity would be classed together (i.e. the Asiatic and feudal modes, 
although co-operation results in much higher productivity in some areas in 
the former mode of production).
The Multilinear Schema of History as Found in Marx.
Marx's multilinear perception of pre-capitalist society, as discovered 
in the Grundrisse has already been discussed in Chapter Three. The dia­
grammatic summary of Marx's Grundrisse schema is repeated below for 
purposes of comparison with the other schemas of historical progress dis­
cussed in this Chapter.
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THE MULTILINEAR SCHEMA
P r i m i t i v e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Community
S l a v o n ic G erm anicRoman A s i a t i c
S la v e r y * A.M.P.
F e u d a l i s m
+ F e u d a l i s m
A.M.P.
^  C a p i t a l i s m
S o c i a l i s m
Legend
-  -  -  -  N o n - p r o g r e s s i v e ,  b u t  can d e v e lo p  i n t o
c a p i t a l i s m  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  from  p r e ­
e x i s t i n g  c a p i t a l i s t  s y s te m s .
* N o n - p r o g r e s s iv e  and s e l f - d e s t r u c t i n g .
As can  b e  s e e n  from  t h e  d ia g r a m ,  Marx b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  
o f  fo rm s o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  w h ich  h a d  e x i s t e d  i n  t h e  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  w o r ld  w ould  
be  b r o u g h t  t o  en d  by th e  u n i v e r s a l i s i n g  t e n d e n c i e s  o f  c a p i t a l i s m .  A c c o rd in g  
t o  Marx t h e  u n i f y i n g  f o r c e  o f  t h e  w o r ld  m a r k e t  w ou ld  i n e l u c t a b l y  a b s o rb  a l l  
l o c a l  p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s  and  p r e p a r e  t h e  way f o r  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  and u n i fo r m  
t r a n s i t i o n  t o  s o c i a l i s m .
. . . I t  ( th e  b o u r g e o i s i e )  com pels  a l l  n a t i o n s ,  on p a i n  o f  
e x t i n c t i o n ,  t o  a d o p t  t h e  b o u r g e o i s  mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n ;
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it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation 
into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves.
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.
The transition from the multiplicity of forms in pre-capitalist society
to the universal forms of capitalism and socialism is interpreted by the
contemporary French Marxist Jean Suret-Canale as follows:
...With the appearance of class societies this diversity of 
forms which was due to geographical .and historical circum­
stances etc., moves onto a different plane, thanks to 
class relations, expressable in a more abstract and general- 
isable form. It is only with capitalism, given the very 
nature of the productive forces on which it rests, and the 
nature of the social relations which it engenders, that 
forces of production and their corresponding relations of 
production become henceforth, in their essence, entirely 
independent of the peculiarities of the geographical and 
historical milieu. By its very nature, capitalism, as 
well as being one of the great stages of human progress, 
also assumes a universal value, destroying or reducing to 
the status of residual survivals, the previous modes of 
production. A fortiore such universality appertains to 
socialism. But one cannot project this universality of the 
last two stages of social development onto the history 
which precedes them.2
One is left with the question of whether Marx did not exaggerate the univer- 
salising force of capitalism, and whether there were not certain socio­
economic structures which,despite the impact of Western capital,were able 
to retain their homeostatic tendencies, and maintain their particularity 
into the new industrial era.
Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, MESW, Vol. I, pp. 36-37. By 
1858 Marx was more pessimistic about the rapidity with which the bourgeoisie 
would complete its universalising functions. He wrote that: 'The specific
task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, at least in 
outline, and of production based upon this world market... The difficult 
question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will
immediately assume a socialist character. Is it not bound to be crushed in 
this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement 
of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant?' (Marx to Engels, 8 Oct.
1858, MESC, p. 111.)
2 Jean Suret-Canale, 'Problemes theoriques de 1'etude des premieres societes 
de classes', loc.cit., pp. 8-9. Cf. J.-J. Goblot on the facticiously homol­
ogous character ascribed to the five stages of the Stalinist schema. Goblot, 
however, while arguing that the pre-capitalist stages are of a less universal 
nature than the capitalist stage, holds to the unilinear view of history 
according to which there is one main thread of development rather than altern­
ative forms. J.-J. Goblot, 'Pour une approche theorique des "faits de civil­
isation"', Part III, La Pensee, No. 136 (1967), p. 69.
Variations of the Multilinear Schema as Applied to Pre-Capitalist 
Societies.
Even among those Marxists accepting the equation of multilinear 
development with pre-capitalist society, and unilinear development with 
post-capitalist society,^many changes have been rung on the general theme. 
One such variation is that of Maurice Godelier, mentioned earlier in a 
slightly different context. Godelier combines the view that the Asiatic 
mode of production is an almost universally occurring transition stage (to 
class society) with the view that subsequent development is at least bi­
linear. As Godelier put it in 1964, given the specific circumstances,
2there might develop out of the Asiatic formation either slave-owning and
commodity production as in the Greco-Roman world, or feudalism and natural
3economy, as in China. The kind of feudalism which developed directly
out of the Asiatic formation, rather than out of the ruins of a slavery-
based formation lacked the dynamic tendencies of Western feudalism, being
4still marked by many of the characteristics of the Asiatic epoch. The 
following diagrams contrast the bilinear schema proposed by Godelier with 
the essentially bilinear schema suggested by Plekhanov and some of the 
participants in the first phase of the Soviet debate (1925-1931), such as 
Mad'iar and Lomakin. Whereas in the earlier schema the Asiatic mode of 
production was the raison d'etre of the bilinearity, in Godelier's schema 
the existence of the Asiatic mode of production is incidental to it.
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1 At the discussion on the A.M.P. at the Institute of Philosophy,Iu. A. Levad; 
and others accepted this equation, rejecting the Stalinist viewpoint that 
there existed 'a single sequence (liniia) of socio-economic stages for all man 
kind' and arguing that 'the unity of man's historical development only comes 
into existence at a late stage.' (L.V. Danilova, 'Diskussiia po vazhnoi 
Probleme', loc.cit., p. 154.)
Defined, as previously noted as a transition stage where communal forms 
of property, still partly based on kinship relations, coexist with early 
forms of class exploitation; the latter expressed in terms of the approp­
riation by the state of surplus value and labour from the communities.
3 M. Godelier, 'La notion de "mode de production asiatique" et les schemas 
marxistes d'evolution des societes', loc.cit., pp. 90-92.
4
Ibid., p. 92.
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DIAGRAM I
(Plekhanov, Mad’iar, Lomakin et al.)
Primitive Agricultural Community 
Slavery A.M.P.
Feudalism Reversible Tendencies to Feudalism
Capitalism
Note that the primary division into slavery and the A.M.P. corresponds to 
the two alternative accounts given in the Anti-Dühring of the genesis of 
state power.
DIAGRAM II 
(Godelier)
Primitive Agricultural Community
A.M.P.
Slavery Feudalism (of a variety
that does not give rise 
to capitalism)
Feudalism
Capitalism
More recently Godelier has tended to go beyond his bilinear schema:
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...Numerous commentators...hesitate to follow Marx when 
he uses the term 'mode of production' apropos the Celts, 
Slavs, etc. They have suggested that Marx was treating 
primarily forms of property and not modes of production, 
and that he was using the latter term with a certain 
carelessness. This is to forget that for Marx relations 
of ownership only had a real existence in a definite 
process of production and that the older the forms of 
production, the more they assumed particular local forms, 
in contrast with the uniformity of the capitalist mode 
of production. There need be no constraint about 
multiplying the number of modes of production and even 
applying this notion to transitional forms between two 
distinct modes of production.!
In the same book Godelier writes that 'all discussion of the Asiatic mode
of production hence leads further, towards the establishment of a
2multilinear theory of the evolution of societies'. At the same time
Godelier clings to his view that the Asiatic mode of production is a more
or less universally occurring transition stage between classless and 
3class societies.
He also continues to argue that real progress does not occur in the
Asiatic formation until it experiences the economic individuation achieved
4in Western societies. Thus the Asiatic formation must be ranked logically 
below the classical and feudal formations. The Asiatic formation conserves 
the immediate unity of individual and community, at the village level, 
although historically the state supersedes the kinship community as the 
ultimate controller of the means of production. Within the Asiatic form­
ation the direct producer is in a position of generalised dependence on the
state and community, rather than in a position of personal dependence on
5slave owner or feudal lord. However the position of the direct producer
M. Godelier ed., Sur les societes precapitalistes: textes choisis de
Marx, Engels, Lenine, C.E.R.M., Paris, Editions sociales, 1970, Introduction, 
p. 61, fn. 1.
2 Ibid., p. 138.
3 Ibid., p. 134.
 ^ Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 75.5
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is not such that it can develop into the kind of personal freedom (but 
economic enslavement) represented by the free labour force of capitalism.
A more convincing attempt to reconcile the multilinear treatment of 
pre-capitalist society with the stadial conception of world history is 
to be found in a joint article by the Soviet historians L.S. Vasil*ev and 
I.A. Stuchevsky, entitled 'Tri modeli vozniknoveniia i evoliutsii dokapital- 
isticheskikh obshchestv*.* 234 5 The burden of their argument is that the law 
of progressive development applied only to the following broad stages - 
primitive communal society (the primary formation of human history), pre­
capitalist class society (the secondary formation), capitalist society, and
socialism.^ At a certain point of development each of these stages must
3be replaced by the next. However the variety of forms found within the 
pre-capitalist stage, or secondary formation, of human history are not 
governed or related by the same law of progression. According to Vasil*ev 
and Stuchevsky, pre-capitalist development assumes three alternative forms,
the slave-holding, the feudal, and the Asiatic - the Asiatic form represent-
4ing a fusion of slave-holding and feudal elements. Wherever the primitve
communal constitution is in the process of disintegration,elements of
either slavery or feudalism appear, but in the Asiatic formation these
appear in conjunction with one another and hold each other in check. The
lack of dynamism of the Asiatic formation is hence attributable to the 'fact*
that within it neither the contradictions of slavery nor of feudal society
5are able to emerge in a pure form.
L.S. Vasil'ev and I.A. Stuchevsky, 'Tri modeli vozniknoveniia i evoliutsii 
dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, Voprosy Istorii, 1966, No. 5, pp. 77-90.
2 Cf. Marx to Zasulich, 8 March 1881, Third Draft: 'The secondary formation
comprises, as you must understand, the series of societies based on slavery 
and serfdom*.
3 L.S. Vasil*ev and I.A. Stuchevsky, 'Tri modeli...', loc.cit., p. 89.
4 Ibid., p. 85.
5
Ibid., pp. 84-85.
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Where the Vasil'ev and Stuchevsky article is weakest is in its attempt
to portray the Asiatic formation as merely representing a mixture of
Western forms of exploitation.1 23 Vasil'ev, as we have seen in Chapter
Two, has since gone some distance towards remedying this weakness.
He has now taken more account of Marx's view that in pre-capitalist
society, where surplus labour is not yet expropriated by purely economic
means (as through the 'free' but non-equivalent exchange of the capitalist
market), there occurs either 'direct slavery, serfdom or political depend- 
2ence', i.e., that economic exploitation by the state, as in Asia,
belongs to a different category than exploitation by private landowner or 
slaveholder and is not merely a fusion of the latter. Vasil'ev has, how­
ever, retained Marx's notion that stagnation was a structural character­
istic of the Asiatic formation, and this marks his work off from that of 
those seriously concerned to develop the concept as the cornerstone of a 
new historiography liberated from 'European' bias.
Where the Vasil'ev and Stuchevsky article does move in the direction 
of a new Marxist historiography is in its suggestion that the old Marxist 
historiography had overlooked for too long that Marx and Engels regarded 
slavery and feudalism as parallel forms of development. As a consequence 
of this oversight, according to Vasil'ev and Stuchevsky, the development 
of feudalism among the Germans and Slavs was treated in an over-simplified
fashion as the result of the preceding technical and productive advances of
3classical antiquity. The productive forces of feudalism were not necessarily,
This view is shared by Iu. I. Semenov, who argues that the non-different­
iation of these antagonistic relations of production in the Asiatic formation 
demonstrates its immaturity. See Iu. I. Semenov, 'Problema sotsi.al'no-ekonom- 
icheskogo stroia drevnego Vostoka', Narody Azii i Afriki, 1965, No. 4, pp.69-8c 
and also comments by Iu. A. Levada at the Institute of Philosophy discussion.
2 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part III, p. 400.
3 L.S. Vasil'ev and I.A. Stuchevsky, 'Tri modeli...', loc.cit., pp. 81-82.
For an example of the kind of treatment the authors are criticising see Sid 
Douglas in Marxism Today (Vol. V, Dec. 1961, p. 381) arguing that China must 
have passed through a slave stage because: 'Primitive communism cannot accumu­
late enough wealth, even when it is affluent, to make a change to feudalism 
practicable'.
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however, of a higher level than those of slavery, though they had the
1potential for being so. This potential existed within feudal relations
of production not so much because the tools of production were of a more
advanced nature, but because the direct producers had a higher stake in
production, being semi-dependent rather than completely dependent.
The potential for development created by the use of semi-dependent
labour did not depend on the contradictions of the slave-relationship
having been revealed; the emergence of feudal relations of production was
determined by the particular development of the primitive community under
2given historical and geographical circumstances. Thus the question of 
whether the primitive community would develop into feudalism or slavery 
was not related to the chronological period in which the transition to 
class society took place, or to the pre-existing level of technological
3development, but to the nature of the prior development of the community. 
This is an interesting rejection of the traditional Soviet view that 
societies which were isolated could not achieve feudalism without passing 
through a slave stage.
A different approach to the analysis of pre-capitalist societies, 
and one which opens up many of the problems associated with the new Marxist 
historiography of the non-Western world is to be found in the work of the 
Soviet historian L.A. Sedov. We have already looked at some of the views 
put forward by Sedov in 1965. Sedov has since developed an even more 
interesting framework for the analysis of 'Asiatic' societies. He has taken 
as his starting point Marx's comment that pre-capitalist economic formations 
are characterised by the appropriation of surplus value from the direct 
producers by means of extra-economic pressures (as contrasted with the
I.A. Stuchevsky, '0 pervichnykh klassovykh formatsiiakh i aziatskom 
sposobe proizvodstva' , in G.F. Kirn, V.N. Nikiforov et al. ed. , Obshchee i 
osobennoe v istoricheskom razvitii straii Vostoka, op.cit. , p. 124.
2 L.S. Vasil'ev and I.A. Stuchevsky, 'Tri moduli...', loc.cit., p. 83.
3 Ibid.
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capitalist formation where purely economic pressure is brought to bear).
He has then taken over some of the apparatus of the American structural- 
functionalists. He finds three different stages or moments of developments 
to exist within the Asiatic mode of production (which is distinguished
2from European historical development by the dominant role of the state).
Like the French Marxists mentioned earlier, he is concerned to eliminate
Marx's notion of the semper idem of the East from the concept of the
Asiatic mode of production. The first of the stages identified by Sedov
is that where the function of integration is dominant, i.e., the function
of integrating the dispersed rural communities into a social whole by means
of a state religion and associated theocratic structures. The second stage,
according to Sedov, is that where the function of pattern maintenance* is
dominant. Here the state is modelled on the family and assumes the polit-
3ical form of the patriarchal bureaucratic monarchy. The third stage in
Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part III, p. 400; Capital Vol. Ill, p. 791 
Here Marx cites only the role of force in the appropriation of surplus value 
in pre-capitalist formations, but elsewhere he discusses the role of sacred 
authority.
2 See L .A . Sedov, 'La societe angkorienne et le probleme du mode de product­
ion asiatique', loc.cit., pp. 75-76. As Sedov wrote elsewhere: 'It is
quite obvious that one cannot compare these secondary class structures with 
feudalism of the European type, which in the course of further development 
could give rise to capitalism'. The state retains its dominant role in the 
exploitation of the people and the distribution of the surplus produce in 
spite of the appearance of private property and elements of slavery and 
feudalism. Status is still determined primarily by position in the service 
hierarchy. Hence 'the changes and progress which took place in South-East 
Asia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were only in the order of 
evolution within the framework of the "Asiatic mode of production", seen as 
that type of social structure within which stages can be distinguished 
distinct from the formations observed in Europe'. (M.G. Kozlova, L.A. Sedov,
V .A. Tiurin, 'Tipy ranneklassovykh gosudarstv v Iugo-Vostochnoi Azii',
Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestva, Kniga 1, ed. L.V. Danilova 
et al., Moscow, Izd. 'Nauka', 1968, p. 545.)
3 Sedov discusses in detail the existence of stages one and two in Cambodian 
history of the Angkor and post Angkor periods. Cf. M. Godelier: 'To set
forth a theory of the differentiated development of societies is therefore at 
the same time to set forth a scientific theory of kinship, of politics and of 
ideology. It means being ready to recognise that in certain conditions kin­
ship is the economy - or that religion can function directly as the relations 
of production'. (Preface to Sur les societes precapitalistes, ed. M. Godelier 
op.cit., p. 141.
* This phrase is rendered in English in the text.
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Sedov's typology is that where the function of mobilisation is dominant, 
whether for military purposes, or to subserve ideological and economic 
competition with other states. In this stage the structures of the state 
are modelled on political or military organisation. The concept of a 
'mobilisation' stage (a concept which derives from David Apter) within the 
framework of a characteristically 'Asiatic' political economy implicitly 
extends the chronological range of the Asiatic mode of production into the 
era of industrialisation. As we will see later this step has been explicitly 
taken by certain non-Soviet Marxists.
Overall, Sedov is making the point that in pre-capitalist or non- 
capitalist formations the organising principle of society may be the family, 
politics or religion. In these formations the economic sub-system is not 
separated out from the socio-political matrix in the distinctive fashion 
found in capitalism, and the priorities of social production do not stop 
short at 'purely economic' desiderata such as the maximisation of individual 
or social wealth. The function of pattern maintenance, for example, may 
actively militate against the accumulation of wealth.
The idea of kinship structure as the organising principle of primitive 
society is to be found in the views expressed by Marx and Engels after 
they came under the influence of Morgan's anthropology. Marx and Engels 
adopted Morgan's proposition that the mode of production dees not directly 
engender the forms of social organisation found in primitive society but 
rather that the structure of the family, or kinship structure, develops 
according to its own specific structural laws. These include the progress­
ive development of incest taboos etc.. Such independently evolving kinship 
structures played a dominant role in organisation of social life. Thus 
Engels wrote to Marx in 1882 that the amazing similarity between the Germans 
described by Tacitus and the American Redskins, despite their completely 
different modes of production, the American Indians lacking animal husbandry 
or agriculture, 'just proves that at this stage the mode of production is
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less decisive than the degree to which the old blood bonds and the old 
mutual community of the sexes in the tribe have been dissolved'.^
The emphasis on kinship structure to be found in contemporary Marxist 
anthropologists reflects the influence of Levi-Strauss and recent structur­
alist theory. Levi-Strauss has said that in primitive societies the rules 
of kinship and marriage 'have an operational value equal to that of 
economic phenomena in our own society'.^
However, while modern structuralist theory incorporates the idea of
the dominant role of kinship, it excludes other aspects of Morgan's anthro-
3pology which were accepted by Marx and Engels. For example, there is a 
complete rejection of the kind of evolutionist anthropology found in Morgan, 
according to which social structures can be ranked on an evolutionary 
scale. Modern structuralists have concerned themselves with the way differ­
ent societies have achieved the satisfactory communication of women, inform­
ation and goods. Allowance is made for the fact that incompatibilities may 
arise between the sub-systems of society, which may cause the breakdown of 
the existing system,but this process is not described in an evolutionary 
manner. Nor is the economic sub-system seen as the most dynamic element 
in society, the element most likely to give rise to discontinuities in the 
rest of the system.
Engels to Marx, 8 Dec. 1882, Werke, Vol. 35, p. 125. Engels has been 
subjected to Marxist 'correction' on this point. He has been criticised for 
not consistently applying the principles of historical materialism to the 
organisation of primitive society and for seeing the development of the family 
as an independently determining factor. 'In reality, however, the forms of 
the family were also always dependent on the conditions of production'. See 
I. Sellnow, 'Die Grundprinzipien einer Periodisierung der Urgeschichte', 
Völkerforschung, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1954, p. 161.
2 Claude Levi-Strauss, interview in TeiiK)ignage chretien, 8 April 1968, p. 18, 
quoted in Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and 'Primitive Societies', tr. M. Klopper, 
N.Y., Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 139. Some Marxist anthropologists would 
argue that in many primitive societies it is not so much kinship as the 
accumulation of support value (the 'big man' relationship) which is the 
dominating principle.
3 One aspect of Morgan's anthropology which is now rejected by both Marxists 
and non-Marxists is the idea of a universal transition from matrifocal to 
patrifocal forms of social organisation.
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Most M a r x i s t s  who have  i n c o r p o r a t e d  a s p e c t s  o f  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  t h e o r y  in
t o  t h e i r  work w o u ld ,h o w e v e r ,  a rg u e  t h a t  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  means o f
p r o d u c t i o n  does  e v e n t u a l l y  a s s e r t  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  th e  r e s t  o f  s o c i e t y
by g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  s o c i a l  t a s k s  w h ich  c a n n o t  b e  f u l f i l l e d  w i t h i n  t h e
k i n s h i p  s t r u c t u r e s . '* '  New s p e c i a l i s e d  s t r u c t u r e s  th e n  a r i s e  w hich  e x p r e s s
th e m s e lv e s  a s  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
M a r x i s t s  i n  g e n e r a l  h av e  a l s o  r e s e r v e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  ju d g e  s o c i e t i e s
on an e v o l u t i o n a r y  s c a l e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e
2
e x t e r n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T here  a r e  e x c e p t i o n s  t o  t h i s ,  f o r  exam ple  among
t h o s e  i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  e c o l o g i c a l  s c h o o l .  Such a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  a n a ly s e
s o c i e t i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  a d a p t a t i o n  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e n v i r o n m e n t ,
r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  assum ed 'm a s t e r y 1 234 o v e r  i t ,  a  m a s te ry  w h ich
3
i s  l i a b l e  t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  im b a la n c e s  i n  t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  s y s te m .
C e r t a i n  p ro b le m s  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
a n th r o p o lo g y  i n t o  M a r x i s t  t h e o r y  r e m a in  u n r e s o l v e d .  The m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  o f  
t h e s e  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  t h e  d o m in a n t  r o l e  o f  k i n s h i p  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
and  u l t i m a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  by t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  m a t e r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  I f  
t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  k i n s h i p  o r g a n i s a t i o n  ( f o r  ex am p le ,  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  ex ch an g e  o f  women) m i l i t a t e  a g a i n s t  i n v e s t ­
m ent i n  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h a t  i s  i f  o t h e r  w e a l th  i s  s q u a n d e r e d  b u t  an 
o r d e r l y  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  women, as  t h e  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e ,  t a k e s  p la c e ,  how can  
t h e  demands o f  p r o d u c t i o n  be  s e e n  as  t h e  u l t i m a t e l y  d e t e r m i n in g  f a c t o r  ? 
G o d e l i e r ' s  a p p ro a c h  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  t o  s e e k  t h e  r e a s o n  why a c e r t a i n
s t a g e  o f  econom ic  d e v e lo p m en t  s h o u ld  d i c t a t e  t h e  dom inance  o f  k i n s h i p
4
r e l a t i o n s  o r  p o l i t i c o - r e l i g i o u s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y .
^ P r e f a c e  t o  Sur l e s  s o c i e t e s  p r e c a p i t a l i s t e s , e d .  M. G o d e l i e r ,  o p . c i t . ,  
p .  140.
2
See E . J .  Hobsbawm, 'K a r l  M a rx 's  C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  H i s t o r i o g r a p h y ' ,  i n  I d e o l  
ogy  i n  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e ,  e d .  R. B la c k b u rn ,  London, F o n ta n a ,  1972, p p .  2 7 5 -2 7 7 .
3
S e e ,  f o r  ex a m p le ,  M a r s h a l l  S a h l i n s ,  S t o n e  Age E conom ics , C h ic a g o ,  A l d i n e -  
A t h e r t o n ,  1972.
4
M. G o d e l i e r ,  R a t i o n a l i t y  and I r r a t i o n a l i t y  i n  E conom ics , t r .  B r ia n  P e a rc e  
London, NLB, 1972, p .  i x .
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The usual reason given for why kinship structures decay and are replaced 
by competing economic classes and a state structure is that an intensifi­
cation of agriculture takes place, for population or other reasons.^ This 
brings about an increase in economic inequalities and a solidifying of 
economic classes. The state structure becomes necessary to deal with the 
increased quantum of social conflict generated by the economic different­
iation now established. In this case economic imperatives have come to 
exercise both an ultimately determining and a dominant role in the structur­
ing of society.
However, where communal ownership or possession continues to exist 
side by side with a territorially-based state organisation, as in the 
different types of Asiatic formation discussed by Sedov, economic imperatives 
do not assume this distinct and dominant role. In these cases the (as yet 
un-class-divided) society requires a strong centralised body to conduct 
certain large-scale public works or to deal with certain military exigencies. 
(The need to control trade and safeguard a central market seems to be part 
of a specifically African model, rather than to be an aspect of a universal 
'Asiatic' model pace the French Marxists.) In order to perform these tasks 
the state has to achieve the integration of the society under the umbrella 
of its common politico-religious authority. This authority assumes a 
dominant role in the society, and is the means by which the surplus is 
expropriated from the direct producers for redistribution to other sectors 
performing state functions. As mentioned earlier, the maximisation of 
social wealth through, for example, technical innovation and the emergence 
of entrepreneurial groups^may be actively discouraged in these societies, 
as in all pre-capitalist societies.
1 See my Note on the Population Factor, pp. 151-155.
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A c c o rd in g  t o  Sedov , t h e  d o m in a n t  p a t t e r n  o f  s t a t e  a u t h o r i t y ,  and  
h e n c e  t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  a l l  o t h e r  s o c i a l  and econom ic  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i l l  
depend  on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c r i s i s  t h e  s o c i e t y  i s  g o in g  th ro u g h  i n  c o n n e c t io n  
w i t h  i t s  i n t e r n a l  and  e x t e r n a l  m a in te n a n c e .  Hence a m u l t i l i n e a r  p a t t e r n  
i s  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s .
The Dynamics o f  Modernisation in  the Don-Western World: Towards a Dew
M arxist H istoriography .
A lth o u g h  t h e  m u l t i l i n e a r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t y  
s t r e n g t h e n e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  by t h e  new i n t e r e s t  i n  M a rx 's  G r u n d r i s s e  (and  
d e v e lo p e d  c r e a t i v e l y  by a num ber o f  M a r x i s t s  w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  
t o o l s  b o r ro w ed  from  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s )  p r o v i d e s  a  more s a t i s f a c t o r y  
fram ew ork  o f  a n a l y s i s  t h a n  th e  u n i l i n e a r  schema p r e v i o u s l y  a t t r i b u t e d  to  
Marx, i t  i s  s t i l l  t i e d  t o  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s  and  a t t i t u d e s  w h ich  a n c h o r  i t  i n  
t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y . W hile  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e  s t a g n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  A s i a t i c  f o r m a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  e l i m i n a t e d ,  M a rx 's  c e n t r a l  t h e s i s  t h a t  
p r o g r e s s  to w a rd s  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  i s  d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  
communal form s o f  economy i n  f a v o u r  o f  p r i v a t e  o w n e r s h ip  h a s  b e e n  r e t a i n e d .  
A c c o rd in g  t o  M a rx 's  f o r m u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  G r u n d r i s s e , n o n -W e s te m  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  
f o r m a t i o n s  w ere  i n c a p a b l e  o f  d e v e lo p in g  to w a rd s  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  w i t h o u t  
a  f u n d a m e n ta l  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e .  On h i s  view i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  p r e ­
r e q u i s i t e  o f  s o c i a l i s m ,  was i t s e l f  made p o s s i b l e  o n ly  by t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
t h e  fo rm s o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o p e r t y  found  i n  t h e  W e s t ;^  n o n -W e s te rn  s o c i e t i e s
I t  h a s  f r e q u e n t l y  b e e n  o b s e rv e d  t h a t  f o r  Marx i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  was synonym­
o u s  w i t h  c a p i t a l i s m  and h e n c e  he  t e n d e d  t o  v iew h i s t o r y  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  -  i . e . ,  i n c r e a s i n g  i n d i v i d u a t i o n .
As Marx h i m s e l f  s a i d :  'W hat i s  c a l l e d  h i s t o r i c a l  e v o l u t i o n  depends  i n
g e n e r a l  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l a t e s t  form  r e g a r d s  e a r l i e r  ones  as s t a g e s  i n  
t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  i t s e l f  and c o n c e iv e s  them a lw ays  i n  a o n e - s i d e d  m a n n e r . . . '  
(Marx, C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  C r i t i q u e  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, o p . c i t . ,  p .  2 1 1 .)  
M a rx 's  own w ork , d e s p i t e  h i s  i m p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a
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had to become Westernised, before they could progress in the direction of 
socialism. Thus the multiplicity of forms of development in the pre­
capitalist era had to give way to a uniformity in the capitalist and post­
capitalist epochs.
One limited revision of Marx's Grundrisse schema, which is in line 
with Lenin's so-called 'law of uneven development' is the argument that 
development may be multilinear up until the socialist stage rather than 
only up until the capitalist stage; that the world market may still not 
have dissolved certain pre-capitalist economic formations by the time that 
they come under the influence of socialist systems. These socialist systems 
will still themselves have depended on the prior development of capitalism 
in Europe, but they will to some extent take the place of capitalism as 
the vehicle of change and as the model for industrialisation and modernis­
ation. Thus the multiplicity of historical forms of development is only 
transcended with the achievement of socialism.
A more drastic revision of Marx's Grundrisse schema consists in the 
argument that the existence of alternative forms of historical development 
in, for example, Europe and Asia gives rise to alternative forms of the 
development of socialism. According to this argument the traditional 
economic role of the state in the Asiatic mode of production lends itself 
to a state-initiated industrialisation process.'*’ The traditional forms of 
village co-operation likewise present less obstacles to the development of 
a planned economy than the highly developed forms of private property found
multiplicity of historical paths, bore witness to the all-pervasive influence 
of the evolutionary paradigm in nineteenth-century social science. There was 
a tension in his work between the idea that different forms of social organi­
sation represented real alternatives and the idea that different forms of 
social organisation merely represented different stages of a universal histor 
ical progression (stages through which Western Europe had already passed).
 ^ See for example B. McFarlane and S. Cooper, 'The Asiatic Mode of Product­
ion - An Economic Phoenix?', The Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 
(Sept. 1966), pp. 27-43.
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in Western Europe.
Thus the Asiatic formation may retain its distinctive structure and 
characteristics while undergoing the process of modernisation and industrial­
isation. The village communities retain their economic autarchy and 
continue to hand over their surplus value to the state. The state now 
uses part of this surplus value to subsidise industrialisation, and the 
structure of state functionaries is supplemented by the managerial and 
technical cadres associated with industrialisation. The symbolic attributes 
of the tutelary Asiatic state, embodied usually in _a paternalistic 'head of 
state', provide continuity into the modem age and modify the disruption 
engendered by the industrialisation process.
According to the argument of Sencer Divit^ioglu, whose economic model 
of the Asiatic mode of production will be reproduced below in a modified 
form, the basic dynamic of the Asiatic formation is provided by two classes, 
the state functionaries, and the people. The traditional state function­
aries have a class interest in preventing the development of a capitalist 
class and a capitalist system in the process of industrialisation, as this 
would threaten their own position.'1' Nonetheless Divit^ioglu points out 
that the 'Asiatic' form of industrialisation cannot give rise to popular
socialism (i.e., the Marxist conception of socialism) as contrasted with
2tutelary socialism until the class of functionaries is abolished and the 
state becomes identified with the people as a whole. One might add that 
even then the relationship between the individual and the collectivity 
is likely to differ from that in the West where individualism has played 
a larger historical role.
Sencer Divitgioglu, 'Essai de modeles economiques ä partir du M.P.A.', 
Recherches internationales h la lumiere du marxisme, No. 57-58 (Jan.-April 
1967), pp. 288-289.
Divitgioglu himself uses the expression 'tutelary state .2
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Divit^ioglu's diagrams'*' firstly of the structure of the Asiatic mode 
of production in the pre-industrial phase, and secondly of the structure 
as modified during contact with industrial countries and during the 
industrialisation process, are as follows:
1 Ibid.f pp. 279, 286.
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The idea illustrated in Divitcioglu's diagrams, that 'Asiatic' 
society may retain its basic structure while undergoing industrialisation, 
implies a complete rejection of Marx's thesis that the Asiatic form of 
political economy was incapable of generating anything approximating 
modem industrial development. According to Marx, the role of Western 
capital in breaking down the old structure of Asiatic society and providing 
the conditions for development in its own image was an essential element 
of the universal progress towards socialism. The notion that (contrary to 
Marx's beliefs) industrialisation and capitalism, may be logically and 
historically separable has given rise to an interesting change of termin­
ology in Marxist writing. One finds scholars such as Sedov discussing 
'pre-industrial' societies rather than 'pre-capitalist' societies, implying 
that capitalism does not denote a universal stage of development whereas 
industrialisation does.^
To sum up then, Marx's perception of the dynamics of development in 
the non-Western world, together with some of the variations discussed in 
this essay, are illustrated in the following diagrams.
L.A. Sedov, '0 sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh tipakh razvitiia', G.F. Kim, 
V.N. Nikoforov et al.r ed., Obshchee i osobennoe v razvitii stran Vostoka, 
o p . c i t pp. 49-50.
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DIAGRAM I
THE STALINIST FIVE STAGE UNILINEAR SCHEMA
West East
Communalism Communalism
Slavery Slavery
FeudalismFeudalism
Capitalism; Capitalism
SocialismSocialism
Legend
= Buds or germs of capitalism which would have evolved independently 
into capitalism but for the impact of Western imperialism.
DIAGRAM II
MARX'S GRUNDRISSE MULTILINEAR SCHEMA
West East
CommunalismCommunalism
Slavery Feudalism A.M.P.
+ CapitalismCapitalism;
Socialism Socialism
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DIAGRAM III
THE HEGELIAN VERSION OF THE UNILINEAR MARXIST SCHEMA
West East
Communalism
A.M.P.
Slavery-
Feudalism
Capitalism
Socialism
N .33. The geographical location of the centre of world history constantly 
shifts.
DIAGRAM IV
A NON-EUROPO-CENTRIC VERSION OF DIAGRAM II
West East
Communalism Communalism
lavery Feudalism A.M.P.
Capitalism A.M.P.
[Tutelary socialism]
Socialism Popular
Socialism?
N.B. The Asiatic mode of production in this instance is conceived of as a 
dynamic structure capable of sustaining modernisation and industrial­
isation.
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The first two diagrams are basically Europo-centric. Diagram I 
posits that the non-Westem world would have developed capitalist and 
socialist stages independently, if it were not for the intervention of 
Western capitalism, which for some reason developed faster than Eastern 
capitalism. But all the categories employed in this diagram are basically 
derived from the study of European history. Nonetheless Asian communist 
parties such as the Chinese, through spokesmen such as Kuo 
Mo-jo, have been particularly anxious to validate Diagram I, by means of 
archeological commissions etc..
Diagram II is, if anything, more Europo-centric than Diagram I. It 
posits an alternative non-Westem form of historical development but this 
lacks any dynamic element. Progress is brought to the East for the first 
time in the form of capitalism introduced from outside, and only capitalism 
leads, through its own contradictions, on to socialism.
Diagram III posits socialism as arriving first in the non-Westem 
world, partly by reasons of the 'advantages of backwardness'. The fact 
that the preceding stages have reached their full flowering in the West 
means that the dialectical antithesis to capitalism tends to arise 
externally to the societies of Western Eufpp.e (i.e. the countries of the 
third world represent the internal contradiction of capitalism, they are 
'proletarian countries'). This is the theory of the 'retarding lead'.
Diagram IV has the advantage of being less Europo-centric than 
Diagrams I and II, and on the other hand, not involving the logical problem 
of perceiving world history as a unitary organic process. According to 
Diagram IV modernisation and industrialisation can take place with less 
dislocation and violent structural change than was necessary in the trans­
ition between feudalism and capitalism in the West, or between capitalism 
and socialism. Diagram IV, with its basic structural continuity between 
the A.M.P. and tutelary socialism stages confirms Marx's belief that the 
structures of Asiatic society were extremely cohesive and resistant to change.
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On the other hand it contradicts Marx's notion that economic development 
or industrialisation could not take place within the structures of 
Asiatic society.
The argument that certain social structures (for example the Asiatic) 
are basically more resilient than others in the context of rapid economic 
development does not entail the view that modernisation would necessarily 
have been initiated in the 'Asiatic' societies without the impact of 
Western capitalism and Western industrialisation. Nor does it deny that 
the impact of Western capitalism on 'Asiatic' societies may have been so 
strong as to foreclose the possibility of the kind of structural continuity 
sketched above. The implications of the concept of the Asiatic mode of 
production for contemporary Marxism lie in the realm of an enhanced under­
standing of the complexities of the historical process.
The functions of the model of an Asiatic mode of production in 
contemporary Marxist historiography have been to stimulate a new heuristic 
approach to Marxism as a theory of world history, and to strengthen the 
view that history is to be regarded as prima facie open, and not as a 
closed and unitary process governed by immutable general laws determining 
its movement towards a single goal.'*'
This does not mean a rejection of Marx's general view of social 
dynamics, the view that social structures appropriate to one level of 
economic development are liable to become a fetter on further development 
and subject to revolutionary change. It does mean a rejection of Marx's 
Western European perspective, and a recognition that non-European forms of 
historical development may have their own dynamics, which although over­
shadowed during the rapid industrial expansion of Western Europe in the
The openness of history is in principle a separate point from whether 
all of history follows a European pattern, but the recognition of diverse 
patterns of historical development has in fact coincided with and to some 
extent given rise to the tendency to treat history as open.
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nineteenth century are now reasserting themselves in the form of self- 
proclaimed non-Western paths of development.
In the context of Europe itself,the stress on the openness of history 
is linked with the idea that although the development of productive 
forces will invariably affect the forms of social organisation, the achieve­
ment of the kind of socialist society which Marx foreshadowed will depend 
largely on subjective factors centring on social choice, social consciousness 
and social struggle. As these factors are deeply affected by the particular 
historical matrix in which they operate, the new approach assumes that the 
multiplicity of forms of social organisation which Marx attributed to the 
pre-capitalist era will continue into the future. The spread of industrial 
technology through the operation of the world market is no longer depicted 
as necessarily giving rise to the spread of a single form of social 
organisation. The assumption of unity has given way to an assumption of 
plurality, which expresses itself both in a more flexible historiography 
and in more flexible political and social policies.
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